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

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HISTORY

OF THE

CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE

OF

FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.

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FORMING A SEQUEL TO

"THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION."

BY

M. A. THIERS,

LATE PRIME MINISTER OF FRANCE,

MEMBER OF THE FRENCH ACADEMY, AND OF THE INSTITUTE,

&c. &c. &c.

TRANSLATED BY

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WITH THE SANCTION AND APPROVAL OF THE AUTHOR.

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
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HISTORY

OF

THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE

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BOOK V.

HELIOPOLIS.

In August, 1799, general Bonaparte, being decided by news from Europe to leave Egypt suddenly, ordered admiral Ganteaume to send out of the harbour of Alexandria the frigates La Muiron and La Carrère, the only ships left after the destruction of the fleet, and to cast anchor in the little roadstead of the Marabout. It was there, about two leagues westward of Alexandria, that he purposed to embark. He took with him generals Berthier, Lannes, Murat, Andréossy, Marmont, and the two men of science to whom he was more attached than to any of the others belonging to the expedition, Monge and Berthollet. On the 22nd of August (5th Fructidor, year VII.), he proceeded to the Marabout, and precipitately embarked, in constant apprehension lest the English squadron should make its appearance. The horses on which the party rode thither, being left upon the beach, galloped back to Alexandria. The sight of these horses, completely saddled, but without riders, excited a sort of alarm; it was supposed that some accident had befallen some of the officers of the garrison, and a detachment of cavalry was despatched from the entrenched camp. Presently, a Turkish

groom, who had been present at the embarkation, explained what had happened, and Menou, who alone had been initiated into the secret, made known in Alexandria the departure of general Bonaparte, and the appointment which he had made of general Kléber to succeed him. The latter had an appointment to meet him at Rosetta, on the 23rd of August, but general Bonaparte was so hurried to embark, that he had gone the day before. Besides, in imposing upon Kléber the heavy burden of the command, he was better pleased to leave him an absolute order, which admitted of neither objection nor refusal.

This intelligence caused a painful surprise throughout the army. At first, it was discredited; general Dugua, commandant of Rosetta, had it contradicted, not believing it himself, and fearful of the bad effect which it was likely to produce. However, it was not possible to doubt long, and Kléber was officially proclaimed the successor of general Bonaparte. Officers and soldiers were in consternation. It had needed the ascendency exercised over them by the conqueror of Italy to draw them after him into distant and unknown countries, and it had needed all his ascendency to keep them there. Regret for home is a passion, which becomes violent, when the distance and the novelty of places, and fears founded on the uncertainty of return, concur to irritate it. In Egypt, this passion frequently burst forth in murmurs, sometimes in suicide. But the presence of the commander-in-chief, his language, his incessant activity, dispelled these gloomy vapours. Well knowing how to occupy himself, and how to occupy others, he captivated their minds to the highest point, and either dissipated around him, or prevented the generation of, those irksome feelings to which he was altogether a stranger. The men often said to themselves that they should never see France again, that they should never recross the Mediterranean, especially now that the fleet had been destroyed at Aboukir; but general Bonaparte was there; with him they could go anywhere, find their way back to their country, or make a new country for themselves. With his departure, the aspect of things was totally changed. The intelligence of it came, therefore, like a thunderbolt. The most opprobrious epithets were applied to this departure. They did not consider that irresistible impulse of patriotism and ambition, which, on the news of the disasters of the Republic, had urged him to return to France. They perceived only the forlorn state in which he left the unfortunate army, which had felt sufficient confidence in his genius to follow him. They said to themselves that he must then have convinced himself of the imprudence of that enterprise, of the impossibility of its success, since he had run away, and relinquished to others what seemed to him thenceforward impracticable. But to sneak off alone, leaving beyond sea those whom he had thus compromised, was cruelty, nay, cowardice, said some traducers; for he always had some, and

very near to his person, even in the most brilliant epochs of his career.

Kléber was not fond of general Bonaparte, and endured his ascendency with a sort of impatience. If he restrained himself in his presence, he indulged elsewhere in unbecoming expressions. A grumbler and whimsical man, Kléber had ardently desired to accompany the expedition to Egypt, that he might get out of that state of disgrace in which he had been left to live under the Directory; and he was now sorry that he had quitted the banks of the Rhine for the banks of the Nile. With a weakness unworthy of his character, he allowed that feeling to betray itself. This man, so great in danger, gave way to it as much as the meanest of his soldiers could have done. The chief command did not counterbalance the necessity of remaining in Egypt, for he was not fond of commanding. Encouraging the discontent against general Bonaparte, he committed the fault, which would deserve to be called criminal, had it not been repaired by heroic actions, of contributing himself to produce in the army an impression which soon became general. After his example, every body began to say, that they could not stay any longer in Egypt, and must absolutely return to France at all hazards. Other feelings mingled with this passion for return, to subvert the spirit of the army, and to produce in it the most mischievous dispositions.

An old rivalry then divided, and long continued to divide, the officers who had belonged to the armies of the Rhine and of Italy. They were jealous of one another, each class pretending to carry on war in a different and a superior manner; and, though this rivalry was repressed by the presence of general Bonaparte, it was the principal cause of the diversity of their opinions. All who had come from the armies of the Rhine showed but little partiality for the expedition to Egypt; on the other hand, the officers originally attached to the army of Italy, though sorry to be so far distant from France, were favourable to that expedition, because it was the work of the general-in-chief. After his departure, all restraint was thrown off. Kléber's partisans rallied tumultuously around him; they loudly repeated with him what, it is true, began to be the conviction of every one, that the conquest of Egypt was a mad undertaking, which ought to be abandoned as soon as possible. This opinion, however, found dissentients; some generals, such as Lanusse, Menou, Davout, Desaix in particular, dared to express other sentiments. The army was thenceforward split into two parties; the one was called the colonist, the other the anti-colonist party. Unluckily, Desaix was absent. He was completing the conquest of Upper Egypt, where he was fighting brilliant battles, and governing with admirable wisdom. His influence, therefore, could not be opposed at that moment to Kléber's. To crown the misfortune, he was not to remain in Egypt.

General Bonaparte, wishing to have him about his person, had committed the fault of not appointing him commander-in-chief, and had left orders for him to return very soon to Europe. Desaix, whose name was universally cherished and respected in the army, whose administrative talents equalled his military talents, would have governed the colony most ably, and would have avoided all those weaknesses to which Kléber gave way, at least for a moment.

Kléber, however, was the most popular of the generals among the soldiery. His name was hailed by them with entire confidence, and somewhat cheered them for the loss of the illustrious commander who had just left them. The first impression once past, their minds, though they had not recovered their wonted tone, acquired more calmness and justice. Other language was used: they said to themselves that, after all, it behoved general Bonaparte to fly to the succour of France when in danger; and that, the army once established in Egypt, the best thing he could do for it was to go to Paris, to represent strongly its situation and its wants, and to claim that assistance which he alone could extort from their supine rulers at home.

Kléber returned to Cairo, assumed the command with a sort of ostentation, and took possession of the fine Arabian mansion which his predecessor had occupied in the Ezbekyeh Place. He displayed a certain pomp, not so much to gratify his own taste, as to make an impression on the Orientals, and resolved to cause his authority to be felt, by exercising it with vigour. But it was not long before the solicitudes of the chief command, which were insupportable to him, the new dangers with which the Turks and the English threatened Egypt, and the grief of exile, which was general, filled his soul with the most gloomy discouragement. A report of the state of the colony having been made to him, by his order, he addressed to the Directory a despatch full of errors; and accompanied it with a report of Poussielgue's, administrator of the finances—a report in which things were represented in the most false, and especially the most inculpatory light, in regard to general Bonaparte.

In this despatch and report, dated the 26th of September (4th Vendémiaire, year VIII.), general Kléber, and Poussielgue, the administrator, stated that the army, diminished by one half, was at this moment reduced to about 15,000 men; that it was nearly naked, which in that climate was extremely dangerous on account of the difference of temperature between day and night; that they were in want of cannon, muskets, projectiles, powder, all which things it was difficult to replace, because cast iron, lead, timber for building, and materials for making gunpowder, were not to be had in Egypt; that there was a considerable deficit in the finances, for the sum of 4,000,000 (of francs) was due to the soldiers for pay, and 7,000,000 or 8,000,000 to the contractors for various supplies; that the resource of levying

contributions was already exhausted, the country being ready to rise, if new ones were imposed; that, the inundation having been scanty this year, and the crops being thus likely to prove deficient, the Egyptians would be alike destitute of the means and the will to pay the tax; that dangers of all kinds threatened the colony; that the two old chiefs of the Mamelukes, Murad Bey and Ibrahim Bey, still maintained their ground, the one in Upper Egypt, the other in Lower Egypt; that Djezzar, the celebrated pasha of Acre, was about to send to the Turkish army a reinforcement of 20,000 excellent soldiers, the former defenders of St. Jean d'Acre against the French; that the grand-vizir himself, having set out from Constantinople, was already in the environs of Damascus, with a powerful army; that the Russians and the English were to join a regular force to the irregular forces of the Turks; that, in this extremity, they had but one resource left, namely, to treat with the Porte; and that, general Bonaparte having set the example, and given express authority in the instructions left for his successor, an attempt was about to be made to negotiate with the grand-vizir a mixed domination, by means of which the Porte should occupy the open country of Egypt, and levy the miri or land-tax, while France should occupy the towns and the forts, and levy the revenue of the customs. Kléber added, that the commander-in-chief had seen the crisis approaching, and this was the real motive for his precipitate departure. M. Poussielgue concluded his report with a calumny: general Bonaparte, when he left Egypt, had, he said, carried away two millions. To complete this picture, it should be known that general Bonaparte had heaped favours on M. Poussielgue.

Such were the despatches sent to the Directory by Kléber and M. Poussielgue. General Bonaparte was there treated as a man who is supposed to be ruined, and to whom one need not show indulgence. It was believed, in fact, that he was exposed to the two-fold danger of being taken by the English, or severely condemned by the Directory for having quitted his army. What would have been the embarrassment of the writers of those despatches, had they known that they would be opened and read by the man who was the object of so many calumnies, and who had now become the absolute head of the government!

Kléber, too careless to ascertain himself the real state of things, not even taking the pains to examine whether the statements which he was sending agreed with his own assertions,—Kléber did not think that he was advancing falsehoods, he transmitted, through negligence and ill-humour, the hearsays which passion had multiplied around him to such a degree as to give them a kind of public notoriety. These despatches were entrusted to a cousin of Barras's, the Director, and accompanied by a multitude of letters, in which the officers of the army gave vent to a despair as unfounded as it was imprudent. This

cousin of Barras's was taken by the English; he hastily threw overboard the packet of despatches of which he was the bearer; but this packet floated, was perceived, picked up, and sent to the British cabinet. We shall soon see what was the result of these mischievous communications, which thus fell into the hands of the English, and were made public to all Europe.

Kléber and M. Poussielgue, however, had sent duplicates of their despatches to Paris. These duplicates, transmitted by a different channel, reached France, and were delivered to the First Consul.

What truth was there in this picture, drawn by morbid imaginations? Of this we shall soon be enabled to judge with certainty by the events themselves; but, meanwhile, we must rectify the false assertions just laid before the reader.

The army, according to Kléber, was reduced to 15,000 men; yet the returns sent to the Directory made them amount to 28,500. When, two years later, it was brought back to France, it still numbered in its ranks 22,000 soldiers, and, in these two years, it had fought several great battles and innumerable actions. In 1798 there had left France, in various convoys, 34,000 men: 4000 were landed at Malta; 30,000, therefore, arrived at Alexandria. Subsequently, 3000 sailors, wrecks of the crews of the fleet destroyed at Aboukir, reinforced the army, and again raised it to 33,000 men. In 1798 and 1799, it had lost from 4000 to 5000 soldiers; it was, therefore, reduced to about 28,000, of whom 22,000, at least, were fit for duty.

Egypt is a healthy country, where wounds heal with extreme rapidity: there were, this year, few sick, and no plague. Egypt was full of Christians, Greeks, Syrians, or Copts, applying to be enlisted into our ranks, and capable of furnishing excellent recruits, to the number of 15,000 or 20,000. The Blacks of Darfur, bought and made free, added so many as 500 good soldiers to one of our demi-brigades alone. Egypt, moreover, was subdued. The peasants who cultivate it, accustomed to obey under all masters, never thought of lifting a musket. With the exception of a few insurrections in the towns, there was nothing to be feared but from undisciplined Turks, coming from a distance, or English mercenaries, transported with great trouble by sea. Against such enemies the French army was more than a match, if it were commanded, not with genius, but merely with ordinary judgment.

Kléber alleged in his despatches that the soldiers were naked; but General Bonaparte had left cloth for clothing them, and, a month after the transmission of this despatch, they were entirely new clothed. At any rate, Egypt abounded in cotton stuffs; it furnished all Africa with them. It could not be difficult to procure these stuffs by purchase, or by demanding them in part of the taxes. As for provisions, Egypt is the granary of the countries destitute of corn. Wheat, rice, beef, mutton,

poultry, sugar, coffee, were then ten times as cheap there as in Europe. So low were the prices of necessaries, that the army, though its finances were not the most flourishing, was able to pay for all that it consumed. Kléber asserted that it was in want of arms; and there were left 11,000 swords, 15,000 muskets, 1400 or 1500 pieces of cannon, 180 of which were field-pieces. Alexandria, which, according to him, was stripped of artillery ever since the siege of St. Jean d'Acre, contained more than 300 pieces of cannon in battery. As for ammunition, there remained 3,000,000 cartridges for infantry, 27,000 gun-cartridges made up, and resources for making more; for there were still in the magazines 200,000 projectiles, and 1,100,000 pounds (500 tons) of powder. The subsequent events demonstrated the truth of these allegations, since the army continued to fight two years longer, and left the English considerable stores. What, in fact, could have become, in so short a time, of the immense *matériel* carefully accumulated by general Bonaparte on board the fleet which conveyed the army to Egypt?

In regard to the finances, Kléber's report was equally false. The soldiers were paid up. It is true that nothing had yet been decided respecting the financial system best adapted for provisioning the army, without draining the country; but the resources existed, and, by levying merely the taxes already imposed, the troops might live in abundance. There was due upon the imposts of the year sufficient to provide for all the current expenses; that is to say, above 16,000,000f. There was, consequently, no need to drive the population to insurrection by the imposition of new taxes. The financial documents subsequently made public proved that Egypt was capable of furnishing 25,000,000f. per year, and that with ease. At this rate it paid but half the amount wrung from it, with a thousand vexations, by the numerous tyrants who oppressed it by the name of Mamelukes. According to the price of things in Egypt, the army could be subsisted for 18,000,000f or 20,000,000f. As for the chests, so far was general Bonaparte from having exhausted them that, at his departure, he had not even taken the whole of his pay.

As for the dangers with which the colony was threatened, the truth was this: Murad Bey, disheartened, was a fugitive in Upper Egypt with a few Mamelukes. Ibrahim Bey, who, under the government of the Mamelukes, shared the sovereignty with him, was then in Lower Egypt, towards the frontiers of Syria. He had not 400 horse, much less some thousands. Djezzar Pasha was shut up in St. Jean d'Acre. So far from preparing a reinforcement of 30,000 men for the army of the grand-vizir, he viewed, on the contrary, with high displeasure, the approach of a fresh Turkish army, now especially that his Pashalik was delivered from the French. As for the grand-vizir, he was not yet across the Taurus. The English had their troops at Mahon,

and were thinking at this moment of employing them in Tuscany, at Naples, or on the coast of France. As for a Russian expedition, that was a mere fable. The Russians never had any idea of taking so long a voyage, for the purpose of furthering the policy of England in the East.

The inhabitants were not so disposed to insurrection as was represented. By humouring the sheiks, who are the priests and the lawyers of the Arabs, as general Bonaparte had prescribed, their attachment might soon be gained. We had already begun to make ourselves a party among them. We had, moreover, on our side the Copts, the Greeks, the Syrians, who, being all Christians, behaved towards us as friends, and as useful auxiliaries. Thus nothing imminent from that quarter was to be apprehended. No doubt, if the French experienced disasters, the Egyptians, with the fickleness of conquered nations, would do as the Italians themselves had recently done, they would join the conqueror of one day against the conqueror of the preceding day. Still they appreciated the difference between the sway of the Mamelukes, who fleeced them, and never came but sword in hand, and that of the French, who respected property, and rarely struck off their heads.

Kléber, then, had indulged in dangerous exaggerations, the melancholy results of hatred, *ennui*, and exile. At his side, general Menou, viewing every thing under the most favourable colours, believed the French to be invincible in Egypt, and regarded the expedition as the commencement of a near and momentous revolution in the commerce of the world. Men never can sufficiently divest themselves of their personal impressions in forming opinions of this kind. Kléber and Menou were both honest, upright men; but one wanted to leave Egypt, the other to stay in it: the clearest, and the most authentic returns, conveyed to them totally contrary significations—misery and ruin to one, abundance and success to the other.

At any rate, be the situation what it might, Kléber and his party rendered themselves seriously culpable in thinking of evacuation, for they had no right to do so. It is true that general Bonaparte, in his instructions replete with wisdom, examining all possible cases, had foreseen the very case in which the army might be obliged to evacuate Egypt. "I am going to France," said he, "either as a private man or as a public man; I will get succours sent to you. But if by next spring (he was writing in August, 1799) you have received no succours, no instructions; if the plague has carried off more than 1500 men, independently of losses by war; if a considerable force, which you should be incapable of resisting, presses you hard, negotiate with the vizir; consent even, if it must be so, to an evacuation, subject to one condition, that of referring to the French government, and meanwhile continue to occupy. You will thus have gained time, and it is impossible that, during the

interval, you should not have received succours." The instructions were very sound; but the case foreseen was far from being realised. In the first place, it would have been requisite to wait till the spring of 1800; it would have been requisite that, at this period, no succours, no orders, should have arrived in Egypt; it would have been requisite that the army should have lost part of its effective force by the plague; and, lastly, that it should be pressed by superior forces: now, nothing of this sort had happened, or did happen. A negotiation opened without these conditions was a real transgression.

In September, 1799 (Vendémiaire, year VIII.), Desaix, having completed the conquest and subjugation of Upper Egypt, had left two moveable columns for the pursuit of Murad Bey, to whom he had offered peace on condition of his becoming a vassal of France. He had then returned to Cairo by order of Kléber, who wished to make use of his name in those luckless negotiations into which he was about to enter. During these proceedings, the army of the grand-vizir, so long announced, was slowly advancing. Sir Sidney Smith, who convoyed with his squadron the Turkish troops destined to be transported by sea, had just arrived off Damietta with 8000 Janissaries. On the 1st of November, 1799 (10th Brumaire, year VIII.), the landing of the first division, of 4000 Janissaries, was effected, towards the Bogaz of Damietta, that is, at the entrance of that branch of the Nile which runs past this town. General Verdier, who had only 1000 men at Damietta, marched out with these troops, and proceeded beyond the fort of Lesbeh, to a narrow tongue of land, on the shore of which the Turks had disembarked, and, without giving time for the other 4000 Janissaries to arrive, attacked the 4000 who had already landed. In spite of the fire of the English artillery, advantageously placed upon an old tower, he beat them, drowned or put to the sword 3000, and took the rest prisoners. The landing craft, at this sight, returned to their ships, and did not land the remainder of the Turkish troops. The French had only twenty-two men killed and 100 wounded.

On the first tidings of this disembarkation, Kléber had despatched Desaix with a column of 3000 men; but the latter, uselessly sent to Damietta, had found the victory won, and the French filled with unbounded confidence. This brilliant achievement ought to have served to encourage Kléber: unfortunately he was swayed at once by his own chagrin and by that of the army. He had before influenced the troops, who in their turn hurried him into the fatal resolution of an immediate evacuation. General Bonaparte became the theme of fresh invectives. That rash young man, it was said, who had exposed the French army to perils, and exposed himself to other perils in braving the seas and the English cruisers in order to

return to France, that rash young man could not have escaped the dangers of the passage. The wise generals trained in the school of the Rhine ought to relinquish a mad scheme, and to carry back to Europe brave soldiers, indispensable to the Republic, now threatened in all quarters.

In this disposition of mind, Kléber had sent to the vizir, who had entered Syria, one of his officers to make new overtures of peace. General Bonaparte, with a view to embroil the vizir with the English, had previously entertained the idea of setting on foot negotiations, which, on his part, were nothing more than a feint. His overtures had been received with great distrust and pride. Kléber's met with a more favourable reception, through the influence of Sir Sidney Smith, who was preparing to play a prominent part in the affairs of Egypt.

This officer of the English navy had largely contributed to prevent the success of the siege of St. Jean d'Acre; he was proud of it, and had devised a *ruse de guerre*, according to the expression of the English agents, which consisted in taking advantage of a momentary weakness to wrest from the French their valuable conquest. Accordingly, as all the intercepted letters of our officers clearly showed their impatient desire to return to France, Sir Sidney Smith wished to induce the army to negotiate and to sign a capitulation, and, before the French government had time to give or to refuse its ratification, to ship it off immediately and to throw it upon the coast of Europe. With this view, he had disposed the grand-vizir to listen to the overtures of Kléber. As for himself, studying to load the French officers with civilities, he permitted the news from Europe to reach them, taking care however that only such intelligence should pass as was anterior to the 18th of Brumaire. Kléber, on his part, despatched a negotiator to Sir Sidney Smith, for as the English were masters of the sea, he wished to induce them to take part in the negotiation, so that the return to France might be rendered possible. Sir Sidney lent a willing ear to this message, and manifested a disposition to enter into arrangements, adding, moreover, that, by virtue of a treaty of the 5th of January, 1799, negotiated by himself, there existed a triple alliance between Russia, England, and the Porte; that those powers had bound themselves to do every thing jointly; that, in consequence, no arrangement with the Porte could be valid and carried into execution, if it was not concurred in by the agents of all the three courts. In his communications, Sir Sidney Smith assumed the title of "Minister plenipotentiary of his Britannic Majesty to the Ottoman Porte, commanding his squadron in the waters of the Levant."

Sir Sidney Smith here attributed to himself a title which he had had, but which he had ceased to hold since the arrival of Lord Elgin as ambassador at Constantinople; and, in reality,

he had at this moment no other power than what a military commander always has—that of signing conventions of war, suspensions of arms, &c.

Kléber, without closer examination, without knowing whether he was treating with agents sufficiently accredited, entered blindly into that perilous track into which he was hurried by a sentiment common to the whole army, and which would have ended in ignominy, if, fortunately for him, Heaven had not endowed him with an heroic soul, which could not fail to retrieve itself with glory, as soon as he should discover the extent of his fault. He entered, then, into negotiation, and offered to Sir Sidney Smith, as well as to the vizir, who had advanced as far as Gaza in Syria, to appoint officers furnished with full powers to treat. Disliking to receive the Turks in his camp, and unwilling, on the other hand, to risk his officers amidst the undisciplined army of the grand-vizir, he resolved to propose Sir Sidney Smith's ship Le Tigre for the place of the conferences.

Sir Sidney, who was cruizing with two ships only—which, be it observed by the way, sufficiently proved the possibility for France to communicate with Egypt—Sir Sidney had at this moment but one; the other, the Theseus, was under repair at Cyprus. Boisterous weather frequently obliging him to stand off the coast, his communications with the land were neither regular nor prompt. It took some time to obtain his assent. At length, his answer arrived: it intimated that he should appear successively off Alexandria and Damietta, to take on board the officers whom Kléber should send to him.

Kléber appointed Desaix and Poussielgue, the administrator, the same who had so clumsily slandered general Bonaparte, and whom the Egyptians, in their Arabic relations, have designated *Sultan Kléber's vizir*. Poussielgue was an advocate for evacuation, Desaix just the reverse. The latter had made the utmost exertions to withstand the torrent, to raise the spirits of his companions in arms, and he had undertaken the negotiation commenced by Kléber, solely in the hope of protracting it, and gaining time for the arrival of succours and instructions from France. Kléber, in order to excuse himself to Desaix, told him that it was general Bonaparte who first began to parley with the Turks; that, moreover, he had himself provided for, and authorised beforehand, a treaty of evacuation, in case of imminent danger. Desaix, misinformed, still hoped that the first ship which should arrive from France would clear up these obscurities and perhaps change the deplorable dispositions of the staff of the army. He set out with M. Poussielgue, and, unable to join Sir Sidney Smith off Alexandria, he found him before Damietta, and went on board Le Tigre, on the 22nd of December, 1799 (1st Nivôse, year VIII.). It was just at this moment that general Bonaparte was invested with the supreme power in France.

Sir Sidney Smith, delighted to have on board such a plenipotentiary as Desaix, gave him a most flattering reception, and strove by all the means of persuasion to bring him into the idea of evacuating Egypt.

Desaix was perfectly competent to defend himself, and stood out for the conditions which his principal had instructed him to demand. These conditions, which were inadmissible by the English commodore, were particularly convenient to Desaix, who wished to gain time; on the part of Kléber they were extremely ill-advised, for their extravagance rendered any agreement impossible. But Kléber sought in that very extravagance an excuse for his fault. He demanded, for instance, that the army, retiring with the honours of war, with arms and baggage, should be allowed to land at any point of the continent that he might be pleased to select, in order to afford the Republic the aid of its presence, wherever it might be deemed most serviceable. He demanded that the Porte should restore to us immediately the Venetian islands, which had become French property by the treaty of Campo-Formio, that is to say, Corfu, Zante, Cephalonia, &c., and were occupied at the moment by Turco-Russian garrisons; that these islands, and above all, Malta, a much more important one, should be given up to France; that the possession of them should be guaranteed to her by the persons signing the treaty of evacuation; that the French army, on retiring, should have a right to reinforce and revictual the garrisons; lastly, that the treaty which united the Porte, Russia, and England, should be instantly annulled, and the triple alliance of the East dissolved.

These conditions were unreasonable, it must be confessed: not that they were an exorbitant equivalent for what was given up in giving up Egypt, but because they were not feasible. Sir Sidney made Kléber sensible of this. Officers treating for a mere suspension of arms could not include other topics of such vast extent in their negotiation. Zante, Cephalonia, Corfu, were occupied by Turkish and Russian troops; it was requisite, therefore, to refer not only to Constantinople but also to Petersburg. Malta was held under the king of Naples as lord paramount: it could not be disposed of without the consent of that prince, who had always refused to cede it to France. To land French troops in the island at that moment, would be in a manner deciding the question. There would be found there cruizers or garrisons of all the coalesced powers, who would not retire upon an order from Sir Sidney Smith or the grand-vizir. Besides, England would never consent to a condition ensuring Malta to France. To land a French army on a point of the continent, where it might derange the combinations of the war by its unexpected appearance, would be a step too bold for a mere commodore to think of taking. Lastly, to demand the abolition of the triple alliance was requiring Sir

Sidney Smith to undo by himself alone, on board his ship, a treaty ratified by three great powers, and which had acquired great importance for the East. Supposing that all these stipulations should be accepted by all the courts whose consent was requisite, it would be necessary to send to Naples, to London, to St. Petersburg, to Constantinople: of course this would no longer be a military convention of evacuation, like that which was signed at Marengo, and capable of being executed at the very instant. If it were referred to London, it must consequently be referred to Paris also, which Kléber had no wish to do. All this evidently far surpassed the bounds of a military capitulation.

Sir Sidney Smith had no difficulty to make the French negotiators feel the force of these reasons. But it was urgently necessary to settle two points immediately—the departure of the wounded, and of the scientific men attached to the expedition, for whom Desaix solicited safe-conducts, and secondly, a suspension of arms; for the army of the grand-vizir, though marching slowly, would soon be in presence of the French. It had actually arrived before the fort of El Arisch, the first French post on the frontiers of Syria, and had summoned it to surrender. Kléber, apprised of this circumstance, had written to Desaix and ordered him to require, as an indispensable condition of these conferences, that the Turkish army should halt on the frontier.

The first point, that relating to the departure of the wounded, and the men of science, rested with Sir Sidney Smith. He assented to it with great cheerfulness and courtesy. As for the armistice, Sir Sidney declared that he would willingly propose it, but he could not answer for obtaining it; for the Turkish army was composed of fanatic and barbarous hordes, and it was a difficult thing to make regular conventions with it, and still more so to ensure their execution. To remove this difficulty, he resolved to go to the camp of the grand-vizir, which was in the environs of Gaza. The negotiations, in fact, had been going on for a fortnight on board Le Tigre, while floating at the pleasure of the winds off the coasts of Syria and Egypt: the parties had said all that they had to say, and the negotiation could not be continued to any useful purpose but with the grand-vizir. Sir Sidney Smith, therefore, proposed to repair thither, to arrange there a suspension of arms, and to prepare for the arrival of the French negotiators, if he thought that he could ensure them safety and respect. This proposal was accepted. Sir Sidney, availing himself of a favourable moment, pushed off in a boat which landed him on the coast, after incurring some dangers, and ordered the captain of Le Tigre to meet him in the port of Jaffa, where Poussielgue and Desaix were to be put ashore, if the conferences were to be transferred to the camp of the grand-vizir.

At the moment when the English commodore reached the camp, a horrible event had occurred at El Arisch. The Turkish

army, composed, for the smaller part, of Janissaries, and for the greater part, of Asiatic militia, whom the Mussulman laws place at the disposal of the sultan, presented a confused and undisciplined mass, extremely formidable to all who wore the European dress. It had been raised in the name of the Prophet; for the Turks were told that this was the last effort that would be required to drive the Infidels out of Egypt; that the redoubtable Sultan of Fire, Bonaparte, had left them; that they were weakened and disheartened; that they must be conquered if the Turks merely showed themselves; that all Egypt was ready to rise against their domination. These and other things, repeated everywhere, had collected around the grand-vizir an army of 70,000 or 80,000 fanatic Mussulmans. The Turks were joined by the Mamelukes. Ibrahim Bey, who had some time before retired to Syria, and Murad Bey, who had descended by a long circuit from the cataracts to the environs of Suez, had become the auxiliaries of their former adversaries. The English had made for this army a sort of field-artillery, drawn by mules. The Bedouin Arabs, in the hope of soon plundering the vanquished, whichever they might be, had placed 15,000 camels at the disposal of the grand-vizir, to assist him to cross the desert which separates Egypt and Palestine. The Turkish generalissimo had in his semi-barbarous staff some English officers, and some of those culpable emigrants, who had taught Djezzar Pasha how to defend St. Jean d'Acre. We shall now see what those wretched fugitives became the cause of.

The fort of El Arisch, before which the Turks were at this moment, was, according to the declaration of general Bonaparte, one of the two keys of Egypt: Alexandria was the other. According to him too, an army arriving by sea could not land in great number anywhere but on the beach of Alexandria. An army advancing by land, and having to cross the desert of Syria, would be obliged to pass by El Arisch, to get water at the wells situated at that place. He had therefore ordered important works to be constructed about Alexandria and the fort of El Arisch to be put into a state of defence. A body of 300 men, supplied with provisions and ammunition, kept garrison there, and it was commanded by a courageous officer named Cazals. The Turkish advanced guard having reached El Arisch, colonel Douglas, an English officer in the service of Turkey, summoned Cazals, the commandant, to surrender. A disguised French emigrant was the bearer of the summons. A parley ensued, and the soldiers were told that the evacuation of Egypt was imminent; that it was already announced as resolved upon; that it would soon be inevitable; and that it was cruel to wish to oblige them to defend themselves. The culpable sentiments which the officers had too much encouraged in the army, then burst forth. The soldiers in garrison at El Arisch, vehemently longing, like their comrades, to leave Egypt, declared to the commandant, that they would not fight,

and that he must make up his mind to surrender the fort. The gallant Cazals indignantly called them together, addressed them in the noblest language, told them that if there were cowards among them, they might leave the garrison and go to the camp of the Turks, that he gave them full liberty to do so, but that he would resist unto death with those Frenchmen who continued faithful to their duty. These words revived for a moment the feeling of honour in the hearts of the soldiers. The summons was rejected, and the attack commenced. The Turks were not capable of carrying a position that was ever so little defended. The batteries of the fort silenced all their artillery. Directed by English and emigrant officers, they nevertheless pushed their trenches to the salient angle of a bastion. The commandant ordered a few grenadiers to make a sortie, for the purpose of driving the Turks from the first branch of the trench. Captain Ferray, who was appointed to head the party, was followed by three grenadiers only. Finding himself abandoned, he returned to the fort. Meanwhile, the mutineers had struck the colours, but a sergeant of grenadiers had hoisted them again. A struggle ensued. During this contest, the recreants who insisted on surrendering, threw ropes to the Turks; these ferocious enemies, once hoisted up into the fort, rushed, sword in hand, upon the dastardly beings who had given them admission into the fort, and slaughtered a great part of them. The others, brought back to reason, joined the rest of the garrison, defended themselves with desperate courage, and were most of them cut in pieces. Some, in small number, obtained quarter, thanks to colonel Douglas, and owed their lives to the interference of that humane, gallant, and distinguished officer.

Thus fell the fort of El Arisch. This was a first effect of the deplorable disposition prevailing in the army, the first fruit reaped by the leaders from their own faults.

It was now the 30th of December (9th Nivôse): the letter written by Sir Sidney Smith to the grand-vizir, to propose to him a suspension of arms, had not reached him in time to prevent the melancholy catastrophe at El Arisch. Sir Sidney Smith was a man of generous feelings. This barbarous massacre of a French garrison horrified him, and, above all, it made him fearful of the rupture of the negotiations. He lost no time in sending explanations to Kléber, both in his own name and in that of the grand-vizir, and he added the formal assurance that all hostility should cease during the negotiations.

At the sight of these hordes, which rather resembled a migration of savage tribes than an army going to battle, fighting among themselves at night over provisions or the possession of a well, Sir Sidney Smith felt alarmed for the safety of the French plenipotentiaries. He insisted that the tents destined for their reception should be pitched in the very quarter of the grand-vizir and the reis-effendi, who were both present with the

army; and that a guard of picked men should be stationed about these tents; he had his own placed near them; and, lastly, he provided a detachment of English seamen, to secure from all violence both himself and the French officers committed to his honour. Having taken these precautions, he sent to Jaffa, to fetch Messrs. Poussielgue and Desaix to the place where the conferences were to be held.

Kléber, when informed of the massacre of El Arisch, did not manifest as much indignation as he ought to have done; he was aware that, if he was too warm upon that subject, all the negotiations might be broken off. He was more urgent than ever for a suspension of arms; and, at the same time, by way of precaution, and to be nearer to the theatre of the conferences, he left Cairo, and transferred his head-quarters to Salahieh, on the very border of the desert, two days' march from El Arisch.

In the mean time, Desaix and Poussielgue, detained by contrary winds, had not been able to land at Gaza till the 11th of January (21st Nivôse), and to reach El Arisch before the 13th. The conferences commenced as soon as they arrived, and the indignation of Desaix had wellnigh broken off the negotiations. The Turks, ignorant and barbarous, interpreting in their way the conduct of the French, attributed their disposition to treat, not to an immoderate desire to return to France, but to fear of fighting. They required, therefore, that the army should surrender themselves prisoners of war. Desaix was for putting an end at once to all kind of communication, but Sir Sidney interposed, prevailed on both parties to moderate their terms, and proposed honourable conditions, if there could be such for a resolution of this nature. It was no longer possible to put forward the original conditions of Kléber. Of this he was himself convinced, from the letters which had been written to him from on board Le Tigre, and he said no more about the Venetian Islands, Malta, and the revictualling of those islands. To give a colour, nevertheless, to his capitulation, he still adhered to one point—that the Porte should withdraw from the triple alliance. This point, strictly considered, was susceptible of being negotiated at El Arisch, since the grand-vizir and the reis-effendi were at hand; but it could scarcely be demanded of the English negotiator, whose intervention, however, was indispensable. This condition, therefore, was set aside, like the others. It was a vain artifice, which Kléber and his advisers employed towards themselves, to conceal from their own eyes the indignity of their conduct.

The pure and simple evacuation, and its conditions, soon became the sole subject of negotiation. After long discussions, it was agreed that all hostility should cease for three months; that those three months should be employed by the vizir in collecting, in the ports of Rosetta, Aboukir, and Alexandria, the vessels requisite for the conveyance of our army; by general

Kléber in evacuating the Upper Nile, Cairo, and the contiguous provinces, and in concentrating his troops about the points of embarkation; that the French should depart with arms and baggage, that is to say, with the honours of war; that they should take with them such military stores as they had need of, and leave the rest; that, from the day of the signature, they should cease to impose contributions, and should abandon to the Porte such as were still due; but that, in return, the French army should receive 3000 purses, equivalent at that time to 3,000,000 francs, and representing the sum necessary for its subsistence during the evacuation and the passage. The forts of Katieh, Salahieh, and Belbeis, forming the frontier of Egypt towards the desert of Syria, were to be given up ten days after the ratification; Cairo forty days after. It was agreed that the ratification should be given within eight days by general Kléber alone, and without any reference to the French government. Lastly, Sir Sidney engaged, in his own name, and in the name of the Russian commissioner, to furnish the army with passports, to prevent molestation from English cruizers.

The French commissioners here committed an error in form, which was of serious consequence. The signature of Sir Sidney Smith was indispensable, for, without that signature, the sea continued closed to them. They ought to have required Sir Sidney Smith, since he was the negotiator of that convention, to sign it. The mystery of his powers would then have been cleared up. It would then have transpired that the English commodore, though he formerly held powers to treat with the Porte, had none at this moment, Lord Elgin having arrived as minister at Constantinople; that he had no special instructions for the present case; that he merely had very strong presumptions to hope that his conduct would be approved in London. The French plenipotentiaries, not conversant with diplomatic usages, supposed that Sir Sidney Smith, offering passports, was qualified to give them, and that these passports would be valid.

The terms of the convention being arranged, there was nothing more to be done but to sign it. The noble heart of Desaix revolted from what he was obliged to do. Before he placed his name at the foot of such a paper, he sent for Savary, his aide-de-camp, directed him to proceed to the head-quarters at Salahieh, where Kléber was, to communicate to him the draft of the convention, and to declare that he would not sign it, till he had received from him a formal order to that effect. Savary came, repaired to Salahieh, and delivered to Kléber the message with which he was charged. Kléber, who had a vague feeling of his fault, determined, in order to cover it, to assemble a council of war, to which all the generals of the army were summoned.

The council met on the 21st of January, 1800 (1st Pluviôse,

year VIII.). The minutes of it still exist. It is painful to see brave men, who had spilt their blood, who were going to spill it again for their country, heap up wretched falsehoods to colour a criminal weakness. This example ought to serve for a lesson to military officers; it ought to teach them that it is not sufficient to be firm in battle, and that the courage to brave balls and bullets is the least of the virtues imposed by their noble profession. In this council of war, great stress was laid on the intelligence which had then reached Egypt, that the great combined French and Spanish fleet had sailed out of the Mediterranean into the ocean; whence it was concluded that all hope of succour from France was at an end. In proof of this, it was argued that five months had elapsed since the departure of general Bonaparte—five months, during which no despatch had arrived. An argument was made of the discouragement of the army, which the very persons who used it had themselves contributed to produce. They adverted to what had recently happened at Rosetta and Alexandria, where the garrisons had behaved like that of El Arisch, threatening to revolt, if they were not immediately taken back to Europe. They alleged that the active army was reduced to 8000 men; they exaggerated, beyond measure, the force of the Turkish army; they talked of a pretended Russian expedition that was about to join the grand-vizir—an expedition which had no existence but in the heated imaginations of those who were desirous to forsake Egypt at any rate. They asserted, as a positive fact, the impossibility of resistance—an assertion which was so soon to be contradicted, in an heroic manner, by the very persons who so stoutly maintained it. Lastly, to keep as closely as possible within the instructions of general Bonaparte, they brought forward some cases of plague, extremely doubtful, and, for the rest, absolutely unknown in the army.

Notwithstanding all that was said, however, the partisans of the evacuation were far from adhering to the instructions left by general Bonaparte. He had laid down as conditions:—1. That no succours, no orders, should have arrived by the spring of 1800. 2. That the plague should have carried off 1500 men, besides the losses from war. 3. That the danger should be so great as to render all resistance impossible. and, these circumstances being realised, he had recommended to his successor to gain time in negotiating, and not to consent to the evacuation, but on condition of its ratification by France. Now, it was still only January, 1800; there was no plague, no pressing danger; and yet an immediate evacuation was the point to be decided, and without any reference to France.

A man who has exhibited in war something superior to courage, that is to say character, general Davout, since marshal and prince of Eckmühl, was the only one who durst withstand this culpable impulsion. He was not afraid to oppose Kléber,

to whose ascendency all the rest bowed, and combated with energy the proposed capitulation. But he was not listened to; and, from a mischievous complaisance, he consented to sign the resolution of the council of war, by suffering an entry to be made in the minutes that it had been adopted unanimously.

Davout, nevertheless, took Savary aside, and charged him to assure Desaix that if he chose to break off the negotiation he would find support in the army. Savary returned to the camp at El Arisch, and communicated to Desaix what had passed, and the message which Davout had desired him to deliver. Desaix, finding Davout's name subscribed to the deliberations, replied with warmth to Savary, "Whom then would you have me trust, when the very man who disapproves the convention dares not make his signature agree with his opinion? He would have me disobey, and yet dares not maintain to the end the sentiments which he has expressed!" Desaix, though deeply grieved, yet, on seeing the torrent, gave way to it himself, and affixed his signature on the 28th of January, to that unlucky convention, afterwards celebrated by the title of the convention of El Arisch (8th Pluviôse).

When the thing was done, people began to be sensible of its importance. Desaix, on his return to the camp, spoke of it with grief, and did not conceal his deep mortification at having been selected for such a mission, and forced to fulfil it by an order from the general-in-chief. Davout, Menou, and some others, launched out into bitter invectives: dissensions broke forth on all sides in the camp at Salahieh.

Meanwhile, preparations were making for departure: the great majority of the army were overjoyed at the prospect of leaving these distant lands, and soon beholding France again. Sir Sidney Smith had returned to his ship. The vizir advanced and took possession, consecutively, of the entrenched positions of Katieh, Salahieh, and Belbeis, which Kléber, in haste to execute the convention, faithfully delivered up to him. Kléber returned to Cairo, to make his preparations for departure, to call in the troops that were guarding Upper Egypt, to concentrate his army, and then to direct it upon Alexandria and Rosetta, at the time stipulated for embarkation.

While these events were occurring in Egypt—baneful consequences of a sentiment which the chiefs of the army had fanned instead of stifling—other events, natural consequences of the same causes, were taking place in Europe. In fact, the letters and despatches, sent in duplicate, had, as we have seen, arrived at the same time in London and Paris. The accusatory despatch directed against general Bonaparte, and addressed to the Directory, had been delivered to general Bonaparte himself, who had become the head of the government. He was shocked at so many weaknesses and falsehoods; but he was sensible how much the army needed Kléber; he appreciated

the great qualities of that general, and, not conceiving that his discouragement could proceed to such a length as to induce him to give up Egypt, he took no notice of his own grievances. He hastened, therefore, to despatch from France instructions and an intimation of the great succours which he was preparing to send.

The British government, on its part, having received a duplicate of Kléber's despatches, and a great number of letters written by our officers to their families, caused them all to be published, with a view to exhibit to Europe the situation of the French in Egypt, and to embroil generals Kléber and Bonaparte. It was a perfectly natural calculation on the part of an hostile power. At the same time, the English cabinet had received advice of the overtures made by general Kléber to the grand-vizir and to Sir Sidney Smith. Believing that the French army was reduced to the last extremity, it lost no time in sending off an express order not to grant any capitulation, unless they surrendered themselves prisoners of war. Mr. Dundas even made use, in his place in parliament, of odious expressions. "An example," said he, "must be made of that army, which, in a time of profound peace, has dared to invade the dominions of one of our allies: the interests of mankind require that it should be destroyed."

This language was barbarous; it displays the violence of the passions which then filled the hearts of the two nations. The English cabinet had taken literally the exaggerations of Kléber and of our officers; it considered the French as reduced to submit to any conditions that might be imposed upon them; and, not foreseeing what was passing, it had the imprudence to give positive orders to Lord Keith, the admiral commanding in the Mediterranean, not to sign any capitulation but on the express condition that the French troops should become prisoners of war.

These orders, despatched from London on the 17th of December, reached admiral Keith in the island of Minorca in the first days of January, 1800; and, on the 8th of the same month, that admiral hastened to forward to Sir Sidney Smith the instructions which he had just received from his government. It took time, especially at that season, to cross the Mediterranean. The communications of Lord Keith did not reach Sir Sidney Smith before the 20th of February. The latter was deeply chagrined. He had acted without precise instructions from his government, reckoning upon it that his acts would be approved. He thus found himself in a false position with the French, for they might, with apparent reason, accuse him of breach of faith. Better acquainted, besides, with the real state of things, he was well aware that Kléber would never consent to surrender himself prisoner of war; and he saw the convention of El Arisch, so adroitly wrung from the weakness of a moment, wholly set

aside. He lost no time in writing to Kléber, to express his mortification, to apprise him honestly of what was passing, to advise him to suspend immediately the delivery of the Egyptian fortresses to the grand-vizir, and to conjure him to wait for fresh orders from England before he took any definitive resolution.

Unfortunately, when these advices from Sir Sidney arrived at Cairo, the French army had already executed in part the treaty of El Arisch. It had delivered up to the Turks all the positions on the right bank of the Nile, Katieh, Salahieh, Belbeis, and some of the positions of the Delta, particularly the town of Damietta and the fort of Lesbeh. The troops were already on march for Alexandria, with their baggage and stores. The division of Upper Egypt had put the Turks in possession of the Upper Nile, and was falling back upon Cairo, for the purpose of rejoining the rest of the army towards the sea. Desaix, availing himself of the order which he had received to return to France, and disliking to have any hand in the details of that ignominious retreat, had set out with Davout, who, for his part, could not stay any longer with Kléber. Kléber, forgetting his bickerings with Davout, was anxious to retain him, and had offered him the rank of general of division, which he had authority to confer as governor of Egypt. Davout refused it, saying that he should not like his promotion to bear the date of such a deplorable event. But, when Desaix and Davout were embarking, M. de Latour Maubourg, arriving from France, with the despatches of the First Consul, met them on the beach, informed them of the revolution of the 18th of Brumaire, and of the elevation of general Bonaparte to the supreme power. Thus Kléber, at the moment when he had just given up the fortified positions, learned that the convention of El Arisch would not be executed, and received the intelligence, not less momentous to him, of the establishment of the consular government.

But there had been sufficient weakness for a great character: an ignominious offer was now about to recall Kléber to himself, and to make him what he really was—a hero. He was obliged either to surrender himself prisoner, or to defend himself in a much worse situation than that which he had declared to be untenable in the council of war at Salahieh; he was obliged either to submit to dishonour, or to engage in a desperate struggle. Kléber did not hesitate, and we shall see that, notwithstanding his much worse situation, he contrived to do what a few days before he judged to be impossible, and thus gave the noblest of contradictions to himself.

Kléber instantly countermanded all the orders previously given to the army. He brought back from Lower Egypt to Cairo part of the troops that had already descended the Nile; he ordered his stores to be sent up again: he urged the division

of Upper Egypt to make haste to rejoin him, and gave notice to the grand-vizir to suspend his march towards Cairo, otherwise he should immediately commence hostilities. The grand-vizir replied that the convention of El Arisch was signed; that it must be executed; that, in consequence, he should advance towards the capital. At the same instant, an officer sent from Minorca with a letter from Lord Keith to Kléber, arrived at the head-quarters. Among other expressions, that letter contained the following: "I have received positive orders from his Britannic Majesty, not to consent to any capitulation with the army under your command, unless the troops lay down their arms, surrender themselves prisoners of war, and give up all the ships in the harbour of Alexandria."

Kléber, fired with indignation, caused Lord Keith's letter to be inserted in the order of the day, adding to it these few words: "Soldiers, to such insults, there is no other answer than victory. Prepare for action."

This noble language found an echo in every breast. The situation was greatly changed since the 28th of January, the day on which the convention of El Arisch was signed. The French then held all the fortified positions in Egypt; they ruled the Egyptians, who were quiet and submissive; the grand-vizir was on the other side of the desert. Now, on the contrary, the most important posts were given up; they had possession of the plain only; the population was everywhere awake; the inhabitants of Cairo, excited by the presence of the grand-vizir, who was at the distance of five hours' march, was waiting only for the first signal to rise. The dismal picture drawn in the council of war, in which the convention of El Arisch was discussed,—that picture, then false, was now strictly true. The French army was about to fight in the plain which borders the Nile, having in front the vizir, with 80,000 men, and on its rear the 300,000 inhabitants of Cairo ready to revolt; and it was without fear! Glorious reparation of a great fault!

Agents of Sir Sidney Smith's had hastened up, to interpose between the French and the Turks, and to make fresh proposals of accommodation. Letters, they said, had just been written to London; when the convention of El Arisch was known there, it would be ratified to a certainty; in this situation, it would be right to suspend hostilities, and wait. To this the grand-vizir and Kléber consented, but on conditions that were irreconcileable. The grand-vizir insisted that Cairo should be given up to him; Kléber, on the contrary, that the vizir should fall back to the frontier. In this state of things, fighting was the only resource.

On the 20th of March, 1800 (29th Ventôse, year VIII.), before daybreak, the French army marched from Cairo, and deployed in the rich plains which border the Nile, having the river on the left, the desert on the right, and in front, but at a dis-

tance, the ruins of ancient Heliopolis. Night, almost luminous in this climate, facilitated the manœuvres, but without rendering them distinct to the enemy. The army formed itself into four squares; two on the left, under general Reynier, two on the right, under general Friant. They were each composed of two demi-brigades of infantry, drawn up in several lines. At the angles and outside were companies of grenadiers, with their backs to the squares, serving to reinforce them during the march and in charges of cavalry, and separating from them to attack defended positions when the enemy attempted to make a stand. At the centre of the line of battle, that is to say, between the two squares on the left, and the two squares on the right, the cavalry was disposed in a deep mass, having light artillery on its wings. At some distance in the rear, and on the left, a fifth square, smaller than the others, was destined to act as a reserve. The number of the troops that Kléber had collected in this plain of Heliopolis might be estimated at somewhat less than 10,000 men. They were firm and tranquil.

Day began to dawn. Kléber, who, since he had been commander-in-chief, had displayed a sort of magnificence, in order to make an impression on the Egyptians, was dressed in a rich uniform. Mounted on a horse of great height, he exhibited to the soldiers that noble countenance which they so much loved to behold, and the manly beauty of which filled them with confidence. "My friends," said he, as he rode through their ranks, "you possess in Egypt no more than the ground under your feet. If you recoil but a single step, you are undone!" His presence and his words were everywhere hailed with the greatest enthusiasm; and, as soon as it was quite light, he gave orders for marching forward.

As yet, only part of the army of the grand-vizir was in sight. In that plain of the Nile which extended before us, appeared the village of El Matarieh, which the Turks had entrenched. Here was an advanced-guard of from 5000 to 6000 Janissaries, very good soldiers, escorted by some thousand horse. A little beyond, another body appeared to harbour a design to glide between the river and our left wing, for the purpose of raising Cairo in our rear. In front, and at a much greater distance, the ruins of ancient Heliopolis, a wood of palm-trees, and considerable undulations of the ground, hid the bulk of the Turkish army from the view of our soldiers. The total number of all these forces, including the principal body, the corps placed at El Matarieh, and the detachment on march to penetrate into the city of Cairo, might be computed at 70,000 or 80,000 men.

Kléber first ordered a squadron of mounted *guides* to charge the detachment manœuvring on our left, for the purpose of introducing itself into Cairo. The *guides* dashed off at a gallop upon this confused mass. The Turks, who never feared cavalry, received and returned the shock. They completely enveloped

our horse, which was in danger of being cut to pieces, when Kléber sent to their relief the 22nd regiment of chasseurs and the 14th of dragoons, who, charging the dense mass by which the guides were, in a manner, surrounded, used their swords so well as to disperse and put them to flight. The Turks then retired out of sight.

This done, Kléber hastened to attack the entrenched village of El Matarieh, before the main body of the enemy's army had time to come up. This duty he assigned to general Reynier, with the two squares on the left; and he himself, with the two squares on the right, wheeling about, posted himself between El Matarieh and Heliopolis, to prevent the Turkish army from coming to the assistance of the attacked position.

Reynier, having reached the village of El Matarieh, detached the companies of grenadiers which lined the angles of the squares, and ordered them to charge the village. These companies advanced, forming two small columns. The brave Janissaries would not wait for them to come up, but went to meet them. Our grenadiers, receiving them firmly, poured upon them, when close to the muzzles of their pieces, a discharge of musketry, which struck down a great number, and then charged with fixed bayonets. While the first column was attacking the Janissaries in front, the second took them in flank, and completed their dispersion. The two columns united then fell upon El Matarieh, amidst a shower of balls. They rushed with the bayonet on the Turks, who resisted, and, after a great carnage, made themselves masters of the position. The Turks fled into the plain; and, joining those whom the guides, chasseurs, and dragoons, had just before dispersed, ran in disorder towards Cairo, with Nassif-Pasha, the lieutenant of the grand-vizir, at their head.

The village of El Matarieh, full of spoils in the Oriental fashion, presented an ample booty to our soldiers. But they did not stop there; both generals and soldiers were aware how important it was not to be surprised, in the midst of a village, by the mass of the Turkish troops. The army, resuming by degrees the same order as in the morning, advanced into the plain, still formed into several squares, with the cavalry in the middle. It passed the ruins of Heliopolis, and perceived beyond them a cloud of dust rising on the horizon, and rapidly advancing towards us. On the left appeared the village of Seriaqous; on the right, amidst a wood of palms, the village of El Merg, situated on the margin of a small lake, called the Lake of the Pilgrims. A slight elevation of ground ran from one to the other of these villages. All at once, this moving cloud of dust stood still, and was presently dispersed by a breeze, leaving the Turkish army exposed to view; it formed a long, floating line from Seriaqous to El Merg. Placed on the elevation just mentioned, it somewhat overlooked the ground upon which our

troops were deployed. Kléber then gave orders to advance. Reynier, with the two squares on the left, marched towards Seriaqous; Friant, with the two squares on the right, moved upon El Merg. The enemy had sprinkled a considerable number of tirailleurs in advance of the palm-trees which surround El Merg. But a fight of tirailleurs could scarcely be successful against such soldiers as ours. Friant sent a few companies of light infantry, which soon obliged these detached Turks to rejoin the confused mass of their army. The grand-vizir was there, in the midst of a group of horsemen, whose bright armour glistened in the sun. Our howitzer fire soon dispersed this group. The enemy brought forward his artillery, with the intention of replying; but his shot, ill-directed, passed over the heads of our soldiers. His pieces were soon dismounted by ours, and put *hors de combat*. The thousand colours of the Turkish army were then seen waving, and part of its squadrons rushed out of the village of El Merg upon the squares of Friant's division. The deep fissures in the ground, the ordinary effect of a hot sun upon a soil long inundated, fortunately checked the impetuosity of the horses. General Friant, suffering these Turkish horse to advance nearly to the muzzles of the guns, gave orders for a sudden discharge of grape-shot, which swept them down by hundreds. They retired in confusion.

This was but the prelude to a general attack. The Turkish army was visibly preparing for it. Our squares waited with firmness, two on the right, two on the left, the cavalry in the centre, facing both before and behind, and covered by two lines of artillery. At a signal given by the grand-vizir, the entire mass of the Turkish cavalry set itself in motion, rushed upon our squares, spread itself upon their wings, turned them, and soon surrounded the four fronts of our order of battle. The French infantry, unmoved by the shouts, the bustle, the tumult of the Turkish cavalry, remained calm, with bayonet presented, keeping up a continued and well-directed fire. In vain these thousand groups of horse whirled round it: they fell under the grape-shot and the balls, rarely coming up to its bayonets, expired at its feet, or turned about and fled, never to show themselves again.

After a long and frightful confusion, the sky, darkened by smoke and dust, suddenly became clear; the sun burst forth, and our victorious troops beheld before them a mass of men and horses, dead or dying; and, at a distance, as far as the eye could reach, bands of fugitives running away in all directions.

The main body of the Turks was retiring, in fact, towards El Kangah, where they had encamped the preceding night, on the road to Lower Egypt. A few groups only went to rejoin those parties which, under Nassif-Pasha, lieutenant of the grand-vizir, had in the morning directed their steps towards Cairo.

Kléber resolved not to allow the enemy any rest. Our

squares, preserving their order of battle, crossed the plain at a rapid pace, and, passing Seriaqous and El Merg, advanced to El Kangah. We arrived there at night. The enemy, finding himself closely pressed, again fled in disorder, leaving to our army the provisions and baggage, of which we stood in great need.

Thus, in that plain of Heliopolis, 10,000 soldiers, by superiority in discipline and quiet courage, dispersed 70,000 or 80,000 foes. But, to obtain a more beneficial result than that of a few thousand killed, wounded, and stretched in the dust, it would be necessary to pursue the Turks, to drive them into the desert, and to cause them to perish there by hunger, thirst, and the sword of the Arabs. The French army was exhausted with fatigue. Kléber allowed it a little rest, and gave orders for the pursuit on the following day.

We had scarcely 200 or 300 wounded or dead, for in this species of combat, troops in a square, which preserve themselves unbroken, sustain but little loss. Kléber, at this moment, hearing cannon towards Cairo, had no doubt that the corps which had turned his left had gone to second the revolt of that city. Nassif-Pasha, the vizir's lieutenant, and Ibrahim Bey, one of the two Mameluke chiefs, had actually entered it with 2000 Mamelukes, 8000 or 10,000 Turkish horse, and some revolted villagers of the environs, in all about 20,000 men. Kléber had left scarcely 2000 in that great capital, distributed in the citadel and the forts. He ordered general Lagrange to set out in the middle of that same night, with four battalions, and go to their relief. He enjoined all the commandants of troops left at Cairo to take strong positions, to keep in communication with one another, but not to attempt any decisive attack before his return. He was apprehensive of some false manœuvre on their part, which might uselessly endanger the lives of the soldiers, every day more and more precious, now that they were absolutely doomed to remain in Egypt.

During the whole time that the battle had lasted, the second Mameluke chief, Murad Bey, who had formerly shared with Ibrahim Bey the rule over Egypt, who was distinguished from his colleague by brilliant valour, chivalrous generosity, and great intelligence, had remained on the wings of the Turkish army, motionless, at the head of 600 superb horse. When the battle was over, he had plunged into the desert and disappeared. It was in consequence of a promise given to Kléber that he had thus acted. Murad Bey, who had recently arrived at the vizir's head-quarters, had felt the old jealousy which so long divided the Turks and the Mamelukes spring up again within him. He was aware that the Turks were anxious to recover Egypt, not to restore it to the Mamelukes, but to possess it themselves. He, therefore, thought to conciliate the French, under the idea of allying himself with them, if they were victorious, or of suc-

ceeding them if they were vanquished. Acting, however, with circumspection, he refrained from the manifestation of his sentiments till hostilities were definitively resumed, and had promised Kléber to declare for him after the first battle. That battle was fought; it was glorious for the French; and his sympathy for them could not fail to be greatly augmented by it. There was reason to hope that, in a few days, we should have him for our professed ally.

In the middle of the very night which followed the battle, after allowing the troops a few hours' rest, Kléber ordered the drums to beat to arms, and marched for Belbeis, determined not to give any respite to the Turks. He arrived there very early in the day. This was the 21st of March (30th Ventôse). The vizir, in his rapid flight, was already beyond Belbeis. He had left in the fort and town a corps of infantry, and in the plain a thousand horse. On the approach of our troops these horse fled. The Turks were driven out of the town; they were shut up in the fort, where, after exchanging a few cannon-shot, want of water and fear induced them to surrender. So great was the fanaticism of these Turkish troops, that some men chose rather to be slaughtered than to give up their arms. Meanwhile, the cavalry of general Leclerc, scouring the plain, seized a long caravan of camels proceeding towards Cairo, and laden with the baggage of Nassif-Pasha and Ibrahim Bey. This capture revealed more completely to Kléber the real design of the Turks, which consisted in exciting not only the capital but all the large towns in Egypt to rise against the French. Apprised of this design, and finding that the Turkish army made no stand anywhere, he detached general Friant with five battalions for Cairo, to support the four battalions sent in the night from El Kangah, under the orders of general Lagrange.

Next day, March 22nd (1st Germinal), he set out for Salahieh. General Reynier preceded him at the head of the left division: he himself followed with the *guides* and the 7th hussars. Lastly came general Belliard, with his brigade, the rest of Friant's division. During the march, a message was received from the grand-vizir, who desired to negotiate. The only answer returned was a refusal. Not far from Karaïm, half-way to Salahieh, a violent canonade was heard; soon afterwards Reynier's division was seen formed in square and engaged with a multitude of horse. Kléber sent word to Belliard to hasten his march, and he himself, with the cavalry, proceeded with the utmost expedition towards Reynier's square. But at this sight the Turks, who were attacking Reynier's division, liking better to have to do with the French cavalry than with the infantry, fell upon the *guides* and the 7th hussars, whom Kléber was bringing with him. Their charge was so sudden that the light artillery had not time to place itself in battery. The drivers were slaughtered on their guns. Kléber, with the *guides* and the

hussars, was for a moment in the greatest danger, especially as the inhabitants of Karaïm, thinking that it was all over with such a handful of French, had hastened to the spot with pitch-forks and scythes to finish them. But Reynier immediately sent the 14th dragoons, which extricated Kléber in time. Belliard, who had pushed on at a great rate, came up soon afterwards with his infantry, and cut in pieces some hundred men.

Kléber, anxious to reach Salahieh, hastened his march, deferring till his return the punishment of Karaïm. The heat of the day was oppressive; the wind blew from the desert, and along with a scorching air was inhaled a fine, penetrating dust. Men and horses were exhausted with fatigue. At length, about nightfall, they arrived at Salahieh. They were now on the very frontier of Egypt, at the entrance of the desert of Syria, and Kléber expected to have on the morrow a final engagement with the grand-vizir. But, on the morning of the next day, March 23rd (2nd Germinal), the inhabitants of Salahieh came to meet him, and informed him that the vizir was continuing his flight in the greatest disorder. Kléber hastened forward, and with his own eyes beheld this sight, which proved how much he had exaggerated to himself the danger of Turkish armies.

The grand-vizir, taking with him 500 of his best horse, had penetrated with some baggage into the desert. The rest of his army was fleeing in all directions; one part was running towards the Delta; a second begged upon its knees for quarter; a third, seeking an asylum in the desert, was slaughtered by the Arabs. These last, after convoying the Turkish army, had remained on the frontier, knowing that one party or the other must be vanquished, and that, of course, there would be booty to pick up. Their conclusion was correct; for, finding the Turkish army completely demoralised and incapable of defending itself even against them, they murdered the fugitives for the purpose of plundering them. Just at the moment when Kléber arrived, they had borne down to the deserted camp of the vizir, and pounced upon it like a flock of birds of prey. At the sight of our army, they flew away on their swift horses, leaving abundant spoils to our soldiers. Here, in the intrenched space of a square league, they found an infinite multitude of tents, horses, cannon, and a great quantity of saddles and harness of all sorts, 40,000 horse-shoes, a profusion of provisions and of rich apparel, boxes already broken open by the Arabs, but still full of perfumes of aloes, silk stuffs, in short of all those articles that compose the dazzling and barbarous luxury of oriental armies. Along with twelve litters of wood, carved and gilt, there was a carriage hung on springs, after the European fashion, of English manufacture; and pieces of cannon were found with the motto *Honi soit qui mal y pense*; a certain evidence of the very active intervention of the English in this war.

Our soldiers, who had brought nothing with them, found, in

the Turkish camp, provisions, ammunition, a rich booty, and objects the singularity of which made them laugh, as they were always disposed to do after a brief moment of dejection. Strange power of the mind over man! Now, victorious, they had no wish to leave Egypt, and no longer considered themselves doomed to perish in distant exile!

When Kléber had ascertained with his own eyes that the Turkish army had disappeared, he resolved to return and reduce the towns of Lower Egypt, and Cairo in particular, to their duty. He made the following dispositions:—generals Rampon and Lanusse were ordered to scour the Delta; Rampon was to march to the important town of Damietta, which was in the hands of the Turks, and to retake it. Lanusse was to keep in communication with Rampon, to sweep the Delta from Damietta to Alexandria, and to reduce successively the revolted villages. Belliard had the general commission to support these different operations, and the special commission to second Rampon in his attack on Damietta, and to retake himself the fort of Lesbeh, which commands one of the mouths of the Nile. Kléber, moreover, left Reynier at Salahieh, to prevent the remnants of the Turkish army, which had fled into the desert of Syria, from coming back. The latter was to remain in observation on the frontier, till the Arabs had completed the dispersion of the Turks, and then return to Cairo. Lastly, Kléber himself set out on the next day, March 24th (3rd Germinal), with the 88th demi-brigade, two companies of grenadiers, the 7th hussars, and the 3rd and 14th dragoons.

He arrived at Cairo on the 27th of March. Important events had occurred there since his departure. The population of that great city, which numbered nearly 300,000 inhabitants, fickle, inflammable, inclined to change, like all multitudes, had followed the suggestions of Turkish emissaries, and fallen upon the French the moment they heard the cannon at Heliopolis. Pouring forth outside the walls during the battle; and seeing Nassif-Pasha and Ibrahim Bey, with some thousand horse and Janissaries, they supposed them to be conquerors. Taking good care not to undeceive the inhabitants, the Turks affirmed, on the contrary, that the grand-vizir had gained a complete victory, and that the French were exterminated. At these tidings, 50,000 men had risen in Cairo, at Boulaq, and at Gyzeh. Armed with swords, pikes, and old muskets, they purposed to slaughter the French left among them. But 2000 men, entrenched in the citadel and in the forts which commanded the city, supplied with provisions and ammunition, opposed a resistance difficult to overcome. Having almost all of them fallen back in time, they had managed to shut themselves up in the fortified places. Some, however, had been in great danger; it was those who, to the number of 200 only, mounted guard at the head-quarters. This noble edifice, for-

merly occupied by general Bonaparte, and since by Kléber and the principal administrations, stood at one of the extremities of the city, overlooking on one side the square of Ezbekyeh, the finest in Cairo; on the other, gardens stretching to the Nile. The Turks and the insurgent populace intended to storm this house, and to slaughter the 200 French by whom it was occupied. This would have been the more easy for them, since general Verdier, who guarded the citadel, placed at the other extremity of Cairo, could not come to their assistance. But the brave soldiers who were in the head-quarters managed, sometimes by a well-supported fire, sometimes by daring sorties, to keep the ferocious multitude at bay, and to give general Lagrange time to arrive. He had been detached, as we have seen, the very night after the battle, with four battalions. He arrived at noon the next day, entered by the gardens, and rendered the head-quarters thenceforth impregnable.

The Turks, seeing no means of overcoming the resistance of the French, reeked their revenge on such unfortunate Christians as were in their power. They began by slaughtering part of the inhabitants of the European quarter; they killed several merchants, plundered their houses, and carried off their wives and daughters. They then went in search of those Arabs who were accused of living on good terms with the French, and of drinking wine with them. They put them to death; and murder and plunder went hand in hand, as usual. They impaled an Arab, who had been chief of the Janissaries under the French, and who was charged with the police of Cairo; and they treated in the same manner one who had been secretary to the Divan instituted by general Bonaparte. Thence they proceeded to the quarter of the Copts. These, as every one knows, are descended from the ancient inhabitants of Egypt, and have adhered to Christianity, in spite of all the Mussulman dominations that have succeeded one another in their country. They possessed great wealth, arising from the collection of the taxes, which the Mamelukes had delegated to them. The intention was, to punish in them, friends of the French, and more especially to plunder their houses. Very fortunately for these Copts, their quarters formed the left side of Ezbekyeh square, contiguous to our head-quarters. Their chief was, moreover, rich and brave; he defended himself well, and succeeded in saving them.

Amid these horrors, Nassif-Pasha and Ibrahim Bey were ashamed of themselves for what they did, or suffered to be done. They saw that wealth wasted, which would belong to them, if they remained in possession of Egypt. But they winked at all that was done by a populace of which they were no longer masters, and thought, besides, by these massacres, to keep up their animosity against the French.

During these transactions arrived general Friant, detached

from Belbeis, and lastly Kléber himself. Both entered through the gardens behind our head-quarters. Though conqueror of the grand-vizir's army, Kléber had a serious difficulty to surmount, nothing less than to subdue an immense city, peopled by 300,000 inhabitants, partly in a state of revolt, occupied by 20,000 Turks, and built in the Oriental style, that is to say, having narrow streets, divided into piles of masonry, which were real fortresses. These edifices receiving light from within, and, exhibiting without nothing but lofty walls, had terraces instead of roofs, from which the insurgents poured a downward and destructive fire. Add to this, that the Turks were masters of the whole city, excepting the citadel and the square of Ezbekyeh. As for the latter, they had blockaded it in a manner, by closing the streets that ran into it with embattled walls.

The French had but two modes of attack; either to keep up a destructive fire of bombs and howitzers from the citadel, till the city was reduced, or to debouch by the square of Ezbekyeh, overthrowing all the barriers erected at the head of the streets, and taking all the quarters by assault, one by one. The first method was liable to cause the destruction of a great city, the capital of the country, which the French needed for the supply of necessaries; the second exposed them to the risk of losing ten times as many men as ten battles like that of Heliopolis would have cost them.

In this case, Kléber showed as much prudence as he had just shown energy in the field. He resolved to gain time, and to let the insurrection wear itself out. He had sent almost the whole of his *matériel* to Lower Egypt, under the idea that he should very soon embark. He enjoined Reynier, as soon as the army of the vizir had entirely crossed the desert, and as soon as Damietta and Lesbeh were retaken, to ascend the Nile with his whole division and the stores necessary for Cairo. Meanwhile, he caused all the outlets, by which the city could communicate with the surrounding country, to be blockaded. Though the insurgents had procured provisions by plundering the houses of the Egyptians, in general amply supplied with them, though they had cast balls, and even founded cannon, they could not possibly help suffering very soon from dearth. Nor could they fail at length to be undeceived respecting the general state of things in Egypt, and to learn that the French were everywhere victorious, and the vizir's army dispersed; moreover, they were likely to fall out ere long, for their interests were totally opposite. Nassif Pasha's Turks, Ibrahim Bey's Mamelukes, and the Arab population of Cairo, could not agree together long. For all these reasons, Kléber thought it advisable to temporise and to negotiate.

While he was gaining time, he completed his treaty of alliance with Murad Bey, through the agency of the wife of that Mameluke prince, a person universally respected, endowed

with beauty, and even with a superior understanding. He granted to him the province of Saïd, under the supremacy of France, on condition of paying a tribute equivalent to a considerable part of the imposts of that province. Murad Bey engaged, moreover, to fight for the French; and the French engaged, if they should ever quit the country, to facilitate for him the occupation of Egypt. Murad Bey, as we shall see by-and-by, faithfully adhered to the treaty which he had just signed, and began by driving from Upper Egypt a Turkish corps which had occupied it.

By means of Murad Bey and the sheiks who were secret friends of France, Kléber then opened negotiations with the Turks who had entered Cairo. Nassif Pasha and Ibrahim Bey began, in fact, to be afraid of being shut up in the city by the French, and treated after the Turkish fashion. They knew, besides, that the grand-vizir's army was completely dispersed. In consequence, they cheerfully assented to conferences, and agreed to a capitulation, by the terms of which they were to be allowed to retire safe and sound. But, at the moment when this capitulation was about to be concluded, the insurgents of Cairo, finding themselves abandoned to the vengeance of the French, were seized with consternation and rage, caused the conferences to be broken off, threatened to despatch all those who showed any determination to desert them, and even gave money to the Turks to induce them to fight. An attack by main force was, therefore, indispensable for completing the reduction of the city.

Lower Egypt having returned to its duty, Reynier had ascended with his corps and a convoy of military stores. He assisted in investing that part of the outworks of Cairo, which stretch from north to east, that is to say, from fort Camin to the citadel; general Friant encamped towards the west, in the gardens behind our head-quarters, between the city and the Nile; Leclerc's cavalry was posted between Reynier's and Friant's divisions, scouring the country; general Verdier occupied the south.

On the 3rd and 4th of April (13th and 14th Germinal) a detachment of general Friant's commenced the first attack. Its chief object was to clear Ezbekyeh square, which was our principal debouché. A beginning was made with the Copt quarter, which formed the left of it. The troops penetrated with the greatest intrepidity into the streets which crossed this quarter in all directions; while several detachments blew up the houses all round Ezbekyeh square, for the purpose of opening avenues to the interior of the city. Meanwhile, the citadel threw a few bombs to intimidate the population. These attacks were successful, and made us masters of the heads of the streets terminating in Ezbekyeh square. In the following days, an eminence situated near fort Sulkouskoi, which the Turks had entrenched, and which commanded the Copt quarter, was taken.

Every preparation was thus made for a general and simultaneous attack. Before he made this attack, Kléber summoned the insurgents for the last time: they refused to listen to the summons. Still making a particular point of sparing the city, which, it is true, was not implicated in the horrors committed by a few fanatics, he resolved to speak to the eye by means of a terrible example. He gave orders for attacking Boulaq, a detached suburb of Cairo, on the banks of the Nile.

On the 15th of April (25th Germinal) Friant's division surrounded Boulaq, and poured upon that devoted suburb a shower of bombs and howitzers. Favoured by this fire, the soldiers rushed to the assault, but met with an obstinate resistance from the inhabitants and the Turks. Every street, every house, became the theatre of a desperate conflict. Kléber ordered this horrible carnage to be suspended for a moment, to offer pardon to the revolters: that pardon was rejected. The attack was then resumed: the fire spread from house to house, and Boulaq, in flames, experienced the two-fold horror of a conflagration and an assault. Meanwhile, the chiefs of the population having thrown themselves at the feet of the conqueror, Kléber put a stop to the effusion of blood, and saved the remnant of the hapless suburb. It was the quarter which contained the warehouses of the merchants; in these were found an immense quantity of goods, which were preserved from the flames for the use of the army.

This horrible sight was witnessed by the whole population of Cairo. Taking advantage of the effect which it was likely to produce, Kléber ordered the capital itself to be attacked. A house adjoining to the head-quarters had been undermined; fire was applied to the mine, and Turks and insurgents were blown up together. This was the signal for the attack. Friant's and Belliard's troops debouched by all the outlets from Ezbekyeh square, while general Reynier entered at the north and east gates, while Verdier, from the elevated citadel, showered bombs upon the city. The fight was obstinate. Reynier's troops penetrated through the Bab-el-Charyeh gate, situated at the extremity of the great canal, and, driving before them Ibrahim Bey and Nassif Pasha, who defended it, at length cooped up both of them between the 9th demi-brigade, which, having entered at the opposite point, had driven back all they encountered in their victorious course. The two French corps joined, after making a frightful carnage. Night separated the combatants. Several thousand Turks, Mamelukes, and insurgents, had fallen; four hundred houses were in flames.

This was the last effort at resistance. The inhabitants, who had long detained the Turks, now began to conjure them most earnestly to quit Cairo, and thus leave them at liberty to negotiate with the French. Kléber, who was averse to these sanguinary scenes, and who was anxious to spare his soldiers, wished for

nothing better than to treat. The envoys of Murad Bey served him for agents. The treaty was soon concluded. Nassif Pasha and Ibrahim Bey were to retire to Syria, escorted by a detachment of the French army. The only terms granted them were, that their lives should be spared. They set out from Cairo on the 25th of April (5th Floréal), leaving to the mercy of the French the wretches whom they had urged into revolt.

Thus terminated that sanguinary struggle, which had commenced with the battle of Heliopolis on the 20th of March, and which ended on the 25th of April with the departure of the last lieutenants of the vizir, after thirty-five days' fighting, between 20,000 French, on one side, and, on the other, the whole force of the Ottoman empire, seconded by the revolt of the Egyptian towns. Great faults had occasioned this insurrection, and provoked this horrible effusion of blood. If, in fact, the French had not made preparations for departing, the Egyptians would never have dared to rise. The contest would have been limited to a brilliant but by no means dangerous battle between our squares of infantry and the Turkish cavalry. But, a commencement of evacuation, having produced a popular explosion in several towns, it was necessary to retake them by assault, which was more destructive than a battle. Let us forget Kléber's faults in admiration of his glorious and energetic conduct! He had imagined that he could not defend Egypt, when subjugated and peaceful, against the Turks; and he had now conquered it in thirty-five days, in spite of Turks and of the insurgent Egyptians, with equal energy, prudence, and humanity.

In the Delta, all the towns had returned to a state of complete submission. Murad Bey had driven from Upper Egypt the Turkish detachment of Dervish Pasha. The vanquished everywhere trembled before the conqueror, and expected a terrible chastisement. The inhabitants of Cairo in particular, who had committed revolting cruelties upon the Arabs attached to the French, and upon the Christians of all nations, were filled with consternation. Kléber, who was humane and wise, took good care not to repay cruelties with cruelties. He knew that conquest, odious to all nations, never becomes tolerable in the estimation of those on whom it falls, but at the price of a good government, and cannot render itself legitimate in the eyes of enlightened nations unless by the accomplishment of great designs. He hastened, therefore, to use his victory with moderation. The Egyptians were persuaded that they should be treated harshly: they conceived that the loss of life and property would atone for the crime of those who had risen in revolt. Kléber called them together, assumed at first a stern look, but afterwards pardoned them, merely imposing a contribution on the insurgent villages.

Cairo paid 10,000,000 fcs., a burden far from onerous for so large a city. The inhabitants considered themselves as most lucky

to get off so easily. Eight millions more were imposed upon the rebel towns of Lower Egypt.

This sum sufficed for the immediate discharge of the arrears of pay, and furnished funds for procuring the provisions needed by the army, for supplying all the wants of the wounded, and for completing the fortifications that were begun. It was a precious resource, till the system of the impositions should be improved and carried into execution. Another resource, equally unexpected, presented itself at this moment. Seventy Turkish vessels had just entered the Egyptian ports, to carry away the French army. The late hostilities justified our detaining them. They were laden with goods, which were sold for the benefit of the chest of the army. Owing to these various resources, an abundant provision was made for all the services, without any requisition in kind. The army found itself in plenty, and the Egyptians, who had not hoped to be let off so easily, submitted with perfect resignation. The army, proud of its victories, confident in its strength, knowing that general Bonaparte was at the head of the government, ceased to doubt that it would soon receive reinforcements. Kléber had in the plain of Heliopolis made the noblest amends for his momentary faults.

He assembled the administrators of the army, the persons best acquainted with the country, and turned his attention to the organisation of the finances of the colony. He restored the collection of the direct contributions to the Copts, to whom it had formerly been entrusted; he imposed some new customs' duties and taxes on articles of consumption. The total of the revenues was to amount to 25,000,000 fcs., and this was sufficient for all the wants of the army, which did not exceed eighteen or twenty millions. He admitted into the ranks of our demi-brigades, Copts, Syrians, and even Blacks, bought in Darfur, and whom some of the subalterns, beginning to speak the language of the country, undertook to drill. These new soldiers placed in the regiments, fought there as stoutly as the French with whom they had the honour to serve. Kléber gave orders for the completion of the forts constructing around Cairo, and set men to work at those of Lesbeh, Damietta, Burlos, and Rosetta, situated on the sea coast. He pressed forward the works of Alexandria, and imparted fresh activity to the scientific researches of the Institute of Egypt. From the cataracts to the mouths of the Nile, everything assumed the aspect of a solid and durable establishment. Two months afterwards, the caravans of Syria, Arabia, and Darfur, began to appear again at Cairo. The hospitable welcome which they received ensured their return.

If Kléber had lived, Egypt would have remained in our possession, at least till the time of our great disasters. But a deplorable event snatched away that general, in the midst of his exploits and of his judicious government.

It is always more or less dangerous to give a deep shock to the ruling principles of human nature. All Islamism had been moved by the presence of the French in Egypt. The children of Mahomet had felt somewhat of that enthusiasm which of old inflamed them against the crusaders. Cries of a holy war were raised, as in the twelfth century; and there were fanatic Mussulmans who vowed to achieve the *sacred fight*, which consists in slaying an infidel. In Egypt, where people saw the French closely, where they appreciated their humanity, where they could compare them with the soldiers of the Porte, especially with the Mamelukes—in Egypt, where they witnessed their respect for the Prophet (a respect enjoined by general Bonaparte), less aversion for them was entertained; and, when they afterwards left the country, the fanaticism had considerably abated. Indeed, during the late insurrection, there had even been perceived, in some places, real signs of attachment to our soldiers, to such a degree, that the English agents were surprised at it. But, throughout the rest of the East, the attention of all was engrossed by one subject, and that was the invasion by Infidels of an extensive Mussulman country.

A young man, a native of Aleppo, named Suleiman, who was a prey to extravagant fanaticism, who had performed the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, who had studied at the mosque El Azhar, the most celebrated and the wealthiest in Cairo, that where the Koran and the Turkish law are taught, who, finally, purposed to obtain admission into the body of the doctors of the faith, chanced to be wandering in Palestine, when the wrecks of the vizir's army passed through the country. He witnessed the sufferings, the despair, of his co-religionists, which violently affected his morbid imagination. The aga of the Janissaries, who had chanced to see him, inflamed his fanaticism still more by his own suggestions. This young man offered to assassinate "the Sultan of the French," general Kléber. Furnished with a dromedary and a sum of money, he repaired to Gaza, crossed the desert, proceeded to Cairo, and shut himself up for several weeks in the great mosque, into which students and poor travellers were admitted, at the cost of that pious foundation. The rich mosques are in the East what convents formerly were in Europe; there are found prayer, religious instruction, and hospitality. The young fanatic intimated his design to the four principal sheiks of the mosque, who were at the head of the department of instruction. They were alarmed at his resolution, and at the consequences to which it was likely to lead; they told him that it would not succeed, and that it would bring great disasters upon Egypt; but still they refrained from apprising the French authorities.

When this wretched man was sufficiently confirmed in his resolution, he armed himself with a dagger, followed Kléber for several days, but, finding no opportunity to approach him, he

resolved to penetrate into the garden of the head-quarters, and to hide himself there in an abandoned cistern. On the 14th of June he appeared before Kléber, who was walking with Protain, the architect of the army, and showing him what repairs would require to be done in the house, to obliterate the traces of the bombs and balls. Suleiman approached him, as if to beg alms; and, while Kléber was preparing to listen to him, he rushed upon him, and plunged his dagger several times into his breast. Kléber fell, under the violence of this attack. Protain, having a stick in his hand, fell upon the assassin, struck him violently on the head, but was thrown down in his turn by a stab with the dagger. At the cries of the two victims, the soldiers ran to the spot, raised their expiring general, sought and seized the murderer, whom they found skulking behind a heap of rubbish.

A few minutes after this tragic scene Kléber expired. The army shed bitter tears over him. The Arabs themselves, who had admired his clemency after their revolt, united their regrets to those of our soldiers. A military commission assembled immediately to try the assassin, who confessed every thing. He was condemned, according to the laws of the country, and impaled. The four sheiks to whom he had communicated his intention were beheaded. These bloody sacrifices were deemed necessary for the safety of the chiefs of the army. Vain precaution! With Kléber, the army had lost a general, and the colony a founder, for whom none of the officers left in Egypt was qualified to make amends. With Kléber Egypt was lost for France. Menou, who succeeded him by right of seniority, was a warm partisan of the expedition; but, notwithstanding his zeal, he was very far beneath such a task. One man alone could have equalled Kléber, nay, surpassed him, in the government of Egypt; this was he, who, three months before, embarked in the harbour of Alexandria for Italy, and who fell at Marengo, on the same day, nearly at the same moment that Kléber was murdered at Cairo; this was Desaix. Both died on the 14th of June, 1800, for the accomplishment of the vast designs of general Bonaparte. How singular the destiny of these two men, constantly placed side by side during life, undivided in death, yet withal so different in every quality whether of mind or body!

Kléber was the handsomest man in the army. His lofty stature, his noble countenance, expressing all the pride of his soul, his valour at once intrepid and cool, his quick and solid intelligence, rendered him a most formidable commander on the field of battle. His mind was brilliant, original, but uncultivated. He read incessantly and exclusively Plutarch and Quintus Curtius; there he sought the food of great souls, the history of the heroes of antiquity. He was capricious, indocile, and a grumbler. It was said of him, that he liked not either to command or to obey; and this was true. He obeyed under

general Bonaparte, but not without murmuring; he sometimes commanded, but in the name of another, under general Jourdan, for example, assuming the command by a sort of inspiration amidst the battle, exercising it like a superior captain, and, after the victory, resuming his character of lieutenant, which he preferred to any other. Kléber was licentious in his manners and language, but upright, disinterested, as men were in those days, for the conquest of the world had not yet corrupted their dispositions.

Desaix was the reverse in almost every respect. Simple, bashful, nay, somewhat awkward, his face hid by a profusion of hair, he had not the look of a soldier. But, heroic in action, kind to the soldiers, modest with his comrades, generous to the vanquished, he was adored by the army and by the people conquered by our arms. His solid and eminently cultivated mind, his intelligence in war, his application to his duties, and his disinterestedness, made him an accomplished model of all the military virtues; and, while Kléber, indocile, refractory, could not endure any superior authority, Desaix was obedient, as though he had not known how to command. Under a rough exterior, he concealed a soul ardent and susceptible of enthusiasm. Though trained in the severe school of the army of the Rhine, he was a warm admirer of the campaigns in Italy, and was desirous of inspecting with his own eyes the fields of battle of Castiglione, Arcole, and Rivoli. While visiting those places, the theatres of immortal glory, he accidentally fell in with the commander-in-chief of the army of Italy, who conceived a strong attachment for him. What an honourable homage was the friendship of such a man! General Bonaparte was deeply touched by it. He esteemed Kléber for his high military qualities, but considered none as equal to Desaix either in talents or character. Besides, he had an affection for him; surrounded by companions in arms, who had not yet forgiven his elevation, though feigning an obsequious submission to him, he appreciated the more Desaix's pure disinterested devotedness, founded on deep admiration. At the same time, keeping to himself the secret of his preferences, affecting ignorance of Kléber's faults, he treated him and Desaix both alike, and was desirous, as we shall see, to unite in the same honours two men whom Fortune had united in one and the same fate.

For the rest, all continued quiet in Egypt after Kléber's death. General Menou, on assuming the command, lost no time in despatching the ship Osiris from Alexandria, to carry to France tidings of the then flourishing state of the colony, and of the deplorable end of its second founder.

BOOK VI.

ARMISTICE.

Vast Preparations for succouring the Army in Egypt—Arrival of M. de St. Julien at Paris—Impatience of the French Cabinet to treat with him—Notwithstanding the insufficiency of M. de St. Julien's Powers, Talleyrand induces him to sign preliminary Articles of Peace—M. de St. Julien signs and sets out with Duroc for Vienna—State of Prussia and Russia—Clever Expedient of the First Consul in regard to the Emperor Paul—He sends back to him six thousand Prisoners without Ransom, and offers him the Island of Malta—Enthusiasm of Paul I. for General Bonaparte, and Mission of M. de Sprengporten to Paris—New League of the Neutral Powers—The four great Questions of Maritime Law—Reconciliation with the Holy See—The Court of Spain, and its Intimacy with the First Consul—Sketch of the internal State of that Court—General Berthier sent to Madrid—This Representative of the First Consul negotiates a Treaty with Charles IV. by which Tuscany would fall to the House of Parma, and Louisiana to France—Erection of the Kingdom of Etruria—France reinstates herself in the Favour of the European Powers—Arrival of M. de St. Julien at Vienna—Astonishment of his Court when apprised of the Preliminary Articles signed without Powers—Embarrassment of the Cabinet of Vienna, which had engaged not to treat without England—Disavowal of M. de St. Julien—Attempt at a joint Negotiation, comprehending England and Austria—For the Admission of England into the Negotiation, the First Consul requires a Naval Armistice, which would enable him to succour Egypt—England refuses, not to treat, but to grant the proposed Armistice—The First Consul then insists on a direct and immediate Negotiation with Austria, or the Resumption of Hostilities—Manner in which he has profited by the Suspension of Arms to put the French Armies on a formidable Footing—Alarm of the Austrians, and cession of the Fortresses of Philipsburg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt, to obtain a Prolongation of the Continental Armistice—Convention of Hohenlinden, granting a fresh Suspension of Arms for forty-five Days—Appointment of M. de Cobentzel as Envoy to the Congress of Luneville—Festival of the 1st of Vendémiaire—Removal of Turenne's remains to the Invalides—The First Consul devotes the Leisure left him by the Interruption of Hostilities in attending to the internal Administration—Success of his Financial Measures—Prosperity of the Bank of France—Payment of the Stockholders in Cash—Repair of the Roads—Return of the Priests—Difficulties respecting the Celebration of Sunday and Decadi—New Measures in regard to the Emigrants—Posture of Parties—Their Dispositions towards the First Consul—The Revolutionists and the Royalists—Policy of the Government towards them—conflicting Influences about the First Consul—Parts acted by Messrs. Fouché, de Talleyrand, and Cambacérès—The Bonaparte Family—Letters of Louis XVIII. to the First Consul and Answer to that Prince—Plot of Ceracchi and Arena—Public Sensation created by the Discovery of this Plot—Imprudent Friends of the First Consul wish to make a Handle of it to raise him too soon to the supreme Power—Pamphlet written in that Spirit by M. de Fontanes—Necessity for disavowing that Pamphlet—Lucien Bonaparte removed from the Ministry of the Interior and sent to Spain.

BOOK VI.

ARMISTICE.

WHILE the Osiris was conveying to Europe the tidings of what had happened on the banks of the Nile, orders totally contrary to those before given were despatched from the ports of England. The observations of Sir Sidney Smith had been well received in London. The government had been fearful of disavowing an English officer, who had come forward as invested with its powers; it had above all discovered the falsehood of the intercepted despatches, and formed a more correct estimate of the difficulty of wresting Egypt from the French army. It had, therefore, ratified the convention of El Arisch, and instructed lord Keith to cause it to be executed. But it was too late, as we have seen: the convention was at that moment torn, sword in hand; and the French, having recovered possession of Egypt, were no longer disposed to abandon the country. The English ministers were destined to experience bitter regret for the levity of their conduct and violent attacks in parliament.

The First Consul, on his part, was rejoiced by the intelligence of the consolidation of his conquest. Unfortunately, the news of Kléber's death reached him almost at the same moment as the news of his exploits. His grief was intense and sincere. He rarely dissembled, and only when obliged to do so by a duty or by an important interest, but always with effort, because the vivacity of his temper rendered dissimulation difficult. But in the narrow circle of his family and his counsellors, he used no disguise; he manifested his affections, his antipathies, with extreme vehemence. It was among these intimates that he betrayed the profound sorrow which he felt for the death of Kléber. In him, he regretted not a friend, as in Desaix; he regretted a great general, an able chief, more capable than any other to ensure the establishment of the French in Egypt—an establishment which he regarded as his most glorious work, but which definitive success alone could convert from a brilliant attempt into a great and solid enterprise.

Time, that like a river sweeps along with it all that falls into its rapid current, Time has engulfed the odious falsehoods then invented by the hatred of parties. There is one of them,

however, which it may be instructive to mention here, though long since consigned to profound oblivion. The royalist agents reported, and English newspapers repeated, that Desaix and Kléber, having given umbrage to the First Consul, were assassinated by his orders, the one at Marengo, the other at Cairo. There were miserable and silly fools enough to believe it, and now people are almost ashamed to recollect such imputations. Those who fabricate these infamous calumnies ought sometimes to place themselves in presence of posterity. They would blush at the refutation which time has in store for them.

The First Consul had already given pressing orders to the fleets at Brest and Rochefort, to prepare to set sail for the Mediterranean. Though our finances were in a much better state, still, being obliged to make great efforts on land, the First Consul could not accomplish all that our navy required. He neglected nothing, however, to put the great Brest fleet in a condition to put to sea. He solicited the court of Spain to send the necessary orders to admirals Gravina and Mazzaredo, commanding the Spanish division, to concur in the movements of the French division. The squadrons of the two nations, blocked up in Brest for a year past, when united, would form a force of forty ships of the line. The First Consul proposed that, taking advantage of the sailing of this immense naval force, the French ships disposable at L'Orient, Rochefort, and Toulon, and the Spanish ships disposable at Ferrol, Cadiz, and Carthagena, should join the combined fleet, to increase its strength. These different movements were to be directed in such a manner as to deceive the English, to throw them into great perplexity, and meanwhile, admiral Ganteaume, taking with him the quickest sailers, was to slip away and to carry to Egypt 6000 picked troops, numerous workmen, and an immense *matériel.*

Spain willingly assented to this combination, which would at least have the advantage of bringing back into the Mediterranean, and consequently into her ports, the squadron of admiral Gravina, uselessly shut up in the harbour of Brest. She saw no other objection to this plan but the bad condition of her fleets and their wretched equipment. The First Consul did his best to remove this objection, and the ships of the two nations were soon provided with the more necessary stores. In the mean time, he was anxious that the army in Egypt should receive intelligence from him every five or six days. He gave orders that, from all the ports of the Mediterranean, Spain and Italy included, there should sail brigs, avisoes, mere merchantmen, carrying balls, bombs, lead, powder, muskets, swords, wood for cartwrights' work, medicines, Jesuits' bark, corn, wine, in short all that the army in Egypt was likely to need. He ordered, moreover, that each of these small vessels should take out a number of workmen, masons or smiths, some gunners, and some picked cavalry-soldiers. He directed them to charter vessels at Carthagena, Barcelona,

Port Vendre, Marseilles, Toulon, Antibes, Savona, Genoa, Bastia, St. Florent, &c. He even bargained with merchants of Algiers to send to Egypt cargoes of wine, of which the army was destitute. By his command, a company of actors was formed, the requisites for a theatre were provided, and the whole was to be sent to Alexandria. The best Paris newspapers were subscribed for, in order to be forwarded to the principal officers of the army, that they might be made acquainted with what was passing in Europe. In short, nothing was neglected that could serve to keep up the courage of the exiled soldiers, and to place them in constant communication with the mother-country.*

Of course several of these vessels were liable to be taken, but the greater number had a chance of arriving, and did actually arrive, for the extensive coast of the Delta could not be strictly guarded. The same success did not attend the attempts made to revictual Malta, which the English kept closely blockaded. They made an especial point of reducing this second Gibraltar; they knew that the blockade must in the long run produce here a certain effect; for Malta is a rock, which cannot be supplied but by sea, whereas Egypt is a vast kingdom, which feeds both itself and its neighbours. They stedfastly persevered, therefore, in investing the place and in inflicting upon it the horrors of famine. The brave general Vaubois, having at his disposal a garrison of 4000 men, was not afraid of their attacks; but he saw the provisions destined for the subsistence of his soldiers hourly diminishing, and unfortunately did not receive from the ports of Corsica sufficient resources to supply the place of those that were every day consumed.

The First Consul also turned his earnest attention to the selection of a chief capable of commanding the army in Egypt. The loss of Kléber was distressing, especially in consideration of those who might be called to succeed him. Had Desaix remained in Egypt, the misfortune would have been easily repaired. But Desaix had returned; Desaix was dead. Those who were left were not competent for such a command. Reynier was a good officer, brought up in the school of the army of the Rhine, skilful, experienced, but cold, irresolute, without ascendency over the troops. Menou was well informed, personally brave, an enthusiast in favour of the expedition, but incapable of directing an army, and covered with ridicule because he had married a Turkish woman and turned Mahometan himself. He took the name of Abdallah Menou, which was a subject of mirth for the soldiers, and greatly abated the respect with which a commander-in-chief needs to be surrounded. General Lanusse, brave, intelligent, full of an ardour, which he understood the art of communicating to others, appeared to the First Consul to

* All these particulars are extracted from the voluminous correspondence of the First Consul with the department of war and of the marine.

deserve the preference, though he was deficient in prudence. But general Menou had assumed the command by right of seniority. It was difficult to ensure the arrival of an order in Egypt; the English might intercept that order; and, without communicating it literally, they might excite a suspicion of its purport, in such a manner as to render the command uncertain, to produce dissension among the generals, and to distract the colony. He therefore left things in the same state, and confirmed Menou in the charge, not conceiving him to be so utterly incapable as he really was.

We must now return to Europe, to see what was passing on this theatre of the great events of the world. The letter addressed from Marengo itself to the emperor of Germany reached him along with the news of the lost battle. The court of Vienna was then aware of the faults which it had committed, in rejecting the offers of the First Consul at the beginning of winter, in persisting to consider France as exhausted and incapable of continuing the war, in refusing to believe the existence of the army of reserve, and in blindly pushing M. de Melas into the gorges of the Apennines. The credit of M. de Thugut was considerably diminished, for to him alone were imputed all the errors of want of conduct and foresight. However, to these faults, already so serious, was added another not less important, that of forming a closer alliance than ever with the English, under the impression of the disaster of Marengo. Till now, the cabinet of Vienna had declined their subsidies, but it thought it right to procure immediately the means of repairing the losses of this campaign, either to place itself in a condition to treat more advantageously with France, or to be able to engage in a fresh struggle with her, if her pretensions were too exorbitant. It accepted, therefore, two millions and a half sterling (62,000,000 francs). In return for this subsidy, it engaged not to make peace with France before the month of February following, unless the peace were common to England and Austria. This treaty was signed on the 20th of June, the very day on which the news of the events in Italy reached Vienna. Austria, therefore, bound herself to the fortunes of England for seven months longer; but she hoped to pass the summer in negotiations, and to get on till winter before hostilities could be recommenced. For the rest, the imperial cabinet had made up its mind to peace; it merely wished to negotiate jointly with England, and especially not to make too great sacrifices in Italy. On this condition, it desired nothing better than to conclude peace.

The emperor sent as bearer of his answer to the letter of the First Consul, the same officer who had brought that letter, namely, M. de St. Julien, in whom he reposed great confidence. The answer on this occasion was direct and personally addressed to general Bonaparte. It contained the ratification of the double armistice, signed in Germany and in Italy, and an invitation to

explain himself confidentially and with perfect frankness respecting the bases of the future negotiation. M. de St. Julien was specially charged to sound the First Consul on the conditions of peace, and on his part to say sufficient concerning the intentions of the emperor to induce the French cabinet to disclose its own. The letter of which M. de St. Julien was the bearer, full of flattering and pacific protestations, contained a passage in which the object of his mission was clearly specified. "I am writing to my generals," said his imperial majesty, "to confirm the two armistices, and to settle the details of them. I have, moreover, sent to you the count de St. Julien, major-general in my army: he is charged with my instructions, and to point out to you how essential it is not to enter into public negotiations, likely to excite prematurely in so many nations hopes perhaps illusory, till it is ascertained, at least in a general manner, if the bases that you mean to propose for peace are such as to afford a prospect of obtaining that desirable end.

"*Vienna, July 5th*, 1800."

The emperor hinted, towards the conclusion of this letter, at the engagements which bound him to England, and which made him desirous of a peace common to all the belligerent powers.

M. de St. Julien arrived in Paris on the 21st of July (2nd Thermidor, year VIII.), and was cordially received. He was the first envoy from the emperor who had been seen for a long time in France. He was welcomed as the representative of a great sovereign and a messenger of peace. We have already shown how earnestly the First Consul desired to put an end to the war. Nobody contested with him the glory of battles; he now aspired to one of a different kind, less brilliant but more novel, and at this time more profitable to his authority, that of giving peace to France and Europe. In his ardent soul desires were passions. He then sought peace as we have since seen him seek war. M. de Talleyrand desired it as much; for he was already fond of assuming the part of moderator about the First Consul. It was an excellent part to play, especially at a later period; but to urge the First Consul to peace at this time was adding one impatience to another, and endangering the result by too great precipitation.

On the very day after his arrival, the 22nd of July (3rd Thermidor), M. de St. Julien was invited to a conference with the minister for foreign affairs. They conversed on the subject of their reciprocal desire to terminate the war, and the best way of accomplishing it. M. de St. Julien listened to all that was said to him concerning the conditions on which peace might be concluded, and hinted on his part at all that the emperor wished. M. de Talleyrand concluded too hastily that M. de St. Julien had secret and sufficient instructions for treating, and proposed that they should not confine themselves to a mere conversation, but

draw up jointly preliminary articles of peace. M. de St. Julien, who was not authorised to take such an important step, for the engagements of Austria towards England were in absolute opposition to it, M. de St. Julien objected that he had no power to conclude a treaty. M. de Talleyrand replied, that the emperor's letter completely authorised him, and that, if he would agree to some preliminary articles and sign them, with the proviso of their ulterior ratification, the French cabinet, on the mere letter of the emperor, would consider him as sufficiently accredited. M. de St. Julien, a soldier by profession, and devoid of experience in diplomatic usages, had the simplicity to avow to M. de Talleyrand his embarrassment and his ignorance of forms, and to ask him what he would do in his place. "I would sign," answered M. de Talleyrand. "Well then, be it so," rejoined M. de St. Julien, "I will sign the preliminary articles, which shall not be held valid till they have received the ratification of my sovereign." "Most assuredly," replied M. de Talleyrand, "no engagements between nations are valid but such as have been ratified."

This singular manner of communicating their powers to each other is specified at length in the minutes still existing of that negotiation. They are dated the 23rd, 24th, 27th, and 28th of July (4th, 5th, 8th, and 9th Thermidor, year VIII.). All the important points to be arranged between the two nations were discussed. The treaty of Campo Formio was adopted as the basis, with the exception of some modifications. Thus the emperor abandoned to the Republic the boundary of the Rhine, from the point where that river leaves the Swiss territory to that where it enters the Batavian territory. In regard to that article M. de St. Julien demanded and obtained a change in the wording. He wished the expression, "The Emperor assents to the line of the Rhine," to be altered as follows: "The Emperor does not oppose the retaining of the boundary of the Rhine by the French Republic." This mode of expression was adopted in answer to the reproaches of the Germanic body, which had accused the emperor of giving up to France the territory of the confederation. It was agreed that France should not retain any of the fortified positions which operated upon the right bank (Kehl, Cassel, Ehrenbreitstein), that their works should be razed, but that, in return, Germany should not throw up any entrenchment, either of earth or masonry, within three leagues of the river.

So much for the boundary between France and Germany. The limits between Austria and Italy yet remained to be settled. The fifth secret article of Campo Formio had stipulated that Austria should receive in Germany an indemnity for certain lordships which she had given up on the left bank of the Rhine, independently of the Netherlands, which she had long before sacrificed to France. The bishopric of Salzburg was to com-

pose that indemnity. The emperor would have liked better to be indemnified in Italy, for the acquisitions which he made in Germany, especially in the ecclesiastical principalities, were scarcely new acquisitions, the court of Vienna already possessing in those principalities an influence and privileges nearly equivalent to a direct sovereignty. On the contrary, the acquisitions which he obtained in Italy had the advantage of giving him territory, which he did not yet possess in any degree, and especially of extending his frontier and his influence in a country which had been the constant object of the ambition of his family. From these same motives it was natural that France should be better pleased to see Austria aggrandise herself in Germany than in Italy. This latter point, however, was conceded. The treaty of Campo Formio threw Austria back upon the Adige, and attributed to the Cisalpine Republic the Mincio and the celebrated fortress of Mantua. The ambition of Austria this time was to obtain the Mincio, Mantua, and the Legations into the bargain, which was exorbitant. The First Consul went so far as to grant her the Mincio and Mantua, but he would not cede the Legations at any rate. The utmost he would consent to was to give them to the grand-duke of Tuscany, on condition that, in return, Tuscany should be transferred to the grand-duke of Parma, and the duchy of Parma to the Cisalpine. The grand-duke of Parma would have gained considerably by this exchange, which was a satisfaction granted to Spain, with what views we shall show by-and-by.

M. de St. Julien replied that, on this latter point, his sovereign was not prepared to adopt a definitive resolution; that these removals of sovereign houses from one country to another were by no means conformable with his policy; that of course this was a point which must be afterwards adjusted. To evade the difficulty, the negotiators merely said, in the preliminary articles, that Austria should receive in Italy the territorial indemnities previously granted to her in Germany.

The Austrian officer, thus metamorphosed into plenipotentiary, expressed in the name of his sovereign a warm interest for the independence of Switzerland, but scarcely any for that of Piedmont, and appeared to insinuate that France might pay herself in Piedmont for what she ceded to the house of Austria in Lombardy.

The parties, therefore, stopped short at very general conditions; the boundary of the Rhine for France, with the demolition of Kehl, Cassel, and Ehrenbreitstein; particular indemnities for Austria, taken from Italy instead of Germany; which signified that Austria would not be confined within the limit of the Adige. But, it must be confessed, not only was it vain to treat with a plenipotentiary without powers; but something still more vain was it to consider as articles of peace articles, the only contestable point in which, the only one for which the

emperor went to war, the boundary of Austria and Italy, was not even resolved in a general manner: for, as to the boundary of the Rhine, no one had seriously thought of disputing that with us, for a long time past.

To the preceding articles were added some accessory arrangements: it was agreed, for example, that a congress should be held immediately; that, during this congress, hostilities should be suspended, the levies *en masse* making in Tuscany disbanded, and the English landings, with which Italy was threatened, deferred.

M. de St. Julien, urged beyond all reasonable bounds by the desire to play an important part, had from time to time scruples respecting the strange and bold step which he had ventured to take. To make him easy upon the matter, M. de Talleyrand promised, on his word of honour, that these preliminary articles should remain secret, and that they should not be considered as having any value whatever till after their ratification by the emperor. On the 28th of July, 1800 (9th Thermidor, year VIII.), these famous preliminaries were signed at the hôtel of foreign affairs, to the great joy of M. de Talleyrand, who, finding M. de St. Julien so prepared upon every question, seriously believed that he had secret instructions to treat. This, however, was not the case, and, if M. de St. Julien was so well informed, it was only because they wished at Vienna to enable him to provoke and to receive the confidential communications of the First Consul relative to the conditions of the future peace. The French minister had not been able to penetrate that circumstance; and, from the desire to sign an act resembling a treaty, he had committed a serious error.

The First Consul, paying no attention to the forms observed by the two negotiators, and trusting on that point entirely to M. de Talleyrand, thought for his part of nothing but making Austria explain her views, in order to ascertain whether she wished for peace, and to force it from her by a new campaign, if she appeared not to desire it. But, for this purpose, it would have been better to have summoned her to explain herself within a given time than to enter into an illusory and puerile negotiation, in consequence of which the dignity of the two nations was likely to be compromised, and their reconciliation to be rendered more difficult.

M. de St. Julien thought it best not to wait in Paris for the emperor's answer, as he was solicited to do; he wished himself to carry the preliminaries to Vienna, no doubt with a view to explain to his master the motives of his extraordinary conduct. He left Paris on the 30th of July (11th Thermidor), accompanied by Duroc, whom the First Consul sent to Austria, as he had previously sent him to Prussia, to observe the court there closely, and to give it an advantageous opinion of the moderation and policy of the new government. Duroc, as we have

elsewhere remarked, was well suited for missions of this kind from his sound sense and elegant manners. The First Consul had, moreover, given him written instructions, in which he had provided with minute attention for every contingency. In the first place, when any circumstance led to a presumption of the intentions of Austria in regard to the preliminaries, Duroc was instantly to send off a courier to Paris. It was recommended to him until the ratification to keep an absolute silence, and to appear totally ignorant of the intentions of the First Consul. If the ratification was granted, he was authorised to declare, in a positive manner, that peace might be signed in twenty-four hours, if there was a sincere desire for it. He was to let it be understood, in one way or another, that, provided Austria would be content with the Mincio, the Fossa Maestra, and the Po, which was the line marked out by the convention of Alexandria; and provided, moreover, that she agreed to the removal of the duke of Parma to Tuscany, and of the duke of Tuscany to the Legations, there was no obstacle to an immediate conclusion. These instructions even contained rules respecting the language to be held on all the subjects that might arise in conversation. Duroc was forbidden to join in any sneers against Russia and Prussia, which were then disliked at Vienna, because they had withdrawn from the coalition. He was enjoined to maintain a great reserve respecting the emperor Paul, whose character was a theme for raillery in every court: he was to speak highly of the king of Prussia, to visit the grand-duke of Tuscany, to show none of those passions which the Revolution had excited, either in one way or in another. Royalists and Jacobins were all to be spoken of as though they were not less ancient in France than the Guelfs and the Ghibellines in Italy. He was particularly enjoined not to manifest any antipathy towards emigrants, excepting those, indeed, who had borne arms against the Republic. He was ordered to assert on all occasions that, of all the countries of Europe, France was most attached to its government, because of all countries it was that which had afforded the government occasion to do the most good. Lastly, he was to represent the First Consul as having no prejudices, neither those of other times nor those of the present day, and as being indifferent to the attacks of the English press, for he did not understand English.

Duroc set out with M. de St. Julien, and though the secret of the preliminaries was kept, still the numerous conferences of the emperor's envoy with M. de Talleyrand had been remarked by every body, and people said aloud that he was the bearer of conditions of peace.

Our prodigious successes in Italy and Germany had naturally exercised a considerable influence, not upon Austria alone, but upon all the courts of Europe, whether friendly or hostile.

On the news of the battle of Marengo, Prussia, still neutral

upon system, but kindly disposed towards us according to events, Prussia had expressed warm admiration to the First Consul, and from that moment had not said a single word which could give rise to a doubt respecting the attribution to France of the entire line of the Rhine. The only point now to be studied, according to her, was to be just in the partition of the indemnities due to all those who lost territories on the left bank of the Rhine, and discreet in settling the general limits of the great States. She even added that it was right to be firm towards Austria, and to curb her insatiable ambition. Such was the language which she held every day to our ambassador in Berlin.

M. d'Haugwitz, and king Frederick William in particular, whose kindness was sincere, informed general Beurnonville from day to day of the rapid progress which the First Consul was making in the esteem of Paul I. As we have already seen, that fickle and enthusiastic prince, had for some months been passing from a chivalrous animosity against the French Revolution to an unbounded admiration of the man who was now the representative of that revolution. He had conceived an absolute hatred for Austria and England. Though from this change a first result of great importance had been obtained, namely, the motionless attitude of the Russians on the Vistula, still the First Consul aspired to something more. He wished to enter into direct communication with the emperor Paul, and suspected Prussia of prolonging that equivocal state, that she might be the sole agent in our relations with the most powerful of the courts of the North.

He devised a method, which was crowned with complete success. There were still in France six or seven thousand Russians taken last year, and who could not be exchanged, because Russia had no prisoners to release in return. The First Consul had proposed to England and to Austria, which held in their hands a certain number of our soldiers and seamen, to exchange these Russians for a like number of French. Both of them assuredly owed Russia such a courtesy, for these Russians had incurred captivity solely by serving the purposes of English and Austrian policy. The proposal was nevertheless rejected. The First Consul immediately conceived the happy idea of restoring unconditionally to Paul I. the prisoners in our hands. This was an act of dexterous generosity, and not very burdensome to France, which could do nothing with these prisoners, since they could not procure her Frenchmen in exchange. The First Consul accompanied this act with the attentions most likely to touch the susceptible heart of the emperor Paul. He caused these Russians to be armed and clothed in the uniform of their sovereign: he even gave up their officers, their colours, and their arms. He then wrote a letter to count de Panin, minister of foreign affairs at St. Petersburg, informing him that, Austria and

England having refused to procure their liberty for the soldiers of the czar, who had become prisoners while serving the cause of those powers, the First Consul would not detain those brave men indefinitely, and that he sent them back to the emperor unconditionally; that this was on his part a testimony of consideration for the Russian army, an army which the French had learned to know and to esteem on fields of battle.

This letter was sent by way of Hamburg. It was transmitted by M. de Bourgoing, our minister in Denmark, to M. de Muraview, minister of Russia at Hamburg. But such was the fear excited by Paul I. in his agents, that M. de Muraview refused to receive this letter, not daring to disobey the anterior orders of his cabinet, which forbade him all communication with the representatives of France. M. de Muraview merely reported to his court what had passed, and made it acquainted with the existence and contents of the letter, of which he had refused to take charge. Upon this, the First Consul made another, and still more efficacious advance towards the Russian monarch. Seeing that Malta could not hold out long, and that this island, strictly blockaded, would be obliged, by want of provisions, to surrender to the English, he conceived the idea of giving it to Paul. It is well known that this prince, an enthusiast on the subject of the ancient orders of chivalry, and that of Malta in particular, had caused himself to be elected grand-master of St. John of Jerusalem, that he was resolved to re-establish that religious and chivalric institution, and that he frequently held at St. Petersburg chapters of the Order, for the purpose of conferring its decoration on the princes and great personages of Europe. It was impossible to take a more direct course to his heart than by offering him the island that was the seat of the Order, of which he had made himself the head. The thing was ably conceived in all its bearings. Either the English, who were on the point of taking it, would consent to restore it, and then it would be out of their hands; or they would refuse, and Paul I. was capable enough to declare war against them on that account. This time, M. de Sergijeff, a Russian officer, and one of the prisoners detained in France, was directed to proceed to Petersburg, as the bearer of the two letters relative to the prisoners and the island of Malta.

When these different communications reached St. Petersburg, they produced their inevitable effect. Paul was deeply touched, and thenceforth indulged, without reserve, in the highest admiration of the First Consul. He immediately selected an old Finland officer, M. de Sprengporten, formerly a Swedish subject, a most respectable man, very well disposed towards France, and in high favour at the court of Russia. He appointed him governor of the island of Malta, ordered him to put himself at the head of the 6000 Russian prisoners in France, and to go with this force perfectly organised, and to take pos-

session of the island of Malta, which would be delivered up to him by the French. He ordered him to proceed to Paris, and to thank the First Consul publicly. To this demonstration Paul added a much more effective step; he enjoined M. de Krudener, his minister in Berlin, who had been charged, some months before, to renew the connexion between Russia and Prussia, to enter into direct communication with general Beurnonville, our ambassador, and furnished him with the necessary powers for negotiating a treaty of peace with France.

M. d'Haugwitz, who thought, perhaps, that the reconciliation was proceeding too rapidly, for Prussia would lose her character of mediating agent, the moment the cabinets of Paris and St. Petersburg were in direct communication—M. d'Haugwitz contrived to be the ostensible agent of this reconciliation. Hitherto M. de Krudener and M. de Beurnonville had met in Berlin, in the houses of the ministers of the different courts, without speaking. One day, M. d'Haugwitz invited them both to dinner; after dinner, he brought them face to face, then left them *tête-à-tête* in his own garden, to give them opportunity for complete explanation. M. de Krudener expressed his regret to M. de Beurnonville, that it had not been in his power before to seek the society of the French legation; he excused the refusal given at Hamburg to receive the First Consul's letter, by the existence of anterior orders; and, lastly, he entered into a very long explanation respecting the new dispositions of his sovereign. He informed him of the mission of M. de Sprengporten to Paris, and avowed the especial satisfaction which Paul I. had felt at the restitution of the prisoners, and the offer to restore Malta to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. At length, from all these subjects he passed to the most serious, namely, the conditions of peace. Russia and France had nothing to quarrel about. They had not gone to war for any interest of territory or commerce, but for a dissimilarity in the form of their government. As far as concerned themselves directly, they had, therefore, but to write one article, to the effect that peace was re-established between the two powers. This circumstance alone showed how unreasonable the war had been. But the war had brought with it alliances, and Paul, who prided himself on strict fidelity to his engagements, desired only one thing, that his allies should be treated indulgently. They were four in number:—Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Piedmont, and Naples. He demanded, on behalf of the four, the integrity of their dominions. Nothing could be more easy, if an explanatory clause were merely introduced to the effect, that this condition should be considered as fulfilled, if those princes obtained an indemnity for the provinces which the French Republic should take from them. The point was thus understood and admitted by M. de Krudener. In fact, the secularisation of the ecclesiastical States of Germany, and their proportionate partition

among the lay princes who had lost the whole or part of their dominions, in consequence of the cession of the left bank of the Rhine to France, was a thing long agreed upon by every body. It had even been admitted at the congress of Rastadt, under the Directory. An arrangement was equally easy for the Italian princes, allies of Paul I. Piedmont was to lose Nice and Savoy; it might be indemnified in Italy, if Austrian ambition were curbed in that country, and not suffered to extend itself too far there. On this point, Paul I., greatly irritated against the cabinet of Vienna, said, like Prussia, that Austria must be kept down, and nothing granted her but what could not be refused. As for the kingdom of Naples, France had nothing to take from it, but she had odious proceedings to punish, outrages to avenge. Still the First Consul was willing to pardon, on one condition, of a nature to be particularly pleasing to Paul I., who was not less hostile to the English than to the Austrians, namely, that the cabinet of Naples should atone for its faults by a formal rupture with Great Britain. On all these points the parties were nearly agreed. They could not fail to become still more so every day, from the natural course of events, and from the impetuous character of Paul I., who from a state of dissatisfaction with his former allies, was about to pass, without transition, to a state of open war.

The reconciliation of France with Russia was, therefore, nearly accomplished, and even public; for the departure of M. de Sprengporten for Paris had just been officially announced. Paul I., the furious enemy of France, thus became her friend, her ally, against all the powers of the old coalition. The glory and the profound address of the First Consul had wrought this extraordinary change. A fortuitous and important circumstance was about to render it still more complete; this was the quarrel of the neutral powers, exasperated by the violences of England upon the seas. It seems as if every thing concurred to favour the designs of the First Consul, and one is tempted to admire, at this moment, his good fortune as much as his genius.

On viewing the course of events in this lower world, one would almost say, that Fortune loves to smile on youth, for she seconds, in a wonderful manner, the early years of great men. Let us not, however, like the ancient poets, make her blind and capricious; if she so often favours the youth of great men, as she did that of Hannibal, of Cæsar, of Napoleon, it is because they have not yet abused her favours. General Bonaparte was fortunate, then, because he had deserved to be so; because he was in the right against all the world; at home, against party strife; abroad, against the powers of Europe. At home, he aimed only at order and justice; abroad, at peace, but an advantageous and glorious peace, such as he has a right to desire who has not been the aggressor, but who has been victorious through his superior ability. Thus Europe sought anxiously

to be reconciled to France, represented by a great man, so just and so powerful. And if this great man had met with auspicious circumstances, there was not one which he had not brought about himself, or by which he had not skilfully profited. It was but yesterday that one of his lieutenants, antipating his orders, had hastened, at the report of the cannon, to gain for him the victory of Marengo; but what had he not done to pave the way to that victory? Now, a prince, struck with insanity on one of the first thrones in the world, afforded an easy prey to his diplomatic ability; but with what masterly condescension had he not contrived to flatter that monarch! England, by her conduct on the seas, was soon going to reconcile all the maritime powers with France; but we shall see what art he had employed to soothe them, and to leave to England the part of violence. Fortune, that capricious mistress of great men, is not, then, so capricious as people are pleased to represent her. All is not caprice when she smiles upon them, caprice when she abandons them, and, in her alleged infidelities, the fault is, in general, not on her side. But let us speak a language more true, more worthy of so grave a subject: Fortune, that pagan name given to the power which governs all things here below, is Providence, befriending genius when walking in the path of rectitude, that is, in the ways marked out by infinite wisdom.

The fortunate circumstance which was destined definitively to rally the powers of the North around the politics of the First Consul, and to procure for him auxiliaries upon the element on which he had most need of them, that is, on the seas, was this:— The English had just committed new violences against neutrals. They could not suffer the Russians, the Danes, the Swedes, the Americans, to frequent quietly all the ports of the world, and to lend their flags to the commerce of France and Spain. They had already violated the independence of the neutral flag, especially in regard to America, and it was because the Americans had not sufficiently defended it that the Directory showed its anger, by subjecting them to treatment almost as rigorous as that which they experienced from the English. General Bonaparte had repaired this fault by annulling the harshest of the regulations enforced by the Directory; by instituting the tribunal of prizes, charged to administer better justice to captured vessels; by paying homage, in the person of Washington, to all America; lastly, by inviting negotiators to Paris, for the purpose of renewing relations of amity and commerce with her. It was precisely at this moment that England, as if irritated by the ill success of her policy, seemed to become more oppressive towards neutrals. Odious acts had already been committed by her upon the seas; but the last exceeded all the bounds, not only of justice, but of the most ordinary prudence.

This is not the place for entering into all the details of that

important dispute; suffice it to specify its principal points. The neutrals alleged that the war, which certain great nations thought fit to wage with one another, ought not, in any way, to cramp their own trade, nay, that they had a right to pick up that commerce of which the belligerent powers voluntarily deprived themselves. In consequence, they claimed the right of frequenting freely all the ports of the world, of navigating even between the ports of the belligerent nations; of going, for instance, from France and Spain to England, from England to Spain and France, and, what was more disputable, of going from the colonies to the mother-countries, of going from Mexico to Spain, for the purpose of carrying thither the precious metals, which, but for their intervention, could never have reached Europe. They maintained that "the flag covers the merchandise," which means, that the flag of a power, not implicated in the war, covered from every kind of search the merchandise transported in their vessels; that, on board them, French merchandise could not be seized by the English, nor English merchandise by the French; as a Frenchman, for instance, would have been inviolable on the quays of Copenhagen and St. Petersburg for the British power; in short, that the vessel of a neutral nation was as sacred as the very quays of its capital.

The neutrals consented to only one exception. They admitted that they ought not to carry goods specially used in war, for it was contrary to the very idea of neutrality that they should supply one of the belligerent nations with arms against the other. But they sought to limit this interdiction solely to articles fabricated for war, such as muskets, cannon, powder, projectiles, materials for accoutrements of every kind, &c.; and as for provisions, they would not consider any provisions interdicted but such as were prepared for the use of armies, such as biscuit, for example.

If they admitted one exception as to the nature of transportable merchandise, they admitted another as to the places to be entered, but on condition that it should be accurately defined. This second exception was relative to the ports bonâ fide blockaded, and guarded by a naval force capable of laying siege to them, or of reducing them by famine, by means of blockade. In such a case they admitted that to run into a blockaded port was thwarting one of the two nations in the use of its right, by preventing it from taking the places of its enemy by attack or by famine; that it was consequently affording succour to one of the two against the other. But they insisted that the blockade should be preceded by formal declarations, that the blockade should be bonâ fide, executed by such a force that there would be imminent danger in violating it; and they did not admit that, by a mere declaration of blockade, either party could interdict at pleasure, by means of a pure fiction, the entry into such or such a port, nay, frequently the entire extent of certain coasts.

Lastly, as it was necessary to ascertain whether a vessel really belonged to the nation whose flag she hoisted, whether or not she carried merchandise called contraband of war, the neutrals consented to be searched, but required that this search should be made with certain courtesies to be agreed upon and punctually observed. Above all, they considered it as an essential rule that search should not take place if merchant-vessels were convoyed by a ship of war. The military or royal flag, according to them, ought to enjoy the privilege of being believed on its word, when it affirmed, upon the honour of its nation, that the vessels under convoy were, in the first place, of its nation, and, in the next, that they had on board no interdicted articles. If it were otherwise, said they, a mere brig, when cruizing, might stop a convoy and with that convoy a fleet of war, perhaps an admiral. Who knows even? a privateer might stop either M. de Suffren or lord Nelson.

Thus the doctrines maintained by the neutrals may be reduced to four principal points.

The flag covers the merchandise, that is to say, no search shall be made after an enemy's goods on board a neutral vessel, foreign to the belligerent nations.

No merchandise is interdicted but contraband of war. This contraband is confined solely to articles made for the use of the armies. Corn, for instance, and naval stores, are not included.

Access cannot be interdicted to any port, unless it is bonâ fide blockaded.

Lastly, no vessel under convoy can be searched.

Such were the principles maintained by France, Prussia, Denmark, Sweden, Russia, and America, that is to say, by an immense majority of nations: principles, founded on respect for the rights of others, but pertinaciously contested by England.

She insisted, in fact, that, on these conditions, the commerce of her enemies would be carried on without obstacle by means of the neutrals (which, be it observed by the way, was not correct, for that commerce could not be continued by means of neutrals, without relinquishing to them the greater part of the profits, and causing the nation obliged to have recourse to them to sustain an enormous loss); she insisted then on seizing French and Spanish merchandise on board whatever vessel it might be. She maintained that certain commodities, without being fabricated, such as corn and naval stores, were real succours carried to a nation in time of war. She alleged that a declaration of blockade was sufficient, without the presence of a naval force, to interdict the entry of certain ports or coasts; and lastly, that neutrals, upon pretext of being under convoy, could not escape the search of the belligerent powers.

If the reader wishes to know what was at the bottom of the important interest concealed under these sophistries of the public writers of England, here it is. England was bent on preventing

the precious metals of Mexico, the principal source of the opulence of Spain, from being brought to the Spaniards; to the French sugar and coffee, which they cannot dispense with; to both the timber, hemp, and iron of the North, necessary for their navy. She would fain have it in her power to starve them, in case of a deficient harvest, as she had done in 1793, for instance; she sought a pretext for closing the ports of entire countries, without having recourse to a bonâ fide blockade; lastly, she purposed, by dint of searches, annoyances, and obstacles of every kind, to ruin the commerce of all nations, so that war, which, for commercial nations is a state of distress, should become for her merchants, what it actually was, a time of monopoly and of extraordinary prosperity. With regard to the Americans, she had an intention still more unjust, namely, to rob them of their seamen upon pretext that they were English, a confusion easy to make, owing to the similarity of the languages.

In 1780, during the American war, Catherine the Great had formed the league of the neutrals to resist these pretensions. The First Consul, taking advantage of the nascent friendship of Paul, of the increasing irritation of the neutrals, and of the unparalleled violences of the English, made the utmost efforts to form a similar one in 1800.

At this moment, the dispute presented itself under one form only, that of the right of search. The Danes and the Swedes, to escape the vexations of the English cruizers, had devised the expedient of sailing in numerous convoys, escorted by frigates bearing the royal flag. It must be added that they never tarnished the honour of their flag, and took good care not to escort false Danes or false Swedes, or to cover contraband of war, as it was called. They studied only how to escape vexations which had become intolerable. But the English, viewing this as a mere subterfuge to elude a difficulty and continue the commerce of neutrals, persisted in exercising the right of search, even in regard to vessels under convoy.

In the preceding year, two Swedish frigates, the Troya and the Halla Fersen, escorting Swedish merchantmen, had been stopped by the English squadrons and obliged to submit to the search of the convoy under their care. The king of Sweden had sent the captains of the two frigates before a court-martial for not defending them. This example had for a moment checked the English, who were apprehensive lest they should provoke a rupture with the northern powers. They had in consequence shown a little more lenience to Swedish vessels. But two recent instances had revived the difficulty, and driven Sweden and Denmark to the last degree of exasperation.

In the winter of 1799—1800, the Danish frigate the Haufersen, captain Vandockum, who was convoying a fleet of merchantmen in the Mediterranean, was stopped by the squadron of admiral Keith; she attempted to resist, was fired upon, and carried into

Gibraltar. A most violent dispute ensued on this subject between the English cabinet and the Danish cabinet, and it was still going on, when, in the month of July, the Danish frigate, the Freya, escorting a convoy of her nation was met in the Channel by an English squadron. The latter insisted on exercising the right of search; captain Krabe, commander of the Freya, nobly resisted the summons of the English admiral, and refused to suffer the convoy to be searched. Force was employed with uncalled for violence; captain Krabe defended himself; his ship was riddled, and he was obliged to surrender to the superior force of the enemy, for he had but a single frigate to oppose to six men of war. The Freya was carried into the Downs.

This occurrence was soon followed by another, of a different nature, but more odious and more serious. Two Spanish frigates were lying at anchor at the entrance of the road of Barcelona. The English formed a plan for taking them. Here was no question about the right of neutrals, but the perpetration of a piece of downright knavery, for the purpose of entering an enemy's port with impunity, without being recognised. They perceived in these roads a Swedish galliot, the Hoffnung, and resolved to make use of her for accomplishing the piratical act which they meditated. They manned their boats, boarded the galliot, clapped a pistol to the breast of the Swedish captain, and obliged him to sail quietly towards the Spanish frigates, which, having no mistrust of the Swedish flag, since it was neutral, suffered her to come alongside. The English immediately rushed on board, surprised the two frigates, which had few hands on board, took possession of them and left the harbour of Barcelona with their unworthily acquired prey.

This event produced an extraordinary sensation in Europe, and incensed all the maritime nations, whose rights the English were no longer satisfied with violating, but whose flag they outraged, by making it, unknown to itself, subservient to acts of the most infamous piracy. Spain was already at war with Great Britain; she could do nothing more; but she had recourse to Sweden, whose flag had been usurped, to denounce this odious fact, more offensive to Sweden than even to Spain. Nothing more was requisite to embitter the quarrel between England and the neutrals. At this moment especially, the moderation which the First Consul had manifested towards them was of such a nature as to render British violence more glaring. Sweden demanded reparations: Denmark had already demanded them. Behind these two courts was Russia, which, ever since the league of 1780, regarded herself as a copartner with the powers of the Baltic in all questions that interested their maritime rights.

On the part of Denmark, M. de Bernstorff kept up a brisk controversy with the cabinet of London, by means of notes

which France published, and which do equal honour to the minister who wrote them, and to the nation which gave them its signature, and which had soon to support them with its arms. "A mere gun-boat," said the English, "carrying the flag of a neutral, is to have a right then to convoy the trade of the world, and to withdraw from our vigilance the commerce of our enemies, which may be carried on as easily in time of war as in time of peace!" "A whole squadron," replied M. de Bernstorff, "would be obliged then to obey the summons of the most paltry cruizer, to stop at her requisition, to suffer the convoy which it is escorting to be examined before its face! The word of an admiral, making a declaration upon the honour of his nation is not to weigh against the doubt of the captain of a privateer, who is to have a right to verify the declaration by a search! One of these hypotheses is more inadmissible than the other."

To support its doctrines by means of terror, the English cabinet, which had just sent lord Whitworth to Copenhagen, despatched after him a squadron of sixteen sail, which was cruizing at this moment at the entrance of the Sound. The presence of this squadron produced a strong sensation among all the powers of the Baltic: it alarmed not only Denmark, against which it was directed, but also Sweden, Russia, and Prussia herself, whose commerce was likewise interested in the free navigation of the seas. The four powers which signed the old armed neutrality of 1780 commenced a negotiation, with the avowed purpose of forming a new league against the maritime tyranny of the English. The cabinet of London, which was, nevertheless, afraid of such an event, insisted warmly at Copenhagen on settling the dispute; but, so far from offering indemnities, it had the singular presumption to demand them. It purposed, by frightening Denmark, to withdraw her from the league before it was formed. Unfortunately, Denmark had been taken by surprise; the Sound was not in a state of defence; Copenhagen was not secured from a bombardment. In this state of things, she was obliged to give way for the moment, with a view to gain the winter season, during which ice would defend the Baltic, and give all the neutrals time to make their preparations for resistance. On the 29th of August (11th Fructidor, year VIII.) Denmark was obliged to sign a convention, in which the question of the law of nations was adjourned, and the last misunderstanding only, which had arisen on the subject of the Freya, was adjusted. The Freya was to be repaired in the English dock-yards and restored; but, for the moment at least, the Danish government ceased to furnish convoys for merchantmen.

This convention had settled nothing. The storm, so far from being dispersed, soon gathered again, for the four northern courts were extremely incensed. The king of Sweden, whose honour was not yet satisfied, prepared for a journey to St. Peters-

burg, to renew the ancient league of neutrality; and Paul I., who was not fond of middle terms, took at the outset a most energetic step. Being informed of the dispute with Denmark, and of the presence of a British fleet at the entrance of the Sound, he sequestrated all property belonging to the English, as a security for the injury that might be done to Russian commerce. This measure was to be continued till the intentions of the British government were completely elucidated.

In the northern courts, therefore, every thing tended to favour the designs of the First Consul. Events served him according to his wish. Things went on equally well in the south of Europe, that is in Spain. Here one of the first monarchies of the globe was seen sinking into dissolution, to the great detriment of the balance of Europe, and to the great grief of a generous nation, indignant at the part which it was made to act in the world. The First Consul, whose indefatigable mind embraced all objects at once, had already directed the efforts of his policy towards Spain, and sought to derive as much advantage for the common cause as he could from that degenerate court.

We should not draw the melancholy picture that follows, if it were not true, in the first place, and if it were not necessary, in the next, for understanding the great events of the period.

The king, the queen of Spain, and the prince of Peace, had engaged for many years the attention of Europe, and exhibited a spectacle extremely dangerous for royalty, at that time already so much lowered in the estimation of nations. One would have said that the illustrious house of Bourbon was destined at the close of this century to lose their crowns in France, in Naples, and in Spain: for, in these three kingdoms, three sovereigns of imbecile weakness, exposed their sceptres to the derision and the contempt of the world, by leaving them in the hands of three queens, either giddy, violent, or dissolute.

The Bourbons of France, whether by their own fault, whether through misfortune, were swallowed up by the French Revolution; by dint of foolishly provoking it, those of Naples had been driven a first time from their capital; those of Spain, before they let their sceptre drop into the hands of the crowned soldier whom that Revolution had produced, deemed it expedient to pay their court to him. They had already allied themselves with France in the time of the Convention; they could not but connect themselves with her much more cheerfully now that the Revolution, instead of a sanguinary anarchy, exhibited to them a great man, disposed to protect them if they followed his advice. Happy had it been for these princes, if they had followed the advice, at that time excellent, of this great man! Happy for himself had he done no more than give it them!

The king of Spain was an honest man, not harsh and blunt like Louis XVI., more agreeable in person, but less informed, and surpassing him in weakness. He rose very early, not to

attend to his royal duties, but to hear masses, and then go down to his workshops, where, surrounded by turners, smiths, and armourers, and stript off his clothes like them, he wrought in their company at all sorts of work. Though very fond of the chase, he liked still better to manufacture arms. From his shops he went to his stables, to assist in dressing his horses, and indulged in the most incredible familiarities with his grooms. After spending the first half of the day in this manner, he took a solitary repast, to which neither the queen nor even his children were admitted, and devoted the rest of the day to the chase. Several hundred horses and servants were set in motion for this daily pleasure, which was his predominant passion. After riding like a young man, he would return to his palace, give a quarter of an hour to his children, half an hour to the signature of the papers submitted to him by the queen and his ministers, sit down to play with some of the nobles of his court, sometimes take a nap with them, till the hour for his last meal, which was followed immediately by his retirement to bed, always at one and the same fixed time. Such was his life, without a single variation throughout the year, unless during Passion Week, which was devoted entirely to religious exercises. In other respects, an honest man, faithful to his word, mild, humane, religious, of exemplary chastity though not cohabiting with his wife, ever since his physicians had, by her direction, ordered him to abstain from it; he had no other share in the scandals of his court, in the faults of his government, than in suffering them to be committed, without perceiving them, without believing them, during the course of a long reign.

By his side, the queen, sister of the duke of Parma, a pupil of Condillac's, who wrote for her and her brother some excellent works of instruction, led a totally different life, and would do very little honour to the celebrated philosophic tutor of her youth, if philosophers could in general answer for their disciples. She was nearly fifty years old, and had still certain vestiges of beauty, which she strove to perpetuate with infinite pains. Going to mass every day, like the king, she employed in corresponding with a great number of persons, and particularly with the prince of Peace, those hours which Charles IV. spent in his workshops and his stables. In this correspondence she communicated to the prince of Peace the affairs of court and State, and received from him a report of all the puerilities and scandal of Madrid. She finished her morning by giving one hour to her children, and one to the duties of government. Not a paper, not an appointment, not a pardon, went for the royal signature, before it was submitted to her. The minister who should have ventured upon such an infraction of the conditions of her favour would have been instantly dismissed. She dined alone, like the king, in the middle of the day; the rest of the afternoon was devoted to receptions, in which

she acquitted herself very gracefully, and to the prince of Peace, on whom she bestowed several hours of her time every day.

The reader is aware that the prince of Peace was no longer minister, at the period of which we are treating. M. d'Urquijo, whom we shall presently introduce, had succeeded him; but that prince was nevertheless the first authority in the kingdom. This singular personage, ignorant, fickle, of no capacity, but of handsome exterior, as it is necessary to be in order to succeed in a corrupt court, the arrogant ruler of queen Louisa, had reigned for twenty years over her vacant and frivolous soul. Weary of his high favour, he shared it cheerfully with obscure favourites, indulged in a thousand debaucheries, which he recounted to his crowned slave, whom he delighted to mortify by his stories, nay, even maltreated her, it is said, in the grossest manner: and yet he retained an absolute empire over that princess, who was incapable of resisting him, who could not be happy unless she saw him every day. After she had long committed the government to him, with the official title of first minister, she gave it up as much to him still, though he no longer had that title; for nothing was done in Spain but according to his pleasure. He disposed of all the resources of the State; and he had at home enormous sums in cash, while the treasury, reduced to the greatest straits, made shift with a discredited paper-money, depressed to half its nominal value. The nation was almost habituated to this spectacle; it manifested indignation only when some new and extraordinary scandal made the blood mount into the faces of the brave Spaniards, whose heroic resistance soon afterwards proved that they were worthy of a different government. At the moment when Europe rang with the great events occurring on the Po and the Danube, the court of Spain was the theatre of an unheard-of scandal, which had well nigh exhausted the patience of the nation. The prince of Peace proceeding from one excess to another, had finished by marrying a relation of the royal family. A child was born from this union. The king and queen, resolving themselves to stand sponsors for the new-born infant, had the ceremony performed with all the etiquette customary at the baptism of Infants of Spain. The highest nobles of the court were obliged to perform the same duty that would have been required of them if the child had been the offspring of royalty. On this infant in long-clothes had been conferred the great orders of the crown and magnificent presents. The grand-inquisitor had officiated at the religious ceremony. This time, it is true, indignation had risen to the highest pitch, and every Spaniard had considered himself as personally insulted by this odious proceeding. Things had come to such a pass that the Spanish ministers opened their minds upon the subject to the foreign ambassadors, and particularly to the ambassador of France, to whom they usually had recourse in most of their embarrassments, and who

received from their own lips the shocking particulars which we are here relating.

Amidst these scandalous proceedings, the king alone, kept under continual espionage by his wife, neither knew nor suspected what was passing. Neither the outcry of his subjects, nor the occasional revolt of some of the grandees of Spain, indignant at the degradation that was required of them, nor the inexplicable assiduities of the prince of Peace, could open his eyes. This poor good-natured king even used sometimes to make this singular remark, which embarrassed all present who were doomed to hear it: "My brother of Naples is a blockhead, who suffers himself to be ruled by his wife." It should be added that the prince of the Asturias, since Ferdinand VII., brought up at a distance from the court and with incredible harshness, detested the favourite, whose criminal influence he was aware of, and that his just hatred for the favourite was at last converted in his mind into an involuntary hatred for his father and mother.

What a spectacle, at the conclusion of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the throne of France had recently sunk with a crash, and when a young warrior, simple, austere, indefatigable, full of genius, had just raised himself upon its ruins! How long could the Spanish monarchy withstand the dangerous effect of this contrast!

Amidst these disorders, the house of Spain was at times overtaken by confused presentiments, and began to feel some apprehensions of a revolution. The ancient attachment of the Spaniards to royalty and to religion served, it is true, to cheer it; but it was afraid that Revolution would come by the way of the Pyrenees, and therefore sought to dispel the danger by implicit deference towards the French Republic. The incredible violence of the English cabinet, the passionate outbursts of Paul I. against that house, on the formation of the second coalition, had thrown it completely into our arms. It regarded this as advantageous, nay, honourable, since general Bonaparte had ennobled, by his presence in the seat of power, all the relations of the cabinets with the government of the Republic.

The good king Charles IV. had conceived, though at a distance, a sort of friendship for the First Consul. This feeling became stronger every day, and it is painful to think how this singular attachment was destined to terminate, without treachery on the part of France, but by an inconceivable concatenation of circumstances. "What a great man is general Bonaparte!" Charles IV. was incessantly saying. The queen said so too, but more coldly, because the prince of Peace, disposed sometimes to censure what the court of Spain did since he was no longer minister, seemed to blame the partiality that was shown to the government of France. Meanwhile the First Consul, informed by M. Alquier, our ambassador, a man of superior understanding and sagacity, that he must absolutely

secure at Madrid the good-will of the prince of Peace, the First Consul had sent to that favourite some magnificent arms, made at the manufactory of Versailles. This attention on the part of the greatest personage in Europe had touched the vanity of the prince of Peace. Some attentions of our ambassador had completely won him, and thenceforward the whole court of Spain seemed to give itself up to us without reserve.

From d'Urquijo, the minister, alone was a slight resistance experienced. He was a man of eccentric character, naturally an enemy to the prince of Peace, whom he had succeeded, and liking general Bonaparte not much better. M. d'Urquijo, of plebeian extraction, and endowed with some energy, having drawn upon himself the enmity of the clergy and of the court through some insignificant reforms which he had attempted, inclined, in an astonishing manner for a Spaniard of that time, towards revolutionary ideas. He was connected with many French demagogues, and participated to a certain point in their aversion for the First Consul. He had the merit of desiring to reform the most crying abuses, of striving, for instance, to diminish the revenues of the clergy and the jurisdiction of the agents of the court of Rome. To these measures he was striving to obtain his Holiness' assent; and in making this attempt he had exposed himself to serious dangers. Having, in fact, the prince of Peace against him, he must be undone, if the Romish influence were to unite with the domestic influence in the palace to overthrow him. Touched with some attentions paid him by M. Alquier, witnessing, moreover, the partiality of the king and queen, M. d'Urquijo at length began, in his turn, to admire general Bonaparte, whom it was not only natural, but at that time quite the fashion, to admire.

The partiality of the king soon became unbounded. Having seen the arms sent to the prince of Peace, he conceived and expressed a wish to have some of the same sort. Some magnificent specimens were manufactured forthwith, and he received them with real joy. The queen also wished for dresses, and Madame Bonaparte, who was celebrated for her taste, sent all the most exquisite and elegant productions of that kind in Paris. Charles IV., generous as a Castilian, unwilling to be behindhand, took care to make a right royal return. Knowing that horses would be acceptable to the First Consul, he stripped the studs of Aranjuez, Medina Cœli, and Altamira, of their handsomest inmates, to find first six, then twelve, then sixteen horses, the finest in the Peninsula. One cannot tell where he would have stopped, had he not been checked in his ardour. He took two months to select them himself, and nobody could have performed the task better, for he was a consummate judge. He appointed, moreover, a numerous train to accompany them to France, chose his best grooms for this mission, clothed them in magnificent liveries, and imposed but one con-

dition on all this parade, namely, that, while travelling in France, his grooms should attend mass every Sunday. A promise was given that his desire should be complied with, and his joy at making a handsome present to the First Consul was then unalloyed. Though fond of France, this excellent prince had a notion that it was impossible for a man to live in that country many days, without wholly forsaking the religion of his forefathers.

The *éclat* of these demonstrations suited well the views of the First Consul. It gratified him; he thought it useful to show to Europe, and even to France, the successors of Charles V., the descendants of Louis XIV., taking honour to themselves from their personal relations with him. But he sought more solid advantages in his diplomatic relations, and aimed at a more important object.

The king and queen of Spain were passionately fond of one of their children, the Infanta Maria Louisa, wife of the hereditary prince of Parma. The queen, sister, as we have said, of the reigning duke of Parma, had united her daughter to her nephew, and concentrated upon this couple her fondest affections; for she was most ardently attached to the house from which she sprang. She meditated an aggrandisement for that house in Italy, and, as Italy was at the disposal of the conqueror of Marengo, it was on him that she rested all her hopes of obtaining the accomplishment of her wishes. The First Consul, apprised of those wishes, took care not to neglect this way of arriving at his ends; and he despatched to Madrid his faithful Berthier, in order to profit by the circumstance that presented itself. This was the first subject of his attention on his return from Marengo. If he had sent one of his aides-de-camp to Berlin and to Vienna, he resolved to do more for the court of Spain; he resolved to send thither the man who had the largest share in his glory; for Berthier was then the Parmenio of the modern Alexander.

It was at the very moment when the First Consul was negotiating the preliminaries of peace with M. de St. Julien, when he was seducing the inflammable heart of Paul I., and fomenting in the North the quarrel of the neutral powers; it was at this moment that he despatched general Berthier in all haste to Madrid. He set out towards the end of August (beginning of Fructidor), without official title, but with the certainty of producing a great effect by his mere presence, and with secret powers for treating on the most important subjects.

His journey embraced several objects; the first was, to visit the principal sea-ports of the Peninsula, to ascertain their state and their resources, and, money in hand, to urge expeditions for Malta and for Egypt. Berthier quickly performed this task, and then hastened to Madrid to fulfil the more important mission with which he was charged. The First Consul was

quite willing to grant an increase of territory to the house of Parma; he was even disposed to add to this aggrandisement a new title, that of king, which would have crowned the wishes of the queen; but he required to be paid for these concessions in two ways: firstly, by the restitution of Louisiana to France; secondly, by a threatening injunction to the court of Portugal, for the purpose of deciding it to make peace with the Republic and to break with England.

The motives of the First Consul for requiring such conditions were these:—Since Kléber's death, he began to be uneasy about the preservation of Egypt, and he shared with all his contemporaries the ambition of distant possessions. The rivalry between France and England, which, for a century past, had fought solely for the East and West Indies, had inflamed to the highest degree the passion for possessing colonies. In case of Egypt being wrested from us, the First Consul wished to achieve something for the colonial greatness of France. He cast his eye over the map of the world, and beheld a magnificent province, situated between Mexico and the United States, formerly belonging to France, ceded, in a time of abasement, by Louis XV., to Charles III., seriously threatened by the English and the Americans, so long as it should be in the impotent hands of the Spaniards, of little value to the latter, who possessed half the American continent, but of great value to the French, who had no possession in that part of America, and capable of being made productive, when the activity of the latter should be specially concentrated on its territory: this province was Louisiana. If Egypt, lost to us, could no longer furnish us with a compensation for St. Domingo, the First Consul hoped to find it in Louisiana.

He demanded it formally, therefore, of Spain, as the price of an acquisition in Italy. He required, in addition, that part of the Spanish fleet blocked up in the roads of Brest should be given to him. As for Portugal, he wished to take advantage of the geographical position of Spain in regard to that country, and of the ties of consanguinity which united the two reigning houses of the Peninsula, to detach it from the alliance with England. The prince of Brazil, regent of Portugal, was, in fact, son-in-law of the king and queen of Spain. The Court of Madrid, therefore, possessed not only the power of neighbourhood, but also family influence, and it was a fit occasion for employing this two-fold medium for driving the English from this part of the Continent. The English, once excluded from Portugal, when the coasts of Prussia, Denmark, Russia, and Sweden were about to be closed against them, when Naples, doomed to submit to the will of France, was going to receive orders to forbid them her ports—the English would soon be excluded from the whole of the Continent.

Such were the proposals which Berthier was ordered t

carry to Madrid. He was cordially received by the king, the queen, the prince of Peace, and by all the grandees of Spain, curious to see the man, whose name always figured beside that of general Bonaparte in the military bulletins of these times. The conditions of France appeared hard, yet no serious resistance could be made to them. D'Urquijo, the minister, alone, fearing the effect which this cession might produce upon the Spaniards, showed rather more opposition than the court. Reasons incontestably good were adduced to make him easy. He was told that it would take a large extent of territory on the yet uninhabited banks of the Mississippi, to form an equivalent for the smallest possessions in Italy; that the Spaniards needed, in the Gulf of Mexico, allies such as the French against the English and the Americans; that, if Louisiana was of great value to France, stripped of all her colonial possessions, it was of scarcely any to Spain, already so rich in the New World; that an increase of influence in Italy would be worth more to Spain than a distant territory, situated in a region where she had more land than she could work and defend; that it was an ancient French possession, wrung from the weakness of Louis XV., and which Charles III. himself, with that upright spirit which was known to all the world, had for a moment refused, so convinced was he that it was not his due. These reasons were excellent, and assuredly, under these circumstances, Spain was not asked to give more than she received. But what decided M. d'Urquijo more than all the best arguments, was the fear of offending France, and thwarting a combination to which his court was attached with a sort of passion.

An eventual treaty was agreed upon. By this treaty, the First Consul promised to obtain for the duke of Parma an increase of dominions in Italy of about 1,200,000 souls; to ensure to him, moreover, the title of king, and the acknowledgment of this new rank by all the sovereigns of Europe, at the general peace. As soon as part of these conditions were fulfilled, Spain, in return, was to cede back to France Louisiana, with the same extent of territory which that province had when it was ceded by Louis XV. to Charles III., and to give, moreover, six ships of the line, rigged, armed, ready to receive their crews. This treaty, signed by Berthier at Madrid, filled the queen with joy, and raised the infatuation of the court of Spain for the First Consul to the highest pitch.

The last condition, which had for its object to force Portugal to break with England, was easy, for it was as accordant with the interests of Spain as with those of France. Spain, in fact, was equally interested with France in weakening the power of England, and above all in excluding her from the Continent. In this the First Consul did no more than rouse her from her unpardonable apathy, and urge her to make use of an influence which she ought long since to have employed. He went still

further in his plans relative to this point: he proposed to Charles IV., if the court of Lisbon should not comply immediately with the injunction given it, to pass the frontiers of Portugal with an army, to seize one or two provinces, and to keep them as pledges, for the purpose of afterwards obliging England to restore the Spanish colonies which she had taken, in order to save the dominions of her ally. For his part, if Charles IV. did not conceive himself strong enough to undertake this enterprise, he offered him the assistance of a French army. That kind-hearted king did not ask for so much. The prince of Brazil was his son-in-law; he had no wish, therefore, to take provinces from him, even though they were only to serve as pledges for the restitution of Spanish provinces. But he addressed to him the most pressing exhortations, and even added threats of war, if his advice was not attended to. The court of Lisbon promised to send a negotiator immediately to Madrid, to confer with the ambassador of France.

Berthier returned to Paris loaded with the favours of the court of Spain, and could assure the First Consul that he had friends entirely devoted to him in Madrid. The magnificent horses sent by Charles IV. arrived nearly about the same time, and were presented to the First Consul in the Place du Carrousel, at one of those great reviews, in which he delighted to show to the Parisians and to foreigners the soldiers who had conquered Europe. An immense concourse of curious persons came to see those beautiful animals and those grooms in splendid liveries, which reminded the spectator of the pageantries of ancient monarchy, and bore evidence to the respect, the extraordinary attentions, of the oldest courts of Europe for the new head of the French Republic.

At this moment, three American negotiators, Messrs. Oliver Ellsworth, Richardson Davie, and Van-Murray, sent to reconcile France and the United States, arrived in Paris. That republic, swayed by interest much more than gratitude, above all, governed at that time by the policy of the federalist party, had drawn closer to Great Britain during the late war, and had been wanting not only to France but likewise to herself in deserting the principles of the maritime neutrality. Forgetful of the treaty of alliance of 1778, to which she owed her existence, a treaty which bound her not to grant to others commercial advantages which were not at the same time extended to the French, she had conceded extraordinary and exclusive advantages to Great Britain. Giving up the principle that "the flag covers the goods," she had admitted that an enemy's property may be searched for on board a neutral bottom, and seized if its origin were ascertained. This conduct was alike impolitic and dishonourable. The Directory, naturally much irritated, had had recourse to the system of reprisals, declaring that France would treat neutrals as they suffered England to treat them. Proceeding

from one harsh step to another, it had come to a state of almost declared war with America, but without actual hostilities.

Such was the state of things which the First Consul had it much at heart to put an end to. We have seen what honours he paid to Washington, with the two-fold intention of producing an effect both at home and abroad: he appointed three plenipotentiaries, his brother Joseph Bonaparte, and the two councillors of state Fleurieu and Rœderer, to arrange matters with the American plenipotentiaries, and earnestly pressed the conclusion of the negotiation, in order to give England very soon a new adversary, by placing another power on the list of those who would engage to cause the true principles of maritime neutrality to be observed. The first obstacle to a reconciliation was the article by which the United States promised to France a share in the commercial advantages granted by her to all nations. This obligation not to concede any thing to others without conceding as much to us, occasioned the Americans great embarrassment. Their negotiators manifested no disposition to yield on this point, but appeared ready to acknowledge and to defend the rights of neutrals, and to re-establish, in their stipulations with France, the principles which they had abandoned in treating with England. The First Consul, who was much more tenacious of the principles of the maritime neutrality than of the commercial advantages of the treaty of 1778, which had become illusory in practice, the First Consul directed his brother to waive the point, and to conclude an arrangement with the American envoys, provided there could be obtained from them a complete and formal recognition of the principles of the law of nations which it was important to enforce. This difficulty removed, the parties soon agreed about all the rest, and at this moment a treaty of reconciliation was preparing to be signed with the United States.

Another reconciliation, of much greater importance still, that of the Republic with the Holy See, began to produce its fruit. The new Pope, elected in the vague hope of an accommodation with France, had beheld this hope, to which he owed his elevation, realised. General Bonaparte, as we have related, returning from Marengo, had transmitted some overtures to Pius VII. through cardinal Martiniana, bishop of Vercelli, assuring him that he had no intention to re-establish the Roman and Parthenopean Republics, instituted by the Directory. He had certainly enough to do in Italy, with the Cisalpine Republic to constitute, to direct, and to defend against the policy and the interests of all Europe. General Bonaparte required in return that the new pontiff should lend the aid of his spiritual authority in re-establishing peace and concord in France. The Pope joyfully received count Alciati, nephew of cardinal Martiniana, who was charged to carry the overtures of the First Consul; he sent him back immediately to Vercelli, to declare, in his name, that, though disposed to co-operate with the First Consul,

in effecting an object so important and so dear to the Church, still he wished first to be made acquainted in a somewhat more precise manner with the views of the French cabinet. The cardinal, in consequence, wrote from Vercelli to Paris, to communicate the dispositions and the wishes of the new Pope. The First Consul, in reply, asked for a negotiator, with whom he could enter into direct explanation, and the Pope immediately appointed Monsignor Spina, bishop of Corinth, nuncio of the Holy See at Florence. This envoy, having first repaired to Vercelli, resolved to set out for France, at the urgent solicitation of the First Consul, who, by bringing this negotiation under his own eye, thought to make the more sure of its success. On the part of the First Consul, it was a ticklish step to bring to Paris a representative of the Holy See, especially in the state of the public mind, which was not yet prepared for a sight of this kind. It was agreed that Monsignor Spina should not have any official title, and that he should profess himself to be bishop of Corinth, charged to treat with the French government on the affairs of the Roman government.

During these negotiations, so actively and so ably conducted with all the powers, M. de St. Julien, who had signed and was the bearer of the preliminaries of peace, had proceeded for Vienna, accompanied by Duroc. Aware of the imprudence of his conduct, he had not concealed from M. de Talleyrand that he was not sure he should be able to take Duroc on to Vienna. The illusion of the minister would not allow him to give heed to this difficulty; and it was agreed that M. de St. Julien and Duroc should take the head-quarters of M. de Kray, established at Alt-Œttingen, near the Inn, in their way, to obtain from that general passports permitting Duroc to enter Austria. They reached the head-quarters on the 4th of August, 1800 (16th Thermidor, year VIII.), but Duroc was detained, and not suffered to pass the limit fixed by the armistice. This was a first and by no means favourable sign of the reception which the preliminaries were likely to meet with. M. de St. Julien then set off alone for Vienna, telling Duroc that he would apply for passports for him and send them to the head-quarters if he obtained them. M. de St. Julien then sought audience of the emperor, and delivered to him the articles which he had signed in Paris, on condition of ratification and secrecy. The emperor was greatly surprised and dissatisfied at the extraordinary latitude which M. de St. Julien had given to his instructions. It was not precisely the conditions contained in the preliminary articles which displeased him: it was the fear of being compromised with England, which had just assisted him with her money, and was extremely suspicious. He was prepared, it is true, to go so far as to communicate part of his intentions, for the purpose of discovering those of the First Consul; but he would not at any price have signed any document whatever, for that would

a negotiation opened without the participation of the British cabinet. Therefore, in spite of the danger of provoking a storm on the part of France, the imperial cabinet resolved to disavow M. de St. Julien. That officer was publicly very ill treated, and sent into a sort of exile in one of the remote provinces of the empire. The preliminaries were considered as null, having been signed, though provisionally, by an agent without character and without powers. Duroc received no passports, and, after waiting till the 13th of August (25th Thermidor), he was obliged to return to Paris.

All this, independently of the delay in the conclusion of peace which it created, was very disagreeable to say to the First Consul; and Austria had reason to fear the effect of such a communication on his irritable character. It was very possible that he might leave Paris immediately, put himself at the head of the armies of the Republic, and march upon Vienna. The court of Austria resolved therefore, while disavowing the preliminaries, not to make a rupture of that disavowal, and to propose to the French government the immediate opening of a congress. Lord Minto, representative of the British cabinet at Vienna, consented to suffer Austria to negotiate, but on condition that England should be a party to the negotiation. It was agreed with him to propose diplomatic conferences in which England and Austria should alike take part. In consequence, M. de Thugut wrote to M. de Talleyrand, under date of the 11th of August (23d Thermidor), that, though disavowing the imprudent conduct of M. de St. Julien, the emperor was nevertheless earnestly desirous of peace; that he, therefore, proposed the immediate opening of a congress, in France itself, at Schelestadt, or Luneville, whichever the French government pleased; that Great Britain was ready to send a plenipotentiary; and that, if the First Consul assented to this, a general peace might soon be restored to the world. The whole was clothed in the language most likely to soothe the impetuous disposition of him who then governed France.

When the First Consul received these tidings, he was highly irritated. He was offended, in the first place, at the disavowal of the officer who had treated with him, and in the next, he saw with mortification that peace was deferred. He perceived, above all, in the presence of England at the negotiation, a cause of interminable delays; for there was much more difficulty in concluding a maritime than a continental peace. On the spur of the moment, and under the influence of a first impression, he was for raising an outcry, denouncing Austria as having violated her faith, and commencing hostilities forthwith. M. de Talleyrand, sensible that he had himself done wrong in treating with a plenipotentiary without powers, endeavoured to pacify the First Consul. The matter was submitted to the Council of State. This great body, which is now nothing more than an administrative tribunal, was then a real council of government.

The minister laid before it a detailed report. "The First Consul," said he in his report, "has thought fit to convoke an extraordinary meeting of the Council of State, and, trusting to its discretion as well as to its wisdom, he has charged me to communicate to it the most minute details of the negotiation which has taken place with the court of Vienna." Having unfolded that negotiation, as one might have done before a council of ministers, M. de Talleyrand acknowledged that the Austrian plenipotentiary had no powers; that, in negotiating with him, the possibility of a disavowal ought to have been foreseen; that, in consequence, there was no establishing a *polemique d'apparat* on this subject; and that a violent outbreak ought to be avoided. But, referring to the example of the negotiations for the peace of Westphalia, which had long preceded the signature of the treaty of Munster, and during which the parties continued to negotiate and fight, he proposed that the opening of a congress should be agreed to, and at the same time that hostilities should be recommenced.

This was, in fact, the wisest course that could be pursued. It was expedient to treat, since the hostile powers had made France an offer to do so, but also to profit by the state of our armies, quite ready to take the field afresh, and that of the Austrian armies not yet recovered from their defeats, to force Austria to negotiate in earnest, and to separate herself from Great Britain.

There was, however, one thing which might be tried that had also its advantages; and the First Consul discovered it with his usual sagacity. England proposed a joint negotiation. In admitting her to a congress, there was the danger of introducing a contracting party in no hurry to conclude, and the danger, more especially, of clogging the continental peace with all the difficulties of the maritime peace: time would, therefore, elapse in negotiations either insincere or rendered more difficult; the season for fighting would be suffered to pass away, and thus the Austrian armies would gain a respite which they greatly needed. These were serious inconveniences. But a compensation might be found for them all; it was this: since England desired to be admitted to the negotiation, to admit her, but on one condition, that of concluding a naval armistice also. If England assented to this, the benefits of the naval armistice would far surpass the inconveniences of the continental armistice; for our fleets, navigating wherever they pleased, would be enabled to provision Malta and to carry soldiers and *matériel* to Egypt. For such an advantage, the First Consul would gladly have run the risk of an extra campaign on the Continent. A naval armistice was no doubt something quite new, quite unusual, in the law of nations; but it was fair that the Anglo-Austrian alliance should pay in some manner for the sacrifice which we made on our part in suspending the march of our legions for Vienna.

We had residing in London a discreet and skilful negotiator, M. Otto, who was there for the purpose of treating of matters relative to the prisoners of war. He had even been chosen by our cabinet, with a view to make use of him on the first occasion, either to make or to listen to overtures. He was instructed specially to address himself to the British cabinet, and plumply propose the question of a naval armistice. In this mode of proceeding the First Consul found the advantage of getting on faster, and of negotiating his business directly, which he always liked to do better than to employ agents. On the 24th of August (6th Fructidor, year VIII.), instructions conformable with this new plan of negotiation were sent to M. Otto. On the same day, the communications from Vienna were answered in a very harsh tone. In this answer, the refusal to admit the preliminaries was attributed to the subsidiary treaty signed on the 20th of June last; the French government disdainfully deplored the dependence in which the emperor was placed in regard to England; it assented to a congress at Luneville, but added, that they must nevertheless fight while negotiating, because, in proposing a joint negotiation, Austria had not taken the precaution to provide, as a natural condition, for a suspension of arms by land and sea. This was one way of inducing Austrian diplomacy itself to make an effort in London for obtaining a naval armistice.

Negotiations were opened in London between M. Otto and captain George, the head of the Transport Office. They lasted during the whole month of September. M. Otto proposed, on the part of France, that hostilities should be suspended by land and sea; that all the vessels both of commerce and war of the belligerent nations should be allowed to sail freely; that the ports belonging to France, or occupied by her armies, such as Malta and Alexandria, should be assimilated to the fortresses of Philipsburg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt, in Germany, which, though blockaded by our armies, were nevertheless to receive provisions and supplies. M. Otto, treating frankly, admitted that France would derive great advantages from this arrangement; but he added, that she ought to have very great advantages, to compensate her for the concession which she made, in suffering the summer to pass away without completing the destruction of the Austrian forces.

The sacrifice required of England in this demand was one which nothing was capable of wringing from her. It would, in fact, be permitting the revictualling of Malta and Egypt, and thus perhaps ensuring for ever those two possessions to France; it would also be permitting the grand combined French and Spanish fleet to leave Brest, to sail into the Mediterranean, and to take a position there, which would render it afresh master of that sea for a longer or a shorter time. England, therefore, could not assent to such a proposal. Still the danger of Austria

touched her deeply; she had an important interest in not suffering her to be crushed; for, if Austria were crushed, general Bonaparte, having the full command of his means, would be able to attempt some formidable enterprise against the British islands. In consequence, she deemed it expedient to make sacrifices to an interest of this kind; and, while crying out against the strangeness of a naval armistice, she presented a counter-project, dated the 7th of September, 1800 (20th Fructidor, year VIII.). To begin with, she assented to Luneville as the place of the congress, and appointed Mr. Thomas Grenville, brother of the minister for foreign affairs, to treat for the general peace. She next proposed the following system respecting the naval armistice. All hostilities were to be suspended by land and sea: the suspension of arms was to extend not only to the three belligerent parties, Austria, England, and France, but to their allies. This arrangement was designed to deliver Portugal from the threatening remonstrances of Spain. The maritime places which were blockaded, such as Malta and Alexandria, were to be assimilated to the places in Germany and to be provisioned every fortnight in proportion to the consumption which had taken place during the interval of time elapsed. The ships of the line lying at Brest and other ports were not to be at liberty to change their station during the armistice.

This counter-project was, on the part of England, rather a testimony of good-will towards Austria than an actual concession on the important point of the negotiation. Malta might, no doubt, gain something by being provisioned for a few months; but Egypt needed no provisions. It was soldiers, muskets, cannon, that it wanted, and not corn, which it had to spare to all the world.

France, however, by yielding on some points, might still find in the naval armistice advantages sufficiently great to induce its acceptance, even with modifications.

On the 21st of September (the 4th complementary day of the year VIII.), the First Consul made a proposal, which was the last. He consented that ships of the line should not be allowed to change their station, which condemned the combined squadron of Spain and France to remain blocked up in Brest; he required that Malta should be revictualled every fifteen days, at the rate of 10,000 rations per day: he consented that Egypt should continue blockaded; but he required that six frigates should have liberty to leave Toulon, to sail to Alexandria, and to return without being searched by the British cruisers.

His intention here was clear enough, and he was right not to disguise an interest, which every one would have guessed at first sight. He meant to arm these six frigates *en flûte*, to load them with men and munitions of war, and to send them to Egypt. He hoped that they might be made to carry 4000 soldiers, a great quantity of muskets, swords, bombs, balls, &c. He had,

therefore, sacrificed every thing, to confine himself to his main object, the revictualling of Malta and the recruiting of the army in Egypt.

But the difficulty, what effort soever might be made on both sides to diminish it, remained at bottom the same. The object was to preserve Malta and Egypt for France, two points upon which England would not give way. Thus there were no means of coming to an understanding. The negotiation was relinquished, on the refusal in London to admit the last plan for a naval armistice.

Before these parleys were definitively broken off, the First Consul, by way of courtesy, made a final proposal to England. He offered to renounce all armistice, and, nevertheless, to treat with her, but in a separate negotiation from that which was about to commence with Austria.

It was now September, 1800. Several months had been spent in sterile negotiations since the victories of Marengo and Hochstett, and the First Consul would not waste any more time without acting.

Austria, when threatened, had replied that she could not force England to sign a naval armistice; that she offered, for her own part, to negotiate immediately; that she had appointed M. de Lherbach to repair to Luneville; that he was about to proceed thither forthwith; that Mr. Thomas Grenville was waiting, on his part, for passports; that they could, therefore, negotiate without delay; but that it was not necessary to resume hostilities during the negotiations, and to spill more torrents of human blood. The First Consul, who perceived the secret intention of protracting till winter should arrive, determined, at length, on resuming hostilities, and had issued his orders accordingly. He had employed to good purpose the two months which had elapsed, and put a finishing hand to the organisation of the armies. His new arrangements in respect to them were as follows:—

Moreau, as we have said, had been obliged to send general St. Suzanne upon the Rhine with some detachments, for the purpose of uniting the garrisons of Mayence and Strasburg, and making head against the partisans raised by baron d'Albini in the heart of Germany. The army of Moreau was in consequence weakened, and, at the same time, the force so collected was insufficient to cover his rear. The First Consul, to ward off all danger in that quarter, had hastened to complete the Batavian army, placed under the command of Augereau. He had formed it of 8000 Dutch and 12,000 French, drawn from the troops which guarded Holland and the departments of the North. These troops, the most worn down by the preceding campaigns, reinvigorated since by rest, reinforced by recruits, now constituted excellent corps. Augereau had marched to Frankfort, where he awed by his presence the Mayence levies of

baron d'Albini and the Austrian detachments left in the environs. This precaution taken, the corps of St. Suzanne reorganised, nearly 18,000 strong, had returned to the Danube, and again formed the left wing of Moreau. His return raised the active army of the Rhine to more than 100,000 men.

When the army of reserve had thrown itself into Italy, it had been obliged to leave behind part of the corps destined to compose it, and for the complete formation of which there had not been time to wait. Instead of an effective force of 60,000 men, as was intended, it had numbered only forty and some odd thousand. The First Consul had formed with these corps left behind a second army of reserve, 15,000 strong, given the command of it to Macdonald, and posted it in the Grisons, facing the Tyrol, which had permitted Moreau to draw him to his right wing, commanded, as the reader is aware, by Lecourbe, and to unite, in case of need, under his hand, the entire mass of his army, if he should have to force the barrier of the Inn.

The army of Italy, on its part, established on the banks of the Mincio by the convention of Alexandria, relieved also by the presence of Macdonald from all concern about Switzerland and the Tyrol, had been enabled to draw its wings closer to its main body, and to concentrate itself in such a manner that it could enter into action at any moment. Composed of the troops which had crossed the St. Bernard, of those which had been drawn from Germany by the St. Gothard, lastly, of the troops of Liguria, which had defended Genoa and the Var, rested and recruited, it presented a total mass of about 120,000 men, 80,000 of whom were assembled on the Mincio. Masséna had at first been appointed commander-in-chief, and he was, in fact, the only one capable of commanding it well. Unfortunately, mischievous dissensions had arisen between the commissariat of the army and the Italian governments. The army, though stationed amidst fertile Italy, and in possession of the rich magazines left by the Austrians, had nevertheless not enjoyed all the plenty to which it was entitled by its long privations. It was alleged that the commissariat officers had sold part of these magazines. The governments of Piedmont and the Cisalpine, moreover, complained that they were drained by war contributions, and refused to pay them. Amidst this confusion, heavy charges were preferred against the French administration; and in these complaints general Masséna himself was included. The clamour soon became so vehement, that the First Consul thought himself obliged to recall Masséna, and to appoint general Brune in his stead. Brune, with abundance of intelligence and courage, was but an indifferent general, and a still more indifferent politician. He was one of the most zealous leaders of the demagogue party, which, however, did not prevent him from being devotedly attached to the First Consul, who was thereby much gratified. Not having had it in his power to assign him an

active command during the spring campaign, the First Consul determined to give him one during the autumn campaign. His victory in Holland caused him to rank high in public estimation; but the recall of Masséna was a misfortune for the army, and for the First Consul himself. Masséna, soured, was about to become, in spite of himself, a subject of hope for a multitude of intriguers, who at this moment were again stirring. The First Consul was aware of this, but he would not suffer irregularities anywhere, and one cannot blame him for it.

To these four armies the First Consul had added a fifth assemblage of troops around Amiens. He had detached from the demi-brigades left in the interior the skeletons of the companies of grenadiers, recruited them with fine men, and formed out of them a superb corps of 9000 or 10,000 picked soldiers, whom he intended to dispatch in haste to the coast, if the English should effect a landing on any part of it, or into Italy, to perform the duty which Augereau was performing in Germany, that of covering the wings and the rear of the principal army. Murat was appointed its commander-in-chief.

All this had been accomplished, as far as related to the recruiting, by means of the levy ordered by the Legislative Body, and, with reference to expense, by means of the financial resources recently created. These different corps were now in want of nothing; they were well fed, well armed; they had horses, and a complete *matériel.*

The First Consul was naturally impatient to avail himself of such means to wring peace from Austria before winter. He, therefore, ordered Moreau and Brune to repair to their head-quarters, and to make preparations for recommencing hostilities. He directed Moreau to give the Austrian general the notice stipulated by the armistice, and not to allow any prolongation of the suspension of arms, unless on one condition, that the emperor should relinquish to the French the three fortresses actually blockaded, Philipsburg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt. On this condition he consented to grant a further respite of five or six weeks. These fortresses, in fact, were worth the sacrifice. Once in possession of them, the French would obtain an excellent base of operation on the Danube; they would be reinforced by the corps which were blockading them; they would, moreover, have time left to push one wing of the army of Italy upon Tuscany and the kingdom of Naples, countries in which levies *en masse* were being raised at the instigation of Austria, and with the money of England. Such were the orders despatched to the head-quarters of Moreau.

The emperor of Germany, on his part, making good use of the time, had employed with the greatest activity the subsidies furnished by England. He hastened the new levies ordered in Bohemia, Moravia, Hungary, Styria, and Carinthia. Wickham, the English minister, had established a sort of offices in several

towns of Germany, for bribing soldiers to fight for the coalition. By means of a fresh subsidy, the Bavarian and Wurtemberg corps had been considerably augmented. Independently of the sums paid to Austria, English recruiting officers had taken into the direct pay of their government two regiments, composed of boatmen plying on the rivers of Germany, and destined to facilitate the passage of them. Ten thousand peasants, hired for the purpose, threw up, under the direction of Austrian engineers, formidable entrenchments along the whole line of the Inn, from the Tyrol to the junction of that river with the Danube. All was bustle from Vienna to Munich. The staff of the Austrian army had been totally changed. M. de Kray, notwithstanding his experience and his vigour on the field of battle, had shared the disgrace of M. de Melas. The archduke Ferdinand himself, who served under him, had been removed. The archduke John, a young prince of highly cultivated mind and very brave, but without experience in war, his head full of theories, his imagination struck by the manœuvres of general Bonaparte, and anxious to imitate him at any rate, had been called to the supreme command of the imperial armies. This was one of those novelties, which people are fond of trying in desperate circumstances. The emperor had repaired in person to the army, to review it, and to excite the spirit of the soldiers by his presence.

He passed several days with the army, accompanied by M. de Lherbach, the negotiator appointed to proceed to Luneville, and by the young archduke John. Having seen every thing, examined every thing, in company with his advisers, he ascertained that nothing was ready, that the army was not yet sufficiently recruited, either in point of *matériel* or courage, for the immediate recommencement of hostilities. M. de Lherbach was, therefore, commissioned to repair to Moreau's head-quarters, to learn whether a prolongation of the armistice for a few days could not be obtained from the French government. M. de Lherbach was informed by Moreau of the conditions fixed by the First Consul for a new suspension of arms. He consented reluctantly to these conditions, and, on the 20th of September (the 3d complementary day of the year VIII.), he concluded a new prolongation of the armistice with general Lahorie, in the village of Hohenlinden, which was destined so soon to become celebrated. The fortresses of Philipsburg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt were to be delivered up to the French army, to be disposed of as it should think fit. In return, the armistice was prolonged for forty-five days, reckoning from the 21st of September, including fifteen days' notice of the resumption of hostilities, if they were once more to recommence.

The emperor returned to Vienna, dissatisfied with the visit which he had been induced to pay to the army, for that visit had been productive of no other result than the surrender to

the French of the three strongest fortresses in the Empire. That prince was overwhelmed with chagrin. His subjects shared his sentiments, and accused M. de Thugut of being a complete tool of England. Queen Caroline of Naples had just arrived with admiral Nelson and lady Hamilton, to support the war party in Vienna; but the public clamour was vehement. M. Thugut was reproached for egregious faults, such as the refusal, at the commencement of winter, to listen to the pacific proposals of the First Consul, the vicious direction of the military operations, his obstinacy in not admitting the existence of the army of reserve, even when it was crossing the St. Bernard, the concentration of the principal forces of the Empire in Liguria, with a view to please the English, who flattered themselves that they should gain possession of Toulon; lastly, the engagement entered into with the British government not to treat without it; an engagement signed on the 20th of June, at a moment when he ought, on the contrary, to have preserved his freedom of action. These reproaches were, in great part, well founded; but, whether founded or not, they had the sanction of events; for nothing had succeeded with M. de Thugut, and nations judge only from results. M. de Thugut was, therefore, obliged to yield to circumstances, and retired, still retaining, however, considerable influence over the Austrian cabinet. M. de Lherbach was appointed to succeed him, and, as envoy to the congress of Lunéville, instead of M. de Lherbach, was selected a well-known diplomatist, M. Louis Cobentzel, who was personally acceptable to general Bonaparte, and who had negotiated with him the treaty of Campo-Formio. Hopes were entertained that M. de Cobentzel would prove a fitter person than any other for establishing amicable relations with the French government, and that, placed at Lunéville, at some distance from Paris, he would occasionally visit that capital, to have direct communication with the First Consul.

The delivery to the French army of the three fortresses of Ulm, Ingolstadt, and Philipsburg, took place most seasonably for the celebration of the fête of the 1st Vendémiaire. It could not fail to revive the hopes of peace, by furnishing evidence of the extremity to which Austria was reduced. This fête, one of the two which the Constitution had retained, was destined to celebrate the anniversary of the foundation of the Republic. The First Consul determined that it should not be less pompous than that of the 4th of July, so opportunely heightened by the presentation to the Invalides of the colours taken in the last campaign; he resolved that it should be distinguished by a character as patriotic, but more serious, from all those which had been given during the course of the Revolution, and, above all, that it should be exempt from the ridicule attached to the imitation of ancient customs in modern times.

Religion, it must be confessed, leaves a great void in the

solemnities of nations, when it is excluded from them. Public games, theatrical representations, and fires, illumining the night with their brightness, may occupy, during several hours, the multitude assembled to rejoice at any joyful occurrence, but cannot fill up an entire day. In all ages, nations have been disposed to celebrate their victories at the foot of their altars, and they have converted their public ceremonies into an act of thanksgiving to the Deity. But altars France then had none. Those which had been erected to the goddess of Reason, during the reign of Terror, those which the Theophilanthropists innocently strewed with flowers, during the licentious system of the Directory, were covered with a ridicule never to be effaced; for, in regard to altars, none are respectable but those which are ancient. Now, the old Catholic altar of France had not yet been restored. Nothing, consequently, was left but ceremonies in some sort academic, beneath the dome of the Invalides; elegant discourses, such as M. de Fontanes could deliver; or patriotic airs, such as a Mehul or a Lesueur could compose. The First Consul, sensible of all this, sought, therefore, to supply the place of the religious feature by a profoundly moral feature.

The homage to Washington, the presentation of the colours taken at Marengo, had already supplied materials for the two fêtes celebrated during his consulship; he contrived to find, in a great reparative act, the subject matter of the fête of the 1st of Vendémiaire, year IX. (23rd September, 1800.)

At the time of the violation of the tombs at St. Denis, the body of Turenne had been found in perfect preservation. Amidst the excesses of the populace, an involuntary feeling of respect had saved these remains from the general profanation. Deposited at first in the Jardin des Plantes, they had afterwards been consigned to the care of M. Alexandre Lenoir, a man, whose pious zeal, worthy of being recorded in history, had preserved for us a multitude of ancient monuments, which he had collected in the museum of the Petits Augustins. There lay these remains of Turenne, exposed to the curiosity, rather than to the respect, of visiters. The First Consul conceived the idea of depositing the relics of this great man beneath the dome of the Invalides, and under the guard of our country's veterans. To glorify an illustrious general and a servant of the ancient monarchy, was reconciling the glories of Louis XIV. with those of the Republic; it was re-establishing respect for the past, without offending the present; it was, in short, the whole policy of the First Consul, under the noblest and the most touching form. This removal was to take place on the last complementary day of the year VIII. (22nd of September), and, on the following day, the first stone of the monument to Kléber and Desaix was to be laid. Thus, at the moment, when our earth, in obedience to the laws which govern its motions, was completing one great century, and giving birth to another, (no less famous in its turn,

if it prove one day worthy of its commencement), at this moment, the First Consul resolved to pay a joint homage to the hero of past times and to the twin heroes of the present time. To render these two ceremonies the more striking, he imitated in some points what had been practised at the Federation of 1790, and desired all the departments to send to him representatives, who, by their presence, should give to these fêtes not merely a Parisian, but a national character. The departments cordially responded to this appeal, and chose distinguished citizens, whom curiosity, a desire to see, with their own eyes, disorder succeeded by tranquillity, the miseries of anarchy by prosperity, and the desire especially to approach and to converse with a great man, drew in great numbers to Paris.

On the fifth complementary day, in the year VIII. (September 22nd), the public authorities repaired to the museum of the Petits Augustins, to fetch the car on which was laid the body of Turenne. On this car, drawn by four white horses, was placed the sword of the hero of the monarchy, preserved in the family of Bouillon, and lent to the government for that noble ceremony. Four old generals, mutilated in the service of the Republic, held the slips of the car; it was preceded by a pie-balled horse, like one which Turenne frequently rode, harnessed as horses were in his time, led by a Black, and offering an accurate representation of some scenes from the age to which this homage was paid. Around the car marched the invalids, followed by some of those fine troops which had just returned from the banks of the Po and of the Danube. This extraordinary and noble procession passed through Paris, amidst an immense concourse, and proceeded to the Invalides, where the First Consul awaited it, surrounded by the envoys of the departments, both those of the old France of Louis XIV., and those of new France; these latter representing Belgium and Luxemburg, the Rhenish provinces, Savoy, and the county of Nice. The precious relique borne by this train was placed under the dome. Carnot, minister of war, delivered a simple and suitable address, and, while music of a solemn kind, pealed through the vaulted edifice, the body of Turenne was deposited beneath the monument where it now reposes and where it was soon to be rejoined by his companion in glory, the illustrious and virtuous Vauban; where he was destined to be joined one day by the author of the great things which we are here relating; where he will certainly remain, surrounded by this august company, throughout the ages which Heaven may reserve for France.

If, in times like ours, when faith is quenched, any thing can supply its place and equal, perhaps, the pomp of religion, it is such spectacles.

On the evening of that day, a gratuitous representation of the Tartuffe and the Cid was given to the people of the capital, with a view to afford them an amusement less coarse than usual.

The First Consul attended the performance. His presence, his intention, instinctively guessed by that impressible and intelligent populace, all concurred to maintain, in that tumultuous assemblage, perfect decorum, a very unusual thing at gratuitous representations. The silence was interrupted only by cries, a thousand times repeated, of "*Vive la République! Vive le général Bonaparte!*"

On the following day, the First Consul, accompanied, as on the preceding, by the public authorities and the envoys of the departments, repaired to the Place des Victoires. There was to be raised a monument in the Egyptian style, destined to receive the mortal remains of Kléber and Desaix, who, according to the intention of the First Consul, were to rest side by side. He laid the first stone, and then proceeded on horseback to the Invalides. There the minister of the interior, who was his brother Lucien, delivered a speech on the state of the Republic, which made a strong impression. Certain passages were highly applauded, among others, the following, relative to the present age and the age of Louis XIV.: "One might say, that at this moment those two great ages have met to express mutual admiration over that august tomb." The speaker, while pronouncing these words, pointed to the tomb of Turenne. He was answered by unanimous applause, proving that all hearts, without derogating from the present, were willing to take again from the past what deserved reviving. And, that the spectacle might be complete, that the ordinary illusions of human nature might have their share in these scenes, otherwise so noble, the orator further exclaimed: "Happy the generation which sees a revolution begun under monarchy terminate in a republic!"

During this ceremony, the First Consul had received a telegraphic despatch, announcing the armistice of Hohenlinden and the cession of the three fortresses of Philipsburg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt. He sent his brother Lucien a note, which was read to those present, and greeted with greater applause than the academic harangue of the minister of the interior. Notwithstanding the respect due to the place, shouts of "*Vive Bonaparte! Vive la République!*" shook the vaults of the noble edifice. An immediate publication of the news in Paris produced a more profound satisfaction than all the rejoicings destined for the amusement of the multitude. People were not afraid of war; they were full of confidence in the genius of the First Consul and in the courage of the French armies, if it must be continued: but, after so many battles, after so many troubles, they wished to enjoy in peace the glory acquired and the prosperity that was beginning to dawn.

That prosperity was, indeed, making rapid advances. If the mere presence of general Bonaparte had sufficed, on the 18th of Brumaire, to soothe, to cheer men's minds, to revive their hopes, the case must be very different now, when the successes

of our armies, the eager advances made by Europe towards us, the prospect of a speedy and a glorious peace, and lastly, tranquillity everywhere restored, had realised the hopes conceived in a first moment of confidence.

These hopes had, in fact, become realities, and it may be said that, in the ten months past, from November, 1799, to September, 1800, the face of France was changed. The public funds, the vulgar but true index to the state of public opinion, had risen from twelve francs (the real price at which five per cent. stock was sold the day before the 18th of Brumaire) to forty francs. They promised to reach fifty.

The stockholders had just received a half-year's dividend in cash, a thing which had not occurred since the commencement of our Revolution. This financial phenomenon had produced a great effect, and it appeared to be not one of the least of the victories of the First Consul. How had he been able to accomplish this prodigy? This was an enigma which the mass of the public explained by that extraordinary power, which he was already said to possess, of doing whatever he pleased.

But there is no miracle in this world: there is no other cause for real successes but sound sense seconded by a strong will. Such too was the sole cause of the happy results obtained by the administration of the First Consul. He had, in the first place, applied a remedy to the real evil, which consisted in the delays in the collection of the taxes: he had, with this view, instituted a special agency for the preparation of the assessments, formerly left too complaisantly to the communes. This special agency, stimulated by the prefects, another creation of the consular government, had made out the assessments in arrear of the year VII. and the year VIII. and finished those for the year IX., the year just entered upon (September, 1800, to September, 1801). Thus, for the first time since the Revolution, the assessments of the current year were about to be put into a train of collection, from the very first day of that year. The receivers-general, having the revenue paid to them punctually, were thus enabled to discharge punctually the monthly bills which they had accepted, and had, in fact, always paid them at the end of every month. We have already said that, to guarantee the solidity of these bills, the Treasury had required of the receivers a security in cash, which security, deposited in the Sinking Fund, was to serve to retire such bills as might be protested. Out of the 20,000,000 composing the total amount of the securities, not more than 1,000,000 had been required for the payment of dishonoured bills. Hence they had obtained immediately a character equal to that of the best commercial paper. At first, they could not be discounted below three-fourths per cent. per month, that is, nine per cent. per annum; now, persons were willing to discount them at eight, and even at seven. This was a very moderate rate, especially

in comparison with that which the government had hitherto been obliged to pay. Now, as the direct contributions in a total budget of 500,000,000 amounted to about 300,000,000, the Treasury had, from the first day of that year's account, had in its hands the 300,000,000 in assets easy to be realised. Instead of receiving nothing, or nearly nothing, as formerly, and receiving but tardily the little that was paid in, it had, from the very 1st of Vendémiaire, the greater part of the public revenue at its disposal. Such had been the result of the preparation of the assessments in proper time, and of that system of bills of exchange drawn, by the name of obligations, on the chests of the receivers-general: by depriving the latter of the pretext of delay in their receipts, the government had been enabled to impose upon them the condition of paying on a fixed day.

The year VIII. which had just closed (September, 1799, to September, 1800), had not been so easily provided for as the year IX. promised to be. It had been necessary to withdraw all the papers previously issued, *bons d'arrérage, bons de réquisition, délégations*, &c. These papers had been withdrawn either by the discharge of anterior contributions, or by means of certain arrangements entered into with the holders. The revenue of the year VIII. had consequently been diminished by so much, and there had resulted a deficit on that year's account. But, the victories of our armies having carried them into the enemy's country, the Treasury was immediately relieved from the burden of their subsistence; and, with some national domains, which began to fetch advantageous prices, the deficit of that year might afterwards be covered. No more *bons d'arrérage* had been issued, for the stockholders were in future to be paid in cash; no more *bons de réquisition*, for the armies were supported either by the French treasury, or by some foreign treasury; lastly, no more *délégations*, for, as we have elsewhere related, the First Consul had adopted an invariable system in regard to persons having claims upon the State: he either gave them nothing or cash; and in cash he already gave them more than the preceding governments. Every week he held a council of finances: at this council he required a statement of the resources, and another of the wants, of each ministerial department, to be laid before him, selecting the most urgent of those wants, and dividing among them the resources which were sure to come in, but nothing more. With this regularity, this firmness of conduct, there was no further necessity for issuing paper; and, throwing no fictitious stock into circulation, the government had ceased to have any to redeem. The receipts of the Treasury, during the year IX., were therefore sure to be in specie.

The public dividends had been paid by the Bank of France. This Bank had existed for only six months, and it was already able to issue notes to a considerable amount, which were taken

by the public as readily as cash. The wants of trade and the conduct of the government towards the new establishment, had occasioned this rapid success. The way in which the thing was done was this. Out of the securities in cash, a million, at most, had been sufficient to support the credit of the obligations. The rest had been left unemployed; and, strong as was the temptation to employ the 18,000,000 or 19,000,000 remaining to satisfy wants, all of which were urgent, the government had not hesitated to impose upon itself the severest privations, in order to devote 5,000,000 to the purchase of Bank shares, the amount of which it had paid immediately. It had not stopped there, but had deposited with it in account current the surplus of the disposable funds. An account current is composed of sums which are paid in on condition that they can be drawn out at pleasure, according to the wants of each day. Having all at once such resources at its disposal, the Bank had lost no time in discounting, in issuing notes, which, always paid in money, if the holders so desired, had acquired in a few months the value of cash. All this may now appear ordinary enough; for we see this phenomenon in every small town operating in the easiest manner, and a great number of banks prospering from the very day of their foundation. But, at that time, after so many bankruptcies, after the aversion which the assignats had excited for paper, it was a sort of commercial prodigy, wrought by a government, which, of all sentiments, particularly inspired that of confidence.

The Treasury then resolved to entrust the Bank with various services advantageous for itself and for the State, especially that of paying the *rentes*. It did this by means of a perfectly simple process. The acceptances of the receivers-general were as good as bills of exchange. The Treasury, therefore, offered the Bank these bills to the amount of about 20,000,000 for discount; an operation highly advantageous to it, for discount was at six or seven per cent., and an operation perfectly safe, as these acceptances had acquired an unexceptionable character. The Bank then undertook the payment of six months dividend to the stockholders, who received from it either cash or notes, at their option.

Thus, in a few months, the government had, by submitting to privations, already raised itself a powerful instrument, which, for an aid of 10,000,000 or 12,000,000 that it had received for the moment, could now render it services to the amount of hundreds of millions.

Financial prosperity, therefore, revived on all sides. The only sensible depression amidst the general well-being was the depression of landed property. In the height of our troubles, the proprietors of land or of houses had enjoyed the advantage of paying no taxes, owing to the delay in making out the assessments, or in paying next to nothing, thanks to the assignats. It was now otherwise. They were now obliged to pay, first the

arrears, next the current assessments, and the whole in cash. For small proprietors, the burden was heavy. Allowance had at first been made for 5,000,000 of non-available assets in the budget, with the intention of exempting the tax-payers who were too hardly pressed; it was found necessary to devote to the same object a much larger sum. It was a kind of profit and loss account opened with the tax-payers, by the operation of which the past was forgiven them, in order that punctual payment of the present might be obtained. Landed property alone cannot support in a State all the public burdens. These must partly be met by excise, and other duties on articles of consumption. The Revolution, by abolishing the taxes on liquors, on salt, and on other articles, had closed one of the two necessary sources of the public wealth. Time had not yet opened it again. This was one of the glories destined at a later period for the restorer of order and of society in France. But he had first a great many prejudices to overcome. By establishing *octrois* at the gates of towns to provide for the wants of the hospitals, he had made a first useful experiment, and which accustomed people to the resumption of a measure, sooner or later indispensable.

Though landed property was for a moment heavily burdened, a general feeling of ease was, nevertheless, diffused among all classes. In all parts people felt themselves regenerated, and they found within them courage for speculation and exertion.

But there was much more to be done in that convulsed society, to restore every thing, not to a perfect state, such as one might aspire to in time, but merely to a state that was endurable. We have just seen what required to be done for the finances: there was another service quite as important and quite as much disorganised as that of the finances, namely, that of the roads. They had become almost impassable. As every body knows, not a few years' but a few months' neglect is sufficient to change into a quagmire the artificial strata which men make upon the earth, for the transport of heavy loads. Now, it was nearly ten years, since the roads in France were left almost without repairs. Under the old government, their repair was provided for by *corvées*, and since the Revolution by means of a sum which figured in the general budget, but had not been paid more punctually than the sums destined for other services. The Directory, seeing how things stood, had been led to the idea of a special resource, which could not be misapplied, and which could never run short: and, to attain this end, it had established a toll for keeping up the roads and erected gates for collecting it. This toll had been farmed to the contractors for the roads themselves, who negligently superintended, defrauded both in the collection of the toll and in the application of the produce of it. Besides, it was insufficient. It yielded at most 13,000,000 or 14,000,000 per annum, and 30,000,000 would have been required. In the three years VI., VII., and VIII. no more

than 32,000,000 had been expended on the roads, and it would have required at least 100,000,000 to remedy the ravages which time had made, and to provide for their annual repair.

The First Consul, adjourning the adoption of a complete system, had recourse to the simplest expedient, that of applying the general funds of the State to the succour of this important service. He continued the toll, the mode of levying it, and its application, confining himself to a stricter superintendence, and gave immediately 12,000,000 upon the year IX., a considerable sum for that time. This sum was to serve for the repair of the principal high roads running from the centre to the extremities of the Republic, from Paris to Lille, from Paris to Strasburg, from Paris to Marseilles, from Paris to Bordeaux, and from Paris to Brest. He proposed to lay out afterwards on other roads a similar amount to what he had thus devoted to them, to augment this grant in proportion to the improved circumstances of the Treasury, at the same time continuing the toll, till the roads of France were restored to the state in which those of every civilised country ought to be.

The canals of St. Quentin and the Ourcq commenced towards the end of the old government, exhibited everywhere the appearance of ditches half filled up, of hills half cut through, of ruins, in short, rather than works of art. He immediately sent engineers to survey them, went thither himself, and ordered definitive plans, with the intention of signalising by works of great public utility the first moments of the speedily expected peace.

It was not merely the wretched state of the roads which rendered them unfit for travelling, but also the robbers by whom they were infested in a great number of provinces. The Chouans, and the Vendeans, unemployed ever since the termination of the civil war, and having contracted habits of life incompatible with peace, pursued the trade of plunder on the high roads of Bretagne, Normandy, and the environs of Paris. Refractory persons running away from the conscription, and some soldiers of the army of Liguria, impelled by privations to desert, were committing the like depredations on the roads of the centre and of the south. Georges Cadoudal, who had returned from England with plenty of money, and was now concealed in the Morbihan, secretly directed this new *chouannerie*. Numerous moveable columns, accompanied by military commissions, were requisite to suppress this disorder. The First Consul had already formed some of these columns, but he had not sufficient troops. While the Directory had kept too many troops at home, he had kept too few. But he said to himself, most justly, that, when he had beaten the enemies abroad, he should soon put down those at home. "Have patience," he replied to those who spoke to him in alarm about this kind of disorder; "give me a month or two; by that time I shall have conquered peace, and then I will do speedy and complete justice upon

those highwaymen." Thus, in every point of view, peace was then the indispensable condition of well-being. Meanwhile, however, he applied himself to remedy the most urgent disorders.

We have already related that he had consented to substitute for the oath formerly required of priests a mere promise of obedience to the laws, which could not offend their consciences in any way. They had immediately availed themselves of this in great numbers, and the clerical functions were at once disputed by the constitutional priests, who had taken the oath to the civil constitution of the clergy, the nonjuring priests, who had given only a promise of obedience to the laws, and, lastly, those who had neither taken the oath nor given the promise. The priests belonging to the first two classes were competitors with one another for obtaining the churches, which were granted to them with more or less facility, according to the extremely variable humour of the local authorities. Those who had refused any sort of declaration, performed the ceremonies of religion clandestinely in private houses, and were held by many stanch Catholics to be its only true ministers. Lastly, to add to the confusion, there were the Theophilanthropists, who also made use of the Catholic churches, and on certain days deposited flowers on those altars, at which the priests had been saying mass. These ridiculous sectaries held festivals in honour of all the virtues, of courage, temperance, charity, &c. On All Saints' day, for example, they celebrated a festival in honour of ancestors. In the eye of strict Catholics this was a profanation of the religious edifices; and sound sense and the respect due to the dominant creeds commanded that it should be done away with.

For putting an end to this chaos, an agreement with the Holy See was requisite; an agreement by means of which those who had taken the oath, those who had given the promise, and those who had refused both, might be reconciled together. But Monsignor Spina, envoy of the Holy See, had but just arrived at Paris, and, surprised to find himself there, kept out of every body's sight. The subject to be discussed was as delicate for him as for the government. The First Consul, discerning with extraordinary tact, the characters of men and the employment for which they were fitted, had opposed to this wily Italian the person most capable of coping with him, namely, the Abbé Bernier, who, after having long directed La Vendée, had at length reconciled it with the government. He had brought him to Paris, attached him to himself by the most honourable of all ties, the desire to contribute to the public welfare, and to share the honour of doing so. To the Abbé Bernier to re-establish a good understanding between France and the Romish Church was like continuing and completing the pacification of La Vendée. The interviews with Monsignor Spina had but just begun, and the government could not promise itself an immediate result.

It was of importance to come to as speedy an arrangement of

religious affairs as possible; for peace with the Holy See was not less desirable for the quiet of people's minds than peace with the great powers of Europe. But, meanwhile, there was a multitude of irregularities, either mischievous or singular, against which the First Consul strove to provide in the best possible manner by consular ordinances. He had already, by his ordinance of the 7th Nivôse, year VIII. (28th of December, 1799), forbidden the local authorities, frequently favourable to the priests, to thwart them in the exercise of their religion. Having charge of the religious edifices, as we have elsewhere observed, they would frequently not allow the priests the use of them on Sundays, but only on Decadis, alleging that the Decadi was the only holiday recognised by the laws of the Republic. The ordinance referred to above had provided for this difficulty, by enjoining the local authorities to give up the edifices for public worship to the priests on the days indicated by each persuasion. But this ordinance had not smoothed all the difficulties relative to Sundays and Decadis. On this point the laws and manners were at variance, a variance which it is necessary to explain, in order to convey an idea of the state of French society at that period.

The Revolution, in its passionate fondness for uniformity and symmetry, had not confined itself to the introduction of uniformity into all measures of length, superfices, and weight, and to the reduction of them to natural and immutable unities, such as a fraction of the meridian, or the specific gravity of distilled water; it had aimed at introducing the same regularity into the measure of time. It had therefore divided the year into twelve equal months, of thirty days each, completing it by the ingenious invention of five complementary days. It had divided the months into three *decades*, or weeks of ten days each, reduced in this manner the days of rest to three per month, and substituted for the four Sundays of the Gregorian calendar the three decadis of the republican calendar. Most assuredly, in all mathematical points of view, this latter calendar was far better than the old one; but it offended religious ideas; it was not that of the generality of mankind, that of history; it could not overcome inveterate habits. The metrical system, after forty years' efforts and legislative restrictions, and notwithstanding its incontestable commercial advantages, has scarcely yet been definitively adopted: how then could there be any hope of supporting the republican calendar against a custom of twenty centuries, against universal usage, against the power of religion? When we reform, we must be content to reform for the purpose of applying a remedy to real sufferings, of re-establishing justice where it is wanting; but to reform for the pleasure of the eye or of the mind, for the purpose of putting a straight line where there is none, is requiring too much of human nature. You may form at pleasure the habits of a child; you cannot remould those of a

grown man. It is the same with nations: you cannot alter the habits of a people after an existence of fifteen centuries.

Accordingly, Sunday was again observed in all quarters. In certain towns, the shops were closed on Sundays, in others on Decadis; frequently in the same town, in the same street, the contrast existed, and exhibited the spectacle of a mischievous conflict of ideas and manners. For the rest, Sunday would have prevailed everywhere, but for the intervention of certain authorities. The First Consul, by a new ordinance of the 7th Thermidor, year VIII. (July 26th, 1800), decided that every one should be at liberty to keep holiday when he pleased, to adopt for a day of rest the day most conformable with his tastes or his religious opinions; and that the public officers, bound to adhere to the legal calendar, should alone be obliged to choose the Decadi for the suspension of their labours. This was ensuring the triumph of Sunday.

The First Consul acted judiciously in encouraging the return to an ancient and general habit, most judiciously, if he designed re-establishing the Catholic religion, as he really did design, and with good reason, to do.

The emigrants again engaged his attention. We have already adverted to their eagerness to return ever since the very first days of the Consulate: this eagerness had kept increasing, on observing what repose France enjoyed, in what security all the inhabitants of its territory lived. But, desirous as the government was to put an end to the proscription launched against them, it was yet necessary, while putting down one disorder, and proscription is one, to avoid falling into another, for a precipitate reaction is a disorder too, and of the most serious nature. These returned emigrants found on their estates either old denouncers, who had contributed to persecute them, or purchasers who had obtained possession of their property with paper: to both these classes they were disquieting enemies, or at least troublesome neighbours; and they were not discreet enough not to abuse the clemency shown to them by the government.

They availed themselves with alacrity of the law passed a few months before, which declared that the list of the emigrants was closed. Those who had been omitted in this list lost no time in profiting by the clause respecting them. As they could no longer be inscribed but by the authority of the ordinary tribunals, which constituted but an inconsiderable danger for them, they lived in quiet, and had almost all returned. Those who had been entered in the list, and whom the law referred to the administrative authorities to claim their erasure, took advantage of the spirit of the times to get their names erased. They applied, in the first instance, for *surveillances*, that is, as we have already explained, the faculty of returning for a time under the superintendence of the political police; they then obtained, from friends, or from complaisant persons, false certificates, attesting

that they had not quitted France during the reign of Terror; that they had only kept concealed to save themselves from the scaffold; and in this manner they obtained their erasure with incredible facility. The list drawn up formerly by the local authorities, with the recklessness of persecution, comprehended 145,000 persons, and formed nine volumes. Now, names were erased with as much recklessness as they had before been inscribed, and the emigrants were reinstated by thousands in all their rights. Some, whose properties had not yet been sold, applied to the members of the government to get the sequestration taken off; they solicited, according to custom, the men whom they abused the day before, whom they would again abuse on the morrow, and frequently madame Bonaparte herself, who had formerly been connected with the French noblesse, in consequence of the rank which she held in society. If the emigrants, whose estates were not sold, recovered them at the price of abject solicitations followed by ingratitude, there was no great mischief in that; but those whose property had been alienated went into the provinces, addressed themselves to the new proprietors, and often, by dint of threats, importunities, or religious suggestions at the pillow of the dying, recovered their family possessions at a low price, by means not much more creditable than those by which they had been despoiled of them.

The tumult was at this moment so general as to attract the attention of the First Consul. He wished to redress the wrongs done by the Revolution, but above all he wished to avoid alarming any of the interests which it had created, and which had become legitimate with time. In consequence, he thought it right to adopt a measure, which was only part of what he did at a later period, but which introduced some order into that chaos of claims, of precipitate returns, and of dangerous attempts. After mature deliberation in the Council of State, the following ordinance was issued on the 20th of October, 1800 (28th Vendémiaire, year IX.).

In the first place, all those previously erased, no matter by what authority, or with what negligence the proceedings in regard to them had been conducted, were validly withdrawn from the list of emigrants. Certain collective inscriptions, under the designation of children or heirs of emigrants, were considered as not having taken place. Women, under the authority of husbands when they quitted France, minors under the age of sixteen years, priests who left the country in obedience to the laws of banishment, persons comprehended under the head of day-labourers, workmen, artisans, or domestic servants; the absent, whose absence was anterior to the Revolution, the Knights of Malta, residing in Malta during our troubles, were all definitively erased. The names of the victims who had perished on the scaffold were also withdrawn from the list: this was a reparation due to their families and to humanity. These modifications

made, those were kept upon the list without exception who had borne arms against France, those who held offices in the civil or military household of the exiled princes, those who had received rank or title from foreign governments, without the authorisation of the French government. The minister of justice was to appoint nine commissioners, the minister of police a like number; to these eighteen commissioners the First Consul was to add nine councillors of State; these twenty-seven persons collectively were charged to make out the new list of emigrants upon the bases indicated. The emigrants definitively erased were obliged to make a promise of fidelity to the Constitution, if they wished to remain in the country, or to obtain the removal of the sequestration from their unsold property. They were condemned to remain under the *surveillance* of the political police till a year after the conclusion of a general peace. This precaution was designed for the protection of the purchasers of national domains. As for the emigrants definitively kept upon the list, nothing could for the present be enacted relative to them: what concerned them was deferred to a later period.

Under existing circumstances, this ordinance comprehended all that could most reasonably be done; it retrenched from the proscription list the great mass of the inscribed; it reduced that list to a small number of the declared enemies of the Revolution, and postponed the decision of the fate of all such to a future period. Thus, when the Republic should be definitively victorious over Europe, universally recognised, solidly established, when the firm determination of the First Consul to protect the purchasers of national domains should have sufficiently dispelled their alarms, the government would probably be able to complete that act of clemency, and at length recall all the proscribed, even those who had been traitors to France. For the moment it went no further than to cut several embarrassing questions and to put an end to many intrigues.

We see what difficulties of all kinds that government had to surmount, to restore order in a subverted society, to be clement and just towards the one, without alarming or being unjust towards others. But toilsome as were its labours, they found their reward in the plaudits, it may be said, of the entire country. In the first days which succeeded the 18th Brumaire, people had thrown themselves into the arms of general Bonaparte, because they sought force, whatever it might be; and because, from the acts of the young general in Italy, they hoped that this force would be enlisted into the service of sound sense and justice. A single doubt was then felt, and somewhat diminished the eagerness to give themselves up to him. Will he keep his place longer than the governments which preceded him? Will he understand how to govern so well as he did how to fight? Will he put an end to the troubles, the persecutions? Will he be of such or such a party? The eleven

or twelve past months had effectually dispelled these doubts. His power was gaining strength from hour to hour; since Marengo, especially, France and Europe bowed under his ascendency. As for his political talents, there was but one voice on that subject among those who approached him; he was, at least, as great a statesman as he was a commander. As for the tendency of his government, that was as evident as his genius. He was of that moderate party which deprecated persecution of every kind, which, disposed to annul some of the things which the Revolution had done, was not for annulling all, but, on the contrary, was determined to uphold its principal results. These doubts removed, people rallied around him with the eagerness of joy and gratitude.

In all parties there are two sets of persons; the one numerous, and honest, whom a man may bring over to himself by realising the wishes of the country; the other, small in number, stubborn and factious, which, far from contenting, you deeply mortify by realising those wishes, because you deprive it of its grievances. With the exception of this latter class, all the parties were satisfied, and lent freely their support to the First Consul, or resigned themselves, at least, to his government, if their cause was irreconcileable with his, as the royalists, for example. The patriots of '89, and ten years before these comprised nearly all France, the patriots of '89, at first hurried on by enthusiasm towards the Revolution, soon borne back at the sight of the bloody scaffold, now disposed to think that they had been mistaken on almost every thing, conceived that they had at length found, under the consular government, all that was possible to be realised in their wishes. The abolition of the feudal system, civil equality, a certain intervention of the country in its affairs, no great deal of liberty, but much order, the triumphant position of France in Europe—all this, very different, it is true, from what they had at first wished for, but now sufficient in their estimation, all this seemed ensured to them. M. de la Fayette, who, in many respects, resembled those men, excepting that he was less convinced—M. de la Fayette, released from the dungeons of Olmütz, through an act of the First Consul's, proved, by his perfectly disinterested assiduities towards him, the esteem which he felt for his government and the adhesion of those who entertained sentiments like his own. As for the more ardent revolutionists, who, without being attached to the Revolution from participation in its condemnable excesses, adhered to it from conviction and from sentiment—these were pleased with the First Consul for being the reverse of the Bourbons and ensuring their definitive exclusion. The purchasers of national domains, though looking black at times, on account of his indulgence towards the emigrants, had no doubt of his resolution to uphold the inviolability of the new properties, and clung to him as to an invincible sword, that secured them from

the only real danger with which they were threatened, the triumph of the Bourbons and the emigrants by means of the arms of Europe.

As for that timid and well-disposed portion of the royalist party, which sought, above all, to be relieved from all further dread of the scaffold, exile, or confiscation, which, for the first time for ten years past, began not to have them before its eyes, it was almost happy, for, with it, to have nothing to fear was almost happiness. All that the First Consul did not yet grant, it finally anticipated from him, if I may so express myself. To see the people in their workshops, the tradesmen at their counters, the nobility in the government, the priests at the altar, the Bourbons in the Tuileries, and general Bonaparte at their side, in the highest station imaginable for a subject, would have been to these royalists perfection. Of these things there were three or four, which already they clearly discerned in the acts and plans of the First Consul. As for the last, that of seeing the Bourbons again in the Tuileries, they were disposed, in their good-natured credulity, to expect it of him, as one of the miracles of his astounding genius; and, if the difficulty of believing that a man would thus give up to others a crown which he held in his hand staggered those possessed of some perspicacity, their resolution was soon taken. "Let him make himself king," said they, "but let him save us, for monarchy alone can save us!" A great man, in default of a legitimate prince, seemed acceptable to them; but a king they must have at any rate.

Thus, by ensuring to the patriots of '89 civil equality; to the purchasers of the national domains, to the stanchest patriots, the exclusion of the Bourbons; to the moderate royalists personal safety, the re-establishment of religion; to all, order, justice, national greatness, he had won the honest and disinterested mass of all the parties.

There was still, what there always is, the implacable portion of these parties, that which Time never changes but by consigning it to the grave. Those who compose it are, in general, the most conscientious, or the most guilty of men, and these are always last upon the breach.

The men who, in the course of the Revolution, had imbrued their hands in blood, or signalised themselves by excesses which it was impossible to forget; others who, though they had nothing wherewith to reproach themselves, had been hurried into demagogue turbulence by the violence of their character or the turn of their mind; the furious Mountaineers, the few survivors of the famous Commune, the old Jacobins and Cordeliers, were irritated in proportion to the success of the new government. They called the First Consul a tyrant, who meant to effect a complete counter-revolution in France, to abolish liberty, to bring back the emigrants, the priests, and even the Bourbons, to make himself their base servant. Others,

less blinded by anger, said that he designed to make himself tyrant for his own aggrandisement, to stifle liberty for his own advantage. He was a Cæsar who ought to fall under the dagger of a Brutus. They talked of daggers, but did nothing but talk of them; for the energy of these men, greatly exhausted by ten years' excesses, began to turn into violence of language. We shall soon see, in fact, that it was not in their ranks that resolute assassins were likely to be found. The police was incessantly at their heels, penetrating into their clandestine meetings, watching them with incessant attention. There were some who wanted nothing but bread; the First Consul, by the advice of Fouché, the minister, cheerfully supplied them with it, or, if they were fit for any thing, he did better, he gave them employment. They then became, according to the account of the others, nothing but wretches sold to the tyrant. If even there were any, who, from sheer fatigue, became a little more calm, as was at this time the case with some notorious personages, such as Santerre, and several others, they were immediately branded with the appellation of hirelings. According to the custom of parties, these incorrigible demagogues sought, among the real or supposed discontented men of the day, the imaginary hero who was to realise their dreams. It is not known from what indications Moreau had appeared to them to be jealous of the First Consul; it was, probably, because he had acquired sufficient glory to be the second personage in the State. They had instantly extolled him to the skies. But Moreau had just arrived in Paris; the First Consul had given him a most flattering reception, made him a present of a pair of pistols, enriched with precious stones, and inscribed with the names of his victories: he was now nothing but a lackey. Brune, the demagogue, at first dear to their hearts, had, by his intelligence, attracted the attention of the First Consul, obtained his confidence, and been appointed to the command of the army of Italy; he, too, was a lackey. Masséna, on the contrary, deprived rather abruptly of the command of that army, was dissatisfied, and could scarcely contain himself; he was immediately declared the future saviour of the Republic, and ought to put himself at the head of the real patriots. Such was the case with Carnot, whom they called a royalist of the 18th of Fructidor, whose proscription they then demanded and obtained, and who, being now deprived of the portfolio of war, again became, in their estimation, a great citizen; such was the case with Lannes, who, it is true, was attached to the First Consul, but was a decided republican, and at times used extremely violent language relative to the return of the priests and of the emigrants; such was the case with M. Sieyès himself—with M. Sieyès odious at first to the republicans for having been the principal accomplice of the 18th of Brumaire, then the butt of their raillery, on account of the disappointment with which the

First Consul had repaid his services, and by this time almost a favourite with them, because, dissatisfied with being a cipher, he showed what he had shown to all the governments—a cold and disapproving mien. Carnot, Lannes, Sieyès, were to join Masséna to set up the Republic again on the first occasion. Lastly, what will strikingly illustrate the silly credulity of the expiring parties, the minister Fouché, one of the two principal advisers of the First Consul, and who had no object to gain—the minister Fouché, because he was well acquainted with these patriots, not afraid of them, and occasionally afforded them relief, knowing that it was rather tongues which needed silencing, than hands disarming—the minister Fouché was to join Masséna, Carnot, Lannes, and Sieyès, to overthrow the tyrant, and save the liberties which were menaced.

The royalist faction had, like the revolutionary faction, its implacable sectaries, equally credulous reasoners, but more formidable conspirators. These were the great nobles of Versailles, who had returned, or were about to return, intriguers charged with the sorry affairs of the Bourbons, going to and fro between France and foreign countries, to frame childish plots, or to earn a little money; lastly, desperadoes, devoted soldiers of Georges, ready for any crimes.

The first, great nobles, accustomed to talk much, attacked by words only the First Consul, his family, and his government. They lived in Paris nearly like foreigners to the country, scarcely deigning to notice what was passing there, sometimes soliciting their erasure from the list of emigrants, or the removal of the sequestration from their unsold property. For this purpose they frequented Madame Bonaparte's, at least such of them as had been acquainted with her when she was the wife of M. de Beauharnais. They went in the morning, never in the evening, were received in the entresol of the Tuileries, which she had fitted up for her private apartments, warm solicitors while there, excusing themselves as soon as they had left for having gone thither, and attributing that step to a strong desire to oblige unfortunate friends. Madame Bonaparte foolishly found pleasure in the society of these equivocal visiters; and her husband, though frequently annoyed by them, nevertheless endured them out of complaisance to his wife, perhaps, too, from a desire to know every thing, and to have communications with all parties. There were few of these solicitors who were not under obligations to the government, either on their own account, or on account of relations; but the freedom of their language was not for this reason at all diminished. All that was done for them was, in their estimation, no more than their due: they had been robbed of their possessions, and, if they were restored to them, this was but a duty, an act of repentance, for which they owed no gratitude to any one. They jeered at every thing and at every body, even at the embarrassment of Madame Bonaparte,

who, if she was proud to be the wife of the first man of the age, seemed almost ashamed of being the wife of the chief of the government, and who was at once too kind and too weak to crush them with the legitimate pride which she ought to have felt. They jeered, we said, at every body, excepting, however, the First Consul, whom they thought a great general, but a middling politician, without consistency in his ideas, favouring the Jacobins one day, the royalists the next, having no will but in war, because war was his profession, and there too, inferior to Moreau, in more than one respect. It is true, he had obtained splendid successes; that those gentlemen admitted; thus far every thing had prospered with him, but how long would that last? Europe, indeed, was now incapable of resisting him; but, though conqueror abroad, would he overcome all the difficulties with which he was surrounded at home? The finances seemed to improve, but paper, which had been the ephemeral expedient of all the revolutionary governments, was also the expedient of his. Nothing was to be seen but bills of the receivers-general, notes of the Bank of France, &c. Would not this new paper end as paper had always ended? The government at this time did make some sort of shift, because the armies were maintained by the conquered countries; but at the peace, when they should return to their own territory, how were they to be provided for? Landed property was grievously burdened, and before long those subject to the taxes neither could nor would pay them. People talked, it was true, of the satisfaction of certain classes, of priests and emigrants, who were well treated by the present government; but that government recalled the emigrants without restoring their property to them. They were enemies whom it brought from abroad into the country, and who were in consequence the more dangerous. It recalled the priests, but without giving them back their altars. To concede every thing by halves in this way, was to confer an obligation one day on people who would not thank you for it the next. Bonaparte, as these royalists called him, for they never deigned to give him his proper title, Bonaparte knew not how to do any thing but in an incomplete manner. He had permitted Sunday to be kept, but he had not dared to abolish the Decadi, and France, left to herself, had returned universally to Sunday. This was not the only ancient custom to which she would return, as soon as an example was set or liberty given. Bonaparte, by re-establishing, now this, then that, was himself commencing a counter-revolution, which would soon hurry him further than he meant to go. Since he was about reviving so much of the past, would he go the length of restoring the monarchy, and even of restoring it for himself, by making himself king or emperor?—if so, he would only render the counter-revolution more certain, by undertaking to effect it with his own hands. On this restored throne there would very soon be wanted those princes who alone were worthy

to fill it; and, in re-establishing the institution, he would have re-established it for the Bourbons.*

It frequently happens that hatred guesses right, because it takes delight in imputing faults, than which nothing is more predicable of human conduct. Only, in its restless impatience, it outstrips time. These shallow tattlers knew not how near they came to the truth; neither did they know that, before their predictions were accomplished, it was decreed that the world should be convulsed for fifteen years, it was decreed that the man of whom they thus spoke should have achieved sublime things, committed prodigious faults, and that, ere the catastrophe arrived, they should have time to belie themselves, to abjure their cause, to forsake the only legitimate princes in their estimation, to serve this ephemeral master, to serve and to adore him; they knew not that, if France should one day return to the feet of the Bourbons, she would approach them as if thrown by the tempest to the foot of a time-honoured tree, but thrown thither only for a moment.

In a lower sphere conspired otherwise than by words the intriguers in the service of the Bourbons, and lower still, but more dangerously, the agents of Georges, with their hands full of money supplied by England. Georges, ever since his return from London, was in the Morbihan, concealing himself from observation, acting the part of a man who retires in resignation to some rural retreat, but implacable in reality, having sworn in his heart, having sworn to the Bourbons, to perish or to destroy the First Consul. To attack in open fight the grenadiers of the consular guard would be hopeless; still there were among the Chouans arms quite ready to have recourse to the last expedient of vanquished parties, that is to assassination. Among them might be found a band ready for any thing, for the blackest crimes as well as the rashest attempts. Georges, still undecided as to the moment and the place which ought to be chosen, kept them to their purpose, communicating with them through trusty persons, giving up to them the high roads for their subsistence, or part of the money received in profusion from the British cabinet.

The First Consul, satisfied with the homage of France, with the unanimous adhesion of the sincere and disinterested men of every party, gave himself little concern about the language of the one class, or the plots of the other. Wholly engrossed by business, he thought little of the empty talk of the idle, though

* This picture of the emigrants of those days is not drawn from imagination. The language which I attribute to them is literally extracted from the voluminous correspondence addressed to Louis XVIII., and brought by that prince to France. Left, during the Hundred Days, at the Tuileries, and subsequently deposited in the archives of the Foreign Office, it furnishes singular evidence of the illusions and of the passions of that time. Some of these letters are very witty, and all very curious.

he was far from being insensible to it; but, for the time being, he was too much absorbed by his task to pay much attention to such language. He thought very little more of the plots directed against his person; he considered them as one of those dangers, which he braved every day on the field of battle with the indifference of fatalism. For the rest, he deceived himself respecting the nature of his danger. Having, on the 18th of Brumaire, wrested the supreme power from the revolutionary party, and having it at the moment for his principal enemy, he threw the blame of all that happened on this party, and seemed to be irritated against it alone. The royalists, at least at that time, were in his eyes but a persecuted party, which it was right to screen from oppression. He was well aware that there were villains among them; but he had contracted the habit, from living with moderate men, of anticipating violence from the revolutionists alone. One of his advisers, however, strove to correct this error of his judgment: it was M. Fouché, the minister of the police.

In this government, conducted almost by one man, all the ministers had been cast into the shade, with the exception of two, Messrs. Fouché and de Talleyrand. They alone were, at times, faintly discernible through the halo of glory which encircled general Bonaparte, and the dazzling effulgence of which threw all around him into comparative obscurity. General Berthier had just succeeded Carnot in the department of war, because he was more supple, more resigned to the modest part of comprehending and rendering the ideas of his chief, which he did with a clearness and a precision truly admirable. It was no slight merit to be the worthy chief of the staff to the greatest captain of the age, and perhaps of all ages. But Berthier, beside the First Consul, could not have any importance as director of the military operations. The navy, at the moment, attracted very little attention. The finances required only the firm and persevering, but unobtrusive application of certain principles of order, laid down once for all. The police, on the contrary, was of great importance, on account of the vast authority with which the government was armed; and, as well as the police, the foreign affairs, on account of the relations to be re-established with the whole world. As for the police, the First Consul needed a man who was acquainted with the parties and with the individuals of whom the parties were composed: this was the cause of the influence acquired by Fouché, the minister. In regard to the foreign affairs, though no person better qualified than the First Consul could be presented to Europe, there needed every moment an agent more mild, more patient than he: and this was the cause of the influence acquired by M. de Talleyrand. Messrs. Fouché and de Talleyrand shared, therefore, the only portion of political credit which the ministers then enjoyed.

The police was not at that period what fortunately it has since become, a mere surveillance, without power, charged solely with warn-

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ing and giving information to justice. It was an immense arbitrary authority deposited in the hands of a single man. The minister of the police could exile these as revolutionists, could recall those as emigrants, fix for all the place of their residence, continue or remove the sequestration from the property of returned emigrants, restore or take away his church from a priest, suppress or reprimand a journal which had displeased him; lastly, point out any person to the mistrust or the favour of a government, which then had an extraordinary number of places to give away, and which soon had the wealth of Europe to distribute among its creatures. The minister of the police, on whom the institutions of the time conferred such attributions, though placed under the supreme and vigilant authority of the First Consul, yet possessed a formidable power over the whole nation.

M. Fouché charged to exercise this power, formerly an Oratorian and a Conventionalist, was an intelligent and a crafty personage, neither good nor wicked, well acquainted with men, especially the bad, and despising them; employing the funds of the police in supporting the agents of troubles as much as in watching them; always ready to procure bread or a place for every person weary of political agitations; thus making friends for the government, and more especially for himself; creating for himself obliged dependents, far superior to credulous and deceitful spies, who never failed to inform him of every thing that it was his interest to know; having persons under obligations to him in all the parties, even among the royalists, whom he knew how to manage, and to repress at the right time; always forewarned, never overrating danger, nor exaggerating it to his master; clearly distinguishing an imprudent man from one really to be feared, knowing when to caution the one, to proceed against the other; in short, managing the police better than it ever was managed, for it consists in disarming animosities as much as in repressing them; a superior minister, if he had had elevated intentions, if his indulgence had sprung from any other principle than an indifference to good and evil, if his activity had proceeded from any other motive than a passion for interfering in every thing, which rendered him irksome and suspicious to the First Consul, and frequently gave him the appearance of a vulgar intriguer. For the rest, his intelligent but ignoble countenance, was a faithful mirror of the qualities and vices of his soul.

The First Consul, chary of his confidence, never granted it freely, especially to men for whom he had no esteem. He made use of M. Fouché, and at the same time distrusted him. Hence he sometimes sought to dispense with or to control him, by giving money to de Bourrienne, his secretary, to Murat, the commandant of Paris, but especially to Savary, his aide-de-camp, in order to compose in this way several contradictory polices. But M. Fouché always contrived to convict these bastard polices of awkwardness and puerility, proved himself alone to be well in-

formed, and, while frequently crossing the First Consul, nevertheless made his peace with him by that manner of treating men in which was mingled neither love nor hate, but an incessant application to wean them, one by one, from an agitated and factious existence.

M. Fouché, half faithful to the revolutionary party, took pleasure in showing indulgence to his old friends, and dared, in reference to them, to contradict the First Consul. Well knowing their moral situation, appreciating, more especially, the villains of royalism, he was incessantly repeating that the danger, if there were any, was from the royalists much more than from the revolutionists, and that they should soon have occasion to perceive this. He had even the merit, but not for a long time, of insisting that it would be well not to forsake the Revolution and its ideas quite so much. Hearing already the flatterers of the day assert, that it was necessary to proceed more rapidly in reaction, to disregard the prejudices of the Revolution, and to return to something that should resemble monarchy, minus the Bourbons, he dared to censure, if not the aim, at least the imprudence with which certain persons pursued that track. While admitting the justice of his opinions, given with good sense, but without frankness and without dignity, the First Consul was struck, but not pleased, with them. He acknowledged the services of this personage, but had no esteem for him.

M. de Talleyrand performed a totally contrary part; he had neither affection for M. Fouché nor resemblance to him. They had both been formerly priests, the one having belonged to the superior, the other to the inferior clergy, and yet they had nothing in common, but their having both taken advantage of the Revolution to cast aside, the former the prelate's robes, the latter the humble gown of the Oratorian professor. How strange, it must be confessed, and how characteristic of that deeply convulsed society, was the spectacle presented by this government, composed of a soldier and two priests, who had abjured their profession, and, though thus composed, having none the less splendour, grandeur, and influence in the world.

M. de Talleyrand descended from a family of the noblest lineage, destined by his birth for the army, doomed to the priesthood by an accident, which deprived him of the use of one foot, having no liking for this imposed profession, successively bishop, courtier, revolutionist, and emigrant, then afterwards minister for foreign affairs under the Directory, M. de Talleyrand had retained something of all these different states; there was to be found in him a touch of the bishop, of the man of quality, and of the revolutionist. Having no firmly fixed opinion, but only a natural moderation, which was opposed to every species of exaggeration; capable of entering at once into the feelings of those whom he wished to please, either from liking or from interest; speaking a unique language peculiar to that society which had Voltaire

for instructor; full of smart, poignant repartees, which rendered him as formidable as he was attractive; by turns caressing or disdainful, demonstrative or impenetrable; careless, dignified, lame without loss of gracefulness, in short, one of the most extraordinary personages, and such a one as a revolution alone can produce, he was the most seducing of negotiators, but at the same time incapable of directing, as head, the affairs of a great State; for every leader should possess a resolute will, settled views, and application, and he had none of these. His will was confined to pleasing, his views consisted in the opinions of the moment, his application was next to nothing. In a word, he was an accomplished ambassador, but not a directing minister: be it understood, however, that this expression is to be taken in its most elevated acceptation. For the rest, he held no other post under the consular government. The First Consul, who allowed no person the right to give an opinion on the affairs of war and of diplomacy, merely employed him to negotiate with the foreign ministers, on basis previously prescribed, and this M. de Talleyrand did with an art that will never be surpassed. He possessed, however, a moral merit, that of being fond of peace under a master who was fond of war, and of showing that he was so. Endowed with exquisite taste, uniting with it unerring tact, and even a useful indolence, he was able to render real services, by simply opposing to the First Consul's exuberance of language, pen, and action, his sobriety, his perfect moderation, and his very propensity to do nothing. But he made little impression on that imperious master, from whom he extorted no respect either by genius or by conviction. Thus he had no more empire than M. Fouché, nay, even less, though quite as much employed, and more agreeable.

Then again, M. de Talleyrand said just the contrary to what M. Fouché said. Attached to the ancient *régime*, minus the persons and the ridiculous prejudices of other times, he recommended the re-establishment of the monarchy as soon as possible, or an equivalent for it, by availing of the glory of the First Consul in lieu of blood-royal, adding that, if we wished to have a speedy and a durable peace with Europe, we ought to make haste to resemble other states. And, while his colleague, Fouché, in the name of the Revolution advised that we should not go too fast, M. de Talleyrand, in the name of Europe, advised that we should not go so low.

The First Consul prized the plain good sense of M. Fouché, relished the graces of M. de Talleyrand, but absolutely believed neither the one nor the other on any subject, and, as for his confidence, had given that, given it wholly and entirely, but not to either of those two men—to his colleague Cambacérès. The latter, with an understanding far from brilliant, had extraordinary good sense, and an unbounded attachment to the First Consul. Having trembled for ten years of his life under pro-

scribers of all sorts, he loved, with a kind of affection, the powerful master, who at length procured him the faculty of breathing at his ease. He loved his power, his genius, his person, from which he had not received, and hoped never to receive, any thing but favours. Acquainted with the weaknesses of men, even of the greatest, he counselled the First Consul, as one ought to counsel when one wishes to be attended to, with perfect sincerity, with extreme discretion, never for the purpose of showing off his own wisdom, but always to be serviceable to a government which he loved as dearly as himself, always approving of all its acts in public, whatever they might be, and never disapproving of them but in private, in an absolute *tête-à-tête* with the First Consul; keeping silence when there was no good to be done, and when censure could be but a vain pleasure of finding fault; sure to speak his mind, and with a courage highly meritorious in a man so extremely timid, when he was in time to prevent a blunder, or influence the general conduct of affairs. And, as if a character which is incessantly under self-restraint must needs be betrayed into some weakness, the consul Cambacérès exhibited a puerile vanity with his inferiors, lived with some subaltern courtiers, who paid him fulsome homage, walked every day in the Palais Royal, in a ridiculously magnificent dress, and sought, in the gratification of a *gourmandise* that has become proverbial, pleasures which were suited to his vulgar but prudent soul. Of what consequence, however, are a few foibles, redeemed by superior reason!

The First Consul cheerfully forgave these foibles in his colleague, and made much of him. He appreciated that superior good sense, which never wished to shine but to be useful, and which threw a tempered and true light upon every thing. He appreciated, above all, the sincerity of his attachment, laughed at his weaknesses, but always with delicacy, and paid him the very high compliment of confiding every thing to him alone, of never being concerned but about his judgment. Hence, he was susceptible of no influence but his—an influence scarcely suspected, and on that account very great.

The consul Cambacérès was qualified more especially to temper his vehemence in regard to persons, and his precipitation in regard to things. Amidst this conflict of two opposite tendencies, one urging to a precipitate reaction, the other, on the contrary, combating that reaction, M. Cambacérès, inflexible when the maintenance of order was in question, was, in every thing else, always a decided advocate for not going too fast. He did not oppose the end to which things were visibly tending, for he kept incessantly repeating, "Let them in due time decree as much power as they please to the First Consul, well and good, but not too soon." He wished especially that reality should always be preferred to appearance, real power to that which was but ostentation. A First Consul, possessing the power to do all that

he pleased for the welfare of the State, seemed to him far superior to a crowned prince, cramped in his action. To act, and to keep out of sight, above all, never to act too quickly, constituted the whole of his wisdom. This most certainly is not genius, but it is prudence; and, for founding a great State, both are requisite.

M. Cambacérès was useful to the First Consul in another way, besides advising him with superior judgment—that of governing the Senate. That body, as we have said, was of immense importance, owing to the patronage vested in it. In the first moments, it had been relinquished, in some measure, to M. Sieyès, as a compensation for the executive power, vested wholly in general Bonaparte. M. Sieyès was at first content to abdicate, but, living on his estate of Crosne, began to feel somewhat vexed at his nullity; for there never was abdication without regret. Had he possessed firmness and consistency, he might have wrested the Senate from the First Consul, who would then have had no resource left but a *coup d'état*. But M. Cambacérès, without noise, without ostentation, insinuating himself by degrees with that body, occupied the ground, which the peevish negligence of M. Sieyès abandoned to him. People knew that it was through him they could come at the First Consul, the source of all favour, and to him they accordingly addressed themselves. Of this he availed himself with infinite and always concealed art, to repress or to regain opponents. But this was done with such discretion, that nobody thought to complain of it. At a time when repose had become true wisdom, when repose was even necessary for reviving one day a taste for liberty, we dare not censure, we dare not give the name of corrupter to the man who, on the one hand, tempered the master imposed by events, and, on the other, checked the imprudences of an opposition without aim, unseasonable, and politically unwise.

As for the consul Lebrun, general Bonaparte treated him with respect, even with affection, but as a person meddling but little with public affairs, the administration excepted. To him he consigned the superintendence over the details of the finances, and charged him to keep him acquainted with the proceedings and the sentiments of the royalists, by whom this third consul was frequently surrounded. He had thus an ear and an eye among them, but only from the mere interest of curiosity as to what might be hatching in that quarter.

To convey an accurate idea of the circle surrounding the First Consul, we must say a word concerning his family. He had four brothers, Joseph, Lucien, Louis, and Jérome. The two latter we shall notice in due time. Joseph and Lucien only were then of any importance. Joseph, the eldest of all, had married the daughter of a wealthy and respectable merchant of Marseilles. He was mild, tolerably acute, agreeable in per-

son, and caused his brother less vexation than any of the others. It was for him that the First Consul reserved the honour of negotiating the peace of the Republic with the States of the old and the new world. He had charged him to conclude the treaty which had been signed with America, and had just appointed him plenipotentiary to Lunéville, thus seeking to assign to him a part which should be popular in France. Lucien, at present minister of the interior, was a clever man, but of an unequal mind, restless, ungovernable, and, though possessing talent, not having sufficient to make amends for what he wanted in point of good sense. Both flattered the propensity of the First Consul to raise himself to the supreme power; and this was but natural. The genius of the First Consul, like his glory, were things personal to himself; one quality only could be transmissible to his family, that was the princely quality, if he should one day assume it, in preference to that of first magistrate of the Republic. His brothers were among those who asserted, with least reserve, that the present form of government was but one of transition, devised to lull revolutionary prejudices; but that he ought to make up his mind, and that, if he wished to found something truly stable, it was indispensably necessary to introduce greater concentration, unity, and durability. The drift of all this was very evident. The First Consul, as every one knows, had no children, which greatly embarrassed those who already dreamt of the transformation of the Republic into a monarchy. It was, in fact, an inconsistency to pretend to be desirous of insuring the regular and natural transmission of the supreme power in the family of a man who had no heirs. Thus though, hereafter, this default of heirs might be a personal advantage for the brothers of the First Consul, it was now an argument against their projects, and they frequently reproached Madame Bonaparte for a misfortune, of which, they said, she was the cause. Having quarrelled with her, from sheer jealousy of her influence, they had not spared her in conversation with her husband, and persecuted her with their remarks, incessantly and loudly repeating that it was absolutely necessary for the First Consul to have a wife who should bring him children, that this was not a private but a public consideration, and that a resolution on this point was indispensable, in order to insure the future welfare of France. They caused these cruel sentiments, pregnant with the most sinister consequences for her, to be repeated by all lips. The wife of the First Consul, apparently so fortunate, was, therefore, at this moment very far from happy.

Joséphine Bonaparte, who had been married first to the count de Beauharnais, then to the young general who had saved the Convention on the 13th Vendémiaire, and now shared with him a place which began to resemble a throne, was a Creole by birth, and had all the graces, all the defects, usual in women who are

so born. Kind-hearted, profuse, and frivolous, not a beauty, but perfectly elegant, and endowed with infinite fascination, she could please much more than women who were superior to her in understanding and personal charms. The levity of her conduct, depicted to her husband in the most unfavourable colours when he returned from Egypt, filled him with anger. He had thoughts of separating himself from a wife whom, right or wrong, he believed to be culpable. She wept a long time at his feet; her two children, Hortense and Eugène Beauharnais, both very dear to general Bonaparte, wept too; he was overcome, and yielded to a conjugal tenderness, which, for many years, was with him paramount to policy. He forgot the real or alleged faults of Joséphine; he loved her still, but not as in the early period of their union. The unbounded extravagance, the vexatious imprudences, in which she daily indulged, frequently excited in her husband gusts of impatience which he could not repress; but he forgave her with the kindness which prosperity inspires, and could not long be angry with a woman, who had shared the first moments of his nascent greatness, and who, from the day of their union, seemed to have brought Fortune along with her.

Madame Bonaparte was altogether a woman of the *ancien régime*, devout, superstitious, nay, a royalist, detesting what she called the Jacobins, who hated her in return; seeking only the society of the ancient nobility, who, returning in throngs, as we have said, used to visit her in the morning. They had known her the wife of an honourable man, pretty high in rank and in military standing, the unfortunate Beauharnais, who died on the revolutionary scaffold; they found her the wife of a *parvenu*, but of a *parvenu* more powerful than any prince in Europe; they did not hesitate to go and solicit favours, while affecting to look down upon her. She was eager to make them partakers of her power, and to render them services. She even took pains to excite in them a sort of illusion which they were fond of indulging, that, in reality, general Bonaparte was only waiting for a favourable occasion to recall the Bourbons, and to restore the inheritance which belonged to them. And, singularly enough, this illusion which she delighted to instil into them, she would almost fain have shared herself; for she would rather have seen her husband a subject of the Bourbons, but a subject the protector of his kings, surrounded by the homage of the ancient French aristocracy, than crowned monarch by the hand of the nation. She was a very faint-hearted woman. Though giddy, she loved that man who covered her with glory, and loved him the more since she was less beloved by him. Not conceiving it possible that he could set his daring foot on the steps of the throne, without falling immediately beneath the dagger of republicans or royalists, she foresaw her children, her husband, and herself, overwhelmed in one general ruin. But, supposing that

he ascended safe and sound to that usurped throne, another fear harrowed her heart—it would not be her lot to share his elevation. If general Bonaparte should some day be made king or emperor, it would evidently be under the pretext of giving a stable government to France, by rendering it hereditary; and unfortunately her physicians left her no hope of ever having more children. She recollected on this subject the extraordinary prediction of a woman, a sort of Pythoness then in vogue,* who had told her: "You will occupy the first place in the world, but only for a short time." She had already heard the brothers of the First Consul pronounce the fatal word, divorce. The victim of grandeur, whom, to judge of her lot from the external splendour by which she was surrounded, the queens of Europe might have envied, was a prey to corroding care. Each advance of fortune added apparently to her happiness, but really augmented her distress; and if she did escape from her keen anxieties, it was by a levity of character which saved her long and intense thought. The attachment of general Bonaparte for her, his gusts of passion, when he gave way to them, repaired the next moment by demonstrations of the greatest kindness, served also to cheer her. Hurried away, moreover, like all the people of that time, by a stupifying whirlwind, she reckoned upon the god of revolutions, upon chance; and, after painful agitations, she returned to the enjoyment of her fortune. She strove, meanwhile, to divert her husband from his ideas of an exaggerated greatness, ventured even to talk to him of the Bourbons, at the risk of raising storms; and, in spite of her partialities, which ought to have led her to prefer M. de Talleyrand to M. Fouché, she had taken a liking to the latter, because, thorough Jacobin as he was, she said, he dared tell the truth to the First Consul; and to tell the truth to the First Consul was, in her estimation, to advise him to uphold the Republic, but to increase at the same time his consular power. Messrs. de Talleyrand and Fouché, thinking to strengthen themselves by penetrating into the family of the First Consul, introduced themselves into it by flattering each as each liked to be flattered. M. de Talleyrand strove to please the brothers, by saying that it was necessary to devise for the First Consul a different position from that which the Constitution conferred on him. M. Fouché, endeavoured to please Madame Bonaparte by saying, that to hurry things would be the height of imprudence, and endanger the loss of all. This method of insinuating themselves into his family, and exciting disharmony by their interference, was excessively displeasing to the First Consul. This feeling he often manifested; and when he had any communication to make to his

* Mademoiselle Le Normand, the celebrated fortune-teller, whom some readers may have visited at her residence, No. 5, Rue de Tournon, Paris. She published, in 1820, *Mémoires Historiques et Secrètes de l'Imperatrice Joséphine*, in two volumes, containing very interesting particulars of her distinguished patroness, and died in 1844.—*Translator.*

relations, he employed his colleague Cambacérès, who, with his accustomed prudence, listened to every thing, but said no more than he was directed to say, and acquitted himself of this kind of commission with equal delicacy and precision.

A very strange circumstance occurred to impart a present and positive feature to all these internal agitations. The prince, who was afterwards Louis XVIII., then an exile, ventured upon a singular and indiscreet step. Many royalists, to account for and excuse their return towards the new government, affected to believe, or really did believe, that general Bonaparte meant to recall the Bourbons. These men, who had not read, or knew not how to read, the history of the English revolution, and to appreciate the terrible lessons with which it abounds, all at once discovered in it an analogy which flattered their hopes; it was the recall of the Stuarts by general Monck. They said nothing about Cromwell, who, however, acted a part great enough not to be forgotten. The unfounded rumour had at length gained currency, and reached Louis XVIII. This prince, endowed with tact and a good understanding, had committed the blunder of writing to general Bonaparte himself, and had transmitted to him several letters which he thought seasonable, but which were not, and which proved only one thing—the ordinary illusions of the emigrants. The first of the letters was as follows:—

"*February* 20*th*, 1800.

"Men such as you, sir, whatever their apparent conduct may be, never excite uneasiness. You have accepted an eminent post, and I am glad you have done so. You know better than any one else how much strength and power are required to secure the happiness of a great nation. Save France from its own frenzy, and you will have fulfilled the first wish of my heart; restore her king to her and future generations will bless your memory. Your services will alway be found too valuable to the state, to admit of my discharging in full, and as I could wish, the debt of my ancestors and my own, by the bestowal of important posts.

"LOUIS."

The First Consul was extremely surprised on receiving this letter, and was for some time undecided whether he ought to reply. It had been transmitted to him by the consul Lebrun, who had received it himself from the Abbé Montesquiou. The First Consul, engrossed by a multiplicity of business, on entering upon the government, had suffered some time to elapse without answering it. The prince, impatient as an emigrant, wrote a second letter, stamped still more with the credulity of his party, still more derogatory to his dignity. It was in these terms:—

"You must long have been aware, general, of the esteem in which I hold you. If you doubt whether I am susceptible of gratitude, mark your own place; fix that of your friends. As for

my principles, they are those of the French character. I am clement by disposition. I shall be so from reason also.

"No, the victor of Lodi, of Castiglione, and of Arcola, the conqueror of Italy and of Egypt, can never prefer a vain celebrity to true glory. You are, nevertheless, losing valuable time: we can insure the repose of France; I say *we*, because I need Bonaparte for this purpose, and he could not accomplish it without me.

"General, Europe observes you, glory awaits you, and I am impatient to restore peace to my people.

"LOUIS."

This time the First Consul thought that he could not help answering. At bottom he had never had any doubt as to the course which he ought to pursue towards the deposed princes. Ambition apart, he considered the recall of the Bourbons as impracticable and fatal. It was from conviction that he repelled them, earnestly as he might otherwise desire to be master of France. His wife had been made acquainted with the incident, so had his secretary; and, though he did them not the honour to admit them to such deliberations, he gave them his motives. His wife had thrown herself at his feet to implore him to leave at least some hope for the Bourbons; he repulsed her angrily, and addressing his secretary, "You do not know those people," said he; "if I were to give them back their throne, they would fancy that they had recovered it by the grace of God. They would soon be surrounded and hurried away by the emigrants; they would overturn, in pretending to remodel, every thing, even what cannot be remodelled. What would become of the numerous interests created since '89? What would become of the purchasers of national domains, and of the leaders of the army, and of all those who have embarked their lives and fortunes in the Revolution? After men, what would become of things? What would become of the principles for which we have fought so hard? All this would perish, but not perish without a struggle; the conflict would be tremendous; thousands of men would perish. No, never will I take so fatal a resolution." He was right. Setting aside all personal interest, he acted judiciously. His dictatorship, which retarded the establishment of public liberty in France, a liberty, however, extremely difficult to establish at that time, his dictatorship completed the triumph of the French Revolution, which Waterloo itself, after a laps of fifteen years, could no longer destroy.

As might be expected, his answer was in unison with his sentiments, and did not hold out more hopes than he meant to give. It is only from the very words of the letter that one can judge of the grandeur of expression with which he replied to the imprudent overture of the exiled prince:—

"Paris, the 20th Fructidor, year VIII. (7 Sept. 1800.)

"I have received your letter, sir, and thank you for the obliging expressions which it contains regarding myself.

"You should renounce all hope of returning to France, you could not do so but over the corses of half a million Frenchmen.

"Sacrifice your individual interest to the repose and happiness of France; history will give you credit for it.

"I am not insensible to the misfortunes of your family; I will contribute with pleasure to the ease and the tranquillity of your retirement. "BONAPARTE."

Some portion of this got abroad, and the personal designs of the First Consul became, in consequence, the more evident.

It is full-often the attempts of parties to stifle an infant power, that accelerate its growth, and encourage it to dare all that it meditates. An attempt more ridiculous than criminal of the republicans against the First Consul, hastened a demonstration quite as ridiculous, on the part of the men who purposed to hurry forward his elevation: both came to nothing.

The patriot declaimers, more noisy and far less formidable than the agents of the Bourbons, met frequently at the house of a man formerly employed by the Committee of Public Welfare, now out of office. His name was Demerville; he talked a great deal, hawked about the pamphlets against the government, and was scarcely capable of doing more. His house was the resort of Aréna, the Corsican, one of the members of the Five Hundred, who had escaped by a window on the 18th Brumaire; of Topino Lebrun, a painter of some talent, pupil of David, participating in the revolutionary extravagance of the artists of that time; and of many Italian refugees, who were exasperated against general Bonaparte, because he protected the pope and did not re-establish the Roman Republic. The principal and the most violent of these latter was a sculptor named Ceracchi. These hot-brained men used to meet at Demerville's, and made use of language the most absurd. It was requisite, they said, to put a finishing hand to the business; they had plenty of people on their side; Masséna, Carnot, Lannes, Sieyès, nay, Fouché himself. There was nothing to do but to strike the tyrant, and all the genuine republicans would speak out; all would unite to raise up the expiring Republic again. But it was necessary to find a Brutus to strike the new Cæsar. Nobody came forward. A soldier out of employ, named Harrel, leading a life of idleness and penury with these declaimers, indigent and discontented like them, appeared to them the man of action whom they needed. They made proposals to him which alarmed him exceedingly. In his agitation, he communicated the matter to a commissary of war, with whom he was somewhat intimate, and who advised him to report all he knew to the government. This Harrel went to M. de Bourrienne, secretary to the First Consul, and general Lannes, commandant of the consular guard. The First Consul, apprised by them, directed the police to give Harrel money and orders to consent to all that his accomplices should propose to him. These miserable conspirators conceived that they had found in him the very

man for executing their purpose; but they thought that one was not sufficient. Harrel offered to bring some others. They agreed to it, and Harrel brought to them some spies of M. Fouché's. After they had fallen into this snare, they thought of procuring daggers to arm Harrel and his companions. This task they took upon themselves, and brought daggers purchased by Topino Lebrun. At length, they chose the place for despatching the First Consul, and this was the Opera, then called the Theatre of the Arts. They fixed the moment, and that was the 10th of October (18th Vendémiaire, year IX.), on which day the First Consul was to attend the first representation of a new opera. The police, being forewarned, had taken its precautions. The First Consul went to the Opera House followed by Lannes, who, watching over him with the most anxious attention, had doubled the guard, and placed the bravest of his grenadiers around his box. The would-be assassins actually came at the time agreed upon, but not all, and not armed. Topino Lebrun was not there, neither was Demerville; Aréna and Ceracchi alone appeared. Ceracchi approached nearer to the First Consul's box than the others, but he had no dagger. The only bold fellows on the spot, and armed, were the conspirators sent by the police to the theatre of crime. Ceracchi and Aréna were apprehended, as were successively all the others, but most of them either at home or in the houses where they had sought refuge.

This affair produced a great sensation; it was not deserving of it. Assuredly the police, which ignorant men, not conversant with such matters, in general charge with fabricating itself such plots as it discovers, the police had not invented this, but it must be admitted, that it had taken too great a part in it. The conspirators wished, without the least doubt, the death of the First Consul, but they were incapable of striking him with their own hands; and, by furnishing them with what was most difficult to be found, pretended perpetrators, they had been led further into the crime than they would have ventured had they been left to themselves. If all this were to have terminated in a severe but only temporary punishment, such as ought to be inflicted on madmen, well and good! but to put them to death on such grounds is more than it is right to do, even when the object is to protect a precious life. But at that time of day people were not so nice; proceedings were immediately instituted, and these were destined to lead the unhappy wretches to the scaffold.

This attempt excited a general alarm. Hitherto there had been seen during the Revolution only what were then called *journées*, or attacks by armed bands; but people now felt secured from such assaults by the military power of the government. They had not yet thought of assassination, or of the possibility of the First Consul being struck unawares, in spite of the guard of grenadiers which surrounded him. The attempt of Ceracchi, the ridiculous part of which was not known, was a

kind of forewarning which terrified all classes. A dread of finding themselves plunged back into chaos seized every body, and generated a sort of enthusiasm in favour of the First Consul. The populace crowded round the Tuileries. The Tribunate, the only one of the assemblies of the State assembled at that moment, since it met every fortnight in the interval between the sessions, repaired thither in a body. All the public authorities followed this example. Great numbers of addresses were sent to the First Consul. They may all be summed up in these words of the municipal body of Paris:

"General," it said, "we beg in the name of our fellow-citizens, to express the deep indignation which they have felt at the news of the attempt meditated against your person. So many interests are involved with your existence, that the plots which have threatened it must necessarily be a subject of public grief, as the vigilance which has preserved it will be a subject of national gratitude and joy.

"That Providence, which in the year VIII. brought you back from Egypt, which at Marengo seemed to protect you from all dangers, which, lastly, on the 18th Vendémiaire, year IX., has just saved you from the fury of assassins, is, permit us to say so, the Providence of France much more than yours. It has not willed that a year so brilliant, so full of glorious events, destined to occupy so large a space in the recollection of men, should terminate all at once in a detestable crime. May the enemies of France cease to seek your destruction and ours! May they submit to that destiny, which, more mighty than all plots, will ensure your preservation and that of the Republic! .... We say nothing to you about the guilty; justice lays claim to them."

These addresses, all cast in the same mould, repeated to the First Consul that he had no right to exercise clemency, that his life belonged to the Republic, and ought to be defended like the public welfare, of which it was the pledge. It must be added that these manifestations were sincere. Every one thought himself in danger along with the First Consul. Every one but the factious wished for his preservation. The royalists believed that, if he were to die, they should be sent back to the scaffold or into exile; the revolutionists imagined that they beheld counter-revolution triumphant through the arms of foreigners.

The First Consul took particular and remarkable pains to diminish the estimate that was formed of the danger to which he had been exposed. He would not have it believed that his life depended on the first comer; and he conceived this to be equally necessary for his safety and for his dignity. In conversing with the authorities deputed to congratulate him, he told them all that the danger, about which they were so much alarmed, had not been serious: he explained to them how, surrounded by the officers of the consular guard and a piquet of his grenadiers, he

was completely secure against the seven or eight wretches who purposed to attack him. He was convinced much more than his words could lead people to suppose of the danger with which his his life was threatened; but he thought it useful to exhibit himself to all imaginations surrounded by the grenadiers of Marengo, and inaccessible amidst them to the weapons of assassins.

More serious plots than this, about which so much fuss was made, and framed by other hands, were preparing in the dark. Under the influence of a vague presentiment, people said to one another, that these attempts would be repeated. Hence the partisans of the First Consul took occasion to insist that something more stable was requisite than an ephemeral power resting on the head of a single man, to which the stab of an assassin's dagger might at any time put an end. The brothers of the First Consul, Messrs. Rœderer, Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely, de Talleyrand, de Fontanes, and many others, held these ideas, some from conviction, others to please the master, all, as it is usually the case, from a mixture of sincere and interested motives. This led to the appearance of a very singular, and very remarkable, anonymous pamphlet, said to have been written by Lucien Bonaparte, but which, from the extraordinary elegance of the language, from the classic knowledge of history, ought to have been attributed to its real author, who was M. de Fontanes. This pamphlet excited so strong a sensation as to deserve mention here. It marks one of the steps taken by general Bonaparte in the career of supreme power. Its title was, "*Parallèle entre César, Cromwell, Monck, et Bonaparte.*" The author first compared general Bonaparte with Cromwell, and found in him no resemblance to that leading personage of the English Revolution. Cromwell, as he said, was a fanatic, a sanguinary leader of a faction, the murderer of his king, victor only in the civil war, conqueror of a few cities or counties of England, in short, a barbarian who had ravaged the universities of Oxford and Cambridge, a clever villain, but no hero. The counterpart to Cromwell in the French Revolution would be Robespierre, if Robespierre had possessed courage, and if, France having nothing to subdue but La Vendée, he had been the conqueror of it. General Bonaparte, on the contrary, having no hand in the evils of the Revolution, had compensated by immense glory for crimes which were not his. He had abolished the barbarous festival instituted in honour of regicide; he was putting an end to the horrors of the revolutionary fanaticism; he honoured the arts and sciences, established schools, opened the temple of the arts. He had not carried on civil war; he had conquered not cities but kingdoms. As for Monck, what had that unsteady mind, that deserter from all parties, who did not know whither he was steering, who wrecked the vessel of the Revolution upon monarchy, as he might have wrecked it on the Republic, what had this sorry personage in common with general Bonaparte, who possessed a mind so firm, and knew so

clearly what he purposed! The title of duke of Albemarle might be enough to satisfy the vulgar vanity of general Monck, "but is it to be supposed that the truncheon of marshal, or the sword of constable, would suffice for the man *before whom the universe stands aghast?* .... Does not every one know that there are certain destinies which call to the loftiest station? .... And besides, were Bonaparte ever to imitate Monck, is it not evident that France would be again plunged into the horrors of a new revolution? The tempests, instead of being allayed, would spring up again on all sides."

After rejecting these comparisons, the author found in the whole range of history no counterpart to general Bonaparte but Cæsar. He discovers in him the same military greatness, the same political greatness, but he discovers also one point of dissimilarity. Cæsar, at the head of the Roman demagogues, had oppressed the party of the honest citizens, and destroyed the Republic; general Bonaparte, on the contrary, had raised in France the party of the honest citizens and put down that of the wicked.

All this was true: the task undertaken thus far by general Bonaparte was much more moral than that of Cæsar.

After all these comparisons, it was necessary to draw a conclusion. Happy the Republic, exclaimed the author, if *Bonaparte were immortal!* "But where," he added, "where are his heirs? where are the institutions capable of upholding his benefits and perpetuating his genius! The destiny of 30,000,000 of human beings hangs on the life of a single man! Fellow countrymen, what would become of you, if at this moment a funeral wail were to announce that this man had ceased to live!"

The author next examined the different chances that might turn up at the death of general Bonaparte. Would the nation return under the yoke of an assembly? but the remembrance of the Convention was there to exclude such a supposition from every mind. Would it throw itself into the arms of a military government? but where was the equal of general Bonaparte? The Republic, no doubt, possessed great generals, but which of them so far eclipsed all the rest as to extinguish all rivalry, and to prevent the armies from slaughtering one another, in behalf of their particular chief? .... In default of the government of assemblies, in default of the government of Prætorians, would the country have recourse to the *legitimate* dynasty, which was on the frontiers, stretching out its arms to France? .... But this would be counter-revolution, and the return of Charles II. and James II. to England, and the blood which flowed at their appearance, were examples sufficient to enlighten nations; and, were more recent examples needed, the late return of the queen of Naples and her imbecile husband to their unfortunate kingdom was a lesson written in characters of blood. *Frenchmen, you are sleeping on the brink of an abyss!* Such were the concluding words of this singular composition.

All that it contained, excepting the flatteries of language, was true; but those truths were very premature, to judge from the impression which they produced. Lucien, minister of the interior, employed the means at his disposal for circulating this pamphlet over all France. He filled Paris and the provinces with it, taking care to conceal its origin. The publication produced a great effect. In reality it said only what every body thought, but it required of France an avowal which a very legitimate pride did not yet permit her to make. Eight years before, the French had abolished a royalty of fourteen centuries, and, were they to come so soon and confess, at the feet of a general of thirty, that they were wrong, and beseech him to revive that royalty in his person! They were willing enough to invest him with a power equal to that of kings, but it was necessary at least to save appearances, were it merely for the sake of the national dignity. True, this young warrior had already gained admirable victories, and already restored, to some extent, security throughout the country, but he had scarcely commenced the reconciliation of parties, the reorganisation of France, the compilation of its laws, and above all he had not yet given peace to the world. There were then many titles yet left for him to acquire, but which he was sure of soon concentrating on his glorious head.

The impression was general and painful. The prefects reported from all quarters that the pamphlet produced a mischievous effect; that it supplied the demagogue faction with some justification; that Cæsars called forth Brutuses; that the publication was imprudent and to be regretted. In Paris the impression was the same. In the Council of State the disapprobation was not concealed. The First Consul, whether he had been concerned in the pamphlet, or whether he had been compromised without his knowledge by impatient and unskilful friends, deemed it incumbent on him to disavow it, especially in the eyes of the revolutionary party. He sent for M. Fouché, and asked him publicly how he could suffer such publications to be circulated. "I know the author," replied the minister. "If you know him you ought to have sent him to Vincennes." "I could not send him to Vincennes," rejoined M. Fouché, "for it is your own brother." At these words general Bonaparte complained bitterly of that brother, who had already compromised him oftener than once. A feeling of displeasure with Lucien Bonaparte was the consequence. One day, the latter not being punctual at the council of the ministers which was frequently the case, and many complaints being preferred against his administration, the First Consul expressed strong dissatisfaction, and seemed disposed to dismiss him immediately. But Cambacérès advised him not to proceed so harshly, and not to take the portfolio of the interior from Lucien, without giving him a suitable compensation. The First Consul complied. M. Cambacérès contrived the embassy to Spain, and was directed to offer it to Lucien. He had no difficulty in persuading him to

accept it. Lucien set off, and before long the imprudent pamphlet ceased to be thought of.

Thus a first attempt at assassination against the First Consul had provoked in his favour a first attempt at elevation: but the one was as mad as the other was awkward. It was requisite that general Bonaparte should purchase by fresh services an augmentation of authority, which nobody yet defined with precision, but which all foresaw confusedly in the future, and to which he or his friends already aspired in an open manner. At all events his fortune was soon to furnish him, in services rendered, in dangers encountered, with immense claims, which France would no longer resist.

BOOK VII.

HOHENLINDEN.

Peace with the United States and with the Barbary Regencies—Meeting of the Congress of Lunéville—M. de Cobentzel declines a Separate Negotiation, and insists at least on the Presence of an English Plenipotentiary, to mask the real Negotiation between Austria and France—The First Consul, with a view to hasten the Conclusion, orders the Renewal of Hostilites—Plan of the Winter Campaign—Moreau is directed to cross the Inn, and to march for Vienna—Macdonald, with a second Army of Reserve, has Orders to pass from the Grisons into the Tyrol—Brune, with eighty thousand Men, is destined to force the Adige and the Mincio—Plan of the young Archduke John, appointed Generalissimo of the Austrian Armies—His Plan for turning Moreau miscarries through defective Execution—He halts by the way, and purposes to attack Moreau in the Forest of Hohenlinden—Admirable Manœuvre of Moreau's executed in a superior Manner by Richepanse—Memorable Battle of Hohenlinden—Important Results of that Battle—Passage of the Inn, the Salza, the Traun, and the Enns—Armistice of Steyer—Austria promises to sign the Peace immediately—Operations in the Alps and in Italy—Macdonald crosses the Splugen, despite the Perils and Hardships of Winter—His Arrival in the Italian Tyrol—Dispositions of Brune for crossing the Mincio at two Points—Defect in those Dispositions—General Dupont attempts a first Passage at Pozzolo, and draws upon himself alone the Main Body of the Austrian Army—The Mincio is forced after a useless Effusion of Blood—Passage of the Mincio and the Adige—Fortunate Escape of General Laudon in consequence of a Falsehood—The Austrians, being beaten, propose an Armistice in Italy—Signature of that Armistice at Treviso—Renewal of the Negotiations at Lunéville—The Principle of a separate Peace admitted by M. de Cobentzel—The First Consul requires Austria to pay the Expenses of this second Campaign, and imposes harder Conditions than in M. de St. Julien's Preliminaries—He fixes, as his Ultimatum, the Boundary of the Rhine in Germany, the Boundary of the Adige in Italy—Courageous Resistance of M. de Cobentzel—This Resistance, though honourable, causes Austria to lose valuable Time—While the Negotiations are pending at Lunéville, the Emperor Paul, to whom the First Consul has ceded the Island of Malta, claims it from the English, who refuse it—Rage of Paul I.—He invites the King of Sweden to St. Petersburg, and renews the League of 1780—Declaration of the Neutrals—Rupture of all the Northern Powers with Great Britain—The First Consul avails himself of it to force harder Terms upon Austria—He insists, not only upon the Boundary of the Adige, but also on the Expulsion of all the Princes of the House of Austria from Italy—The Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena are to be removed to Germany—M. de Cobentzel at length gives way, and, with Joseph Bonaparte, signs the celebrated Peace of Lunéville, on the 9th of February, 1801—France obtains for the second Time the Boundary of the Rhine, throughout its whole Length, and is left almost Mistress of Italy—Austria is thrust back beyond the Adige—The Cisalpine Republic is to include the Milanese, Mantua, the Duchy of Modena, and the Legations—Tuscany destined for the House of Parma, with the Title of Kingdom of Etruria—The Principle of the Secularisations laid down for Germany—Important Results obtained by the First Consul in the course of fifteen Months.

BOOK VII.

HOHENLINDEN.

JOSEPH BONAPARTE had just signed at Morfontaine, with Messrs. Ellsworth, Davie, and Van-Murray, the treaty which re-established peace between France and the United States. It was the first treaty concluded by the consular government. It was natural that the reconciliation of France with the different powers of the globe should begin with that Republic, to which she had, in a measure, given birth. The First Consul had allowed the difficulties relative to the treaty of alliance of the 6th of February, 1778, to be adjourned; but, on the other hand, he had required the adjournment of the claims of the Americans relative to captured vessels. He judged, and very justly, that, at the moment, he ought to be satisfied with the acknowledgment of the rights of neutrals. This was giving to France one ally more, and to England one enemy more upon the seas; it was a new leaven added to the maritime quarrel, which was arising in the North, and which became from day to day more serious. In consequence, the principal articles of the law of neutrals, such, at least, as they are laid down by France and all the maritime States, were inserted integrally in the new treaty.

These articles were the same to which we have already adverted.

1. *The flag covers the merchandise*—consequently, the neutral can carry the goods of any enemy, without being searched.

2. There is no exception from this rule, unless for contraband of war, and that contraband does not extend to alimentary substances, or to naval stores, timber, pitch, hemp, but solely to manufactured arms and munitions of war, such as "powder, saltpetre, petards, matches, balls, bullets, bombs, grenades, carcasses, pikes, halberts, swords, sword-belts, or accoutrements, pistols, scabbards, cavalry-saddles, harness, cannon, mortars with their carriages, and generally all arms, munitions of war, and implements for the use of troops."

3. Neutral bottoms can sail from any port to any port; there is no exception to their freedom of navigating, unless in regard

to ports *bonâ fide* blockaded; and only those ports are *bonâ fide* blockaded which are guarded by such a force that there is serious danger in attempting to break the blockade.

4. The neutral is bound to submit to search, for the purpose of ascertaining her real character; but the visiting vessel must keep at the distance of cannon-shot, and send only a boat and three men to board her; and, if the neutral is convoyed by a vessel of war, no search can take place, the presence of the admiralty flag being a sufficient guarantee against every species of fraud.

The treaty contained other stipulations of detail, but these four principal clauses, which truly constitute the law of neutrals, were an important victory; for the Americans, in adopting them, were obliged to insist on the application of them to their vessels on the part of the English, or forced to go to war with them.

The signature of this treaty was celebrated with *éclat* at Morfontaine, a beautiful seat, which Joseph, who was richer than his brothers, in consequence of his marriage, had some time before purchased. The First Consul went thither, accompanied by a numerous and brilliant party. Elegant decorations, set up in the mansion and the gardens, everywhere exhibited France and America united. Toasts suited to the occasion were drunk. The First Consul proposed the following: "To the manes of the French and the Americans who died on the field of battle for the independence of the New World." Lebrun proposed, "The union of America with the Northern powers, to enforce respect for the liberty of the seas." Cambacérès gave for the third, "The Successor of Washington."

The French government waited with impatience for the arrival of M. de Cobentzel at Lunéville, to learn whether his court was disposed to conclude peace. The First Consul, if he was not satisfied with the progress of the negotiations, was determined to renew hostilities, let the season be ever so far advanced. Since he had crossed the St. Bernard, he reckoned obstacles as nothing, and thought that men could fight just as well in snow or on ice, as on ground covered with verdure or with crops. Austria, on the contrary, wished to gain time, because she was pledged to England not to make any separate peace before the month of February ensuing, that is, February, 1801 (Pluviôse, year IX.). Extremely apprehensive of the renewal of hostilities, she had just applied for a third prolongation of the armistice. The First Consul had peremptorily refused it, on the ground that M. de Cobentzel had not yet arrived at Lunéville. He was resolved not to concede this point, till the Austrian plenipotentiary should be on the very spot fixed for the negotiation. At length, on the 24th of October, 1800, M. de Cobentzel arrived at Lunéville. He was received on the frontiers and along the whole route with salutes of cannon, and with extraordinary demonstrations of respect. General Clarke had

been appointed governor of Lunéville, to do the honours of the place to the members of the Congress; and, that he might be able to discharge that duty in a suitable manner, a sum of money and some crack regiments had been placed at his disposal. Joseph, on his part, had repaired thither, accompanied by M. de Laforêt, for secretary. No sooner had M. de Cobentzel arrived, than the First Consul, anxious to learn himself the dispositions of the Austrian negotiator, sent him an invitation to come and pass a few days in Paris.* M. de Cobentzel durst not refuse, and proceeded to Paris with great deference. He reached it on the 29th of October. A new prolongation of the armistice for twenty days was at once granted him. The First Consul then conversed with him on the peace, and the conditions upon which it might be concluded. M. de Cobentzel's replies were not very satisfactory on the question of a separate negotiation, and, as to the conditions, he put forward pretensions that were totally out of place. Austria had views in regard to Italy which it was impossible to satisfy, and she expected, if the indemnities promised in Italy by the treaty of Campo-Formio were granted to her in Germany only, she expected that exorbitant concessions of territory should be made to her either in Bavaria, or in the Palatinate, or in Swabia. The First Consul gave way to some sallies of passion. This he had done before in the negotiations of Campo-Formio, with this same M. de Cobentzel; but, with increasing age and power, he controlled himself even less than he had formerly done. M. de Cobentzel complained bitterly, saying that he had never been treated in that manner, either by Catherine, or by Frederick, or by the emperor Paul himself. In consequence, he desired to return to Lunéville, and the First Consul suffered him to depart, imagining that it would be better to negotiate foot by foot with him, through the medium of Joseph. The latter, mild, calm, and tolerably intelligent, was fitter than his brother for this operation of patience.

M. de Cobentzel and Joseph Bonaparte, having met at Lunéville, exchanged their full powers on the 9th of November (18th Brumaire). Joseph had orders to put to him the three following questions:—1. Had he authority to treat? 2. Was he authorised to treat separately from England? 3. Was he to treat for the emperor, in the name of the house of Austria alone, or in the name of the whole Germanic empire?

The powers being exchanged, and found to be valid, for which purpose they were most minutely scrutinised, on account of the misadventure of M. de St. Julien, they entered into explanations concerning the extent of those powers. M. de Cobentzel declared, without hesitation, that he could not treat

* Napoleon said, at St. Helena, that M. de Cobentzel was desirous to come to Paris in order to gain time. His memory deceived him. The diplomatic correspondence proves what I advance.

without the presence of an English plenipotentiary at the congress. As to the question, whether he was to treat for the house of Austria alone, or for the whole Empire, he said that he must refer to Vienna for fresh instructions.

These answers were transmitted to Paris. The First Consul immediately directed M. de Cobentzel to be informed that hostilities should be renewed at the expiration of the armistice, that is to say in the last days of November; that, nevertheless, the congress need not break up; that while the hostilities continued they might negotiate; but that the French armies would not stop in their march till the Austrian plenipotentiary had consented to treat without England.

During these transactions the First Consul had taken a precaution, which had become indispensable, in regard to Tuscany. The Austrian general, Sommariva, had remained there with a few hundred men, agreeably to the convention of Alexandria, but he continued to raise levies *en masse* with English money, At the same moment intelligence was received of a landing at Leghorn of those same English troops, which had so long been on their way from Mahon to Ferrol, from Ferrol to Cadiz. The Neapolitans, on their part, were advancing towards Rome, and the Austrians, spreading themselves in the Legations beyond the limits marked out by the armistice, were thus endeavouring to extend a hand to the Tuscan insurrection. The First Consul, seeing that, while the Austrians were seeking to gain time, they were preparing to place the French army between two fires, directed general Dupont to march upon Tuscany, and Murat, commanding the camp at Amiens, to proceed immediately to Italy. He had several times warned the Austrians what he meant to do, unless they suspended the movements of troops begun in Tuscany; and, perceiving that they paid no attention to these intimations, he had actually given orders accordingly. General Dupont, with Pino's, Malher's, and Carra St. Cyr's brigades, rapidly crossed the Apennines, and occupied Florence; while general Clement marched from Lucca to Leghorn. No resistance was anywhere experienced. Meanwhile, the insurgents assembled in the town of Arezzo, which had already distinguished itself against the French, at the time of Macdonald's retreat in 1799. They were obliged to take it by assault, and to punish it. This was done less severely, perhaps, than it had deserved for its conduct towards our soldiers. All Tuscany was thenceforward submissive. The Neapolitans were stopped in their march, and the English driven from the soil of Italy, at the very moment when they were about to enter Leghorn. Two days afterwards, they landed 12,000 men.

The armies were in motion on all sides, from the banks of the Mayn to the coast of the Adriatic, from Frankfort to Bologna. Notice of hostilities had, moreover, been given. Austria, in alarm, made a last attempt, through the medium of M. de

Cobentzel—an attempt which proved her desire to bring matters to a conclusion, but also the embarrassment resulting from her unfortunate engagements with England. M. de Cobentzel, therefore, addressed himself to Joseph Bonaparte, and, assuming a tone of confidence, asked him several times if the discretion of the French government might be depended upon. Made easy on this point by Joseph, he showed him a letter, in which the emperor, expressing the same fears that he himself had just expressed, relative to the danger of an indiscretion, but, relying upon his knowledge of men and things, authorised him to make the following overture. Austria consented, at length, to detach herself from England, and to treat separately, on two conditions, on which she must insist in the most absolute manner; firstly, inviolable secrecy till the 1st of February, 1801, the period at which her engagements with England terminated, with a formal promise, if the negotiation should miscarry, to give up all the papers written on both sides; secondly, the admission of an English plenipotentiary to Lunéville, to mask the real negotiation by his presence. On these two conditions, Austria consented to treat immediately, and desired a fresh prolongation of the armistice.

The proximity of Paris admitted of an immediate answer. The First Consul would not, at any rate, admit an English negotiator to Lunéville. He consented, however, to suspend hostilities again, on condition of a peace signed secretly, if that suited Austria, but signed within forty-eight hours. The conditions of this peace were already settled, in a great measure, by the discussion on the preliminaries. They were the following:—The Rhine as boundary of the French Republic in Germany; the Mincio for the boundary of Austria in Italy, instead of the Adige, which she had in 1797, but with the cession of Mantua to the Cisalpine; the Milanese, the Valteline, Parma, and Modena to the Cisalpine; Tuscany to the duke of Parma; the Legations to the duke of Tuscany; lastly, as general conditions, the independence of Piedmont, Switzerland, and Genoa. These were the groundwork of the St. Julien preliminaries, with a single difference, the relinquishment of Mantua to the Cisalpine, to punish Austria for the refusal of her ratification. But the First Consul required that the treaty should be signed in forty-eight hours, otherwise he threatened immediate war, and with redoubled vigour. In case of acceptance, he bound himself absolute secrecy till the 1st of February, and to a new suspension of hostilities.

Austria was not disposed either to proceed so expeditiously, or to assent to such sacrifices in Italy. Deceiving herself respecting the conditions which she was able to obtain, she rejected the French proposal. Hostilities were, therefore, renewed immediately. M. de Cobentzel and Joseph remained at Lunéville, waiting, before they made new communications

to one another, for the events that were about to take place at once on the Danube, on the Inn, on the High Alps, and on the Adige.

The renewal of hostilities had been announced for the 28th of November (7th Frimaire, year IX.). Every thing was ready for this winter campaign, one of the most celebrated, and one of the most decisive in our annals.

The First Consul had disposed five armies on the vast theatre of this war. His intention was to direct them from Paris, without putting himself personally at their head. Still he had not renounced the idea of going to Germany or Italy, and assuming the direct command of one of them, if an unforeseen reverse, or any other cause, should render his presence necessary. His equipages were at Dijon, quite ready to start for the point to which he might be obliged to repair.

These five armies were those of Augereau on the Mayn, of Moreau on the Inn, of Macdonald in the Grisons, of Brune on the Mincio, and of Murat on march for Italy, with the grenadiers of Amiens. Augereau had under his command 8000 Dutch, 12,000 French, in all 20,000 men; Moreau 130,000, of whom 110,000 belonged to the active army. The army of this latter had been raised to this considerable force by recruiting, by the return of sick and wounded, and by the junction of St. Suzanne's corps. The delivery of Philipsburg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt, had, moreover, permitted Moreau to concentrate all his troops between the Isar and the Inn. Macdonald had at his disposal 15,000 men in the Grisons. Brune in Italy was at the head of 125,000 soldiers, 80,000 of whom were on the Mincio, 12,000 in Lombardy, Piedmont, and Liguria; 8000 in Tuscany; and 25,000 in the hospitals. Murat's corps formed a force of 10,000 grenadiers. This constituted a total of 300,000 combatants. If we add to this number 40,000 men in Egypt and in the colonies, 60,000 in the interior and on the coasts, we shall find that, since the administration of the First Consul, the Republic numbered nearly 400,000 soldiers under arms. The 300,000 posted on the theatre of war, 250,000 of whom were effective, and capable of acting immediately, were provided with every thing, thanks to the united resources of the Treasury, and the contributions levied in the countries occupied. The cavalry was well mounted, especially that in Germany. The parks of artillery were large, and in admirable condition. Moreau possessed 200 pieces of cannon, Brune 180. We were, therefore, much better prepared than in spring, and our armies had unbounded confidence in themselves.

Enlightened but rigid judges have asked why the First Consul, instead of dividing the whole of his active forces into five corps, had not, according to his own principle, formed two great masses, one of 170,000 men under Moreau, marching for Vienna through Bavaria; the other of 130,000 under Brune,

crossing the Mincio, the Adige, and the Alps, and threatening Vienna by the Friule. This was, indeed, the plan which he adopted in 1805, but the exposition of facts will enable the reader to comprehend his motives, and prove with what a profound knowledge of men and things he understood how to vary the application of the great principles of war according to circumstances.

Our two principal armies, that of Moreau and that of Brune, were posted on the two sides of the Alps, nearly on the same meridian, the first along the Inn, the second along the Mincio. Moreau was to force the line of the Inn, Brune that of the Mincio. These two armies were at least equal in numerical force, immensely superior in moral force, to those which were opposed to them. Between the two lay the chain of the Alps, forming in this part what is called the Tyrol. The Austrians had the corps of general Iller in German Tyrol, and that of general Davidovich in Italian Tyrol. General Macdonald, with the 15,000 men placed under his command, and designated the second army of reserve, was to occupy those two corps, and to attract all their attention, by leaving them uncertain respecting the point of attack which he should choose; for, placed in the Grisons, he had the option of throwing himself directly into German Tyrol, or by the Splugen into Italian Tyrol. The title borne by his army, and the doubts circulated respecting its force, could not but excite apprehensions of some other extraordinary stroke, and it was there to profit by the dread which the passage of the St. Bernard had produced. People had not given sufficient credit to the first army of reserve; they were ready to give too much to the second. Moreau and Brune, thenceforth relieved from all uneasiness about the side next to the Alps, could, without being alarmed for their flanks, push forward with the whole of their forces.

Augereau's little army was destined to watch the levies *en masse* of Franconia and Swabia, supported by the Austrian corps of Simbschen. It covered, therefore, the left and the rear of Moreau. Lastly, Murat, with 10,000 grenadiers and a powerful artillery, was to perform precisely the same part, in regard to Brune, as Augereau was about to perform in regard to Moreau. He was to cover the right and the rear of Brune, against the insurgents of central Italy, the Neapolitans, and the English, &c.

These prudential precautions are such as it is right to take when you are confined within the conditions of ordinary warfare. Now, the First Consul was necessarily confined within them, when he had for executers of his plans two such generals as Brune and Moreau. Moreau, the best of the two, and one of the best in Europe, was, nevertheless, not the man to do what the First Consul, after he became emperor, himself did in 1805, when, collecting a considerable force on the Danube, and

leaving a smaller force in Italy, he swept onwards like a torrent upon Vienna, regardless either about his flanks or his rear, and placing his safety in the overwhelming vigour of the strokes which he dealt to the principal enemy. But Moreau, but Brune, were not men to act thus. It was, therefore, necessary that, in directing them, he should keep within the conditions of methodical warfare; it was necessary to guard their flanks and their rear, to secure them against whatever might happen around them; for neither was capable of controlling accidents by the grandeur and vigour of his resolutions. For this reason it was that Macdonald was placed in the Tyrol, Augereau in Franconia, Murat in central Italy.

These dispositions did not admit of improvement, unless the state of affairs at home had allowed the First Consul to assume, in person, the command of one of the armies; but every body agreed that at this moment he ought not to leave the centre of the government. His absence, during the short campaign of Marengo, had been attended with inconveniences serious enough to prevent him from incurring them again, without absolute necessity.

The dispositions of the Austrians were, in all respects, inferior to ours. Their armies, nearly equal in number to the French forces, were not a match for them in any other respect. They had not yet recovered from their recent defeats. The archduke John commanded in Germany, marshal Bellegarde in Italy. Simbschen's corps, destined to form the nucleus of the levies in Swabia and Franconia, appuyed itself on general Klenau. The latter commanded an intermediate corps, placed *à cheval* on the Danube, connecting itself, on the right, with Simbschen's corps, on the left with the principal army of the archduke. Generals Simbschen and Klenau had, between them, 24,000 men, exclusively of the partisan troops raised in Germany. General Klenau was destined to follow the movements of general St. Suzanne, to approach the archduke if St. Suzanne approached Moreau, to join Simbschen's corps if St. Suzanne should join the little army of Augereau.

The archduke John had with him 80,000 men, of whom 60,000 were Austrians, in advance of the Inn, and 20,000 Wurtembergers or Bavarians, behind the entrenchments of that river. General Iller commanded 20,000 men in the Tyrol, besides 10,000 Tyrolese. Marshal Bellegarde, in Italy, was at the head of 80,000 soldiers, well established behind the Mincio. Lastly, 10,000 Austrians, detached towards Ancona and La Romagna, were to second the Neapolitans and the English, in case these latter should make an attempt upon central or southern Italy. They formed, therefore, a principal force of 224,000 men, which, with the Mayencers, the Tyrolese, the Neapolitans, the Tuscans, and the English, might amount to about 300,000. The First Consul, in causing the Tuscans to be disarmed, in closing

Leghorn against the English, in repressing the Neapolitans, had taken very useful and proper precautions for preventing the augmentation of the hostile forces.

By a sort of mutual resolution, both the belligerent parties prepared to settle the quarrel in Germany, between the Isar and the Inn. The operations commenced on the 28th of November (7th Frimaire), in severe weather, produced by a very cold rain in Swabia, and intense frost in the Alps. While Augereau, advancing by Frankfort, Aschaffenburg, Wurtzburg, and Nuremberg, fought a brilliant action at Burg-Eberach, separated the Mayence levies from Simbschen's corps, and crippled the latter for the rest of the campaign; while Macdonald, after occupying the Austrians for a considerable time towards the sources of the Inn, was preparing, in spite of the season, to cross the great chain of the Alps, with the intention of boldly throwing himself into Italian Tyrol, and facilitating for Brune the attack of the line of the Mincio; Moreau, with the principal mass of his forces, advanced, between the Isar and the Inn, to a field of battle which he had long studied, seeking a decisive engagement with the great Austrian army.

It is necessary to give an accurate idea of the ground on which the French and the Austrians were about to meet, upon one of the most important occasions of our long wars. We have elsewhere described the basin of the Danube, watered by that great river and a series of tributaries, which, descending rapidly from the Alps, come in succession to swell the mass of its waters. These tributaries, we observed, are lines which an Austrian army, intending to cover Vienna, ought to defend, and which a French army, purposing to march on that capital, must force. In the summer campaign, Moreau, as it will be recollected, after penetrating from the valley of the Rhine into that of the Danube, and crossing the Iller, the Lech, the Isar, had halted between the Isar and the Inn. He was master of the course of the Isar, all the principal points of which he occupied; first Munich, then Freising, Moosburg, Landshut, &c. He had advanced beyond that river, and was facing the Inn, occupied in force by the Austrians.

The Isar and the Inn, both issuing from the Alps, run together towards the Danube, separated by an almost invariable distance of between ten and twelve leagues. Proceeding at first, in a northward direction, the Isar to Munich, the Inn to Wasserburg, they both turn off towards the east, till they fall into the Danube; the Isar at Deggendorf, the Inn at Passau. We were masters of the Isar, and it was requisite that we should force the Inn; but the Inn, broad, deep, defended at its outlet from the mountains by the fort of Kufstein, and in the lower part of its course by the fortress of Braunau, covered between these two points by a vast number of intrenchments, the Inn was a difficult barrier to pass. If Moreau attempted to force it

in the upper part of its course, between Kufstein, Rosenheim, and Wasserburg, he would meet with almost insurmountable local difficulties; he would, moreover, have the army of Tyrol on his right flank. If he determined on forcing it in the lower part of its course, between Braunau and Passau, near the point where it falls into the Danube, he would have to run the risk of a lengthened march upon the left, through a difficult, wooded, marshy country, exposing his flank to the Austrian army, which, advancing by Mühldorf and Braunau, might throw itself upon the right wing of the French army. These two inconveniences were judged extremely serious. If the Austrians, taking care to guard themselves properly, and to observe with vigilance all the passes of the Inn, confined themselves to the defensive, Moreau might encounter almost invincible obstacles. But such was not their design. The offensive was resolved upon in the Austrian staff. The young archduke John, with his head full of new theories invented by the Germans, and emulous also to imitate something of the great movements of general Bonaparte, devised a very extensive plan, which was not badly conceived either, in the opinion of competent judges. Unluckily this plan was inapplicable, because it was not based on the accurate appreciation of present circumstances. As far as it has come to our knowledge, it was as follows:—

Moreau was established on the ground which separates the Isar from the Inn. Between Munich and Wasserburg this ground forms an elevated plain, covered with a thick forest, subsides as it approaches the Danube, and, as it sinks, is rent into numerous ravines, continues wooded in some parts, becomes swampy in others, and, in short, is very difficult of access on every side. Moreau was in possession of this plateau, of the forest which covers it, and of the roads that intersect it. From Munich, where he had his head-quarters, two roads lead to the Inn; the one running direct through Ebersburg to Wasserburg, the other in an oblique direction to the left, and passing through Hohenlinden, Haag, Ampfing, and Mühldorf. Both crossed the gloomy forest of pines, which covers that elevated tract. It was in this formidable retreat, formed by a hilly and wooded country, approachable by two roads, both of which were held by Moreau, that an assailing force must needs encounter him. The other roads consisted of only very narrow paths, destined solely for the conveyance of timber, and impassable for the heavy waggon-train of an army.

The young archduke projected a great manœuvre. He purposed not to attack Moreau's position in front, but to turn it, in debouching by the bridges of Mühldorf, Neu-Oetting, and Braunau. Leaving about 20,000 men, Bavarians, Wurtembergers, and Condé's emigrants, to dispute the Inn, he intended to assume the offensive with 60,000 Austrians, and to march on the left of Moreau, through that half woody, half swampy country, which

extends between the Inn and the Isar, near the points where they fall into the Danube. If the young archduke proceeded rapidly through the difficult country by Eggenfelden, Neumarkt, and Wilsburg, and arrived in time at Landshut on the Isar, he would be able to ascend the Isar on our rear, to Freising, cross it at that place, and thence continue his march upon a chain of heights which begins at Dachau, and commands the plain of Munich. Occupying this point, he would dangerously threaten Moreau's line of retreat, and oblige him to evacuate the country between the Inn and the Isar, and to pass through Munich with the utmost haste, in order to take a retrograde position on the Lech. But, to insure the success of such a manœuvre, one must have correctly calculated all the means of execution, and, after engaging in it, great firmness was requisite for encountering its perilous chances; for there was an almost impassable country to traverse, in horrible weather, and at the same time incessantly skirting an enemy, who was not prompt and daring, it is true, but intelligent, firm, and not easily disconcerted.

The troops of both nations were in motion on the 26th and 27th of November (5th and 6th Frimaire), to commence hostilities on the 28th (7th Frimaire). The Austrian general Klenau, stationed on the Danube to support Simbschen against the little army of Augereau, had attracted the attention of general St. Suzanne, commanding Moreau's fourth corps. Being thus both of them removed to a considerable distance from the principal theatre of events, they were on the Danube; general St. Suzanne towards Ingolstadt, general Klenau towards Ratisbon.

Moreau had moved his left wing, 26,000 strong, and under the command of general Grenier, along the high road from Munich to Mühldorf, by Hohenlinden, Haag, and Ampfing, thus making it occupy the slopes of that species of plateau which extends between the two rivers. His centre, which he commanded in person, and which amounted to about 34,000 men,* occupied the direct road from Munich to Wasserburg by Ebersberg. The right wing under Lecourbe, of about 26,000 men, was posted along the upper Inn in the environs of Rosenheim: a division of it observed the Tyrol. Moreau had consequently at hand only his left and his centre, nearly 60,000 men. He had set his army in motion to make a strong reconnoissance from Rosenheim to Mühldorf, and to force the enemy to disclose his intentions. Moreau, unable to anticipate, like general Bonaparte, the designs of his adversary, still less to dictate them, as the latter did, by taking the initiative with a high hand,—Moreau was obliged to grope about to discover what he could, neither divine nor pre-induce. But he advanced prudently, and if he was

* The centre consisted of 30,000 men; but the Polish division of Kniacewitz, which had rejoined general Decaen, and the artillery reserve, must have augmented it to about 34,000 or 35,000 men.

surprised, he repaired expeditiously, and with great calmness, the mischief of the surprise.

The 29th and 30th of November (8th and 9th Frimaire) were spent by the French army in reconnoitring the line of the Inn; by the Austrian army in crossing that line and traversing the low tract between the Inn, the Danube, and the Isar. Moreau forced the Austrian advanced posts to fall back, moved his right under Lecourbe to Rosenheim, his centre, under his own immediate command, to Wasserburg, his left, under Grenier, to the heights of Ampfing. These heights command, but at a great distance, the banks of the Inn. The left of the French army was in some danger; for, following the course of the Inn to Mühldorf, it was fifteen leagues from Munich, while the rest of the army was only ten. Moreau had, in consequence, taken care that it should be supported by a division of the centre, that which general Grandjean commanded. But it was a fault to advance in this manner in three corps, so far separated from one another, in place of marching on the Inn *en masse*, and presenting himself before a single débouché, while he made false demonstrations at several points. This fault had wellnigh been productive of serious consequences.

The Austrian army had passed, at Braunau, Neu-Oetting Mühldorf, and crossed the low tract which has been already mentioned. Part of the archduke's troops, recently arrived, had scarcely had time to rest themselves. They were marching laboriously in that region, sometimes wooded, sometimes intersected by small rivers, the Wils, the Rott, the Isen, which descend from the plateau occupied by the French army. The narrow paths, which is was necessary to follow, were broken up; and it was with the utmost difficulty that the heavy park of waggons could move along them. The young archduke and his advisers, who had not foreseen any of these circumstances, were alarmed at the undertaking, now that it was begun. Our left wing, advanced nearly to Ampfing and Mühldorf, gave them uneasiness, and made them apprehensive lest they should be cut off from the Inn. They designed to turn Moreau, and now they were fearful that they should themselves be turned instead. This danger should have been foreseen, and a new base of operations prepared on the Danube, between Ratisbon and Passau, in case they should be separated from the Inn. But nothing of this kind was done. In every bold operation it is necessary to provide, in the first place, for difficulties of execution, and, in the next, after commencing the execution, to persevere with firmness in what one has planned, for it is very rarely the case that we do not incur ourselves the dangers in which we would involve our adversary. The Austrian staff, from the very outset, was astonished, terrified, at what it had projected, and suddenly changed its plan. Instead of persisting in gaining the Isar, for the purpose of ascending on our rear, it stopped short, and resolved to turn down upon our left, and to give battle immediately.

This was meeting the difficulty in front, and undiminished; for it became necessary, in ascending the bed of the rivers, to climb the elevated ground which we occupied, and then penetrate into the forest, in which we had been for a long time established. The enemy might at first have an advantage over our left wing, which was somewhat endangered, but, this success obtained, he would find our army concentrated in an absolute labyrinth, all the outlets of which it knew and occupied.

Accordingly, on the 1st of December (10th Frimaire, year IX.), the archduke John moved the greater part of his army upon our left by three roads at once; the valley of the Isen, the high road from Mühldorf to Ampfing, lastly, the bridge of Kraiburg on the Inn. The valley of the Isen, commencing on the flanks of the woody plateau, already described, permitted the greatly lengthened position of our left to be turned. A corps of 15,000 men ascended it. Another corps marched direct for the high road from Mühldorf, which, after ascending the heights of Ampfing, leads through the forest to Hohenlinden and Munich. Lastly, a detachment, crossing the Inn at Kraiburg, and passing through Aschau, took in flank our left wing, which had unluckily ventured as far as Ampfing. Forty thousand men were going in a moment to fall upon 26,000.

These 26,000 men, commanded by general Grenier, had to sustain a severe and unequal contest. Ney, who defended the heights of Ampfing, displayed that incomparable energy which distinguished him in war. He performed prodigies of valour, and contrived to retire without serious loss. Threatened by the corps which had passed the Inn at Kraiburg and penetrated into the defile of Aschau, he was fortunately extricated by Grandjean's division, which Moreau, as we have said, had detached from his centre to support his left. Legrand's division, which was in the valley of the Isen, ascended that valley in retrograding upon Dorfen. Moreau, seeing the superiority of the Austrians, had the good sense not to persist, and effected his retreat in the best order.

It is obvious from these first movements that Moreau had not been able to penetrate the designs of the enemy, and that, in advancing upon all the débouchés of the Inn at once, instead of making an attack upon a single point, he had compromised his left. The extraordinary valour of his troops, and the vigour of his lieutenants, who, in execution, were accomplished generals, had made amends for all.

But this was only an insignificant beginning. Moreau had abandoned the outskirts of his position, and retired to the centre of the extensive forest of Hohenlinden. It would be requisite to force him in this formidable retreat. His coolness and vigour were here about to be pitted against the inexperience of the archduke, flushed by a first success.

We have already said that two roads ran through the forest: one

on the right, descending directly to the Inn, by Ebersberg and Wasserburg; the other, on the left, which passes through Hohenlinden, Mattenboett, Haag, Ampfing, and joins the Inn at Mühldorf, is rather longer. It was along this latter road that the Austrians were proceeding *en masse*, some following the defile which it forms through the forest, others laboriously ascending the beds of the small rivers which gave access to the flank of our position. Moreau immediately formed a judgment, and a sound one, of this situation, and conceived an idea from which he derived great results: it was to allow the Austrians, already engaged with his left, to penetrate into the forest, and then, when they should be pretty far advanced in it, to transfer his centre from the Ebersberg road to the Hohenlinden road, to surprise them in that dangerous place, and to destroy them there. He made his dispositions accordingly.

The road on the left, or the Hohenlinden road, adopted by the Austrians, after leaving the banks of the Inn and ascending the heights of Ampfing, passed over hills, alternately wooded and naked, as far as Mattenboett, then through a thick wood from Mattenboett to Hohenlinden, forming there a long defile bordered by lofty pine-trees. At Hohenlinden itself the forest suddenly ceased. A small plain, free from wood, studded with several hamlets, extended to the right and left of the road; in the middle were the village of Hohenlinden and the post-house. Not only the principal column of the Austrian army, marching in the defile of the forest, but also the detachments ascending the river Isen, for the purpose of debouching by different outlets on the left of our position, would necessarily have to pass this spot.

In this little plain of Hohenlinden, Moreau deployed his left wing under Grenier, Grandjean's division having been previously detached from the centre, with all the reserves of artillery and cavalry.

On the right of the road and village of Hohenlinden he posted Grandjean's division, commanded on this day by general Grouchy; on the left, Ney's division; still further to the left, on the skirt of the wood, and at the head of the roads by which the Austrian columns ascending the valley of the Isen would arrive, Legrand's and Bastoul's divisions, both drawn up in advance of the villages of Preisendorf and Harthofen. The reserves of cavalry and artillery were in rear of these four divisions of infantry, deployed in the middle of the plain. The centre, reduced to Richepanse's and Decaen's two divisions, was at some leagues' distance, on the right-hand road, in the environs of Ebersberg. Moreau sent to those two divisions an order, somewhat vaguely expressed, but positive, to throw themselves from the right-hand into the left-hand road, to get into the latter in the environs of Mattenboett, and there surprise the Austrian army entangled in the forest. This order was neither precise, nor clear, nor circumstantial, as well-conceived and well expressed or-

ders ought to be, and those of general Bonaparte, for instance, invariably were. He neither indicated the route to be pursued, nor provided against any accidents which might occur; he left every thing that was to be done to the intelligence of generals Decaen and Richepanse. They, however, might well be trusted to make up for all that the commander-in-chief omitted to say. Moreau, moreover, directed Lecourbe, who formed his right towards the Tyrol, and general St. Suzanne, who formed his left towards the Danube, to draw near in haste to the spot on which the decisive event of the campaign was about to take place. But one was fifteen leagues off, at least, the other twenty-five, and they were consequently out of reach. It was not thus that general Bonaparte acted on the eve of great battles: on these occasions he did not leave half his forces at such distances. But, to bring up all the parts of which a numerous army is composed in time to the point where the fortunes of war are decided, there is required a superior foresight, which the greatest men alone possess, and without which it is still possible to be an excellent general. Moreau was about to fight nearly 70,000 Austrians with fewer than 60,000 French; this number was more than sufficient, with the soldiers of whom our legions were then composed.

The archduke John, ignorant of all this, was intoxicated with his success on the 1st of December (10th Frimaire). He was young, and he had seen that formidable army of the Rhine, which for many years the Austrian generals had not possessed the skill to stop, falling back before him. He rested on the 2nd of December, which gave Moreau time to make the dispositions which we have just detailed; and he prepared every thing for passing through the extensive forest of Hohenlinden on the 3rd of December (12th Frimaire). This general, rather raw in his profession, imagined that the French army could not make the least resistance to him in the route which he was about to pursue. He conceived at most that he should fall in with it in advance of Munich.

He divided his army into four corps. The principal, that of the centre, composed of the reserve, the Hungarian grenadiers, Bavarians, the greater part of the cavalry, the baggage, and a hundred pieces of cannon, was to follow the high road from Mühldorf to Hohenlinden, to traverse the defile which it forms through the forest, and then debouch in the little plain of Hohenlinden. General Riesch, who had crossed the Inn at Kraiburg, on the 1st of December, with about twelve thousand men, was to flank the centre, and to debouch in the open ground at Hohenlinden, on the left of the Austrians, on the right of the French. At the other extremity of this field of battle, the corps of Baillet-Latour and Kienmayer, which had entered the valley of the Isen, were to continue to ascend it, and to debouch at some distance from one another, the first by Isen upon Kronacker and Preisendorf, the second by Lendorf upon Harthofen; both in

the unwooded plain of Hohenlinden. They had orders not to lose time, to leave even their artillery behind, the corps of the centre taking a great quantity along with it by the principal road, and to carry with them no more baggage than was necessary for making soup for the soldiers.

Thus these four corps of the Austrian army, marching at a considerable distance from each other, in that thick forest, one only, that of the centre, on a high road, with causeway, the three others by paths exclusively destined for the carriage of timber, were to meet in the open space extending between Hohenlinden and Harthofen, exposed to the risk of not arriving together, and of encountering, by the way, many unforeseen adventures. The Bavarians having rejoined the Austrians, the archduke's army amounted, at this moment, to 70,000 men.

On the morning of the 3rd of December, the French were deployed between Hohenlinden and Harthofen. Moreau, on horseback before daybreak, was at the head of his staff, and, a little farther off, Richepanse and Decaen were executing the movement which they were directed to make from the Ebersberg road to that of Hohenlinden.

The four Austrian corps, on their part, advanced simultaneously, each as fast as it could, sensible of the value of time in a season when there is so little daylight either for marching or for fighting. A thick fall of snow darkened the air, and rendered the nearest objects indistinguishable. The archduke John, at the head of the centre, had penetrated into the defile of the forest from Mattenboett to Hohenlinden, and had almost cleared it long before general Riesch, on his left, and generals Baillet-Latour and Kienmayer on his right, could reach the field of battle, embarrassed as they were in those horrible roads. The young prince at length appeared on the margin of the wood facing Grandjean's and Ney's divisions, both drawn up in order of battle, in advance of the village of Hohenlinden. The 108th demi-brigade, of Grandjean's division, was deployed, having on its wings the 46th and the 57th, formed in close column. The 4th hussars and the 6th of the line supported it in the rear. A very brisk cannonade was opened on both sides. The Austrians attacked the 108th, which made a firm resistance. Eight battalions of Hungarian grenadiers were ordered to file through the wood, in order to turn it on its right. On seeing this, generals Grandjean and Grouchy hastened, with the 46th, to the assistance of the 108th, which was shaken, and began to lose ground. They penetrated into the wood, and commenced, among the pine-trees, a desperate struggle, almost man to man, with the Hungarian grenadiers. A battalion of the 57th, pushing still deeper into it, turned the Hungarians, and obliged them to seek refuge in the recesses of the forest. Thus Grandjean's division remained victorious, and prevented the Austrian column from deploying in the plain of Hohenlinden.

After a few moments' rest, the archduke John made a new attack on Hohenlinden, and on Grandjean's division. This second attack was repulsed like the first. At this moment, the Austrian troops of Baillet Latour began to be perceived towards Kronacker, making their appearance on our left, at the margin of the wood, ready to debouch into the plain of Hohenlinden. The snow, having ceased falling for a few minutes, allowed them to be easily discerned. But they were not yet in a state to act, and, besides, Bastoul's and Legrand's divisions were preparing to receive them. All at once, a kind of agitation, a wavering, was perceptible in the Austrian troops of the centre, which had not yet been able to get out of the defile of the forest. Something extraordinary seemed to be taking place on their rear. Moreau, with a sagacity which does honour to his military intuition, remarked this circumstance, and said to Ney, "Now is the moment to charge; Richepanse and Decaen must be upon the rear of the Austrians." He immediately ordered Ney's and Grandjean's divisions, which were on the right and left of Hohenlinden, to form into columns of attack, to charge the Austrians drawn up on the margin of the forest, and to drive them back into that long defile in which they had till then been shut up. Ney charged them in front; Grouchy, with Grandjean's division, took them in flank, and both drove them impetuously into that gorge, where they were crowded together pell-mell, along with their artillery and cavalry.

At this very instant, the events which Moreau had foreseen and prepared were taking place at the other extremity of the defile, at Mattenboett. Richepanse and Decaen, in obedience to the orders which they had received from him, had struck off from the Ebersberg road into that of Hohenlinden. Richepanse, who was the nearest to Mattenboett, had started, without waiting for Decaen, and daringly penetrated into that tract of thickets and ravines which separates the two roads, marching while the fight was going on at Hohenlinden, and making incredible efforts to drag with him, over that inundated ground, six pieces of small calibre. He had already passed, without accident, the village of St. Christoph, when the corps of general Riesch, destined to flank the centre of the Austrians, arrived there; but he had proceeded onward from St. Christoph with a single brigade, leaving the second, Drouet's, engaged with the enemy. Richepanse, reckoning upon Decaen to extricate Drouet's brigade, had marched, without losing a moment, for Mattenboett; for his military instinct told him that there was the decisive point. Though he had left but two demi-brigades of infantry, the 8th and the 48th, a single regiment of cavalry, the 1st chasseurs, and six pieces of cannon, with about 6000 men, he had continued his march, dragging his artillery by hand, almost always through the quagmire. On reaching Mattenboett, at the other extremity of the defile of the forest, the head of which

we have just said that Ney was attacking, he fell in with a body of Austrian cuirassiers, dismounted, with their horses' bridles over their arms; he fell upon them, and made them prisoners. Then deploying on the small open spot which surrounds Mattenboett, he placed the 8th on the right, the 48th on the left, and pushed the 1st chasseurs on eight squadrons of cavalry, which, on seeing him, had formed to charge him. The 1st chasseurs, after a vigorous charge, was repulsed, and fell back behind the 8th demi-brigade. The latter, crossing bayonets, stopped the career of the Austrian cavalry. At this moment, Richepanse's position became critical. Having left behind his second brigade to make head against Riesch's corps, surrounded himself on all sides, he thought that he ought not to give the Austrians time to perceive his weakness. Committing to general Walther, with the 8th demi-brigade and the 1st chasseurs, the duty of keeping in check the enemy's rear-guard, which was preparing to fight, he himself, with the 48th alone, fell to the left, and took the bold resolution to fall upon the Austrian rear in the defile of the forest. Hazardous as was this resolution, it was not less sensible than vigorous; for the archduke's column, entangled in this defile, must have before it the main body of the French army, and, by dashing furiously upon its rear, it was probable that he should produce great disorder in it, and obtain important results. Richepanse immediately formed the 48th into columns, and, marching sword in hand amidst his grenadiers, penetrated into the forest, sustained, without flinching, a violent discharge of grape-shot, then fell in with two Hungarian battalions, which hastened up to bar his passage. Richepanse would have inspirited his brave soldiers with words and gestures, but they had no need of them. "Those fellows are our prisoners," cried they, "let us charge!" They charged accordingly, and completely routed the Hungarian battalions. Presently, they came to masses of baggage, artillery, infantry, accumulated pell-mell at this spot. Richepanse struck inexpressible terror into this multitude, and threw it into frightful disorder. At the same moment, he heard confused shouts at the other extremity of this defile. On advancing, these shouts, becoming more distinct, revealed the presence of our troops. It was Ney, who, marching from Hohenlinden, had penetrated by the head of the defile, and pushed before him the Austrian column, which Richepanse was driving the other way, by attacking it in rear.

Ney and Richepanse met, recognised one another, and embraced, intoxicated with joy on seeing so glorious a result. Their troops rushed, on all sides, upon the Austrians, who sought shelter by flight in the woods, or begged quarter of the conqueror. They took thousands of prisoners, the whole of the artillery, and the baggage. Richepanse, leaving Ney to secure these trophies, returned to Mattenboett, where general Walther had remained with a demi-brigade and a single

regiment of cavalry. He found this brave general, struck by a ball, borne away in the arms of his soldiers, but his countenance beaming with joy, and compensated for his sufferings by the satisfaction of having contributed to a decisive manœuvre. Richepanse extricated his troops, and returned to St. Christoph, where he had left Drouet's brigade alone engaged with Riesch's corps. But all his anticipations were verified on that auspicious day. General Decaen had arrived in time, extricated Drouet's brigade, and repulsed Riesch's corps, after taking from it a great number of prisoners.

It was by this time midday. The centre of the Austrian army had been enveloped and entirely routed. The left, under general Riesch, arriving too late to stop Richepanse, attacked and driven towards the Inn by Decaen, was in full retreat, after sustaining considerable losses. With such results at the centre and on the left of the Austrians, the issue of the battle could no longer be doubtful.

During these events, Bastoul's and Legrand's divisions, posted on the left of the clear ground about Hohenlinden, had had upon their hands the infantry of generals Baillet-Latour, and Kienmayer. These divisions had been hard pressed, for they were inferior by one-half to the enemy; they had, moreover, the disadvantage of ground; for the head of the wooded ravines, by which the Austrians debouched into the little plain of Hohenlinden, being rather higher than that open plain, enabled them to pour a downward fire upon it. But generals Bastoul and Legrand, under the command of general Grenier, seconded by the courage of their brave soldiers, made a vigorous stand. Luckily, too, d'Hautpoul's cavalry was there to support them, as well as Ney's second brigade, the latter general having entered the defile with one only.

The two French divisions, at first overwhelmed by numbers, had lost a little ground. Quitting the margin of the wood, they had fallen back into the plain, but with extraordinary steadiness and displaying to the enemy an heroic firmness. Two demi-brigades of Legrand's division, the 51st and the 42nd, thrown back towards Harthofen, had to oppose Kienmayer's infantry, besides a division of cavalry attached to that corps. Sometimes keeping up a well-sustained fire upon the infantry, at others crossing bayonets against the cavalry, they opposed an invincible resistance to all attacks. But, at this moment, Grenier, being apprised of the success obtained at the centre, formed Legrand's division into columns, caused it to be supported by charges of d'Hautpoul's cavalry, and drove back Kienmayer's corps to the skirt of the wood. General Bonnet, on his side, with a brigade of Bastoul's division, charged the Austrians, and overthrew them in the valley from which they had endeavoured to issue. Meanwhile, the grenadiers of Iola's brigade, Ney's second, rushed upon Baillet-Latour, and repulsed him. The impulsion

of victory communicated to these brave troops, redoubled their ardour and their strength. They finally drove back the two corps of Baillet-Latour, and Kienmayer, the one towards the Isen, the other towards Lendorf, in that low and difficult tract from which they had in vain attempted to debouch, in order to gain possession of the plateau of Hohenlinden.

Moreau returned at this moment from the heart of the forest with a detachment of Grandjean's division, to bring relief to his left, which was so briskly attacked. But there, as at all the other points, he found his soldiers victorious, transported with joy, congratulating their general on such a glorious triumph. That triumph was indeed glorious. The Austrian army had greater difficulty to get out of those thickets than it had to penetrate into them. There were seen everywhere straggling corps, which, not knowing whither to flee, fell into the hands of our victorious troops, and laid down their arms. It was five o'clock, and darkness shrouded the field of battle. The French had killed or wounded 7000 or 8000 of the enemy, made 12,000 prisoners, taken 300 waggons, and eighty-seven pieces of cannon, results very uncommon in war. Thus in one day the Austrian army had lost nearly 20,000 soldiers, almost all its artillery, its baggage, and, what was of still greater importance, its whole moral courage.

This battle is the most brilliant of all that Moreau ever fought, and certainly one of the greatest in the present century, which has beheld such extraordinary conflicts. It has been wrongfully asserted that there was another conqueror of Marengo than general Bonaparte, and that this was general Kellermann. With much greater reason it might be alleged that there was another conqueror of Hohenlinden than general Moreau, namely, general Richepanse, for he executed, upon a rather vague order, a most brilliant manœuvre. But, though less unjust, this assertion would still be unjust. Let us leave to every man the merit of his deeds, and not imitate those paltry efforts of envy, which is on all occasions bent on discovering a different conqueror from the real one.

Moreau, in advancing along the Inn from Kufstein to Mühldorf, without having chosen a precise point of attack, without having concentrated all his forces upon that point, to make nothing but mere demonstrations,—Moreau had in this manner exposed his left in the battle of the 1st of December. Still this could prove but a momentary advantage to the enemy; and, in retiring into the recesses of the labyrinth of Hohenlinden, in drawing the Austrians thither, in bringing down opportunely his centre upon his left, from Ebersberg to Mattenboett, he had executed one of the most successful manœuvres known in the history of modern warfare. It has been alleged that Richepanse marched without orders,* that is incorrect; an order was

* So Napoleon erroneously asserted at St. Helena. The written orders exist, and have been printed in the Memorial of the war.

given to him, as we have related, but it was too general, not sufficiently detailed. None of the circumstances that might have happened had been provided against. Moreau had merely directed Richepanse and Decaen to strike off from Ebersberg for St. Christoph, without specifying the route, without providing against either the presence of Riesch's corps, or any of the possible and even probable accidents, amidst that forest full of enemies; and, with an officer less vigorous than Richepanse, he might have reaped a disaster instead of a triumph. But fortune always has some share in military successes. All that can be said is, that in this case it was very great, nay, greater than usual.

Moreau has been censured because, while fighting with six divisions out of twelve, he left three under general St. Suzanne on the Danube, three under general Lecourbe on the Upper Inn, and thus exposed his left, under general Grenier, to the hazard of fighting in the proportion of one against two. This reproach is certainly more weighty and more deserved; but let us not tarnish so glorious a triumph, and let us add, in order to be just, that there are flaws in the finest works of men, that in the most splendid victories there are faults,—faults which fortune repairs, and which must be admitted as an ordinary accompaniment of great military exploits.

After this important victory, the conqueror would have done well to pursue the Austrian army briskly, to march for Vienna, to demolish, by pushing forward, the defences of the Tyrol, to necessitate in this manner a retrograde movement in the whole line of the Austrians from Bavaria to Italy; for the retreat of the troops from the Inn would occasion that of the troops from the Tyrol, and the retreat of these latter would render the abandonment of the Mincio inevitable. But to obtain all these results it would have been necessary to have forced the Inn, then the Salza, which falls into the Inn, and forms a second line to cross after the first. At the moment, all this might have been accomplished from the impulsion given to our army by the victory of Hohenliden.

Moreau, as soon as he had allowed some rest to his troops, moved his left and part of his centre into the Mühldorf road, threatening at once the bridges of Kraiburg, Mühldorf, and Braunau, to persuade the enemy that he intended to cross the Inn in its lower course. But, meanwhile, Lecourbe, who a few months before had so gloriously passed the Danube at the battle of Hochstett, was directed to cross the Inn, with the right, near Rosenheim. This general had discovered a spot called Neubeurn, where the right bank, which we occupied, commanded the left bank, occupied by the enemy, and where the artillery might be advantageously employed to protect the passage. This point was therefore chosen. Several days were unfortunately lost in collecting the necessary *matériel*, and it was not till the morning of

the 9th of December, six days after the great battle of Hohenlinden, that Lecourbe was enabled to act.

Moreau had suddenly resumed his position on the Upper Inn. The three divisions of the centre had been despatched from Wasserburg to Aibling, at a little distance from Rosenheim, ready to assist Lecourbe. The left had succeeded them in their positions, and general Collaud, with two divisions of St. Suzanne's corps, had been pushed forward from the Isar to Erding.

On the morning of the 9th of December (18th Frimaire) Lecourbe commenced the operations for the passage before Neubeurn. Montrichard's division was to cross the Inn first. General Lemaire placed on the heights of the right bank a battery of twenty-eight pieces of cannon, and swept off everything that appeared on the left bank. On this part of the Inn there was nothing but Condé's corps, and this was too weak to oppose any serious resistance. While all the enemy's detachments were kept at a respectable distance by a continued fire of artillery, the pontonniers threw themselves into boats, accompanied by some battalions of *élite*, destined to protect their operations. In two hours and a half a bridge was completed, and Montrichard's division could begin to debouch. It advanced upon the Austrians, who retreated, and descended the right bank of the Inn till they were opposite to Rosenheim. They took a strong position at Stephans Kirchen. During this movement the divisions of the centre, stationed before Rosenheim itself, exerted themselves to prevent the Austrians from destroying completely the bridge of that town. Having been unsucessful, they ascended the Inn and crossed at Neubeurn, for the purpose of seconding Lecourbe. Condé's corps, reinforced by some succours, appuyed itself, on the one hand, upon the destroyed bridge of Rosenheim, on the other upon the small lake of Chiemsee. Lecourbe sent a detachment to turn this lake, which obliged the enemy to retire, after a resistance that was not very bloody. The Inn was thus crossed, and that formidable obstacle, which it was alleged could not fail to stop the French army, was surmounted. Thus Lecourbe had gathered a fresh laurel in the winter campaign. The march was not slackened. Next day, a bridge was thrown before Rosenheim for the passage of the rest of the centre. Grenier, with the left, crossed the Inn over the bridges of Wasserburg and Mühldorf, which the enemy had abandoned without destroying them.

It was expedient to lose no time in driving the Austrians to the banks of the Salza, which runs behind the Inn and falls into that river, a little above Braunau. The Salza is like a second arm of the Inn itself. If you would cross the Inn near the mountains, you are obliged to cross it twice, as it were; whereas, in passing it in the environs of Braunau, after its junction with the Salza, there is but one passage to perform. But then the volume of its waters is doubled, and the difficulty of crossing

by main force is proportionably increased. This reason, and a desire to surprise the enemy, who did not expect to see the French attempt the passage above Rosenheim, had decided the choice of Moreau.

Lecourbe, supported by the divisions of the centre, advanced rapidly, in spite of all the difficulties presented by that hilly country, interspersed with woods, rivers, and lakes,—a country difficult in any season, but still more so in the middle of December. The Austrian army, though shaken by so many reverses, still kept the field. The sentiment of honour, awakened by the danger of the capital, caused it still to make noble efforts to stop us. The Austrian cavalry covered the retreat, and vigorously charged the French corps, which advanced too rashly. The enemy crossed the Alz, which conveys the water of the Chiemsee to the Inn; they passed Fraunstein, and at length arrived near the Salza, not far from Salzburg.

There, before Salzburg itself, was still left a strong position to occupy. The archduke John thought that he might there concentrate his troops, hoping to procure for them some success, which would raise their courage, and somewhat slacken the daring pursuit of the French. Accordingly, he did concentrate them there on the 13th of December (22nd Frimaire).

The town of Salzburg is seated on the Salza. In advance of that river runs another small stream, the Saal, which descends from the neighbouring mountains, and falls into the Salza below Salzburg. The ground between the two is level, marshy, covered with clumps of trees, everywhere difficult of access. Here the archduke John took a position, with his right to the Salza, his left to the mountains, his front covered by the Saal. His artillery swept this level tract. His cavalry, drawn up on the naked and solid parts of the ground, was ready to charge the French corps which should dare to take the offensive. His infantry was solidly appuyed upon the town of Salzburg.

On the morning of the 14th, Lecourbe, impelled by his ardour, forded the Saal, sustained several charges of cavalry on the strand bordering the river, and bore them bravely; but presently, the thick fog which covered the plain clearing off, he perceived, in advance of Salzburg, a formidable line of cavalry, artillery, and infantry. It was the whole Austrian army. In presence of this danger he behaved with great steadiness, but suffered some loss.

Fortunately Decaen's division at this moment crossed the Salza towards Laufen, in an almost miraculous manner. On the preceding day, the advanced guard of this division, finding the bridge of Laufen destroyed, had explored the banks of the Salza, everywhere covered by the enemy's tirailleurs, in search of a passage. It had perceived a boat lying on the opposite shore. At this sight, three chasseurs of the 14th swam across to the other side, in spite of the most

intense cold, and a current still more rapid than that of the Inn. After fighting hand to hand with several Austrian tirailleurs, they had taken and brought across the boat. Some hundred French availed themselves of it for crossing successively to the opposite bank, occupied a village quite close to the destroyed bridge of Laufen, and barricaded themselves there in such a manner that a small number of them sufficed to defend it. The others had rushed upon the Austrian artillery, taken it, seized all the craft on the right bank of the Salza, and thus furnished the division remaining on the left bank with the means of crossing. On the morning of the following day, the 14th, Decaen's whole division having crossed, and ascending to Salzburg, came up at the very moment when Lecourbe was engaged single-handed with the whole Austrian army. It could not have arrived more opportunely. The archduke, apprised of the passage of the French and of their march upon Salzburg, hastily decamped, and thus Lecourbe was extricated from the serious danger to which chance and his ardour had exposed him.

All the defences of the Inn and the Salza were thus overcome. From that moment there was no obstacle to cover the Austrian army, or to give it courage to resist the French army. In Tyrol, it is true, there were left 25,000 men, who might have annoyed our rear, but it is not when you are victorious, and demoralisation has seized your enemy, that you need fear bold attempts. Moreau, having left St. Suzanne's corps behind, to invest Braunau, and to occupy the tract of country between the Inn and the Isar,—Moreau, emboldened by the success attending every step he took, marched towards the Traun and the Ens, which were now incapable of stopping him. Richepanse formed the advanced guard, supported by Grouchy and Decaen. The retreat of the Austrians was effected in disorder. The French picked up every moment men, carriages, or cannon. Richepanse fought brilliant actions at Frankenmarkt, at Vöklabrück, and at Schwanstadt. Incessantly engaged with the Austrian cavalry, he took so many as 1200 horse at a time. On the 20th of December (29th Frimaire) the French had crossed the Traun, and were marching for Steyer, with the intention of crossing the Ens at that place.

The young archduke John, whom such a series of disasters had completely disheartened, had just been superseded by the archduke Charles, who was at length recalled from disgrace, to have a task assigned to him, now impossible to be performed—that of saving the Austrian army. He beheld with grief on his arrival the spectacle exhibited by those soldiers of the empire, who, after they had nobly resisted the French, desired that they might no longer be sacrificed to a fatal and universally reprobated policy. He sent M. de Meerfeld to Moreau, to propose an armistice. Moreau agreed to grant forty-eight hours, on condition that within this time he would return from Vienna, furnished with

the emperor's powers; but he stipulated, at the same time, that the French army should meanwhile have the faculty of advancing to the Ens.

On the 21st, he crossed the Ens at Steyer. His advanced posts appeared on the Ips and the Erlaf. He was at the gates of Vienna; he might feel tempted to enter it, and to appropriate to himself the glory which no French general had yet had, of penetrating into the capital of the empire. But the moderate spirit of Moreau was not fond of pushing fortune to extremities. The archduke Charles gave him his word that if hostilities were suspended, Austria would treat immediately for peace, on the conditions which France had always insisted upon, especially that of a separate negotiation. Moreau, full of a just esteem for that prince, showed a disposition to believe him.

Several of his lieutenants urged him to march to Vienna.—"It will be better," he replied, "to secure peace .... I hear nothing of Macdonald and Brune; I know not whether the one has succeeded in penetrating into the Tyrol, whether the other has been able to cross the Mincio. Augereau is at a great distance from me, in a critical situation. I might perhaps drive the Austrians to despair, were I to persist in humbling them. We had better halt and be content with peace; for it is for that alone that we are fighting."

These were wise and praiseworthy sentiments. On the 25th of December (4th Nivôse, year IX.), he consented, therefore, to sign, at Steyer, a new suspension of arms, the conditions of which were the following:—There was to be a cessation of hostilities in Germany, between the Austrian armies and the French armies, commanded by Moreau and Augereau. Generals Brune and Macdonald were to be invited to sign a similar armistice for the armies of the Grisons and of Italy. The whole valley of the Danube, including the Tyrol, was given up to the French, besides the fortresses of Braunau and Wurtzburg, the forts of Scharnitz, Kufstein, &c. The Austrian magazines were placed at our disposal. No detachment of troops could be sent to Italy, in case a suspension of arms should not be agreed to by the generals commanding in that country. This stipulation was obligatory on both armies.

Moreau was satisfied with these conditions, calculating, with reason, upon peace, and preferring it to more signal, but more hazardous triumphs. A brilliant glory surrounded his name, for his winter campaign surpassed that of the spring. After crossing the Rhine in that first spring campaign, and driving the Austrians to the Danube, while the First Consul was crossing the Alps; after having then dislodged them from their camp at Ulm by the battle of Hochstett, and pushed them back to the Inn, he had taken breath during the summer, and, resuming his march in winter, during the most intense cold, he had overwhelmed them at Hohenlinden, driven them from the Inn to the Salza,

from the Salza to the Traun and the Ens, pushing them, in disorder, to the very gates of Vienna. At last, halting a few leagues from the capital, he granted them time for signing peace. In his conduct there had been irresolution, dilatoriness, in short, faults which severe judges have since keenly censured, as if to revenge, on the memory of Moreau, the injustices committed upon the memory of Napoleon; but there was an unbroken series of successes, obtained by prudence and firmness. We ought to respect all glories, and not destroy one to avenge another. Moreau had proved himself capable of commanding 100,000 men with prudence and vigour; no man, excepting Napoleon, has manœuvred such a force so well, in the present century; and, although the place of the conqueror of Hohenlinden be at an immense distance from that of the conqueror of Rivoli, of Marengo, and of Austerlitz, that place is, nevertheless, glorious, and would have remained glorious, if criminal misconduct, the fatal effects of jealousy, had not subsequently sullied a life till then noble and pure.

The armistice in Germany happened seasonably for extricating the Gallo-Batavian army, commanded by Augereau, from its hazardous position. The Austrian general, Klenau, who had always remained at a great distance from the archduke John, had suddenly formed a junction with Simbschen, and, by this union of forces, had brought Augereau into danger. But the latter had bravely defended the Rednitz, and maintained his ground till the conclusion of hostilities. The retreat of the Austrians into Bohemia relieved him from embarrassment, and the armistice covered him from the dangers of a position too destitute of support, since Moreau was at the gates of Vienna.

During these events in Germany, hostilities continued in the Alps and in Italy. The First Consul, seeing, from the commencement of the campaign, that Moreau could dispense with the assistance of the army in the Grisons, had ordered Macdonald to cross the Splugen, to throw himself from the great chain of the Alps into the Valteline, and from the Valteline into Italian Tyrol, then to proceed to Trent, and thus turn the line of the Mincio, and, by this manœuvre, put an end to the resistance of the Austrians in the plains of Italy. No objection, founded on the height of the Splugen or the inclemency of the season, could shake the First Consul. He had invariably replied that, wherever two men could set their feet, an army had the means of passing, and that the Alps were easier to cross in frost than when the snow was melting, the season in which he had himself crossed the St. Bernard. This was the argument of an absolute spirit, which is determined to attain its end at any rate whatever. The event proved that, in the mountains, winter is attended with dangers at least equal to those of spring, and that, moreover, it dooms men to the most frightful hardships.

General Macdonald prepared to obey, and he did it with all the energy of his character. After leaving Morlot's division in the Grisons, to guard the débouchés which communicate between the Grisons and the Engadine (the upper valley of the Inn), he approached the Splugen. For some time past, the division of Baraguay d'Hilliers was in the Upper Valteline, threatening the Engadine from the Italian side; while Morlot threatened it from the side next to the Grisons. With the bulk of his army, about 12,000 men, Macdonald commenced his movement, and climbed the first acclivities of the Splugen. The passage of that lofty mountain, narrow and winding during an ascent of several leagues, was attended with the greatest dangers, especially at that season, when frequent tempests covered the roads with enormous drifts of snow and ice. The artillery and ammunition had been placed on sledges, and the soldiers were laden with biscuit and cartridges. The first column, composed of cavalry and artillery, began the passage in fine weather, but it was all at once assailed by a tremendous tempest. An avalanche precipitated one half of a squadron of dragoons into the abyss, and struck terror into the soldiers. They, nevertheless, kept up their courage. In three days, the storm having ceased, a fresh attempt was made to cross this formidable mountain. It was encumbered with snow. Oxen were driven before the troops, to trample the snow, into which they sank up to the belly; then labourers beat it down hard; the infantry, in passing, rendered it quite solid; lastly, sappers widened the passes, when too narrow by cutting the ice with hatchets. These exertions were requisite to render the road passable for cavalry and artillery. The first days of December were thus spent in effecting the passage of the first three columns. The soldiers endured these horrible sufferings with admirable fortitude, living upon biscuit and a small quantity of brandy. The fourth and last column had at last nearly reached the summit of the mountain, when a fresh storm once more closed the passage, entirely dispersed the 104th demi-brigade, and buried about 100 men. General Macdonald was there. He rallied his soldiers, cheered them under dangers and hardships, caused the road, barred by blocks of frozen snow, to be again opened, and at length debouched with all the rest of his corps into the Valteline.

This truly extraordinary enterprise had carried the greater part of the army of the Grisons across the great chain, and to the very threshold of the Italian Tyrol. General Macdonald, as he had been ordered, sought, as soon as he had passed the Splugen, to concert with Brune before proceeding to the sources of the Mincio and the Adige, and thus demolishing the whole defensive line of the Austrians, which extended from the Alps to the Adriatic.

Brune would not deprive himself of a whole division to assist

Macdonald, but he consented to detach Lecchi's Italian division, which was to ascend from the valley of the Chiesa to the Rocca d'Anfo. Macdonald, therefore, resolved to ascend the Valteline, and to attack Mont Tonal, which commands the pass into the Tyrol and the valley of the Adige. But here, though the height was inferior to that of the Splugen, the ice was as deeply drifted; and besides, general Wukassowich had covered the principal approaches to Mont Tonal with intrenchments. On the 22nd and 23rd of December, general Vandamme made an attack at the head of a corps of grenadiers, and renewed it several times with heroic courage. Those brave fellows made incredible but useless efforts. Several times, marching upon the ice, and exposed to a most destructive fire, they advanced to the very palisades of the intrenchment, and endeavoured to pull them up, but, the ground being frozen, they were foiled in the attempt. It was useless to persist further; it was, therefore, resolved, to pass into the valley of the Oglio, to descend it to Pisogno, and then proceed into the valley of the Chiesa. The intention in this was to cross the mountains in a less elevated region, and by passes not so well defended. Macdonald, having descended to Pisogno, crossed the Cols which separated him from the valley of the Chiesa, formed his junction with Lecchi's brigade towards the Rocca d'Anfo, and found himself beyond the obstacles which parted him from the Italian Tyrol and the Adige. He was enabled to reach Trent, before general Wukassowich had effected his retreat from the heights of Mont Tonal, and to take a position between the Austrians who defended the sources of the rivers amidst the Alps and the Austrians who defended the lower part of their courses in the plains of Italy.

Brune, before he attempted to force the Mincio, had waited till Macdonald had made sufficient progress for the attacks to be nearly simultaneous in the mountains and in the plain. Out of 125,000 spread over Italy, he had, as we have observed, 100,000 effective men, tried soldiers, and recruited after their privations, an artillery admirably organised by general Marmont, and an excellent cavalry. Nearly 30,000 men guarded Lombardy, Piedmont, Liguria, and Tuscany. A weak brigade, commanded by general Petitot, observed the Austrian troops, which, setting out from Ferrara, threatened Bologna. The national guard of the latter city was ready, besides, to defend itself against the Austrians. The Neapolitans were again passing through the Roman States on their march to Tuscany; but Murat, with the 10,000 men from the camp of Amiens, was gone to meet them. Brune, after providing for the guard of the different parts of Italy, had about 70,000 men to direct upon the Mincio. General Bonaparte, who was perfectly acquainted with this theatre of operations, had recommended to him carefully to concentrate his troops as much as possible in Upper Italy; to take no heed what

the Austrians might attempt towards the banks of the Po, in the Legations, or even in Tuscany; to remain steadily, as he had himself formerly done, at the débouchés of the Alps; and he was incessantly repeating that, when the Austrians should be beaten between the Mincio and the Adige, that is to say, on the line by which they enter Italy, all those who had passed the Po and penetrated into central Italy would be in so much the greater danger.

The Austrians did actually seem disposed to come out of Ferrara and to threaten Bologna; but general Petitot found means to repress them, and the national guard of Bologna displayed on its part the firmest attitude.

Brune, straightways conforming to the instructions which he had received, advanced to the Mincio, between the 20th and 24th of December (29th Frimaire to 3rd Nivôse), took the positions which the Austrians had occupied in advance of that river, and made his dispositions for passing it on the morning of the 25th. General Delmas commanded his advanced-guard, general Moncey his left, general Dupont his right, and General Michaud his reserve. Besides the cavalry and artillery distributed in the divisions, he had a considerable reserve of both.

In recording the first campaigns of general Bonaparte,* we have already described this theatre as the scene of so many memorable events; we must, nevertheless, portray in a few words the configuration of the country. The mass of the waters of the Tyrol, is discharged by the Adige into the Adriatic; hence the Adige forms a line of great strength. But, before you reach the line of the Adige, you come to one of minor importance, namely that of the Mincio. The waters of several valleys lateral to that of the Tyrol, at first accumulated in the Lake of Garda, afterwards pour themselves into the Mincio, tarry some time at Mantua, around which they form an inundation, and at last fall into the Po. There was, consequently, a double line to cross, first that of the Mincio, then that of the Adige, the latter being far the more considerable and the stronger of the two. It was requisite to cross both, and if this were done promptly enough to give a hand to Macdonald, who was marching by the Rocca d'Anfo and Trent to the Upper Adige, it would be possible to separate the Austrian army defending the Tyrol from the Austrian army defending the Mincio, and to take the former.

The line of the Mincio, seven or eight leagues long at most, appuying on the Lake of Garda on the one hand and Mantua on the other, bristling with artillery, and defended by 70,000 Austrians, under the command of the count de Bellegarde, was not easy to force. The enemy had at Borghetto and Vallegio a well intrenched bridge, which enabled him to act on both banks. The river was not fordable at this season; and the mass of its

* In the *History of the French Revolution*.

waters had been further increased by closing all the canals which are supplied by it.

Brune, after collecting his columns, conceived the singular idea of crossing the Mincio at two points at once, at Pozzolo and at Mozzembano. Between these two points the river formed a bend, the convexity of which was turned towards our troops; moreover, the right bank, which we occupied, commanded the left bank occupied by the Austrians, so that at Mozzembano, as well as at Pozzolo, we could open a converging fire from higher batteries upon the enemy's bank, and thus cover the operation of a passage. But at both points the Austrians were found firmly seated behind the Mincio, covered with solid intrenchments, appuyed either on Mantua or on Peschiera. The advantages and the inconveniences of the passage were, therefore, nearly alike at Pozzolo and at Mozzembano. But what ought to have decided Brune to prefer one of the two points, no matter which, while he might have made a false demonstration on the other, was that between these two points there was a *tête de pont*, then occupied by the enemy. The Austrians, therefore, could debouch by this *tête de pont*, and throw themselves on one of the two operations with a view to interrupt it. It follows that only one should have been attempted, and that with the whole of the forces.

Brune, nevertheless, persisted in his double plan, apparently to divide the enemy's attention, and on the 25th of December made all necessary dispositions for a double passage. But difficulties which supervened in regard to carriage, difficulties extremely great at this season, prevented every thing from being ready at Mozzembano, the point at which Brune himself was with the greater part of his troops, and the operation was deferred till the next day. It would seem that, in this case, the second passage ought to have been countermanded; but Brune, having always considered the attempt near Pozzolo as a mere diversion, thought that the diversion would produce its effect with the greater certainty, if it preceded the principal operation by twenty-four hours.

Dupont, who commanded at Pozzolo, was an officer full of ardour: he advanced, on the morning of the 25th, to the bank of the Mincio, crowned with artillery the heights of Molino della Volta, which commanded the opposite bank, threw a bridge in a very short time, and, favoured by a thick fog, succeeded in passing Wattrin's division to the right bank. Meanwhile, Brune continued motionless with the left and the reserves, at Mozzembano. General Suchet, placed between the two with the centre, masked the Austrian bridge of Borghetto. General Dupont, then, was on the left bank with a single corps in presence of the whole Austrian army. It was easy to foresee the result. The count de Bellegarde, without loss of time, directed the mass of his forces upon Pozzolo. General Dupont sent to apprise his neighbour, Suchet, and the commander-in-chief, of the success

of the passage, and of the danger to which that success exposed him. General Suchet, like a brave and faithful comrade, hastened to the assistance of Dupont's division; but, on quitting Borghetto, he sent to beg Brune to provide for the guard of that débouché, which he left uncovered by his movement towards Pozzolo. Brune, instead of hurrying with all his forces to the point where a lucky accident had opened the passage of the Mincio to his army, Brune, still engrossed by his operation of the following day upon Mozzembano, never quitted his position. He approved the movement of general Suchet, at the same time recommending to him not to compromise himself on the other side of the river, and merely sent Boudet's division to mask the bridge of Borghetto.

But general Dupont, eager to follow up his success, was absolutely engaged. He had crossed the Mincio, taken Pozzolo, which is situated on the left bank, and carried successively Wattrin's and Monnier's divisions across the river. One of his wings was appuyed on Pozzolo, the other on the Mincio, under the protection of the elevated batteries of the right bank.

The Austrians marched with all their reinforcements upon that position. They were preceded by a great number of pieces of cannon. Fortunately, our artillery, placed at Molino della Volta, and firing from one bank to the other, protected our soldiers by the superiority of its fire. The Austrians fell furiously upon Wattrin's and Monnier's divisions. The 6th light, the 28th, and the 40th of the line, were wellnigh overwhelmed, but they resisted, with admirable intrepidity, all the joint assaults of the Austrian infantry and cavalry. Monnier's division, however, surprised in Pozzolo by a column of grenadiers, was dislodged. At this moment, Dupont's corps, separated from its principal *point d'appui*, was on the point of being thrown into the Mincio. But general Suchet, arriving on the other bank, with Gazan's division, and perceiving from the heights of Molino della Volta the serious danger of his brother commander, engaged with 10,000 men against 30,000, hastened to send him reinforcements. Restrained, at the same time, by the orders of Brune, he durst not send him the whole of Gazan's division, and threw Clauzel's brigade only to the other side of the river. This brigade was insufficient; and Dupont must have succumbed notwithstanding these succours, when the rest of Gazan's division, crowning the opposite bank, from which the Austrians could be reached with grape-shot and even by musketry, poured on them a murderous fire, and thus stopped them short. Dupont's troops, being supported, resumed the offensive, and made the Austrians fall back. General Suchet, seeing that the danger increased every moment, resolved to send Gazan's whole division to the other bank. The important point of Pozzolo was thenceforward most fiercely disputed. That village was six times taken and retaken. At nine o'clock

at night, the combatants were still fighting by moonlight and in a severe frost. The French finally remained masters of the left bank, but they had lost the *élite* of four divisions. The Austrians had left 6000 dead or wounded on the field of battle, the French nearly as many. But for the arrival of general Suchet, our left wing would have been destroyed; and, as it was, he durst not engage completely, his hands being tied by the orders of the commander-in-chief. If M. de Bellegarde had directed his whole forces upon that point, or if he had debouched from the bridge of Borghetto, while Brune was immovable at Mozzembano, he might have inflicted a disaster on the centre and on the right of the French army.

Fortunately, he did nothing of the kind. The Mincio was thus crossed at one point. Brune persisted in his plan of passing the next day, the 26th of December, towards Mozzembano, thus exposing himself anew to the risks of an operation by main force. He covered the heights of Mozzembano with forty pieces of cannon, and, favoured by the fogs of the season, succeeded in throwing a bridge. The Austrians, fatigued with the preceding day, doubting the intention of a second passage, made less resistance than the day before, and suffered the neighbouring positions of Sallionzo and Vallegio to be taken from them.

The whole army debouched in this manner beyond the Mincio, and was enabled to march, with all its divisions united, for the second line, that of the Adige. The *tête de pont* of Borghetto must have fallen, as a matter of course, from the offensive movement of our columns. A fresh blunder was committed in sacrificing several hundred of our brave soldiers for the conquest of a point which was not tenable. Twelve hundred Austrians were made prisoners there.

The French were victorious, but at the cost of valuable blood, which generals Bonaparte and Moreau would not have failed to spare the army. Lecourbe passed the rivers of Germany in a different manner. Brune, having forced the Mincio, advanced towards the Adige, which he ought to have crossed immediately. He was not ready to effect the passage till the 31st of December (10th Nivôse). On the 1st of January, general Delmas, with the advanced-guard, crossed the river without accident at Bussolengo, above Verona. General Moncey, with the left, was to ascend to Trent, while the rest of the army descended again to envelop Verona.

Count de Bellegarde was at this moment in imminent danger. Part of the troops of the Tyrol, under general Laudon, had retired before Macdonald, and fallen back upon Trent. General Moncey, with his corps, was marching thither also, in reascending the Adige. General Laudon, hemmed in between Macdonald's corps and Moncey's, must succumb, unless he had time to escape into the valley of the Brenta, which, running beyond

the Adige, terminates, after numerous windings, at Bassano. Brune, if he suddenly crossed the Adige, and vigorously pushed count de Bellegarde beyond Verona, to Bassano itself, might anticipate at this latter point the corps of the Tyrol, and take it entire by closing the débouché of the Brenta.

An act not the most honourable of general Laudon's, and the tardiness of general Brune, extenuated, it is true, by the season, extricated the Tyrol corps from all these perils.

Macdonald had actually reached Trent, while Moncey's corps was proceeding thither, on its side. General Laudon, hemmed in between these two corps, had recourse to a falsehood. He assured general Moncey that an armistice had just been signed in Germany, and that this armistice extended to both armies, which was false; for the convention signed at Steyer by Moreau applied only to the armies operating upon the Danube. General Moncey, from a nice sense of honour, credited the statement of general Laudon, and opened to him the passes leading to the Brenta; so that he was enabled to rejoin the count de Bellegarde in the environs of Bassano.

But the disasters in Germany were known. The Austrian army, beaten in Italy, pressed by an army of 90,000 men, since the junction of Macdonald's and Brune's troops, could hold out no longer. An armistice was proposed to Brune, who hastened to accept it, and signed it on the 16th of January at Treviso. Brune, impatient to settle matters, demanded no more than the line of the Adige, with the fortresses of Ferrara, Peschiera, and Portolegnago. He never thought of requiring the cession of Mantua. Yet he had received specific orders not to halt till he had entered Isonzo, and made himself master of Mantua. That place was the only one which was worth the trouble; for all the others must have fallen as a matter of course. It was of especial importance to occupy it, that there might be a ground for demanding, at the congress of Lunéville, its cession to the Cisalpine Republic.

While these events were occurring in Upper Italy, the Neapolitans penetrated into Tuscany. The count de Damas, who commanded a corps of 16,000 men, 8000 of whom were Neapolitans, had advanced to Sienna. General Miollis, obliged to guard all the posts of Tuscany, had not more than 3500 disposable men, mostly Italians. He marched, nevertheless, to meet the Neapolitans. The brave soldiers of Pino's division rushed upon the advanced-guard of the count de Damas, overthrew it, forced an entrance into Sienna, and put to the sword a considerable number of the insurgents. The count de Damas was obliged to fall back. Besides, Murat was advancing with his grenadiers, to wring from him the signature of a third armistice.

Thus the campaign was finished everywhere, and peace insured. In every quarter our operations had been successful. Moreau's army, flanked by that of Augereau, had penetrated to

the very gates of Vienna; Brune's, seconded by that of Macdonald, had passed the Mincio and the Adige, and advanced to Treviso. Though it had not entirely thrown the Austrians to the other side of the Alps, it had dispossessed them of sufficient territory to furnish the French negotiator at Lunéville with powerful arguments against the pretensions of Austria in Italy. Murat was about to complete the submission of the court of Naples.

On receiving intelligence of the battle of Hohenlinden, the First Consul, who was said to be jealous of Moreau, was filled with sincere joy.* This victory lost none of its value in his estimation because it was achieved by a rival. He deemed himself so superior to all his companions in arms in military glory and in political influence, that he felt no jealousy of any of them. Wholly devoted to the task of pacifying and reorganising France, he derived warm satisfaction from every event which contributed to facilitate his task, even when such events added to the fame of those men, who were destined afterwards to be set up for rivals to him.

What displeased him in this campaign was the useless effusion of French blood at Pozzolo, and especially the grievous fault of not demanding Mantua. He refused to ratify the convention of Treviso, and declared that he would give orders for the renewal of hostilities, if the fortress of Mantua were not immediately delivered to the French army.

All the while, Joseph Bonaparte and M. de Cobentzel, were at Lunéville, awaiting the events occurring on the Danube and the Adige. It is a singular situation, that of two negotiators, treating while hostilities are going on, witnesses, as it were, of the duel between two great nations, expecting every instant the news not of the death, but of the exhaustion of the one or the other. On this occasion, M. de Cobentzel displayed an energy of character, which may be held up as an example to men who are called to serve their country in disastrous circumstances. He did not suffer himself to be disconcerted by the defeat of the Austrians at Hohenlinden, or by the passage of the Inn, the Salza, the Traun, &c. To all these events he replied, with imperturbable composure, that all this was certainly unfortunate, but that the archduke Charles had recovered from his mortifications; that he had arrived at the head of the extraordinary levies of Bohemia and Hungary; that he had brought to the assistance of the capital 25,000 Bohemians and 75,000 Hungarians; that, in advancing farther, the French would meet with a resistance which they did not expect. At the same time, he persisted in all the pretensions of Austria, particularly in that of not treating without an English plenipotentiary, who would

* M. de Bourrienne says that "he leaped for joy;" and this biographer is not to be suspected, for, though he owed every thing to Napoleon, he seems not to have recollected this in his Memoirs.

at least mask by his presence the real negotiations which might take place between the two legations. Sometimes he went so far as to say, that he would retire to Frankfort, and thus put an end to the hopes of peace, which the First Consul needed for lulling people's minds. At this threat, the First Consul, who never shuffled when any one tried to intimidate him, sent word to M. de Cobentzel, that if he left Lunéville, all chance of an accommodation would be totally lost, and that the war should be pushed to the utmost extremity, even to the entire destruction of the Austrian monarchy.

Amidst this diplomatic struggle, M. de Cobentzel received intelligence of the armistice of Steyer, the emperor's order to treat on any terms, and, in particular, urgent injunctions to obtain an extension to Italy of the armistice already agreed on for Germany; for there would be nothing gained, if, after stopping one of the two French armies which were marching for Vienna, the other should be suffered to reach that capital by the Friule and Carinthia. In consequence, M. de Cobentzel declared, on the 31st of December, that he was ready to treat without the concurrence of England, that he consented to sign preliminaries of peace, or a definitive treaty, whichever the French government pleased; but that, before he definitively committed himself by separating from England, he desired that an armistice common to Italy and Germany should be signed, and that some explanation respecting the conditions of peace should be entered into, at least in a general manner. For his part, he proposed these conditions: the Oglio, for the boundary of Austria in Italy, together with the Legations; and at the same time, the reinstatement of the dukes of Modena and Tuscany in their former dominions.

These conditions were unreasonable. The First Consul would not have admitted them even before the successes of the winter campaign, and still less after them.

The reader has not forgotten the preliminaries signed by the count de St. Julien. The treaty of Campo-Formio was there adopted for basis, with this difference, that certain indemnities promised to Austria for various petty territories should be granted in Italy, instead of Germany. We have already mentioned the drift of this alteration; the treaty of Campo-Formio assigned the Adige for the boundary between the Cisalpine Republic and Austria; by promising Austria indemnities in Italy, she was led to hope for the Mincio, for example, instead of the Adige, as a boundary, but the Mincio at most, and never the territory of the Legations, which the First Consul intended to dispose of otherwise.

The ideas of the First Consul were thenceforth fixed. He determined that Austria should pay the expenses of the winter campaign; he determined that she should have the Adige, and nothing more, and that she should receive no indemnity, either

in Germany or Italy, for the small territories ceded on the left bank of the Rhine. As for the Legations, he meant to reserve them, and to make them subservient to various combinations. Hitherto they had belonged to the Cisalpine Republic. His design was either to leave them to it, or to devote them to the aggrandisement of the house of Parma, promised, by treaty, to the court of Spain. In this latter case, he should give Parma to the Cisalpine, Tuscany to the house of Parma, which would be a considerable aggrandisement, and the Legations to the grand-duke of Tuscany. As for the duke of Modena, Austria had promised, by the treaty of Campo-Formio, to indemnify him for the loss of his duchy by means of the Brisgau. It was, therefore, for her to fulfil her engagements towards that prince.

The First Consul wished for something else, that was thoroughly understood but very difficult to make Austria agree to. He wished not to be obliged, as after the peace of Campo-Formio, to hold a congress with the princes of the Empire, to obtain from each individually the formal cession of the right bank of the Rhine to France. He recollected the congress of Rastadt, which terminated in the murder of our plenipotentiaries; he recollected the trouble it had been to treat with each prince separately, and to agree with all those who had lost territories upon a system of indemnities that would satisfy them. In consequence, he required that the emperor should sign, as head of the house of Austria, for what related to his house, and, as emperor, for what related to the Empire. In short, he wanted to have, in a single stroke, an acknowledgment of our conquests, both on the part of Austria and on the part of the Germanic confederation.

He, therefore, ordered his brother Joseph to notify to M. de Cobentzel the following conditions, as definitively fixed:—The left bank of the Rhine to France; the boundary of the Adige for Austria and the Cisalpine, without relinquishing the Legations; the Legations to the duke of Tuscany; Tuscany to the duke of Parma; Parma to the Cisalpine; the Brisgau to the duke of Modena; lastly, peace to be signed by the emperor, both for himself and for the Empire. As for the armistice in Italy, he was willing to grant it, on condition of the immediate delivery of the fortress of Mantua to the French army.

As the First Consul was acquainted with the Austrian manner of negotiating, and particularly that of M. de Cobentzel, he wished to cut short a great many difficulties, a great many oppositions, a great many threats of a feigned desperation; and he devised a new way of signifying his *ultimatum*. The Legislative Body had just assembled; it was proposed to it on the 2nd of January (12th Nivôse), to declare that the four armies commanded by generals Moreau, Brune, Macdonald, and Augereau, were entitled to their country's thanks. A message, added to this proposal, announced that M. de Cobentzel had at length

engaged to treat without the concurrence of England, and that the definitive condition of peace was the Rhine for France, and the Adige for the Cisalpine Republic. The message added that, in case these conditions were not accepted, the French would march on Prague, on Vienna, and on Venice, and there enforce them.

This communication was hailed with transport in Paris, but excited a strong emotion at Lunéville. M. de Cobentzel raised great outcries against the hardness of these conditions, and particularly against their form. He complained bitterly that France seemed to be making the treaty by herself, without having to negotiate with any body. He, nevertheless, continued firm, and declared that Austria could not give way on all the points, that she would rather fall with arms in her hand than accede to such conditions. M. de Cobentzel consented, however, to fall back from the Oglio to the Chiesa, which runs between the Oglio and the Mincio, on condition of having Peschiera, Mantua, and Ferrara, without obligation to demolish those fortresses. He consented to indemnify the duke of Modena with the Brisgau; but he insisted on the restitution of the dominions of the duke of Tuscany. He spoke of formal guarantees to be given for the independence of Piedmont, Switzerland, the Holy See, Naples, &c. As for peace with the Empire, he declared that the emperor was about to demand powers of the Germanic Diet, but that this sovereign would never take it upon him to treat for it without being authorised. He insisted further on the signature of an armistice in Italy, declaring that, as for Mantua, if Austria were to deliver that fortress to the French army, she would put all Italy at once into the hands of the French, and deprive herself of all means of resistance, if hostilities should be renewed. Adding caresses to firmness, M. de Cobentzel endeavoured to touch Joseph, by talking to him of the favourable dispositions of the emperor towards France, and particularly towards the First Consul, insinuating even that Austria might probably ally herself with the French Republic, and that such an alliance would be very serviceable against the secret but real ill-will of the northern courts.

Joseph, who was extremely mild, could not help being affected, to a certain degree, by the complaints, the threats, and the caresses of M. de Cobentzel. The First Consul roused his energy by numerous despatches. "You are forbidden," he wrote to him, "to admit of any discussion on the principle laid down in the ultimatum: *the Rhine and the Adige.* Stick to those two conditions as irrevocable. Hostilities shall not cease in Italy till Mantua is given up. If they begin again, the *thalweg* of the Adige shall be carried back to the Julian Alps, and Austria shall be excluded from Italy. If Austria," added the First Consul, "should talk of her friendship and her alliance, reply that those who have just shown themselves so attached

to the English alliance cannot care about ours. Assume, in negotiating, the attitude of general Moreau, and force M. de Cobentzel to play the part of the archduke John."

At length, after a further resistance of several days, intelligence more and more alarming every moment arriving from the banks of the Mincio—it must not be forgotten that hostilities continued in Lombardy longer than in Germany—M. de Cobentzel consented, on the 15th of January, 1801 (25th Nivôse), that the Adige should be adopted for the boundary of the possessions of Austria in Italy. He ceased to mention the duke of Modena, but renewed the formal demand of the reinstatement of the duke of Tuscany in his dominions. He consented further to declare that the peace of the Empire should be signed at Lunéville, but after the emperor should have obtained powers from the Germanic Diet. In the same protocol, this plenipotentiary again claimed an armistice for Italy, but without assenting to the condition which France attached to it—the immediate delivery of Mantua to our troops. His fear was, that after giving up this *point d'appui*, France would impose harder conditions; and, alarming as the resumption of hostilities appeared to him, he would not yet part with this pledge.

This persevering firmness in defending his country in so difficult a situation was natural and honourable, but at last it became imprudent, and led to consequences which M. de Cobentzel had not foreseen.

The occurrences in the North contributed as much as the victories of our armies to augment the pretensions of the First Consul. He had hitherto sought anxiously for peace with Austria, in the first place, to have peace, and, in the next, to secure himself against one of those changes of humour so frequent in the emperor Paul. For some months past, it is true, that prince had shown a keen resentment against Austria and England; but a manœuvre of the Austrian or English cabinet might bring back the czar to the coalition, and then France would again have all Europe upon her hands. It was this apprehension which had induced the First Consul to brave the inconveniences of a winter campaign, in order to crush Austria while she was deprived of the support of the forces of the Continent. The turn which events had recently taken in the North having relieved him from all fear on this head, he had become at once more patient and more exacting. Paul, in fact, had formally broken with his late allies, and thrown himself completely into the arms of France, with that warmth which he showed in all his actions. Strongly disposed to this line of conduct by the effect produced upon his mind by the victory of Marengo, by the restitution of the Russian prisoners, by the offer of the island of Malta, lastly, by the adroit and delicate flatteries of the First Consul, he had been definitively decided by a recent event. It will be recollected that the First Consul,

despairing of saving Malta, strictly blockaded by the English, had conceived the happy idea of offering that island to Paul I.; that this prince had received that offer with transport; that he had commissioned M. de Sprengporten to go to Paris, to thank the head of the French government, to receive the Russian prisoners, and to conduct them to Malta, to form its garrison. But, in the mean time, general Vaubois, reduced to the last extremity, had been compelled to surrender the island to the English. This event, which, under any other circumstances, must have mortified the First Consul, grieved him but little. "I have lost Malta," said he, "but I have put an apple of discord into the hands of my enemies." Paul hastened to claim, from England the seat of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem; but the British cabinet, instead of giving it up, replied by a flat refusal. Paul was enraged beyond measure. He laid an embargo on the English shipping, caused so many as three hundred of their vessels at once to be seized in the ports of Russia, and even ordered such as endeavoured to escape to be sunk. This circumstance, added to the quarrel of the neutrals noticed above, could not fail to produce a war. The czar put himself at the head of this quarrel, calling to his aid Sweden, Denmark, and even Prussia, and proposing to them to renew the league of maritime neutrality of 1780. He invited the king of Sweden to repair to St. Petersburg, to confer with him on this important subject. Gustavus went thither, and was magnificently entertained. Paul, full of the mania with which he was possessed, held at St. Petersburg a grand chapter of Malta, admitted as knights the king of Sweden and all the personages who accompanied him, and conferred most lavishly the honours of the Order. But he did something more serious—he immediately renewed the league of 1780. On the 26th of December, a declaration was signed by the ministers of Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, by which those three maritime powers engaged to maintain, even by arms, the principles of the law of neutrals. They specified all these principles in their declaration, without omitting one of those which we have mentioned, and which France had just induced America to recognise. They bound themselves, moreover, to unite their forces, and to direct them in common against any power whatever that should violate the rights which they alleged to belong to them. Denmark, though extremely zealous for the interests of the neutrals, would have been glad not to proceed so fast; but the ice defended her for three months, and she hoped that, before her waters were navigable, England would have given way, or at least that the preparations of the neutrals of the Baltic would be sufficient to prevent the British fleet from appearing before the Sound, as it had done in the month of August last. Prussia too, which would rather have negotiated than proceeded with such promptness, was hurried along like Sweden and Den-

mark, and gave her adhesion two days afterwards to the declaration of St. Petersburg.

These were important events, and insured to France the alliance of the whole North of Europe against England; but these were not all the diplomatic successes of the First Consul. The emperor Paul had proposed to Prussia to concur with France in what was passing at Lunéville, and to agree to three of the bases of the general peace. Now, the tenour of the communications* of these two powers to our government, entirely coincided with those principles on which France had most insisted at Lunéville.

Prussia and Russia conceded the left bank of the Rhine, without dispute, to the French Republic; but they demanded an indemnity for the princes who lost portions of territory, but solely for the hereditary princes, and by means of the secularisation of the Ecclesiastical States. This was precisely the principle which Austria repudiated, and which France proposed. Russia and Prussia demanded the independence of Holland, of Switzerland, of Piedmont, and of Naples, which, at the moment, was in no way contrary to the designs of the First Consul. The emperor Paul interfered in behalf of Naples and Piedmont, solely on account of the treaty of alliance concluded with those States in 1798, when it had been necessary to involve them in the second coalition war; but he meant to protect Naples only on condition that this court should break with England. As for Piedmont, he claimed but a slight indemnity for the cession of Savoy to France. He thought it right, and Prussia with him, that France should curb the ambition of Austria in Italy, and confine her within the boundary of the Adige. Paul became at last so ardent, that he proposed to the First Consul to form a close alliance with him against England, and to engage not to make peace with her until the restitution of Malta to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. This was more than was desired by the First Consul, who was shy of such absolute engagements. Paul, wishing appearances to correspond with the real state of things, opened, instead of clandestine communications between M. de Krudener and general Beurnonville in Berlin, a public negotiation in Paris itself. He accordingly appointed M. de Kalitscheff as plenipotentiary to treat ostensibly with the French cabinet. M. de Kalitscheff received orders to repair immediately to France. This negotiator was the bearer of a letter addressed to the First Consul, and, moreover, written by the emperor Paul with his own hand. We already had M. de Sprengporten in Paris; we were now about to have M. de Kalitscheff: it was not possible to desire a more signal reconciliation of Russia with France.

* Letter of the King of Prussia of the 14th of January, communicated by M. de Lucchesini.

Thus the face of things was changed in Europe, in the North as well as in the South. In the North, the maritime powers, at open war with England, sought to join with us against her, by absolute engagements. In the South, Spain was bound to us by the closest ties: she threatened Portugal, to compel her to break with Great Britain. Lastly, Austria, worsted in Germany and Italy, left by all the powers at our mercy, had nothing but the daring obstinacy of her negotiator at Lunéville to defend her.

These events, the fruits of the ability of the First Consul, followed each other in rapid succession in the first days of January. Prussia and Russia, in fact, manifested their desire for the peace of the Continent; and Paul, with his own hand, apprised the First Consul of the mission of M. de Kalitscheff, at the very moment when M. de Cobentzel, giving way as to the boundary of the Adige, but obstinately standing out in regard to all the rest, refused the delivery of Mantua, as the price of an armistice in Italy.

The First Consul immediately wished to retard the progress of the negotiation at Lunéville. He directed instructions to be given to Joseph, and wrote to him,* prescribing a new line of conduct to our legation. In a state of crisis, such as Europe was in at that time, he thought it inexpedient to be in a hurry. It was possible, in fact, that too much might have been ceded, or something stipulated, which might have run counter to the views of the northern courts. Anticipating besides, that M. de Kalitscheff would arrive in a few days, he wished to see him, before he concluded definitively. Instructions were therefore transmitted to Joseph, to temporise for at least ten days, before he signed, and to require conditions still more stringent than the preceding.

Austria had consented to confine herself within the Adige. The construction which the First Consul now sought to put upon this was, that the duke of Tuscany was not to remain in Italy, but should receive, like the duke of Modena, an indemnity in Germany. His ultimate object was not to leave a single Austrian prince in Italy. To leave the duke of Tuscany in Tuscany, was, in his views, equivalent to giving Leghorn to the English; to remove him to the Legations, was granting Austria a footing beyond the Po. In consequence, he adopted the idea, of transferring Tuscany to the house of Parma, as he had stipulated at Madrid; thereby converting Leghorn into a Spanish arsenal; and of thenceforth including the whole valley of the Po in the Cisalpine Republic; for, according to this plan, it would comprehend the Milanese, the Mantuan, Plaisance, Parma, Modena, and the Legations. Piedmont, at the entrance of that valley, would in future be but a vassal of France. Austria, limited by the Adige, would be thrown to one extremity of Italy;

* Letter dated 1st Pluviôse (21st January).—(State Paper Office.)

Rome and Naples confined to the other extremity; France, with Tuscany and the Cisalpine for her advanced ports, would control and sway that superb country. Joseph Bonaparte was therefore directed by his new instructions to require that the duke of Tuscany should, like the duke of Modena, be removed into Germany; that the scheme for the secularisation of the ecclesiastical States, should be realised to indemnify the hereditary German princes, as well as the Italian princes, dispossessed by France; that the peace with the Empire should be signed at the same time as the peace with Austria, without even waiting for the sanction of the Diet; that nothing should be stipulated respecting Naples, Rome, and Piedmont, because France, though willing to preserve those States, desired first to arrange with them the conditions of their preservation; lastly, that Mantua should be delivered up to the French army, under threat of immediate renewal of hostilities.

Nothing is more usual, when a negotiation is still pending, when a treaty is not signed, nothing is more common than to modify the proposed conditions. The French cabinet, therefore, was quite justified in departing from its first conditions; but it must be confessed that, in this case, the alterations were abrupt and extensive.

M. de Cobentzel, by waiting too long, by demanding too much, by being wilfully blind to his real position, had lost the favourable moment. According to his custom, he complained bitterly, and threatened France with the desperation of Austria. He was, nevertheless, pressed to obtain the armistice for Italy, and made up his mind to concede Mantua; but he feared lest, after he had given up this bulwark, he should be at the mercy of France, and that fresh demands should be brought forward. In this frame of mind, he showed himself mistrustful and captious, and would not relinquish Mantua till at the last extremity. At length, on the 26th of January (6th Pluviôse), he signed the surrender of that fortress to the French army, to obtain an armistice in Italy and a prolongation of the armistice in Germany. The negotiators immediately dispatched couriers from Lunéville to the Adige, to prevent an effusion of blood, which was imminent.

Warm discussions ensued at the conferences, which were held at Lunéville, on the following days. M. de Cobentzel said that he had been promised the re-establishment of the grand-duke, on the very day, that he had consented to the boundary of the Adige. Joseph replied, that this was true, but that the re-establishment of this prince, was to be granted in Germany; that every state availed itself of its present situation to treat more advantageously: that France, in acting thus, adopted the very principles expressed by M. de Thugut, in his letters of the preceding winter; that, moreover, the grand-duke, whose case was under discussion, would be in Tuscany, cut off from Austria and unsupported; that, in the Legations, or the contrary, he would be too well

placed, as he would serve for a link between Austria, Rome, and Naples, that is to say, between the enemies of France, an arrangement to which France would never consent. The idea of placing him, either in Tuscany, or in the Legations should, therefore, be relinquished.

After vehement controversies, M. de Cobentzel seemed at last to consent that the indemnities for the grand-duke should be taken in Germany; but he would not admit the absolute principle of the secularisation of the ecclesiastical States. The ecclesiastical States were devoted to Austria, especially the three archbishop-electors of Treves, Cologne, and Mayence, whereas the hereditary princes, on the contrary, were often opposed to her interest in the Germanic Diet. Austria assented to the secularisations, understood in this way, that the small ecclesiastical States should serve to indemnify not only the hereditary princes of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Orange, but the great ecclesiastical princes, such as the archbishops of Treves, Cologne, and Mayence; for then her influence in Germany would have been in part maintained. Joseph Bonaparte had orders to make an obstinate opposition to this proposal. He was to admit the principle of secularisations solely for the benefit of the hereditary princes. Lastly, M. de Cobentzel would not sign the peace for the Empire, without powers from the Diet. This refusal proceeded, according to him, from a reluctance to violate forms; but in reality from an unwillingness to render too evident the part usually played by Austria in regard to the members of the Germanic body, a part which consisted in compromising them with France, whenever it was to the interest of Austria to do so, and afterwards deserting them, when the war had been disastrous. In 1797, she had delivered Mayence to the French, a proceeding most severely censured by all Germany; and now, to sign for the Empire, without powers from the Diet, seemed to M. de Cobentzel a new and very grievous act, to add to all the anterior acts with which the German princes reproached their sovereign. To these reasons Joseph Bonaparte replied, that it was easy to perceive the real motive of Austria; that she was afraid of committing herself with the Germanic body, but that it was not for France to heed such considerations; that, as to form, there was a precedent in the peace of Baden, signed by the emperor in 1714, without powers from the Diet; that, besides, the emperor was now only asked to sanction what the representatives of the Empire had already assented to at Rastadt, that is to say, the cession of the left bank of the Rhine to France; and that his refusal would be a sorry service rendered to Germany, for the French armies would continue in the territories occupied by them, till peace was concluded with the Empire; whereas, if the peace were common to all the German princes, the evacuation would immediately follow the ratifications.

These discussions lasted several days, M. de Cobentzel was, nevertheless, anxious to conclude. The French negotiator, on his side, though at first desirous to defer the signature of the treaty for a few days, being now apprised that M. de Kalitscheff would not arrive in Paris so soon as he was at first expected, saw no further advantage in temporising: he too was desirous to bring matters to a close. Orders had, in fact, been given to the two plenipotentiaries to come to an agreement; and, to decide M. de Cobentzel, Joseph Bonaparte had been authorised to make one of those concessions, which, at the last moment, serve for a pretext to an exhausted negotiator for yielding with honour. The *thalweg** of the Rhine was the limit assigned to France and Germany; consequently Düsseldorf, Ehrenbreitstein, Philipsburg, Kehl, Old Breisach, situated on the right bank, though attached to the left bank by many ties, were to be left to the Germanic Confederation. But Cassel, a suburb of Mayence, on the right bank, was a subject of dispute, for that suburb could scarcely be separated from the city itself. Joseph was authorised to cede Cassel, but on condition that it should be dismantled. Mayence would thus cease to be longer a fortified *tête de pont*, affording a passage at all times to the right bank of the Rhine.

The last conference was held on the 9th of February, 1801 (20th Pluviôse, year IX.). As it usually happens, the negotiators were never nearer to a rupture than when they were on the point of agreeing definitively. M. de Cobentzel warmly insisted on the maintenance of the grand-duke of Tuscany in Italy; on the indemnity destined for the German princes, an indemnity which he wished to extend to the ecclesiastical princes of the first order; lastly, on the inconvenience of signing for the Germanic body, without having powers from the Diet. An article relative to the debts of Belgium also gave rise to great difficulties. On all these accounts he at last declared that he durst not conclude without referring to Vienna. Joseph thereupon replied that his government enjoined him to declare the negotiations at an end, unless they brought them to a termination before they broke up; he added that in the event of another campaign Austria would be thrown back beyond the Julian Alps. At length he ceded Cassel, besides all the fortified positions on the right bank, but on condition that France should demolish before she evacuated them, and that they should never be reconstructed.

Upon this concession M. de Cobentzel yielded, and the treaty was signed on the 9th of February, 1801, at half-past five in the evening, to the great joy of Joseph, to the great grief of M. de Cobentzel, who, however, had nothing to reproach himself with; for, if he had endangered the interests of his court, it was because he had persisted in defending them too warmly.

* The middle of the stream.—*Translator.*

Such was the celebrated treaty of Lunéville, which terminated the war of the second coalition, and for the second time conceded to France the left bank of the Rhine, with a commanding situation in Italy. The principal clauses were as follows.

The *thalweg* of the Rhine, from its exit out of the Helvetic territory to its entry into the Batavian territory, formed the boundary of France and Germany. Düsseldorf, Ehrenbreitstein, Cassel, Kehl, Philipsburg, Old Breisach, situated on the right bank, were left to Germany, but were first to be dismantled. The hereditary princes who suffered losses on the left bank were to be indemnified. No mention was made of the ecclesiastical princes or of the mode of fixing the indemnities; but it was perfectly understood that the whole or part of the ecclesiastical territories were to serve for the indemnities.

The emperor, at Lunéville as at Campo-Formio, ceded the Belgic provinces to France, as well as the small territories which he possessed on the left bank, such as the county of Falkenstein, and the Frickthal, which lay wedged in between Zurzach and Basle. He gave up, moreover, the Milanese to the Cisalpine. For these he obtained no other indemnity than the Venetian States as far as the Adige, which had been previously insured to him by the treaty of Campo-Formio. He lost the archbishopric of Salzburg, which had been promised him by a secret article of the same treaty. His house was, besides, deprived of Tuscany, which was ceded to the house of Parma. An indemnity in Germany was promised to the duke of Tuscany. The promise of the Breisgau was still held out to the duke of Modena.

The territorial distribution of Italy was thus settled on a much more advantageous basis for France than at the time of the treaty of Campo-Formio. Austria continued to have the Adige for her boundary; but Tuscany was taken from her house and given to a house dependent on France; the English were excluded from Leghorn; the whole valley of the Po, from the Sesia and the Tanaro to the Adriatic, belonged to the Cisalpine Republic, a dependent daughter of the French Republic; lastly, Piedmont, confined to the sources of the Po, was dependent on us. Thus, masters of Tuscany and the Cisalpine, we occupied all central Italy, and prevented Austria from giving a hand to Piedmont, the Holy See, and Naples.

By the first coalition, Austria had lost Belgium and Lombardy, besides Modena for her family. By the second, she lost the bishopric of Salzburg for herself, and Tuscany for her house, which placed her in a position somewhat inferior in Germany, but very inferior in Italy. This was certainly not too much for all the bloodshed, for all the efforts imposed upon France.

The principle of the secularisations was not explicitly but implicitly laid down, since it was promised to indemnify the

hereditary princes without alluding to the ecclesiastical princes. Evidently the indemnity could not be demanded of any but the ecclesiastical princes themselves.

The peace was declared common to the Batavian, Helvetic, Cisalpine, and Ligurian Republics. Their independence was guaranteed: nothing was said concerning Naples, Piedmont, or the Holy See. These States were dependent on the pleasure of France, which, for the rest, was tied in regard to Piedmont and Naples, by the interest which the emperor Paul took in behalf of those two courts, and in regard to the Holy See, by the religious plans of the First Consul.

The First Consul, however, as we have seen, had not thought fit to explain himself to any one relative to Piedmont. Displeased with the king of Sardinia, who gave up his ports to the English, he was desirous of keeping himself at liberty in regard to a territory situated so near to France and of such high importance to her.

The emperor signed the peace for himself as sovereign of the Austrian States, and for the whole Germanic body as emperor of Germany. France promised secretly to use her influence with Prussia to dispose her to approve this mode of proceeding of the emperor's. The ratifications were to be exchanged in thirty days by Austria and by France. The French armies were not to evacuate Germany till the ratifications had been exchanged at Lunéville, but were to have evacuated it entirely a month after that exchange.

Here, as at Campo-Formio, the liberation of all persons confined for political offences was stipulated. It was agreed that the Italians, shut up in the prisons of Austria, particularly Moscati and Caprara, should be released. The First Consul had not ceased to insist on this act of humanity ever since the opening of the congress.

General Bonaparte had attained the supreme power on the 9th of November, 1799 (18th Brumaire, year VIII.); it was now the 9th of February, 1801 (20th Pluviôse, year IX.); consequently just fifteen months had elapsed, and France, partly reorganized at home, completely victorious abroad, was already at peace with the Continent, and in alliance with the North and the South of Europe against England. Spain was preparing to march against Portugal; the queen of Naples had thrown herself at our feet; the court of Rome was negotiating in Paris the arrangement of religious affairs.

General Bellavène, appointed to carry the treaty, left Lunéville in the evening of the 9th of February, and arrived as an extraordinary courier in Paris. The treaty which he brought was immediately inserted entire in the Moniteur. Paris was suddenly illuminated; vehement and general joy burst forth on all sides; and thanks without number were given to the First Consul for this happy result of his victories and his policy.

BOOK VIII.

INFERNAL MACHINE.

Plots against the Life of the First Consul—Carbon, St. Réjant, and Limoëlan, three Agents of Georges, form a Plan for destroying the First Consul by the Explosion of a Barrel of Gunpowder—Choice of the Rue St. Nicaise, and of the 3rd Nivôse for the Execution of this Crime—The First Consul saved by the Dexterity of his Coachman—Sensation produced—The Crime attributed to the Revolutionists, and to the Indulgence shown them by Fouché, the Minister—Animosity of the new Courtiers against that Minister—His Silence and Coolness—He discovers Part of the Truth and makes it known; but Measures are nevertheless taken against the Revolutionists—Irritation of the First Consul—Project of an arbitrary Measure—Deliberation on this Subject in the Council of State—After long Discussions, a Resolution is adopted for transporting a certain Number of Revolutionists without Trial—Some Resistance, but very faint, made to this arbitrary Act—Discussion whether it shall take place by a Law, or by a spontaneous Measure of the Government, referred only to the Senate, for the sake of Constitutionality—The latter Course adopted—Transportation decreed against one hundred and thirty alleged Terrorists—Fouché, who knew them to be innocent of the Attempt of the 3rd Nivôse, consents, nevertheless, to the Measure which proscribes them—Discovery of the real Authors of the Infernal Machine—Execution of Carbon and St. Réjant—Unjust Condemnation of Topino Lebrun, Arena, &c.—Session of the Year IX.—Fresh Manifestations of Opposition in the Tribunate—Institution of Special Tribunals for the Suppression of Robbery on the Highroads—Financial Statement of Ways and Means for the Years VI., VII., and VIII.—Budget of the Year IX.—Definitive Adjustment of the Public Debt—Rejection by the Tribunate, and Adoption by the Legislative Body, of this Plan of Finance—Sentiments of the First Consul—Continuation of his administrative Labours—Roads—Canal of St. Quentin—Bridges over the Seine—Works at the Simplon—The Monks of the Great St. Bernard established at the Simplon and at Mont Cenis.

BOOK VIII.

INFERNAL MACHINE.

WHILE the external position of France was daily becoming more brilliant, while Germany and Austria were treating for peace, while the northern powers were leaguing with us to resist the maritime pretensions of England, while Portugal and Naples were closing their ports against her, and while, in short, every thing was succeeding to the wish of a victorious and moderate government, her internal situation exhibited a spectacle, at times frightful, of the last convulsions of expiring parties. We have already seen, in spite of the prompt re-organisation of the government, robbery infesting the high roads, and factions, in despair, attempting the assassination of the First Consul. These were the inevitable consequences of our past disunion. The men whom civil war had trained to crime, and who could no longer resign themselves to a peaceable and honest life, sought employment on the highways. The broken-down factions, despairing of overpowering the consular guard, attempted to destroy, by atrocious means, the invincible author of their defeat.

Robbery had increased on the approach of winter. It was impossible to travel the roads without running the risk of being plundered or murdered. The departments of Normandy, Anjou, Maine, Bretagne, and Poitou, were, as formerly, the theatres of these depredations. But the evil had spread. Several departments of the centre and the South, as those of the Tarn, la Lozère, the Aveyron, the Upper Garonne, l'Herault, the Gard, the Ardèche, the Drôme, Vaucluse, the Bouches du Rhone, the Upper and Lower Alps, the Var, had been infested in their turn. In these departments the bands of robbers had been recruited by the assassins of the South, who, upon pretext of chastising Jacobins, murdered, for the purpose of robbing, the purchasers of national domains; by young men who would not submit to the conscription; and by some soldiers whom want had driven from the army of Liguria, during the cruel winter of 1799 and 1800. These wretched men, having once entered upon this criminal life, had taken a liking to it; and nothing but the force of arms and the severity of the laws could now divert them from those courses. They stopped the public conveyances; they kidnapped from

th'r homes the purchasers of national domains, and frequently opulent landed proprietors also, carried them into the woods, as they did the senator Clement de Ris, for example, whom they detained for twenty days, inflicted horrible tortures on their victims, sometimes burning their feet, till they had paid considerable sums for their ransom. They plundered more especially the public chests, and even seized the funds of the State at the houses of the collectors, upon pretext of making war upon the government. Vagabonds who, in these times of trouble, had left their homes to follow a wandering life, served them for scouts, by assuming the character of beggars in the towns. These wretches, picking up all sorts of information while engaged in begging, intimated to the robbers, their accomplices, what carriages to stop and what houses to plunder.

Small bodies of troops had been required to repress these bands. When any of them were taken, justice could not take its course, for the witnesses durst not give evidence, and the juries were afraid to convict. Extraordinary measures are always to be regretted, not so much on account of the severities attendant on them, as the shock which they give to the constitution of a country, especially when that constitution is new. But, in this case, measures of that kind were indispensable; for ordinary justice, after it had been tried, was found to be powerless. A bill (*projet de loi*) had been prepared for instituting special tribunals for the suppression of highway robbery. This bill, presented to the Legislative Body, which was then sitting, was violently attacked by the opposition. The First Consul, exempt from those scruples of legality which are felt only in times of quiet, and which, even when they happen to be petty or narrow, are at least a happy sign of respect for the authority of the law, the First Consul had not hesitated to have recourse to martial law till the plan under discussion should be adopted. As it was necessary to employ bodies of troops to suppress these bands of robbers, the gendarmerie not being strong enough to cope with them, he thought that this situation might be assimilated to a state of real war, which authorised the application of the laws peculiar to the state of war. He formed several small corps, which scoured the infested departments, and were accompanied by military commissions. All the robbers taken in arms were tried within forty-eight hours and shot.

The horror excited by these villains was so great and so general, that nobody durst raise a doubt as to the regularity or the justice of these executions. Meanwhile, villains of another stamp were meditating the destruction of the consular government by different and still more atrocious means. While Demerville, Ceracchi, and Arena, were undergoing judicial examination, their adherents of the revolutionary party continued to form a thousand schemes, the one more insane than the other. They had planned the assassination of the First Consul in his

box at the Opera, and had scarcely dared, as we have seen to grasp their daggers. Now, they were dreaming of something else. One day they proposed to excite a disturbance at the breaking up of one of the theatres, and to dispatch the First Consul amidst the tumult; on another, to seize him on his way to Malmaison, and to murder him after they had carried him off. Like genuine declaimers at clubs, they talked of these schemes everywhere and aloud, so that the police was informed from hour to hour of each of their plans. But, while they talked incessantly, not one of them was bold enough to act. M. Fouché feared them but little, and yet watched them with continual attention. However, among their numerous devices, there was one more formidable than the rest, and which had roused the particular vigilance of the police. One Chevalier, a workman employed in the manufactories of arms established in Paris under the Convention, had been found at work upon a frightful machine. It was a barrel filled with powder and langrage to which was adjusted a musket-barrel with a trigger. This machine was evidently destined to blow up the First Consul. The inventor was apprehended and thrown into prison. This new contrivance made some noise, and contributed greatly to keep all eyes fixed on those who were called Jacobins and Terrorists. Their reputation of '93 caused them to be more feared than they deserved to be. The First Consul, as we have already said, participated in the error of the public respecting them; and, having continually to do with the revolutionary party, sometimes with honest men of that party dissatisfied with too rapid a re-action, sometimes with villains planning crimes which they no longer had the energy to commit, he laid the blame of every thing upon the Revolutionists, was angry with none but them, talked of punishing them alone. M. Fouché persisted, but to no purpose, in directing his attention to the Royalists. It would have required strong facts to change the opinion of the First Consul and that of the public on this subject. Unfortunately, atrocious facts were in course of preparation.

Georges, having returned from London to the Morbihan, was full of money, thanks to the English, and secretly directed the plunderers of the diligences. He had sent some of his cut-throats to Paris, for the purpose of murdering the First Consul. Among them were two men, named Limoëlan and St. Réjant, both practised in the horrors of the civil war, and the latter formerly a naval officer, having some knowledge of gunnery. To these two he added a third, called Carbon, a subordinate person, the worthy tool of those great criminals. Arriving in Paris one after another, towards the end of November (first days of Frimaire), they sought the surest means of killing the First Consul, and made more than one trial with air-guns in the neighbourhood of Paris. Fouché, the minister, apprised of their presence and of

their errand, had them closely watched. But, owing to the inefficiency of two agents employed to follow these men, he had lost sight of them. While the police was making every exertion to discover traces of them, these villains had buried themselves in profound obscurity. Without declaiming, like the Jacobins, or communicating their secret to any one, they prepared for an atrocious deed, which has been equalled but once, and in our own times. Chevalier's machine had suggested to them the idea of destroying the First Consul by means of a barrel of powder charged with langrage. They resolved to put this barrel into a small cart, and to place it in one of the narrow streets which then led to the Carrousel, and through which the First Consul very frequently passed in his carriage. They bought a horse and a cart, and hired a cart-house, passing themselves off for foreign traders. St. Réjant, who, as we have just said, was a naval officer and artillerist, made the necessary experiments, went several times to the Carrousel, to see the First Consul's carriage leave the Tuileries, to calculate how long it took to reach the neighbouring streets, and to arrange every thing in such a manner that the barrel should explode at the right time. These three men chose, for the accomplishment of their plan a day when the First Consul was to go to the Opera to hear Haydn's oratorio of "The Creation," which was to be performed for the first time. It was the 3rd Nivôse (December 24th, 1800). They selected for the theatre of the crime the Rue St. Nicaise, which ran from the Carrousel to the Rue de Richelieu, and through which the First Consul was in the habit of passing very often. Several successive windings in this street must necessarily slacken the progress of the most expert driver. The day having arrived, Carbon, St. Réjant, and Limoëlan, drove their cart to the Rue St. Nicaise, and then separated. While St. Réjant was to set fire to the barrel of powder, the two others were to place themselves within sight of the Tuileries, and to come and give him notice the moment they saw the First Consul's carriage make its appearance. St. Réjant had the barbarity to get a girl of fifteen to hold the horse harnessed to this horrible machine. For his part, he kept himself in readiness to set fire to it.

At this very moment, the First Consul, fatigued with business, was hesitating about going to the Opera, but he suffered himself to be persuaded by the earnest solicitations of those about him, and set out from the Tuileries at a quarter past eight o'clock. He was accompanied by generals Lannes, Berthier, and Lauriston, and escorted by a detachment of mounted grenadiers. Most fortunately these grenadiers followed, instead of preceding, the carriage. It arrived in the narrow part of the Rue St. Nicaise, without having been announced either by the detachment or by the accomplices. The latter never came to apprise St. Réjant. Fear had prevented their doing so, or perhaps they had not recognised the First Consul's carriage. St. Réjant himself

did not perceive it till it was a little past the machine. He was violently jostled by one of the horse-guards; but, not disconcerted, he set fire, and instantly took to flight. The First Consul's coachman, who was a capital whip, and usually drove his master with extreme rapidity, had had time to pass one of the turnings of the street, when the explosion was suddenly heard. The shock was tremendous: the carriage was nearly overturned; all the windows were broken, and the fronts of the neighbouring houses were shattered by the discharge. One of the horse-grenadiers was slightly wounded, and all the surrounding streets were instantly strewed with a great number of persons dead or dying. The First Consul and those who accompanied him, at first conceived that they had been fired at with grape; they stopped for a moment, soon learned the real state of the case, and pursued their way. The First Consul insisted on going to the Opera. He appeared calm, unmoved, amidst the extraordinary agitation that prevailed in all parts of the house. It was reported that, in order to despatch him, banditti had blown up a whole quarter of Paris.

He staid but a few moments at the Opera, and returned immediately to the Tuileries, where, on the report of the attempt, an immense concourse had collected. His anger, which he had before repressed, then burst forth. "It is the Jacobins, the Terrorists," he exclaimed; "it is those wretches in permanent revolt, in *battaillon carré* against every government, it is the cut-throats of the 2nd and 3rd of September, the ringleaders of the 31st of May, the conspirators of Prairial; it is those villains who, to assassinate me, have not scrupled to sacrifice thousands of lives. I will do signal justice upon them." There was no need for an impulsion from so high a quarter to inflame the public opinion against the Revolutionists. Their exaggerated reputation, and their attempts for two or three months past, were such as to cause every possible crime to be attributed to them. In that saloon, thronged more especially by those who were anxious that their attachment should be remarked, there was soon but one cry against the Terrorists, as they were called. The numerous enemies of M. Fouché hastened to profit by the occasion, and to launch forth into invectives against him. His police, said they, sees nothing, allows any thing to be done; it shows a criminal indulgence towards the revolutionary party. This is owing to M. Fouché's fellow-feeling for his old accomplices. The life of the First Consul would no longer be safe in his hands. In a moment the animosity against that minister was at its height; that very evening it was asserted that he had been dismissed. As for M. Fouché, retiring into a corner of the saloon of the Tuileries, with a few persons who did not share the general excitement, he listened to the accusations preferred against him with the utmost composure. His air of incredulity inflamed still more the anger of his enemies. Still he

would not disclose what he knew, for fear of marring the success of the researches that were on foot. But, recollecting the agents of Georges, dogged for some time by the police, and afterwards lost sight of, he did not hesitate in his own mind to impute the crime to them. Certain members of the Council of State would have addressed some observations to the First Consul, and expressed their doubts as to the real authors of the attempt in the Rue St. Nicaise: he flew into a violent passion. "I am not to be bamboozled," he exclaimed. "This is no attempt of Chouans or emigrants, or *ci-devant* nobles and priests. I know the authors; I shall be sure to get at them, and to inflict on them an exemplary punishment." While uttering these words, his speech was vehement, his gesture threatening. His flatterers applauded and excited that anger which should have been soothed, not inflamed, after the horrible events which had just agitated all around.

On the following day, the same scenes were repeated. According to a custom recently introduced, the Senate, the Legislative Body, the Tribunate, the Council of State, the judges, the administrative authorities, the staffs, waited upon the First Consul, to express their grief and indignation, sentiments sincerely and universally felt. Never, indeed, had such a thing been seen. The Revolution had familiarised men's minds with the cruelties of dominant factions, but not yet with the dark plots of vanquished parties. People were filled with surprise and dismay: they dreaded the repetition of these atrocious attempts, and asked each other in consternation what would become of France, if the man, who alone curbed these wretches were to be cut off. All the bodies of the State, admitted into the Tuileries, expressed ardent attachment to the hero-pacificator, who had promised to restore, and who was actually restoring, peace to the world. The terms of these addresses were common-place, but the sentiment which pervaded them all was not less genuine than profound. The First Consul replied to the municipal council: "I have been touched by the proofs of affection which the people of Paris have shown me on this occasion. I deserve them, because the only aim of my thoughts, of my actions, is to augment the prosperity and the glory of France. While those banditti confined themselves to direct attacks upon me, I could leave to the laws the task of punishing them; but, since they have just endangered part of the population of the capital by a crime unexampled in history, the punishment shall be equally speedy and terrible. Assure the people of Paris, in my name, that that handful of villains, whose crimes have gone far to dishonour liberty, shall soon be deprived of the power to do mischief."

Every one applauded these words of vengeance, for there was not a person but, for his own part, made use of similar expressions. Men of reflection anticipated with pain that the enraged lion might, perhaps, overleap the barrier of the laws; but the multitude called for punishment. In Paris, the agitation was

extreme. The Royalists threw the guilt on the Revolutionists, and the Revolutionists on the Royalists. Both were equally sincere, for the crime remained a profound secret to all but its authors. Every one descanted on the subject, and, according to his inclination to condemn one party rather than another, found reasons equally plausible for accusing the Royalists or the Revolutionists. The enemies of the Revolution, both old and new, said that the Terrorists alone could have devised so atrocious a scheme, and adduced, as a conclusive proof of their opinion, the machine of Chevalier, the gunsmith, recently discovered. Sagacious persons, on the contrary, who had stedfastly clung to the Revolution, asked why those highway robbers, those *Chauffeurs*, who committed so many crimes, who daily displayed an unparalleled refinement in cruelty, and who, in particular, had just carried off the senator Clement de Ris, why these men might not be the authors of the horrible explosion in the Rue St. Nicaise as well as the so-called Terrorists. It should moreover be borne in mind that persons of sedate minds could scarcely obtain a hearing at that moment, so deeply was public opinion agitated, and so strong was the tendency to condemn the revolutionary party. But, will it be believed? amidst the conflict of diverse imputations, there were men of both parties inconsiderate or perverse enough to hold a totally different language. Certain factious Royalists longed for the destruction of the First Consul at any rate, and adopting the general opinion which attributed the crime to the Terrorists, admired the atrocious energy, the profound secrecy, which had been required for the commission of such a deed. The Revolutionists, on the contrary, seemed almost to claim the merit for their party; and there were among them braggarts of crime, who had the culpable folly of being almost proud of the execrable act that was imputed to them. It is only in times of civil war that we meet with such levity and such unprincipled language, among men who would themselves be incapable of perpetrating the deeds which they dare to approve.

We may further add, that all who talked of this event were totally wrong. The minister Fouché alone suspected who were the real culprits.

While he was engaged in searching after them, every body was asking what was to be done to prevent future attempts of the same kind. People were, at that time, so accustomed to violent measures, that they thought it almost natural to seize the men known to have been formerly Terrorists, and to treat them as they had treated their victims in '93. The two sections of the Council of State, to whose province this subject more particularly belonged, the sections of legislation and of the interior, assembled two days after the event, on the 26th of December (5th Nivôse), to inquire which of the various plans proposed was most admissible. As the bill (*projet de loi*) to institute special tribunals was then under discussion, it was

suggested that two clauses should be added to it. The first instituting a military commission for the trial of crimes committed against the members of the government; the second investing the First Consul with authority to remove from Paris men whose presence in the capital should be deemed dangerous, and to punish them with transportation, if they should attempt to disregard such first exile.

After the preliminary investigation of this subject in the two sections of legislation and of the interior, the whole Council of State met under the presidency of the First Consul. M. Portalis reported what had passed in the morning in the two sections, and submitted their propositions to the Council. The First Consul, out of temper, thought these propositions defective. A mere change of jurisdiction appeared to him totally inadequate to the circumstances. He was for apprehending the Jacobins *en masse*, shooting those who should be convicted of having had a hand in the crime, and transporting the others. But it was his wish to accomplish this by means of an extraordinary measure, in order to be more sure of the result. "The proceedings of a special tribunal," said he, "will be slow, and not reach the real criminals. Our business now is not to frame a system of judicial metaphysics. Metaphysical minds have ruined every thing in France for the last ten years. We must judge of the situation like statesmen, and apply a remedy to it like resolute men. What is the evil that annoys us? There are in France 10,000 scoundrels, spread over the whole country, who have persecuted all the honest people, and who are steeped in blood. All are not guilty in the same degree, far from it. Many are still open to repentance, and are not incorrigible criminals; but, while they see the head-quarters established in Paris, and the chiefs concocting plots with impunity, they retain hope, and keep up their spirits. Strike the chiefs boldly, and the soldiers will disperse. They will return to those occupations from which they were driven by a violent revolution; they will forget that stormy passage in their lives, and again become peaceable citizens. Honest men, who are now in constant fear, will take courage, and attach themselves to a government which has known how to protect them. There is no middle course; either we must pardon all, like Augustus, or vengeance, prompt, terrible, and proportionate to the crime must overtake them. As many of the guilty must be sacrificed as there have been victims. Fifteen or twenty of these villains must be shot, and 200 of them transported. By these means we shall rid the Republic of agitators who convulse it; we shall clear it of such sanguinary scum." .... At each successive sentence, the First Consul became more and more animated; and, nettled at the disapprobation even which he perceived in certain countenances, "I am," he exclaimed, "I am so convinced of the necessity and justice of a strong measure, to purify, and, at the same time, to quiet France, that I am ready to constitute myself sole

judge, to have the culprits brought before me, to examine them, to try them, and to order sentence of condemnation to be executed. All France will applaud me, for it is not my own person that I here seek to avenge. My fortune, which has preserved me so often on the field of battle, will continue to preserve me. I think not of myself; I think of social order, which it is my mission to re-establish, and of the national honour, which it is my duty to purge from an abominable stain."

This scene petrified part of the Council of State with surprise and terror. Some members, sympathising with the sincere, but intemperate feelings of the First Consul, applauded his speech. A very decided majority discerned, with regret, in his words, the language which the Revolutionists had themselves held, when they proscribed thousands of victims. They, too, had said that the aristocrats endangered the Republic, that it was necessary to get rid of them by the most speedy and by the surest means, and that the public safety was worth a few sacrifices. The difference, to be sure, was great; for, instead of a bloodthirsty rabble, who, in their blind fury, at length took each other for aristocrats, and slaughtered one another, here was a man of genius, proceeding, with consistency and vigour, towards a noble aim, that of setting convulsed society to rights. Unfortunately, he endeavoured to succeed, not by the slow observance of rules, but by prompt and extraordinary means, like those which had been employed to overturn it. His good sense, his generous heart, and the horror of shedding blood, then prevalent, were guarantees against sanguinary executions; but, with the exception of actual bloodshed, he was disposed to resort to every severity towards those who were then denominated Jacobins and Terrorists.

Objections were raised in the Council of State, timidly, it is true, for the indignation universally excited by the crime of the Rue St. Nicaise, checked the courage of those, who would fain have made some resistance to arbitrary proceedings. However, one individual, who was not afraid to oppose the First Consul, and who did so bluntly, and in a straightforward way, admiral Truguet, seeing that the intention was to strike the Revolutionists *en masse*, raised doubts respecting the real authors of the crime. "Government," said he, "is desirous to get rid of the villains who disturb the Republic; well and good; but there are villains of more than one kind. The returned emigrants threaten the purchasers of the national domains; the Chouans infest the high roads; the re-instated priests inflame the passions of the people in the South; the public mind is poisoned by pamphlets"..... This last expression of admiral Truguet had reference to the famous pamphlet of M. de Fontanes, to which we have before adverted. At these words, the First Consul, stung to the quick, and, advancing directly to the speaker, asked, "What pamphlets do you allude to?" "Pamphlets that are publicly circulated," replied admiral Truguet. "Specify

them," rejoined the First Consul. "You know them as well as I do," retorted this courageous man, who thus dared defy such indignation.

A scene like this had never yet been witnessed within the walls of the Council of State. The circumstances produced an outburst of the impetuous temper of the man who then held in his hands the destinies of France. He thereupon gave vent to his passion, and displayed all the eloquence of wrath. "Do people take us for children?" he exclaimed. "Do they think to hurry us away with these declamations against the emigrants, the Chouans, the priests? Because there are still some partial attempts in La Vendée, are we to be required, as formerly, to declare the country in danger?.... Has France ever been in a more brilliant situation, have the finances ever been in a better state, the armies more victorious, has general peace ever been nearer at hand? If the Chouans commit crimes, I will have them shot. But must I begin again by proscribing on account of the appellations of nobles, priests, or royalists? Must I send into exile ten thousand old men, who only desire to live peaceably, while paying respect to the established laws? Have you not seen poor ecclesiastics put to death in Bretagne, at the instigation of Georges himself, because he saw that they were gradually becoming reconciled to the government? Must I again proscribe on account of rank or title? Must I strike some because they are priests, others because they were formerly nobles? Do you not know, gentlemen, members of the Council, that, with the exception of two or three, you are all reputed Royalists? You, citizen Defermon, are you not taken for a partisan of the Bourbons? Must I send citizen Portalis to Sinnamary, citizen Devaisne to Madagascar, and then constitute myself a council *à la Babœuf?* No, citizen Truguet, I am not to be deceived: we have none who threaten our quiet but the Septembrisers. They would not spare even you; in vain you might tell them, that you had defended them to-day in the Council of State; they would sacrifice both you and me, as well as all your colleagues."

There was only one word to be said in reply to this vehement apostrophe, that it was not right to proscribe any person for a mere title, neither one party because they were styled Royalists, nor another party because they were Revolutionists. The First Consul had no sooner uttered his concluding words, than he rose abruptly, and put an end to the sitting.

Cambacérès, the consul, always calm, possessed infinite skill in obtaining by gentleness, what his imperious colleague would fain extort by the sole power of his will. He assembled the two sections on the following day at his residence; he endeavoured, in a few words, to excuse the warmth of the First Consul, affirming, what was true, that he had no dislike to contradiction, when it was free from acrimony and personality; and he endeavoured to reconcile their minds to the idea of some extraordinary mea-

sure. This was not worthy of his accustomed moderation; but, though in the habit of giving prudent advice to the First Consul, he gave way when he saw that he was absolutely resolved, and especially when the point in discussion, related to the curbing of the Terrorists. M. Portalis, who had the merit of being averse to proscribe any one, though he had been proscribed himself, adhered to the plan of the two sections, proposing to add two clauses, to the law instituting the special tribunals. Cambacérès, however, insisted, and obtained a majority in favour of the adoption of an extraordinary measure, upon the understanding that it should be discussed afresh before the united sections. In this sort of meeting with closed doors, words again ran very high. M. Rœderer inveighed vehemently against the Jacobins, imputed their crimes to the indulgence of M. Fouché, and went so far as to move that the Council of State should join in an address, praying for the dismissal of that minister.

M. Cambacérès repressed all these ebullitions of zeal, and convoked the sections at the apartments of general Bonaparte, in whose presence was held a sort of privy council, composed of the Consuls, the two sections of the Interior and Legislation, and the ministers of Foreign affairs, of the Interior, and of Justice. So strong were the prejudices against M. Fouché, that he was not even summoned to these conferences.

The proposal of an extraordinary measure, was again presented and discussed at great length. Several sittings of this same privy council were held before the members could agree. At length, it was resolved that a general measure should be adopted against those who were called the Terrorists. But a serious question yet remained to be settled; that was the form of that measure. The point to be decided was, whether that measure should be carried into execution by a spontaneous act of the government, or by means of a law. The First Consul, generally so bold, was in favour of a law. He was averse to compromise the great bodies of the State on this occasion, and this he declared openly. "The Consuls are irresponsible," said he, "but the ministers are not so, and any of them who sign such a resolution may some day be called to account. Not a single individual must be compromised; the Legislative Body must share in the responsibility of the proposed measure. The Consuls themselves," he added, "know not what may happen. As for myself, while I live, I am not afraid that any one will dare to call me to account for my actions. But I may be killed, and then I cannot answer for the safety of my two colleagues. It would be your turn to govern," said he, laughing, to the second consul, Cambacérès, "and *you are not very firm in the stirrups.* It will be better to have a law for the present, as well as for the future."

A singular scene was passing at this moment. They who were averse to the measure, wished that it might be adopted,

not by means of a law, but through a spontaneous resolution of the government. They were desirous to throw upon the government the entire responsibility, without perceiving that they were thus suffering it to acquire the mischievous habit of acting alone, and on its arbitrary authority. It was said, in support of this opinion, that the law would not pass, that opinions began to be divided respecting the real authors of the crime, that the Legislative Body would recoil from a proscription-list, and that the government would run the risk of incurring a most signal defeat. Messrs. Rœderer and Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely expressed themselves to this effect. To the latter the First Consul made this reply: "Since the Tribunate has rejected one or two laws, you are panic-struck. There are, it is true, some Jacobins in the Legislative Body, but not above ten or twelve at most. They frighten the others, who know that, but for me, but for the 18th of Brumaire, they would have been massacred. These latter will stand by me on this occasion; the law will pass."

The advocates of the other course persisted in their sentiments, and M. de Talleyrand, siding with those who were afraid of the bill being thrown out, suggested an argument most likely to make an impression on the First Consul, namely, that abroad the measure would have a more salutary effect. "Foreigners," he said, "would recognise in it the act of a government that dared, and was able to defend itself against the anarchists." The First Consul yielded to this argument, but he devised a middle course, which was adopted: this was, to refer it to the Senate, that this body might examine whether the act was, or was not, an infringement of the Constitution. The reader will, no doubt, recollect that, according to the Constitution of the year VIII., the Senate did not vote the laws, but was empowered to rescind them, if it deemed them contrary to the Constitution. It had not the same power with regard to the measures of the government. The suggestion of the First Consul was therefore approved, and M. Fouché was directed to make out a list of the principal Terrorists, with a view to their being transported to the deserts of the New World. The two sections of the Council of State were charged to draw up a declaration of the reasons for this act. The First Consul was to sign the decree, and the Senate to declare whether it was, or was not, contrary to the Constitution.

This measure against the Terrorists, illegal and arbitrary in itself, had not even the justice which an arbitrary act may sometimes carry with it, when it punishes those who are really guilty; for the Terrorists were not the authors of the crime. By this time, the truth began to be suspected. Fouché, the minister, and Dubois, prefect of police, had been incessantly engaged in the most active search, and this search had not been fruitless. The violence of the explosion had destroyed almost all the instru-

ments of the crime. The girl, whom St. Réjant had employed to hold the horse, had been blown to pieces; nothing was left of the unfortunate creature, but her legs and feet. The iron tires of the cart-wheels had been thrown to a great distance. Fragments of the articles employed in the commission of the crime, and which were likely to lead to the discovery of the authors, had been found, at a great distance apart, in every direction. There were also left some remains of the cart, and the horse. These remains were collected, a description of them was drawn up, and made public through the newspapers, and all the horse-dealers in Paris were invited to inspect them. By a lucky chance, the original owner of the horse at once identified him, and gave the name of the seedsman to whom he had sold him. This seedsman, being summoned, declared with the utmost frankness, all that he knew about the matter. He had sold the horse to two men, who represented themselves as foreign traders. He had had two or three interviews with them, and described them very minutely. A man who kept carriages for hire, and who had let for a few days the cart-house, in which the cart was deposited, made also a very circumstantial deposition. He described the same persons, and furnished particulars perfectly corresponding with those which had been received from the seedsman. The cooper who had sold the barrel, and who had put on the iron hoops, gave information agreeing entirely, with the preceding accounts. All these depositions perfectly tallied as to the stature, features, dress, and appearance of the suspected individuals. When all these witnesses had been heard, recourse was had to a decisive proof. Upwards of two hundred Revolutionists, apprehended on this occasion, were taken from prison and brought before them. These examinations lasted during the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th of January (11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th Nivôse), and led to the conviction that not one of the Revolutionists was concerned in the crime, as not one was recognised. And no doubt could be entertained of the veracity of the witnesses who furnished these descriptions, for almost all of them had come forward spontaneously to give evidence, and manifested great zeal in seconding the efforts of the police. Thus, it was proved almost to a certainty that the Revolutionists were innocent. The fact, however, could not be perfectly established, unless by the discovery of the real authors. But an important circumstance, pointed to the agents of Georges, who had been sent upwards of a month before to Paris, and who had always been considered by M. Fouché as really the guilty parties. Though all trace of them had been lost, yet, down to the 3rd Nivôse they had been seen, sometimes in one place, sometimes in another, though the police had not been able to apprehend them. But, since the 3rd Nivôse, they had entirely disappeared, so that one would almost have thought that they had concealed themselves under ground. This disappearance, so sudden and so complete, ever since the day

of the crime, was a striking circumstance. Add to this, that one of the descriptions given by all the witnesses, corresponded in every point to that of Carbon. M. Fouché, more convinced than ever by all these indications, that the real authors were the Chouans, lost no time in dispatching an emissary to watch Georges' motions, and to obtain information relative to Carbon, St. Réjant, and Limoëlan. In the mean time he had collected sufficient evidence to shake the conviction of many, and even that of the First Consul, who, nevertheless, would not relinquish his first opinion but upon the production of actual proof.

Such was the state of the proceedings on the 4th of January (14th Nivôse), the day on which the act that condemned so many men under the designation of Terrorists, was definitively decreed.*

The Council of State had successively come to an agreement upon all the points; it had never thought seriously of a tribunal which should try in a summary manner, and sentence the Terrorists to be shot; it had always stopped short at the idea of transporting a certain number of them; and, after many discussions, it was agreed that they should be transported, by virtue of an act of the Consuls, submitted to the approbation of the Senate. The affair having been arranged with the principal members of the Council and the Senate, the rest could be nothing but an empty formality.

M. Fouché, who, without knowing the whole truth, was nevertheless acquainted with it in part, and buffeted on all sides, had the weakness to lend himself to a measure, directed, it is true, against men stained with blood, but not the authors of the crime, which it was intended to punish at the moment. Of all those who participated in this act of proscription, he was therefore the most inexcusable; but he was attacked in all quarters; he was accused of complaisance towards the Revolutionists; and he had not the courage to resist. He himself drew up the report for the Council of State, on which the decree of the Consuls was founded.

In this report, presented to the Council of State on the 1st of

* I have compared the dates of all the documents in the case with the dates of the measures passed against the revolutionary party, and the result is, that between the 11th and the 14th Nivôse, (the 1st and the 4th of January) only one thing was known, namely, that the personal examinations of the so-called Terrorists, had not led to the identification of any one of them. Consequently, there were strong reasons for believing that the revolutionary party, was not concerned in the crime of the Rue St. Nicaise; but this was not positively ascertained till much later, that is to say, till the 28th Nivôse (18th of January), the day of the apprehension, and complete identification of Carbon by the sellers of the horse, cart, and barrel. The act against the Revolutionists is dated the 14th Nivôse (4th of January): it is not true, therefore, as it has been sometimes asserted, that the proscription took place in spite of a perfect knowledge of the real authors of the crime, and that the government punished the Revolutionists, knowing them to be innocent. The procedure was at all events highly arbitrary; but it is our duty to state the facts as they occurred, without exaggeration or extenuation.

January, 1801 (11th Nivôse), a class of men was denounced, who for ten years had steeped themselves in crime of every kind; who had shed the blood of the prisoners in the Abbaye, invaded and outraged the Convention, threatened the Directory, and who now, driven to despair, had recourse to the dagger, to strike the Republic in the person of the First Consul. "All these men," it was said, "have not taken up the dagger, but all are universally known to be capable of pointing it, and of using it." It was added that the protective forms of justice were not made for them; it was therefore proposed to seize, and to transport them from the territory of the Republic.

The examination of the report gave rise to the question, whether the Jacobins ought not to be denounced in it as the contrivers of the 3rd Nivôse. The First Consul took great pains to oppose this. "We believe so," said he, "but we do not know it;"—(he began, in fact, to be shaken in his conviction)—"they are transported for the deeds of the 2nd of September, of the 31st of May, of the days of Prairial, for Babœuf's conspiracy, for all that they have done, for all that they might yet do."

A list of 130 persons doomed to transportation was annexed to this report. The government did not confine itself to transporting them; but, what was perhaps more cruel, there was added to the names of several of them the appellation *Septembriser*, without any other ground for thus stigmatising them than public notoriety.

The Council of State manifested a visible repugnance on hearing these 130 names; for it might be said that it was called upon to draw up a proscription list. Thibaudeau, the councillor, said that such a list could not be prepared by the Council. "I am not so silly," replied the First Consul, angrily, "as to make you pass sentence upon individuals; I merely submit to you the principle of the measure." The principle was approved, but not without some dissentient votes.

The question was then proposed, whether the measure should be an act of state police, on the part of the government, or a law passed in the accustomed forms. This point had been previously arranged: the resolutions already secretly adopted were confirmed, and it was decided that the measure should be a spontaneous act of the government, but referred to the Senate, which should pronounce upon the question of constitutionality.

On the 4th of January (14th Nivôse,) the First Consul, having had the definitive list prepared, drew up a decree, by which he banished from the territory of the Republic the persons included in that list, and without hesitation affixed his signature.

On the 5th of January (15th Nivôse), the assembled Senate, proceeding a step further than the decision of the Council of State, declared that the resolution of the First Consul was a measure essential to the preservation of the Constitution.

These unfortunate persons were collected on the following day, and despatched to Nantes to be shipped and transported to

distant countries. There were among them some deputies of the Convention, several members of the old Commune, all that remained of the murderers of September, and the notorious Rossignol, who had been general of the revolutionary army. Assuredly these men, at least most of them, deserved no sympathy; but all the forms of justice were violated in regard to them, and that which proves the danger of the violation of those sacred forms is, that many of the denunciations made by the police were disputed, and with a strong appearance of truth. It required some moral courage at the moment, to intercede on behalf of these proscripts; still there were some who, on the recommendation of bold men, were properly erased from the list of proscription, and spared at Nantes from the fatal embarkation. That an individual should be able to obtain, or fail in obtaining, the favour of a government, according as he can command, or is unable to command, an influential recommendation, is a point to which I shall not advert; but that his exclusion from a proscription list should depend upon the accidental circumstance, whether he can or cannot find a courageous influential friend to interfere on his behalf, must shock every feeling of justice, and prove that when forms are violated, society is exposed to all the horrors of arbitrary rule. And yet this period was resplendent with glory; it was distinguished by a love of order, by an antipathy to blood. But the nation was emerging from the revolutionary chaos; it had no respect for rules; it found them inconvenient and insupportable. If ever this arbitrary act were canvassed, a single word was sufficient to justify it. Those wretches, it was said, were steeped in blood, they would wallow in it again, if they were allowed free scope; they are treated much better than they had treated their victims. And, certainly, if this act had many previous precedents at anterior epochs, in regard to the violation of forms, it was marked by two peculiar distinct features from the past: punishment fell mostly upon villains, and their blood was not shed. A miserable excuse, we admit, but which we must nevertheless urge in extenuation, to show that the year 1800 had nothing in common with the year '93.

While these unfortunate persons were on the road to Nantes, it was with the greatest difficulty that they were saved from the fury of the populace in all the towns through which they passed, so strongly was public feeling expressed against them. Under the dominion of this feeling, something still more deplorable occurred; this was the condemnation of Ceracchi, Arena, Demerville, and Topino Lebrun. It will be recollected that in the preceding October (Vendémiaire), these hot-headed men had entered into a plot for the assassination of the First Consul at the Opera. But none of them had had the courage, nor perhaps even any decided intention, to assist in the execution of the plot. The police agents, sent in as spies amongst them, and to whom they gave daggers, urged them on to a degree of guilt, which before, perhaps,

they had not contemplated ! But, at any rate, they did not make their appearance at the place fixed for the execution of their plot; and Ceracchi, the only one apprehended in the Opera-house, was not even armed with one of the daggers which had been distributed amongst them. They were declaimers, who certainly wished for the destruction of the First Consul, but would never have dared to consummate it. They were tried on the 9th of January (19th Nivôse), at the very moment when the events just related were occurring. Their counsel, aware of the fatal influence exercised upon the minds of the jury by the catastrophe of the 3rd Nivôse, strove in vain to weaken it. That influence was irresistible upon the jury, which, of all tribunals, is that most swayed by public opinion, and which has the advantages and the inconveniences of that bias. Sentence of death was passed on four of these wretched men: these were Ceracchi, Arena, Demerville, and Topino Lebrun. The latter deserved some sympathy, and became a striking example of the cruel mutability of fortune during revolutions. This young Topino Lebrun was a painter of some talent, and a pupil of David. Participating in the extravagant ideas of the artists of the time, he had been a juryman at the revolutionary tribunal, but had there shown himself far more merciful than his colleagues. He brought forward the advocate Chaveau Lagarde, the respectable defender of the victims of that time, who in vain gave evidence in favour of his humanity. Extraordinary change of fortune! the former juryman of the revolutionary tribunal, now accused in his turn, calls to his assistance the former defender of the victims of that sanguinary tribunal! But this assistance, generously afforded, could not save him. The whole four, condemned on the 9th of January (19th Nivôse), were, after an unavailing appeal to the court of Cassation, executed on the 31st of the same month of January.

Meanwhile, the horrible mystery of the infernal machine was being gradually brought to light. M. Fouché had set agents to work about Georges, to make inquiries concerning Carbon, what had become of him, and where he lived. He had learned through this channel that Carbon had sisters residing in Paris, and he had also discovered their abode. The police searched it, and found a barrel of powder. They obtained, moreover, from Carbon's youngest sister, the address of the new lodging in which he had secreted himself. He was residing with very respectable persons, the demoiselles de Cicé, sisters of M. de Cicé, formerly archbishop of Bordeaux, and minister of justice. These ladies, taking him for a returned emigrant, whose passport was not in order, had procured him an asylum amongst a number of females, formerly nuns, who lived together in a remote quarter of Paris. These innocent women, who every day returned thanks to Heaven for the preservation of the First Consul, as they would have given themselves up for lost if he had fallen, had afforded a retreat,

unconsciously, to one of his assassins. The police repaired thither on the 18th of January (28th Nivôse), and apprehended Carbon, together with all the persons who had admitted him into the house. He was confronted the same day with the witnesses previously examined, and fully identified At first, he denied every thing, but at length confessed his participation in the crime, but an innocent participation, according to his account, for he asserted that he was not aware of the purpose for which the cart and the barrel were intended. He denounced Limoëlan and St. Réjant. Limoëlan had had time to make his escape to a foreign country, but St. Réjant, thrown down by the explosion, and half dead for some minutes, had only time and strength to change his lodging. An agent of Georges employed to attend on him, and who had been left at liberty, in hopes by tracking him to find St. Réjant, served to indicate his abode. On proceeding thither, the police found that he was still very ill from the effects of his wounds. He was soon confronted, identified, and convicted upon abundance of evidence, which left no room for doubt. Under his bed was found a letter to Georges, in which he related, with some ambiguity, the principal circumstances of the crime, and justified himself to his chief for his miscarriage. Carbon and St. Réjant were sent to the criminal tribunal, which soon sentenced these execrable assassins to the death they deserved.

When all these particulars were published, the obstinate accusers of the revolutionary party, and the complaisant defenders of the royalist party, were alike surprised and confounded. The enemies of M. Fouché, also were disconcerted. The soundness of his judgment was acknowledged, and he was re-established in the favour of the First Consul. But he had furnished a weapon of which his enemies, with justice, took advantage. Since he was so sure of his point, said they, why did he suffer the Revolutionists to be proscribed? He deserved, indeed, this keen reproach. The First Consul, who was unconcerned about violated forms, and cared for nothing but the results obtained, manifested no regret. He thought that what was done, was well done in every respect; that he was rid of what he called "the staff of the Jacobins," and that the 3rd Nivôse proved merely one thing—the necessity of watching the Royalists, as well as the Terrorists. "Fouché's opinion," said he, "was, after all, the only correct one; he is right: we must keep an eye on the returned emigrants, the Chouans, and all the members of that party."

This event greatly diminished the sympathy which had been felt for the Royalists, who had been complaisantly called the victims of terror; and likewise greatly diminished the animosity against the Revolutionists. M. Fouché had gained in credit, but not in esteem.

The painful feelings created by the employment of the machine, since named infernal, were soon dispelled by the joy produced by the peace of Lunéville. All days are not auspicious even

under the most prosperous governments. That of the Consulate had the unexampled advantage, that, if sad impressions took possession of the public mind one moment, they were dissipated the next, by some grand, new, unforeseen result. Occasional brief but mournful scenes, in which the First Consul was conspicuous as the saviour of France, which each faction was striving to undo, and these scenes followed by victories, treaties, and acts of reparation, which healed deep wounds, or restored public prosperity—such was the spectacle which was then incessantly exhibited. General Bonaparte always emerged from them greater, dearer to France, more clearly destined for the supreme power.

The second session of the Legislative Body had commenced. It was engaged, at this moment, in the discussion and adoption of several laws, the principal of which—that of the special tribunals—was of no real importance, after what had just been done. But the opposition in the Tribunate opposed these laws against the government; this was sufficient to induce the latter to persevere in them. The first of them related to the archives of the Republic. It had become necessary, since the abolition of the ancient provinces had given up to neglect a great number of old title deeds and documents, still either very useful, or very curious, to decide in what place these and other ancient records, such as laws, treaties, &c., should be deposited. This was a measure of order, devoid of all political bearing. The Tribunate voted against the law, and having, as usual, sent its three orators to the Legislative Body, obtained its rejection by a great majority. The Legislative Body, although strongly attached to the government, was, like assemblies thus devoted, sometimes jealous of showing its independence in measures of detail; and it could certainly do this without danger, in the discussion of a law, the object of which was to determine in what place, or places, certain ancient records and papers should be deposited.

The two assemblies had, under their consideration, at the moment, a law more important than the preceding, but equally foreign to politics. It related to Justices of peace, whose number had been found too great. Six thousand having been appointed at the time of their first institution, they had not answered the purpose for which they were created. In many districts, men capable of duly performing such functions were not to be found. They had failed in another point. It had been resolved to assign to them the judicial police; they had performed this duty very indifferently, and besides, the paternal and benevolent character of their jurisdiction had been, in a certain degree, impaired by it. The new plan of the government proposed two modifications relative to the Justices of peace: in the first place, their reduction from 6000 to 2600; and, in the next, the transfer of the judicial police to other magistrates. The project was a reasonable one, and presented with excellent intentions; but it met with violent

opposition in the Tribunate. Several members spoke against it, especially M. Benjamin Constant. It was, nevertheless, carried in the Tribunate by 59 votes against 32; and in the Legislative Body by 218 against 41.

Another law, more calculated to produce discussion, and of an entirely political nature, was presented at this period: this was the law which had for its object the institution of special tribunals. But this had lost its chief utility since the First Consul had appointed military commissions, to accompany the moveable columns employed in the suppression of robbery; and especially since he had not hesitated to proscribe arbitrarily such Revolutionists as were deemed dangerous. These military commissions had already produced salutary effects. The judges in military uniform, who composed them, were not afraid of the accused: they encouraged the witnesses who were to give evidence, and frequently these witnesses were the very soldiers who had seized the banditti, and surprised them with arms in their hands. Prompt and vigorous justice, following the very active employment of force, had singularly contributed to re-establish safety on the roads. The deadly conflicts which had ensued with the escorts placed on the *impériales* of the diligences soon intimidated the robbers. Attacks became less frequent; and security began again to prevail, thanks to the vigour of the government and of the tribunal, thanks also to the conclusion of the winter. The proposed law, therefore, was introduced when the evil was already abated; but it was beneficial, inasmuch as it imparted regularity to the military tribunals established on the high roads, and applied to highway robbery a permanent and perfectly legal measure of punishment. The projected organisation was this:—

The special tribunals were to be composed of three ordinary judges, all of them members of the criminal tribunal, of three military officers, with two assessors, the latter chosen by the government, and duly qualified, by their standing at the bar, to act as judges. Thus the military members could not have a majority. The government was empowered to establish these tribunals in those departments where they might be thought useful. They were authorised to take cognizance of all crimes committed by armed bands on the high roads and in the country, of all outrages against the purchasers of national domains, and lastly, of murders attempted with premeditation against the heads of the government. This last clause comprehended such crimes as the infernal machine, the plot of Ceracchi, Arena, &c. The court of Cassation was empowered to decide in every case of disputed jurisdiction, all other business before the court being suspended. This institution was to be abolished, as a matter of right, two years after the general peace.

These tribunals were obnoxious to every objection which can attach to exceptional justice. But there was this to be urged in

their favour, that never had society, convulsed to the very centre, required more prompt and more extraordinary measures for tranquillising it. Under the pretext of an adherence to the Constitution, recourse was had to that article of it, which permitted the Legislative Body to suspend its provisions in the departments where that might be deemed necessary. The case of extraordinary jurisdictions, was evidently comprehended in this clause; as the suspension of the Constitution necessarily led to the immediate establishment of martial law. Moreover, the discussion was altogether superfluous in a country, and at a time when 130 persons had just been proscribed without trial, and military commissions had been established in several departments, without eliciting the slightest murmur from public opinion. It must even be confessed that, as compared with these acts, the proposed law was a return to constitutional government. But it was vehemently, acrimoniously attacked by the usual opponents, Messrs. Daunou, Constant, Ginguené, and others. In the Tribunate it passed by a majority of only 49 votes to 41. In the Legislative Body, the majority was much greater, for the bill obtained 192 votes against 88. But a minority of eighty-eight votes exceeded the usual strength of the minority in that assembly, wholly devoted to the government. This great number of dissentient votes was attributed to a speech of M. Français, of Nantes, who addressed language perhaps a little too intemperate to the Legislative Body. "M. Français, of Nantes, has done right," said the First Consul to his colleagues, Cambacérès and Lebrun, who seemed to disapprove that speech; "it is better to have fewer votes, and to show that we feel insults and are determined not to put up with them."

The First Consul made use of still stronger language to a deputation of the Senate, which presented to him a resolution of that body. He expressed himself in the boldest manner, and on several occasions he plainly declared, that, if he was too much annoyed, that if people would endeavour to prevent him from restoring peace and order to France, he would rely upon the opinion which the country had of him, and govern by consular ordinances. His ascendency increased every moment with success, his boldness with his ascendency, and he was no longer at the pains of dissembling the extent of his designs.

He met with still stronger opposition on the questions of finance, which were the last discussed during this session. This was, nevertheless, the most meritorious work of the government, and more particularly owing to the personal intervention of the First Consul.

We have several times explained the means employed to insure the collection, and the regular payment into the Treasury, of the revenues of the State. These means had been completely successful. In the year VIII. (1799—1800), there had

been received 518,000,000,* which equalled the amount of the taxes for a whole year; for, in the budget, the expenditure and the receipts did not at that period exceed 500,000,000. Of these 518,000,000, a sum of 172,000,000 belonged to years V., VI., and VII., and 346,000,000 to the year VIII. Some items were still owing for those four years; it was necessary that they should be completely liquidated, in order that the year IX. (1800—1801), which was the current year, might at length proceed with perfect regularity. The income of the year IX. was sure to be adequate to the expenses, as the taxes would produce from 500,000,000 to 520,000,000; and this was sufficient to cover the expenses of the peace establishment. A system of annual accounts, distinguishing the income and expenditure for each twelve months had been introduced, and thenceforth the receipts of the year IX. were to be exclusively applied to the expenses of the year IX., and the receipts of the year X. to the expenses of the year X., and so on; provision was thus made for the future. But for the past, that is to say, for the years V., VI., VII., and VIII., there was a deficit to be made good. To this purpose, the daily receipts derived from the arrears of the contributions of those respective years were appropriated. But these arrears, which were chiefly owing by the landed proprietors, reduced them to a state of great depression. At the meeting of the councils-general of the departments, a meeting then held for the first time, eighty-seven councils-general out of 106 complained of the excessive burden of the direct contributions. Government, therefore, had no alternative, as we have before observed, but to remit a part of the outstanding arrears, if it persevered in requiring in future, the punctual payment of the whole tax. A law was proposed to authorise the local administrations to relieve the tax-payers who were too heavily assessed. This bill passed without opposition. But this would occasion a considerable deficiency appertaining to the years V., VI., VII., and VIII. This deficiency was estimated for the three years V., VI., VII., at 90,000,000, and for the year VIII., separately, at 30,000,000. The year VIII. (1799—1800) was kept distinct from the years V., VI., and VII., because the year VIII. belonged to the Consulate

It was necessary to decide how these deficies were to be met. There were national domains still undisposed of, to the extent of about 400,000,000; and it was here that the sound sense of the First Consul, exercised the happiest influence on our financial system, and caused the best possible employment to be made of the public resources.

As the national domains were not always marketable, their value had repeatedly been received in anticipation, by means of a government paper, which had been issued under different denominations, and which was receivable in payment of these

* These figures express francs, twenty-five of which are equivalent to 1*l.* sterling.—*Translator.*

domains. Since the extinction of the assignats, this kind of paper was known by the name of *rescriptions*. In the course of the year VIII., some of these rescriptions had been negotiated at less ruinous rates than before, but still at too great a sacrifice, to render it prudent to have recourse to them. These notes were negotiated at a loss from the very first day they were issued, soon fell into discredit, then passed into the hands of speculators, who, in this manner purchased the national domains for next to nothing. In this way a valuable resource had been wasted, to the great detriment of the State, and to the great advantage of stockjobbers. The remaining 400,000,000, if they could be saved from the disorder, by which so many other millions had been swallowed up, to this day, would soon acquire, with time and peace, a three or fourfold value. The First Consul was resolved not to squander them in the same way that several thousand millions had already been thrown away.

Immediate funds were nevertheless required. The First Consul endeavoured to obtain them by the emission of *rentes** (stock), which, since his accession, had already advanced considerably in value. They had risen from the price of ten and twelve, to that of twenty-five and thirty after Marengo, and above that of fifty, since the peace of Lunéville; it was asserted that they would rule as high as sixty at the general peace. At this rate, the government could begin to negotiate them, as there was less loss in selling *rentes*, than national domains. The First Consul, unwilling to open a loan, proposed to pay with *rentes*, certain creditors of the State, and to appropriate to the Sinking Fund an equivalent sum in landed property, which that Fund would sell by and by, slowly and at its full value, so as to compensate in this manner for the augmentation about to be made to the public debt. Such was the principle of the laws of finance proposed this year.

The debts yet unpaid for the last three years of the Directory, V., VI., and VII., passed for bad debts. They were the remnant of the disgraceful contracts, to the amount of 600,000,000, made under the Directory. Upon commencing a new system, the government resolved to respect these debts, notwithstanding their origin, and their nature. They amounted to a sum of about 90,000,000, but, almost the whole being in the hands of speculators, they were at a discount of seventy-five per cent. in the market. It was proposed to pay them off by means of a stock bearing interest at the rate of three per cent. The total of these debts amounting to 90,000,000, it would require, at three per cent., 2,700,000 francs to meet the dividends. This stock, at the current price of the public funds, (say 30 to 33⅓), represented a real value of 27,000,000 or 30,000,000 and could

* "*Rente*" signifies the annual dividend payable on stock: thus, 250 five per cent "rentes" (perpetual annuity of 250 francs) represents 5000 francs capital stock.—*Translator.*

not fail to represent one of 40,000,000 at least, in the eight or ten months which must elapse before the operation was completed. The debts intended to be paid, being at a discount of seventy-five per cent., and the capital of 90,000,000, of which they were composed, being thus reduced in reality to 22,000,000 or 23,000,000, much more would be paid for them than they were worth, if government granted a *rente* of 2,700,000 francs for them, since that *rente*, sold immediately, would have produced 27,000,000 or 30,000,000, and soon was likely to produce 40,000,000.

The debts of the year VIII. to be still liquidated, were of a totally different nature. They were contracted for services performed during the first year of the consular government, when order already prevailed in the administration. These services, rendered at a time when the distress was still great, had, it is true, been paid for at a very high rate; but it would have been derogatory to the honour of the consular government not to have faithfully kept these engagements, which were recently contracted, which had not been classed, like those of the Directory, among discredited paper, nor negotiated as such, and to have treated them in the same manner as those which belonged to the years V., VI., and VII. Government, therefore, did not hesitate to pay in full, and at its nominal value, the excess of the expenditure of the year VIII. It was now estimated at 60,000,000, but the receipt of arrears of the contributions of the year VIII. would reduce it to 30,000,000. It was resolved to pay a portion of it, 20,000,000, with a stock bearing interest at five per cent., which made 1,000,000 interest. We shall explain presently, in what way the balance of 10,000,000 was provided for.

The income of the year IX. (1800—1801) seemed likely to meet the expenses, on the nearly certain hypothesis of a speedy termination of the war; for the continental peace concluded at Lunéville must soon lead to a maritime peace. The budget was not at that time voted a year in advance; it was voted in the same year, while the expenses were being incurred. The budget of the year IX., for instance, was presented and discussed in Ventôse, year IX., that is to say, the budget of 1801 in March, 1801. The expenditure and the receipts of this year were estimated at the moment at 415,000,000 (exclusively of the expenses of collection and various local services, which may be taken at 100,000,000 more, so that 415,000,000 must be taken at 515,000,000). But the estimate of 415,000,000 for the expenditure and the receipts fell short of the truth, for then, as now, the real charges always exceeded the estimates. We shall even show, by and by, that the sum of 415,000,000, was increased to 500,000,000. Fortunately, the produce of the taxes exceeded the sum estimated, as well as the expenditure. This excess on both sides was certainly calculated upon; but fearing, erroneously by-the-bye, that the surplus receipts would not cover

the excess of the expenditure, government determined to secure a supplementary resource. Ten millions yet remained to be provided for, as we have just said, to complete the payments of the year VIII.; it was supposed that 20,000,000 would be required for the balance of the year IX.; thus 30,000,000 would have to be raised in two years. It was resolved to have recourse to a sale of national domains to that extent only. The sale of fifteen millions' worth of these domains might be effected with advantage and without confusion, in the course of each year. By placing this business in the hands of the commissioners of the Sinking Fund, who had already performed this duty with great ability, the government was sure to dispose of this portion of the domains of the State on advantageous terms. In this manner the previous accounts would be liquidated, and the present balanced. There was but one more operation requisite to render the organisation of the finances of the State complete, and that was, the definitive regulation of the public debt.

The moment was come, in fact, for fixing its amount, for adjusting the resources of the Sinking Fund to the amount of the entire capital of the debt, and for applying to this object the 400,000,000 of national domains, which were still at the disposal of the State.

The public debt was just as it had been left by the bankruptcy declared by the Directory, but attributable to the Convention and the Constituent Assembly. One-third of this debt had been placed upon the Great Book: it was this portion which was called, in the language of the time, *the Consolidated Third.* Interest at five per cent. had been allowed on this third, saved from the bankruptcy. The amount of it inscribed in the Great Book was 33,000,000 (interest and not capital). A very considerable sum had still to be inscribed. Two-thirds had been *mobilised,* another expression of the time, that is to say, struck out of the Great Book, and declared receivable in payment of the national domains, so that, in point of fact, they were clearly assignats. A subsequent law had completed their depreciation, by restricting them to a single purpose, that of being received in payment exclusively for the buildings, and not for the lands or the woods, constituting part of the national possessions.

It was necessary to put an end to this state of things, and for that purpose to carry to the Great Book the remainder of the *Consolidated Third,* which the preceding government had deferred inscribing, that it might be dispensed from paying interest upon it. Justice and regularity in the finances demanded that an end should be put to this state of things. It was proposed to enter in the Great Book *Consolidated Third* to the extent of 1,500,000, but to bear interest only from the commencement of the year XII. This part of the debt, though the enjoyment of the income from it was postponed for two years, yet acquired

immediately, from the mere circumstance of the inscription, a value nearly equal to the portions already inscribed; and a very high value was moreover conferred on all that remained of the *Consolidated Third* by this earnest of punctuality. There was a considerable amount left uninscribed, either in *Consolidated Thirds*, properly so called, or in debts of the emigrants, which the State had taken upon itself, in confiscating their property, or in debts of Belgium, which had been a condition of the conquest. Lastly, there were the *mobilised two-thirds*, now extremely depreciated, and which it was but just to afford the holders the means of realising. An offer was made to convert them into *Consolidated Thirds*, funded at the rate of five francs stock for one hundred francs nominal capital. It was probable that the holders would eagerly accept this offer. It was proposed to create for this purpose, 1,000,000 of *rentes*, and if this first trial succeeded, it was anticipated that the entire value of the *mobilised two-thirds* would be soon absorbed. A fixed period was also appointed, after which the *two-third bonds*, should no longer be receivable in payment of the national domains. At the expiration of this term, the domains purchased and not paid for were to revert unconditionally to the State.

It was calculated that the addition of the sum of 20,000,000 of *rentes* to the 37,000,000 of *Consolidated Third* already inscribed in the Great Book, would suffice to meet the balance of *Consolidated Third* still uninscribed, the *mobilised two-thirds*, the conversion of which was contemplated, and lastly, the debts of the emigrants and of Belgium. The national debt would accordingly comprise 57,000,000 perpetual *rentes*. In addition to that permanent charge there existed, however, 20,000,000 of life annuities, 19,000,000 of civil and religious pensions (the latter paid to the clergy who had been dispossessed of their property), and lastly, 30,000,000 of military pensions; thus, in all, 69,000,000 of terminable annuities, of which about 3,000,000 would annually fall in. There was reason, therefore, to hope, that in a few years, as the annuitants, pensioners, and others died off, the saving under the head of life annuities would compensate for the successive augmentations which the perpetual debt would receive in consequence of new inscriptions in the Great Book. Consequently, the entire annual charge for interest on both branches of the debt, supposing provision to be made for all old claims, could not possibly exceed the sum of 100,000,000, about one-half of which consisted of *perpetual rentes*, and the other of *terminable rentes*. Our financial position then was this: a debt bearing 100,000,000 annual interest, and a budget exhibiting a total expenditure (interest on the debt included) of 500,000,000, with a clear net revenue of a like amount, after deduction of 100,000,000 for the costs of collection. This position was certainly far superior to that of England, which had an annual debt of nearly 500,000,000,

with a revenue of 1,000,000,000 or 1,100,000,000. Add to this that France still had left the resource of the indirect contributions, that is to say, taxes on liquors, tobacco, salt, &c., not yet re-established, and which were destined to furnish at a future period an immense revenue.

The First Consul was desirous of augmenting the resources of the Sinking Fund in proportion to the increase of the debt. He had decided upon the creation of *rentes* to the amount of 2,700,000 francs to wipe off the deficit of the years V., VI., and VII., of 1,000,000 for the deficit of the year VIII., and of several more millions for the inscription of the balance of the *Consolidated Third*, and for the conversion of the *mobilised two-thirds*, &c. He caused a capital of 90,000,000 in national domains, saleable at discretion, and applicable to the redemption of *rentes* to be assigned to the Sinking Fund. At the suggestion of the First Consul, there was moreover transferred to the Commissioners a *rente* of 5,400,000 francs belonging to the fund for public instruction: we shall presently see how this sum was made good.

By this arrangement, the national domains were preserved from being frittered away; for the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund, disposing of them slowly, and at seasonable times, or keeping them, if it suited them, thus avoided the deplorable dilapidations which had formerly taken place. To secure the remainder with a greater degree of certainty, the First Consul resolved to apply a considerable portion of them to various other branches of service, in which he took great interest, such as public instruction and the maintenance of the invalids. Public instruction appeared to him the most important service of the State, that, in particular, for which an enlightened government like his, having a new society to found, ought to lose no time in providing. As for the invalids, that is to say, wounded soldiers, they formed, as it were, his family; they were the props of his power, the instruments of his glory: all his attention was due to them; he owed them at least some instalment of the thousand millions formerly promised by the Republic to the defenders of the country.

The First Consul did not like to see these important services dependent on the budget, on its fluctuations and contingencies. In consequence, he caused 120,000,000 worth of national domains to be allotted to public instruction, and 40,000,000 to the support of the Hospitals for the Invalids. Here was sufficient amply to endow the noble institution which he intended one day to devote to the education of the French youth, and wherewithal to endow also several similar hospitals upon the same footing as that which owes its origin to Louis XIV. Whether these assignments were or were not afterwards respected, it was for the moment 160,000,000 rescued from the improvident sales of public lands, and an annual relief for the budget. Thus

of the 400,000,000 worth of national domains left, 10,000,000 were granted towards the expenditure of the year VIII., 20,000,000 for that of the year IX., 90,000,000 to the Sinking Fund, 120,000,000 to public instruction, 40,000,000 to the invalids. These formed a total sum of 280,000,000 out of 400,000,000, for which a useful employment was immediately found, without having recourse to the system of public sales. Out of this sum of 280,000,000, 10,000,000 only for the year VIII., and 20,000,000 for the year IX., were to be disposed of in the course of two years, which would not be attended with any inconvenience; the 90,000,000 assigned to the Sinking Fund were to be sold, but very slowly, when the Fund should be in absolute want of money, perhaps not at all. The 120,000,000 for public instruction, the 40,000,000 for the Invalids, were never to be offered for sale. Out of the total of 400,000,000, there would remain 120,000,000 disposable and unappropriated. In reality, only 30,000,000 out of the 400,000,000 were to be sold; the rest remained in trust for different branches of the services, or as a disposable reserve, with a certainty of soon increasing at least double or treble in value for the advantage of the State.

To sum up: the government availed itself of the revival of credit to substitute the expedient of the creation of *rentes* to that of the alienation of the national domains; it discharged by a very small portion of these domains, and by a creation of *rentes*, the deficiencies left unpaid in the years V., VI., VII., and VIII., it completed the liquidation of the floating public debt, and insured the payment of the interest in a certain and regular manner. After having thus regulated old accounts, saved the remnant of the domains of the State, and fixed the amount of the debt, there would be an annual interest of 100,000,000, an ample Sinking Fund; and finally, a budget, with an equal income and expenditure of 500,000,000, exclusive of the costs of collection, or of 600,000,000 including those costs.

Such a distribution of the public property, conceived with not less equity than sound sense, ought to have met with general approbation. A violent opposition was nevertheless raised in the Tribunate. The 415,000,000 demanded for the current year, the year IX., were granted without difficulty; but the opposition complained that the budget was not voted a year in advance; an unfair reproach, for nothing was at that time arranged for such a mode of proceeding. It was not yet practised in England, and it was even a disputed point among financiers. The same opposition members complained of the regulation of the arrears being an act of bankruptcy towards the creditors of the years V., VI., and VII., whose debts were to be consolidated at three per cent. only, instead of five, as was the case with those of the year VIII. They found fault with the regulation of the debt for depriving the holders of the *Consolidated Third*

of the interest of their stock for two years, since that interest was to commence only with the year XII. For these two complaints there was very little foundation; for, as we have seen, the creditors of the years V., VI., and VII., in obtaining a permanent *rente* of three per cent., received more than their debts were worth; and as for the portion of the *Consolidated Third*, the inscription of which was resolved upon, a great service was rendered to the holders by the mere circumstance of that inscription. If, in fact, that inscription had been deferred a year or two longer, as had been done by the preceding government, the holders would have been deprived, not only of the interest, but of the benefit of the definitive consolidation. To resume the process of that consolidation so long deferred, was of itself to place them in a much better position.

The Tribunate grew warm upon these trivial objections; paid no regard to the answers that were addressed to it; and rejected the plan of finance by a majority of fifty-six votes to thirty, in the sitting of the 19th of March (28th Ventôse). Some cries of "*Vive la République!*" were even raised in the tribunes, a circumstance which had not happened for a long time, and revived the remembrance of the tumultuous days of the Convention. On the motion of Messrs. Riouffe and Chauvelin, the president caused the tribunes to be cleared.

Two days later, on the 21st of March (30th Ventôse), the last day of the session of the year IX., the Legislative Body heard the discussion of the bill. Three tribunes were to attack, and three Councillors of State to defend it. M. Benjamin Constant was one of the three tribunes. He urged in a brilliant manner, the objections raised against the plan of the government. The Legislative Body, nevertheless, voted its adoption by a majority of 227 to 58. The First Consul ought to have been satisfied. But he knew not, neither did those about him know, that we ought to do good without being surprised, without being ruffled, by the injustice with which we are frequently repaid. And what man ever had so much glory as the First Consul, to compensate him for these attacks, so frivolous, so indiscreet! Besides, notwithstanding these attacks, the arrangements were excellent on the part of the government. The majority in the Legislative Body was five-sixths at least; and in the Tribunate, the vote of which decided nothing, it was two-thirds. There was nothing to be astonished at, little to cause alarm in such inconsiderable minorities. But, although the object of universal admiration, the man who then governed France could not endure the petty censures passed upon his administration. The time for a real representative government had not yet arrived: the opposition had not its principles, or its manners any more than the government itself. That which will completely portray the oppositionists of the Tribunate is, that the odious procedure against the Revolutionists

did not elicit from them a single observation. They took advantage of the circumstance, of the act not having been referred to the Legislature, to remain silent on the subject. They declaimed on things that were of little importance or unobjectionable, and winked at the unpardonable infringement of all the rules of justice. Such, in almost all times, is the conduct of men, and of parties.

After all, the barren agitation of a few systematic oppositionists, mistaking the general movement of minds, and the exigencies of the time, produced little sensation. The public was wholly engrossed by the spectacle of the immense efforts, which had achieved victory and a continental peace for France, and which were soon to procure for her a maritime peace also.

As we have observed several times, the First Consul, amidst his military and political occupations, never ceased to give his attention to roads, canals, bridges, to manufactures, and to commerce.

We have already described the wretched state of the roads, and the means employed by the First Consul, to supply the insufficiency of the produce of the tolls. He had given orders for a thorough inquiry into this subject, but, as is mostly the case, the difficulty consisted much more in the want of money, than in the choice of a good system. He proceeded direct to the point, and in the budget of the year IX. he appropriated fresh sums out of the general funds of the treasury, for prosecuting the extraordinary repairs already begun. Canals were also the subject of conversation. Men's minds, disgusted with political agitations, gladly turned towards every thing that concerned industry and commerce. The canal now known by the name of the canal of St. Quentin, connecting the navigation of the Seine, and of the Oise, with that of the Somme and the Scheld, that is to say, connecting Belgium with France, had been abandoned. It had been found impossible to agree upon the mode of executing the cutting, which was to afford a passage, from the valley of the Oise, into those of the Somme and the Scheld. The engineers were divided in opinion. The First Consul went thither himself, heard what each had to say, decided the question, and decided it well. The cutting was determined upon, and continued in the best direction, the identical one which has succeeded. The population of St. Quentin received him with transport, and no sooner had he returned to Paris, than the inhabitants of the Seine Inferieure sent a deputation, to solicit him to grant them in their turn forty-eight hours of his time. He promised a speedy visit to Normandy. At his instigation, the erection of three new bridges in Paris over the Seine was decided upon, and entrusted to companies: these were, that fronting the Jardin des Plantes, and called the bridge of Austerlitz; that which unites the isle of the City, with the isle St. Louis; lastly, that which connects the Louvre with the palace of the Institute. He

directed his attention at the same time, to the road of the Simplon, the first project of his youth—a project ever dearest to his heart, most worthy to rank, in future, beside the exploits of Rivoli and Marengo. It will be recollected, that the First Consul, as soon as he had founded the Cisalpine Republic, was desirous to connect it with France by a road, which, running from Lyons or Dijon, passing through Geneva, traversing the Valais, descending to the Lago Maggiore and Milan, should enable an army of 50,000 men with 100 pieces of cannon to debouch at any time, in the heart of Upper Italy. For want of such a road, he had been obliged to cross the St. Bernard. Now that the Cisalpine Republic had been reconstituted at the congress of Lunéville, it was more than ever expedient, to form a great military communication between Lombardy and France. The First Consul had immediately issued orders for the necessary works. General Turreau, whom we have seen descending the Little St. Bernard, with the legions of conscripts, while general Bonaparte was descending the Great St. Bernard with his seasoned troops, received orders to fix his head-quarters at Domo d'Ossola, at the very foot of the Simplon. This general was to protect the workmen, and his soldiers were to assist in the completion of the undertaking.

To this magnificent work the First Consul resolved to add another, in commemoration of the passage of the Alps. The monks of the Great St. Bernard had rendered important services to the French army. Supplied with some money, they had during ten days, supported the strength of our soldiers with food and wine. The First Consul retained a deeply grateful recollection of those services. He resolved upon the establishment of two similar *hospices*, one on Mount Cenis, the other on the Simplon, both auxiliary to the convent of the Great St. Bernard. They were each to contain fifteen monks, and to receive from the Cisalpine Republic, a considerable endowment in lands. That Republic could refuse nothing to its founder but as that founder liked prompt execution in all things, he had the works necessary for the first establishment performed at the expense of France, that these useful undertakings might experience no delay. Thus magnificent roads and institutions founded with a beneficence truly noble, were to attest to future ages, the passage of the Alps by the modern Hannibal.

Concurrently with these grand and beneficent views, a subject of another kind engaged his attention, which was no less useful to the nation; that is the compilation of the Civil Code. The task of digesting this code, the First Consul had confided to several eminent lawyers, Messrs. Portalis, Tronchet, and Bigot de Préameneu. Their labours were concluded, and the result had been communicated to the Court of Cassation, as well as to the twenty-nine tribunals of appeal, since called Royal courts. The opinions of the whole of the magistracy were thus collected, and

the work was now about to be submitted to the Council of State, and gravely discussed under the presidency of the First Consul. It was proposed, that it should then be presented to the Legislative Body in the course of the ensuing session, that of the year X.

Ever ready to undertake great works, and at the same time to reward their authors munificently, the First Consul had just used his influence to raise M. Tronchet to the Senate. By this means, he conferred a distinction upon an eminent juriconsult, one of the compilers of the Civil Code, and, what was not a matter of indifference to him in a political point of view, the courageous defender of Louis XVI.

All things, therefore, were being organised at the same time, with the harmony which a comprehensive mind is capable of introducing into its works, with the rapidity which a resolute energy, an authority already punctually obeyed, is capable of imparting to them. The genius which accomplished these things was without doubt extraordinary; but, it must be confessed, the situation was as extraordinary as the genius. General Bonaparte had France and Europe to move, and victory for a lever; he had to digest all the codes of the French nation, but then at the same time all ranks were disposed to submit to his laws with implicit obedience; he had roads, canals, bridges to construct, and the necessary resources for these objects, at his undisputed disposal; he had even nations ready to furnish him with their treasures, the Italians, for example, who cheerfully contributed to the expense of opening the Simplon, and to the endowment of the Hospices raised on the summits of the Alps. Providence does nothing by halves. For every mighty task, she furnishes a great genius, and to every great genius, she assigns a mighty task.

BOOK IX.

NEUTRAL POWERS.

Sequel of the Negotiations with the Powers of Europe—Treaty with the Court of Naples—Exclusion of the English from the Ports of the Two Sicilies, and Engagement entered into by the Neapolitan Government to receive a French Division at Otranto—Spain pledges herself to coerce the Portuguese, to put an end to the English Trade on the Coasts of Portugal—Vast naval Projects of the First Consul, for combining the Naval Forces of Spain, Holland, and France, to enable them to act in Concert—Means contemplated to assist Egypt—Admiral Gantcaume, at the Head of a Division, leaves Brest during a Gale of Wind, and proceeds to the Straits of Gibraltar on his Way to the Mouth of the Nile—General Coalition of all the Maritime Nations against England—Preparations of the Neutral Powers in the Baltic—Warlike Ardour of Paul I.—Distress in England—She is visited by a frightful Famine—Her Financial and Commercial Position before, and since the War—Her Income and Expenditure both doubled—Unpopularity of Mr. Pitt—His Differences with George III., and Retirement from Office—The Addington Administration—England, in spite of her Embarrassments, faces the Storm, and despatches Admirals Nelson and Parker to the Baltic, to break up the Confederacy of the Neutral Powers—Plan conceived by Nelson and Parker—They determine upon forcing the Passage of the Sound—The Swedish Coast being badly defended, the English Fleet passes the Sound almost without Difficulty, and appears before Copenhagen—Nelson's views are to attack the Danes, before proceeding to the Baltic—Description of the Position of Copenhagen, and Measures adopted to defend this important Maritime Position—Nelson executes a bold Manœuvre, and succeeds in anchoring in the King's Channel, Broadside on to the Danish Fleet—Bloody Engagement—Gallantry of the Danes, and Danger of Nelson—He sends a Flag of Truce to the Crown Prince of Denmark, and thereby obtains the Advantage of a Victory—Suspension of Hostilities for fourteen Weeks, during which the Death of Paul I. becomes known—Events which have taken place in Russia—Exasperation of the Russian Nobility against the Emperor Paul, and their Resolution to get rid of this Prince by any Means, even by Crime—Count Pahlen—His Character and Projects—His Conduct towards the Grand Duke Alexander—The Scheme of a forced Abdication made to conceal their Project of Assassination—Frightful Scene at the Palace (Michael) on the Night of the 23rd of March—Tragical Death of Paul I.—Accession of Alexander—The Confederacy of the Neutral Powers dissolved by the Death of the Emperor Paul—Virtual Armistice in the Baltic—The First Consul endeavours, by offering Hanover to Prussia, to retain her in the League of the Neutrals—England satisfied with having broken up this Confederacy by the Battle of Copenhagen, and with being rid of Paul I., seeks to improve the Opportunity offered, by treating with France, and redeeming the Errors of Mr. Pitt—The Addington Administration proposes Peace to the First Consul, through the Medium of Mr. Otto—This Proposal accepted, and Opening of Negotiations between France and England at London—Peace becomes general, both by Sea and Land—Progress of France since the 18th Brumaire.

BOOK IX.

NEUTRAL POWERS.

PEACE between the Emperor and the Empire having been concluded at Lunéville in February, 1801, the First Consul was impatient to secure the results of his policy. These were to conclude a peace with those continental States which had not yet been reconciled to the Republic, and to compel them to close their ports against England; to direct against the latter the combined strength of the neutral powers, and, in conjunction with them, to strike some decisive blow against the British trade and territory; and by this combination of means attain a maritime peace, without which the peace of the continent would be incomplete. Every thing proclaimed that these happy results could not be long delayed.

The Germanic diet had ratified the signature affixed by the emperor to the treaty of Lunéville. There were no grounds for supposing that there would be any demur, as Austria possessed the power of influencing the Ecclesiastical States, the only dissidents opposed to the treaty. With respect to the secular princes, as they were to be indemnified for their losses, from the territories proposed to be secularised they had a strong interest in accelerating the acceptance of the conditions stipulated between Austria and France. They were, moreover, under the influence of Prussia, which power France had induced to view favourably the proceedings at Lunéville. Besides all this, every one was anxious for peace, and was ready to contribute to promote it, even by sacrifices. Prussia alone, in ratifying the signature of the Emperor, which he had granted without the authority of the Diet, appeared desirous to qualify her consent, in such a form as rather to assume the semblance of toleration, than that of approbation, thereby reserving for the future the rights of the Empire. But this proposition of Prussia, which at the same time that it ratified the treaty, implied an indirect censure on the Emperor, was not supported by the majority. The treaty was ratified unconditionally in its original form, by a *conclusum* of the 9th of March, 1801 (18th Ventôse, year IX.). The ratifications were exchanged at Paris on the 16th of March (25th Ventôse).

There only remained to settle a plan of indemnifications, which was to be the subject of ulterior negotiations.

Peace was thus concluded with the greater part of Europe. It was, indeed, not yet signed with Russia, but we were, as will soon appear, engaged with her, and with the northern courts, in one great maritime coalition. There were at the same moment, two Russian ministers at Paris. M. de Sprengporten, on the subject of the prisoners, M. de Kalitscheff for the adjustment of general affairs. The latter had just arrived in the early part of March (middle of Ventôse).

There still remained the courts of Naples and Portugal to coerce, in order to close the entire continent completely against England.

Murat was advancing towards Southern Italy with a chosen body of troops, which had been drawn from the camp at Amiens. Reinforced by several detachments supplied from the army of general Brune, he had proceeded as far as Foligno, with a view to compel the court of Naples to yield to the will of France. Had it not been for the interest evinced by the emperor of Russia in favour of this court, the First Consul would probably at once have granted to the house of Parma the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, with the view of depriving a hostile family of this fine territory. But the disposition manifested by the emperor Paul, would not allow him to carry this idea into effect. He was desirous, moreover, to conciliate general opinion throughout Europe, and for this reason it was expedient to avoid, as much as possible, the overthrowing of the ancient kingdoms. He was then willing to grant peace to the court of Naples, on the condition that she should come to a rupture with England. But to influence her to take this step was in the highest degree difficult of accomplishment. Murat advanced to the frontiers of the kingdom taking care to avoid Rome, and lavishing upon the Pope the greatest demonstration of respect. The court of Naples no longer resisted, but signed an armistice which contained a stipulation agreeable to the wishes of the First Consul, for the exclusion of the English from the ports of the Two Sicilies. Nevertheless, the armistice was only for the short term of thirty days; at the expiration of which, a definitive treaty of peace was to be signed.

The marquis de Gallo, one of the negotiators at Campo-Formio, who boasted of his intimacy with the First Consul, and of having as much influence over him, as M. de Cobentzel, had repaired to Paris. Confiding on these personal recommendations, he flattered himself that, under the protection of the Russian embassy, and at the instances of Austria, he should obtain the conditions desired by the court of Naples, which were confined to a simple neutrality. These pretensions were ridiculous, inasmuch as this court, which had given the signal

for the second coalition, which had waged against us an obstinate war, which had, in short, treated the French with great indignity, could not expect, now that we held her at our discretion, to escape upon the condition of a plain and simple separation from England. The least we could do, was to compel her, either willingly or by force, to act as hostilely against England, as she had done against France.

M. de Gallo having betrayed considerable self-sufficiency at Paris, having even appeared to depend more than was becoming upon the Russian embassy, a prompt termination was put to his negotiation. M. de Talleyrand notified to him, that a French plenipotentiary had set out for Florence, that the negotiation was consequently transferred to that city, and that, moreover, he could not treat with a negotiator who had not the power to consent to the sole condition deemed indispensable, namely, the expulsion of the English from the ports of the Two Sicilies—a condition which the emperor Paul had as much at heart as the First Consul himself. Consequently, M. de Gallo found it necessary to quit Paris without delay. We had, in fact, just despatched to Florence M. Alquier, who had been recalled from Madrid, at the period when Lucien Bonaparte was sent to Spain. M. Alquier was invested with full instructions and powers to negotiate.

This plenipotentiary repaired to Florence with the utmost haste, and found there Chevalier Micheroux, the same minister who signed the armistice with Murat, who had just received full powers from his court. The negotiations, transferred to that city, and carried on under the bayonets of the French army, no longer experienced the same difficulties as at Paris. A treaty of peace was signed on the 18th of March, 1801 (27th Ventôse, year IX.). The conditions may be pronounced moderate, if the situation of the court of Naples be compared with that of the French Republic. We permitted that branch of the house of Bourbons to retain the whole of its dominions, which were preserved to them in their full integrity. We only exacted an insignificant portion of territory which it possessed in the island of Elba. This was Porto Longone, and the surrounding district. The island of Elba, at that time, belonged partly to Tuscany, and partly to the Two Sicilies. The intention of the French Consul was to annex it entirely to France. An historian of these treaties has loudly inveighed against this alleged act of spoliation, as if it were not plainly the natural right of the victor. With the exception of this insignificant sacrifice, the court of Naples lost nothing. She bound herself to close her ports against the English, and to furnish France with three frigates, to be delivered over, ready armed, at Ancona. The First Consul destined these for Egypt; but the most important article of the treaty was secret. It stipulated that the Neapolitan government should receive a division of 12,000 to 15,000

French troops in the Gulf of Tarentum, and should victual them during the whole term of their occupying that station. The real intention of the French Consul, without any reservation, was to transport them to that spot, with a view to succour Egypt. At that station they would be half way on the route to Alexandria; a last article required the restitution of all the objects of art, which had been selected at Rome, by the French, which were all packed up in cases, when the Neapolitan army penetrated into the Papal States in 1799, and which the court of Naples had seized, and appropriated to itself. An indemnity of 500,000 francs was granted to the French who had been pillaged or harassed by the marauding bands of Neapolitans.

Such were the terms of the treaty of Florence, which must be viewed as an act of clemency, when the previous conduct of the court of Naples is taken into consideration; but which was perfectly in accordance with the intentions of the First Consul, who was aiming exclusively at procuring the ports of the continent to be closed against England, and at securing advantageous positions, to enable him to keep up communications with Egypt.

Nothing was yet agreed upon with the Pope, whose plenipotentiary was still negotiating at Paris, upon the most important of all, the religious question. He was dissatisfied with the king of Piedmont, who had yielded up Sardinia to the English, and also with the Piedmontese, who had manifested dispositions but little friendly towards our troops. He was desirous, therefore, of freeing himself from any engagement respecting that important part of Italy.

Let us now turn to Spain and Portugal. Every thing proceeded favourably in that quarter. The court of Spain, delighted with the stipulations agreed upon at Lunéville, which secured Tuscany to the young Infant of Parma, with the title of king, appeared every day more and more devoted to the First Consul, and to his views. An unexpected event, the fall of M. d'Urquijo, far from injuring our relations, had only served to strengthen them. This was not at first anticipated, as M. d'Urquijo was in Spain a sort of revolutionist, from whom a greater degree of favour was expected towards France, than from any other individual. But the result proved this to be a misapprehension. M. d'Urquijo had been at the head of affairs but a short time. Desirous of correcting certain abuses, he had induced his royal master, king Charles IV., to send an autograph letter to the Pope, recommending a series of propositions for the reform of the Spanish clergy. The Pope, alarmed at perceiving a reforming spirit arising in Spain, appealed to the old duke of Parma, brother to the queen, complaining of M. d'Urquijo, whom he stigmatised as a bad Catholic. This was sufficient to ruin M. d'Urquijo in the mind of the king. The prince of Peace, an avowed enemy of

M. d'Urquijo, availed himself of the opportunity, and struck the last blow during a royal progress. Through these combined influences, M. d'Urquijo was stripped of power, and treated with an unexampled degree of harshness and severity. He was seized in his own house, and banished from Madrid, like a criminal of state. M. de Cevallos, a relative and creature of the prince of Peace, was appointed his successor. This prince thus again became, from that moment, the real prime minister of the court of Spain. As he had sometimes shown some sort of opposition to an intimate alliance with France, probably in order to have an opportunity of thus throwing blame upon the Spanish ministry, it was feared that this change of ministers might be prejudicial to the designs of the First Consul. But Lucien Bonaparte, recently arrived at Madrid, forming at once a correct opinion of the actual state of things, neglected M. de Cevallos, a powerless subordinate, and put himself in direct relations with the prince of Peace. He gave this prince to understand, that it was he who was considered at Paris as in reality prime minister of Charles IV., that to him would be ascribed all the difficulties which French policy might encounter in Spain, and that upon his own conduct would depend, whether we should regard him as a friend, or as an enemy. The prince of Peace, who had provoked numberless animosities, and, above all, that of the heir-presumptive, deeply irritated with the state of oppression in which he was condemned to live, and conscious that his ruin was inevitable if the king and queen chanced to die, regarded the friendship of the Bonapartes as most precious, and promptly preferred their alliance to their hostility.

From that moment, business was conducted between the prince of Peace and Lucien directly. M. d'Urquijo, finding himself too weak to bring this question of Portugal to a solution, had from time to time postponed any positive explanation on the subject. He had made France a thousand promises, unattended by any substantial results. The prince of Peace admitted in his interviews with Lucien, that up to that time they had not been inclined to act, that M. d'Urquijo had cajoled France with fine words; but he declared that he was ready, as far as regarded himself, to concert measures with the First Consul to act effectually against Portugal, provided they could come to an understanding upon certain points. He demanded first, the co-operation of a French division of 25,000 men, as Spain had it not in her power to raise a larger force than 20,000, to such a point of depression had that splendid monarchy been reduced. As the presence of a French force might alarm the king and queen, it would be necessary, therefore, in order to reassure them both, that this force should be placed under the command of a Spanish general. This

general was to be the prince of Peace himself. Finally, the provinces of Portugal, of which they were to take possession, were to remain as security in the hands of the king of Spain until a general peace: in the meantime, the ports of Portugal should be closed against England.

These proposals were accepted by the First Consul with the greatest eagerness, and returned in order to receive the sanction of king Charles IV. This prince, governed by his queen, who, in her turn, was under the influence of the prince of Peace, consented to the war against his son-in-law, on condition that the latter should not be deprived of any portion of his territories; that he should be forced only to break with the English, and to enter into an alliance with France and Spain. These views did not coincide with those of the prince of Peace, who was desirous, it was alleged at Madrid, to secure for himself a principality in Portugal. However this may be, he was obliged to submit, and he received accordingly the rank of generalissimo. A summons was sent to the court of Lisbon, to come to an explanation within a fortnight, and to make election between England and Spain, the latter supported by France. In the meantime, the preparations for war were commenced on both sides of the Pyrenees. The prince of Peace, now created generalissimo of the Spanish and French troops, carried off even the king's own guards, to enable him to complete his army. He amused the court with reviews, with warlike spectacles, and indulged in the wildest dreams of military glory. The First Consul, on his part, hastened to direct towards Spain a portion of the troops which were returning to France. He formed a division of 25,000 men, well armed and equipped. General Leclerc was appointed to the command of the advanced-guard. General Gouvion St. Cyr, whom he justly regarded as one of the most able generals of the time, was appointed to the command of the entire army, in order to compensate for the utter incapacity of the prince generalissimo.

It was arranged that these troops, set in motion in the month of March, should be ready to enter Spain in the course of the ensuing month of April.

The whole of Europe, thus co-operated to aid our designs. Under the influence of the First Consul, the States of the south closed their ports against England, and the Northern States entered into an armed league against her. Under these circumstances, this power was under the necessity of having troops everywhere; in the Mediterranean in order to blockade Egypt; in the straits of Gibraltar, to check the movements of the French fleets passing from one sea to the other; upon the coast of Portugal, to succour their threatened ally; before Rochfort and Brest, in order to blockade the great French and Spanish squadron which was ready to set sail: in the north to keep

the Baltic under control, and prevent the rising of the neutral powers; they were also necessary in India to maintain their authority and conquests in that quarter.

The First Consul was desirous of seizing this peculiar moment, when the British forces, required in all places at the same time, had their strength necessarily widely scattered, to attempt some great expedition. The principal object he had in view, that which he the most cherished, was to succour Egypt. He owed a great duty to the army led beyond the sea, and subsequently abandoned by him, in order to return to the assistance of France. He also considered the colony founded on the banks of the Nile as the most glorious of his works. It was of importance to prove to the world, that in transporting 36,000 men to the East, he had not yielded to the inspirations of a young and ardent imagination, but had attempted a serious enterprise, susceptible of being brought to a successful conclusion. We have seen the endeavours made to negotiate a naval armistice; the object of which was to permit six frigates to enter into the port of Alexandria. This armistice, it will be recollected, had not been concluded. Not having sufficient financial resources for the equipment of armaments by sea and land, the First Consul had not yet been able to undertake the vast operation which he had in contemplation to succour Egypt. But now, relieved from the continental contest, being able to direct all his resources towards naval warfare, having almost entirely the coasts of Europe at his disposal, he meditated, in order to preserve Egypt, projects as extensive, and as bold as those which he had executed to achieve its conquest. The winter season contributed to the success of his plans, by rendering the presence of the English cruisers on the coasts quite impossible.

In the meantime, vessels of every description, trading vessels, and ships of war from the smallest despatch-boat up to frigates, sailed from the various ports of Holland, France, Spain, Italy, and even from the coast of Barbary, carrying to Egypt with news from France, provisions, European goods, wines, and munitions of war. Some of these vessels were captured, but the greater part reached Alexandria, and not a week elapsed without news from the government at home being received at Cairo, together with signal proofs of the interest which it took in the colony.

The First Consul also prepared a fleet adapted for the inland navigation of Egypt. He had executed a model of a seventy-four gun ship, which would combine great strength with the advantage of being able to navigate the shallow channels of Alexandria without discharging her guns.* Orders were given to build a certain number after this model.

Whilst he bestowed all this sedulous care to sustain the spirits of the army of Egypt, transmitting to it frequently news with

* Letter dated 1st Nivôse, year IX.—(State Paper Office.)

partial relief, the First Consul was, at the same time, preparing a vast expedition in order to convey thither, by one mighty effort, a powerful reinforcement of troops and materials of war. The armies returned to the soil of France were about to add a pressure on our finances; but, on the other hand, they supplied the government with great means to disquiet, perhaps to strike a blow at England. Thirty thousand men remained in the Cisalpine; 10,000 in Piedmont; 6000 in Switzerland; 15,000 were proceeding to the gulf of Tarentum; 25,000 were directing their march towards Portugal; 25,000 were stationed in Holland: thus 111,000 men were to be supported by foreign powers. The remainder were about to be thrown on the French treasury, but nevertheless entirely at the disposal of the First Consul. A camp was forming in Holland; another in French Flanders; a third at Brest; a fourth was already collected in the Gironde, either destined for Portugal, or to furnish troops for embarcation at Rochefort. The corps returning from Italy assembled between Marseilles and Toulon. The division of 15,000 men appointed to the station in the gulf of Tarentum, was to occupy Otranto, in virtue of a secret article of the treaty of Naples, to cover the surrounding roadsteads by numerous batteries, to prepare a place of anchorage, where a fleet might approach and embark a division of 10,000 to 12,000 men in order to transport them to Egypt. Admiral Villeneuve had already set out to give the necessary orders on the spot for such embarcation.

The naval forces of Holland, France, and Spain, with some remains of the Italian navy, stationed near these several assemblages of troops, gave England reason to apprehend descents contemplated upon different points at the same time; upon Ireland, upon Portugal, upon Egypt, or upon the East Indies.

The First Consul had concerted measures with Spain and Holland, relating to the employment of their respective navies. By collecting the wrecks of the ancient Dutch navy, five ships of-the-line and a few frigates might be armed. Thirty vessels were lying at Brest, fifteen French, and as many Spanish, which had been detained two years in that harbour. The First Consul had made the following arrangements with Spain. Five Dutch ships combined with five French vessels, and five of the Spanish vessels lying at Brest, were to be despatched to Brazil, in order to protect that fine kingdom, and to prevent England from indemnifying herself for the enterprise set on foot against Portugal, by seizing on the Portuguese colonies. Twenty Spanish and French ships, according to the convention, were to remain at Brest, to be ready at any moment to throw an army into Ireland. A French division was preparing under admiral Gauteaume, in the same port of Brest, destined, it was said, for St. Domingo, there to re-establish the French and Spanish authority. Another French division was being equipped at

Rochefort, and a Spanish division of five vessels at Ferrol, for the purpose of carrying troops to the West India Islands, and recovering Trinidad, for instance, or Martinique. Spain, by the treaty which secured Tuscany to her in exchange for Louisiana, had engaged to furnish France with six vessels fully equipped, placed in the harbour of Cadiz, and to employ the resources of that ancient arsenal to reorganise a portion of the forces which she formerly possessed at that station.

The First Consul, in forming these arrangements, did not communicate to the Spanish government his real intentions, as he feared the indiscretion of that cabinet. He was desirous to send a portion of the combined fleets to Brazil, and to the West India Islands, to accomplish the avowed designs, and to attract thither the English fleets; but at Brest his paramount object was the expedition under Gauteaume, ostensibly destined for St. Domingo, but intended in reality for Egypt. He gave orders for the selection of seven of the fastest sailing ships of the squadron, with two frigates and a brig; and these vessels were to transport 5000 men to effect a landing, with an ample supply of warlike stores of all kinds, timber, iron, medicines, and a selection of European commodities most wanted in Egypt. The First Consul gave orders to reland the cargoes of those vessels which were already in a very advanced state of loading, and to reload them in conformity with the fresh arrangements which he had determined upon. He was anxious, in short, that each vessel should contain a complete assortment of every individual article prepared for the colony, and not an entire cargo of one single description of articles; so that in the case of one of the vessels being captured, the expedition would not be totally deficient of the precise article which the captured vessel might contain. This arrangement being contrary to the usage of the navy, rendered the stowage of these vessels more difficult, but the absolute will of the First Consul overcame all these obstacles. His aide-de-camp, Lauriston, was at Brest, seconding the written instructions of which he was the bearer by the influence of his presence, and by his urgent endeavours to expedite their departure. The expedition from Rochefort, ostensibly announced for the West India Islands, was also destined for Egypt. Its equipment was proceeding as rapidly as possible. The aide-de-camp Savary urged its departure, and drew thither a body of troops detached from the army of Portugal. The division of 25,000 men, which was about to pass the Pyrenees, being assembled in the Gironde, furnished convenient means for disguising the real object of the Rochefort expedition. Without exciting the least suspicion, a few battalions had been borrowed from this force with the intention of embarking them in this squadron. The expedition was to be confided to admiral Bruix, perhaps the most distinguished naval commander whom France at that time possessed. This

admiral united to a superior understanding, seldom found amongst either civil or military men, a perfect knowledge of naval affairs, and had distinguished himself by his successful and well-known cruise of 1799 in the Mediterranean. When, at the last moment, general Bonaparte should disclose his secret to the cabinet at Madrid, admiral Bruix was to proceed to Ferrol, and, reinforced by the squadron lying at that place, repair to Cadiz, there to be joined by the division furnished by Spain, and then proceed onwards to Otranto, embark the troops collected at that point, and from thence set sail for Egypt. This division at Cadiz, furnished by Spain, was composed of six fine vessels which were being prepared in the greatest haste. Admiral Dumanoir had just set out post to Cadiz, in order to urge on their equipment. Bodies of sailors were proceeding by land towards this port. Small vessels, filled with seamen, were sent also at the same time, and these men, when transferred, helped to complete the crews of the vessels of war.

These numerous expeditions would inevitably attract the attention of England to all points at once, divide her forces, cause her infinite confusion, and some of them, taking advantage of this confusion, would be almost certain to reach Egypt. Desirous of availing himself of the bad season, which rendered the enemy's cruising off Brest both difficult and interrupted, the First Consul intended to make admiral Gauteaume sail before spring. His orders to this effect were very precise; but it was not easy for him to inspire his naval commanders with the same spirit that animated the generals of his land forces. Admiral Gauteaume had seemed to him bold and successful, as it was he who had brought him almost miraculously from Alexandria to Fréjus. But in this opinion he was mistaken. This officer, an experienced seaman, perfectly acquainted with the navigation of the Levant, of undaunted bravery, was, nevertheless, of irresolute character, and incapable of sustaining the burden of a heavy responsibility. The expedition was ready for sea: several families of workmen were embarked, under the impression instilled into them, that they were bound to St. Domingo, but still they hesitated to put to sea. Savary, armed with the orders of the First Consul, overcame all the obstacles which presented themselves, and compelled Gauteaume to set sail. The enemy's cruisers descried them, and made signals to the blockading squadron that the French fleet was leaving the port, so that Gauteaume was under the necessity of returning to the anchorage in the outer road of Bertheaume. He then feigned to re-enter the inner roads, in order to induce the English to believe that his only object was to exercise his crews by performing these evolutions.

At last, on the 23d of January (3rd Pluviôse), the enemy's cruisers being dispersed by a dreadful gale of wind, he set sail, and, in spite of the greatest dangers, happily succeeded in getting out of the port of Brest, and proceeded towards the straits of

Gibraltar. The success of Gauteaume's enterprise was the more desirable, as the famous expedition consisting of 15,000 or 18,000 English, destined one day for Ferrol, and another day for Cadiz, or it might be the south of France, was at that moment on its way to Egypt. It was lying in the road of Macri, opposite the island of Rhodes, waiting the season for landing, and the completion of the preparations of the Turks.

Orders were issued to the journals of the capital to make no mention of the naval movements which might be remarked in the ports of France, unless the intelligence was derived from the *Moniteur*.*

Before we trace the operations of our squadrons in the south, we must revert to the north, and see what was passing between England and the neutral powers.

Great Britain was, at this moment, menaced by an accumulation of the greatest dangers. War had at length broken out between that government and the Baltic powers. The declaration of the neutrals, similar to that issued in 1780, being only a simple declaration of their rights, England might still have dissembled with them without construing this declaration, which was directed in a general manner to all the belligerent parties, as addressed especially to herself, and might have endeavoured, for the moment, to avoid any collision, by taking care to respect the Danish, Swedish, Prussian, and Russian flags. England had, in fact, much greater interest in maintaining peace with the northern powers of Europe, than in harassing the commerce of the smaller maritime powers trading with France. Moreover, her immediate want of foreign corn rendered even the freedom of the neutrals temporarily expedient. Strictly considered, she was only justified in making reprisals against Russia; inasmuch, as amongst all the members of the neutral league, the emperor Paul was the only one who had added to the declaration, the hostile act of an embargo on her vessels. Besides, the question of Malta was much more the motive of this measure, than were any of the contested points concerning maritime rights.

But England, in her pride, had met a simple exposition of principles by an act of violence, and had placed under embargo all the Russian, Swedish, and Danish vessels. She had only excepted from these rigorous proceedings the commerce of Prussia, towards which power she showed more moderation, in the hopes of detaching her from the confederacy, and moreover, because Hanover was at her mercy.

* The following is a curious letter on this subject:—

"The First Consul to the Minister of General Police.

"Have the goodness, Citizen Minister, to address a short circular to the editors of the fourteen journals, forbidding the insertion of any article calculated to afford the enemy the slightest clue to the different movements which are taking place in our squadrons, unless the intelligence be derived from the official journal."

"Paris, 1st Ventose, year IX."—(State Paper Office.)

England, then, was actually at war at the same time with France and Spain, her ancient enemies, and with the courts of Russia, Sweden, and Prussia, her ancient allies; she had been abandoned by Austria, since the peace of Lunéville, and by the court of Naples since the treaty of Florence. Portugal, her last foothold on the continent, was about to be wrested from her. Her situation was precisely similar to that in which France was placed in 1793. She was reduced to struggle alone against all Europe, exposed, however, it is true, to fewer dangers than France, and entitled to less merit for being able to defend herself, inasmuch as her insular position protected her from the peril of an invasion. But to render the parallel of their respective positions more remarkable and complete, England was a prey to a frightful famine. The people were in want of food of primary necessity. This state of things was entirely brought about by the obstinacy of Mr. Pitt, and by the genius of general Bonaparte. Mr. Pitt having refused to treat before Marengo, and general Bonaparte having disarmed one portion of Europe by his victories, and turned the other against England by means of his policy, were both incontestably the authors of this prodigious change of fortune.

The position of England was unquestionably most alarming, and we must acknowledge that at this critical juncture she did not give way to despondency. The harvest of the preceding year having been less by one-third than an average crop, all the preceding stock on hand had been consumed. The harvest of the year 1800 having again been deficient by one-fourth, the present scarcity had followed. This scarcity was doubly aggravated by the general war, and especially by the war with the maritime powers, since the supplies of grain were usually derived from the Baltic. If, therefore, the bad harvest was the primary cause of the famine, it is true that the war greatly tended to aggravate the calamity. Had it only raised the price of grain, by interposing impediments in the way of the Baltic trade, even then its influence upon the general distress must have been truly disastrous. The revenue presented this year the most alarming deficit. The income tax, customs, and excise gave apprehensions that there would be a deficiency in the revenue of 3,000,000*l.* to 4,000,000*l.* sterling. The expenditure of the year was enormous. To meet this it became necessary to borrow 25,000,000*l.* to 26,000,000*l.* sterling. The total expenses of the year for the three kingdoms (Ireland having just become united by the act of union), including the interest of the debt created by Mr. Pitt, were estimated at 69,000,000*l* sterling, an enormous amount at any time, but the more so in 1800, as at that period the revenue had not been augmented to that considerable amount to which a subsequent interval of forty years has raised it in England and in all the countries of Europe. France, as we have stated, had only to support a burden of 600,000,000 francs (24,000,000*l.* sterling). The exact total of the English debt was, as usually, stoutly dis-

puted; but, in taking only the statement of the government,* it amounted in capital to 484,365,474*l.* sterling. To meet the interest of the debt and the sinking fund, there was required annually a sum of 20,144,000*l.* sterling, without taking into account the debt of Ireland, or the loans guaranteed to the emperor of Germany. Mr. Pitt was accused of having increased the debt on account of the war of the revolution, more than 300,000,000*l.* sterling. On the showing of the government the increase was 298,000,000*l.*

But we must say that England presented a most surprising improvement in every branch, and that her riches had augmented in the same proportion as her burdens. Besides the conquest of India, consummated by the destruction of Tippoo Saib; besides the conquest of a portion of the French, Spanish, and Dutch colonies, to which was just added the acquisition of the island of Malta, England had monopolised the commerce of the whole world. According to the official returns, the imports which had been in 1781, towards the close of the American war, 12,724,000*l.* sterling, and which, in 1792, at the breaking out of the war of the Revolution, were 19,659,000*l.* sterling, increased, in 1799, to 29,945,000*l.* The exports of English manufactured goods, which, in 1781, were 7,633,000*l.*, in 1792 were 24,905,000*l.*, and rose, in 1799, to 33,991,000*l.* Thus her foreign trade had tripled since the termination of the American war, and had nearly doubled since the war of the Revolution. In 1788, the English trade employed 13,827 vessels, and 107,925 seamen; it now, in 1801, employed 18,877 vessels, and 143,661 seamen. The excise and customs had risen from 7,320,000*l.* to 15,587,000*l.* The Sinking Fund, which was, in 1784, 1,000,000*l.*, had also increased, in 1800, to 5,500,000*l.*

The resources of the British empire had, then, all doubled or trebled during the preceding twenty years; and, if the pressure at the moment was great, there existed enormous wealth to meet it. England, it is true, was incumbered by a debt of more than 480,000,000*l.* with an annual charge of 20,000,000*l.*, to meet the accruing interest; she had to meet, this year, an expenditure of 68,000,000*l.*, and to raise, by loan, 24,000,000*l.*, to meet her exigencies. All this was enormous, no doubt, if we, moreover, consider the value of money at the time; but England possessed resources within herself, proportionate to these demands. Although not a continental power, she had an army of 193,000 regular troops, 109,000 militia and fencibles, making a total of 302,000 men. She possessed 814 vessels of war, of all sizes, either in course of building or repairing, advance ships, or in commission at sea. In this number were included 100 ships of the line, and 200 frigates, under sail, in all quarters of the world; twenty ships of the line, and forty frigates in reserve, ready for

* These amounts are taken from the budget presented to Parliament in June 1801, by Mr. Addington, successor to Mr. Pitt.

sea. Her effective force then could not be estimated at less than 120 line-of-battle ships, and 250 frigates, manned by 120,000 seamen. In addition to this stupendous force, England possessed a number of naval officers of great merit, and, at their head, a renowned seaman in the person of Nelson. He was an eccentric, violent man, not fit to be entrusted with authority, in cases where diplomatic services were combined with his duties as a naval commander; and he had but recently given a proof of this at Naples, by allowing his name to be tarnished by the intrigues of women, during the bloody executions ordered by the Neapolitan government; but in the midst of danger he was a hero; and he displayed as much genius as courage; his country was justly proud of his glory.

England and France have filled the present age with the fame of their formidable rival exploits. The period at which we have now arrived in this recital is one of the most remarkable during the struggle which they maintained against each other. They both had waged war during eight years. France, with financial resources, far less vast, but perhaps more solid, inasmuch as they were founded upon a territorial revenue, with a population nearly double, with all the enthusiasm which a good cause inspires, had successfully resisted all Europe, had extended her territory to the Rhine, and to the Alps, had acquired the dominion over Italy, and a decisive influence on the continent. England, with the profits arising from the commerce of the whole world, with a powerful navy, had acquired a preponderance on the ocean, equal to that which France had acquired on land. England, by subsidising the European powers, had incited them against her rival, had urged them to fight, even to their destruction. But whilst she exposed them to be crushed in her service, at the same time she seized upon the colonies of all nations, oppressed the powers which remained neutral, taking revenge, for the success of France on land, by an oppressive tyranny on the ocean; and, although victorious upon this element, she could not prevent France from creating a magnificent maritime station in Egypt, threatening even the British dominions in the East Indies.

A strange revulsion of public opinion, as we have said elsewhere, resulted from this concatenation of events. France, admirably governed, appeared, in the eyes of the world, humane, wise, tranquil, evincing moderation in her victories—a combination of meritorious qualities as rare as they are admirable. Whilst the various cabinets were becoming reconciled to her, they perceived at once how they had all, till then, been the dupes of England's policy. Austria had been urged on to fight for the cause of England, as if she were struggling for her own existence. For this same England the Germanic empire had been dismembered. The powers of the north, with Russia at their head, discovered, at length, that under

pretext of prosecuting a moral purpose, and contending against the French revolution, they had only contributed to procure for England the commerce of the whole universe. Thus the whole world at this moment turned against the mistress of the seas. Paul I. had given the signal with the accustomed impetuosity of his character. Sweden imitated his example without hesitation. Denmark and Prussia followed in the same steps, although with a less degree of resolution. Austria conquered, and now recovered from her delusions, digested her spleen in silence, and, for the moment, at least, gave signs of resisting, for a long period to come, the baneful influence of the British subsidies.

England reaped the fruits of the policy she had pursued; she had doubled her colonies, her commerce, her revenue, her navy; but she had also doubled her debt, her expenditure, her burdens, her enemies, and she presented a spectacle of immense wealth, with all the frightful misery attending a people dying from hunger. France, Spain, Russia, Prussia, Denmark, and Sweden, were leagued against her. France, Spain, and Holland united, possessed eighty ships, fully equipped, and were capable of arming a greater number. Sweden had twenty-eight, Russia thirty-five, Denmark twenty-three, making a total together of 166 ships of the line—a force superior to that of the British navy. But England, on her side, enjoyed one great advantage, in having to contend with a coalition; moreover, her armaments surpassed, in effectiveness, those of the coalition. The French and Danish vessels were the only ones which could cope with theirs; and these found it difficult, when fighting in large squadrons, as the manœuvres of the English navy excelled all others in the world. Nevertheless, the danger was becoming imminent, for, if the struggle were prolonged, general Bonaparte was capable of undertaking some formidable expedition, and, if he succeeded in crossing the English channel with an invading army, England was lost.

The long-continued good fortune of Mr. Pitt, like that of M. de Thugut, was now on the wane, before the rising star of young general Bonaparte. Mr. Pitt had enjoyed the most brilliant destiny of his time, after that of the Great Frederick; he was only forty-three years of age, and had already held the reins of power, during seventeen years, a power almost absolute in a free country. But his fortune was declining with years, and that of general Bonaparte, on the contrary, was rising—it was just dawning. The fortunes of men succeed each other in the history of the world, like beings in the universe, they have their youth, their decrepitude, and their death. The incomparably more brilliant fortune of general Bonaparte was also destined one day to decline, but meanwhile it was reserved for it to witness the fall of the greatest statesman England ever had, sinking beneath its bright ascendant.

Great Britain seemed menaced by a sort of internal convulsion.

The people, suffering from a frightful scarcity, were rising in different parts of the kingdom, pillaging the magnificent country seats of the English aristocracy, and in the cities, plundering the bakers' shops and the provision warehouses. There were in London in 1801, as in Paris in 1792, misguided friends of the people, who incited proceedings against the alleged engrossers, and, in fact, insisted upon a measure which differed only in name from a *maximum* in the price of bread. Nevertheless, neither the government, nor the parliament appeared in the least degree disposed to yield to these senseless demands. The masses reproached Mr. Pitt with being the cause of all their present distresses, they alleged it was he, who, by loading the country with taxes, by doubling the debt, had raised the prices of articles of primary necessity to an exorbitant degree; that it was he, who, in persisting in prosecuting a mad war, in refusing to treat with France, had ended by turning all the maritime nations against England, and by depriving the English people of a supply of foreign grain from the Baltic, now become indispensable. The opposition, seeing for the first time for seventeen years, Mr. Pitt's power shaken, redoubled their energy. Mr. Fox, who had so long absented himself from parliament, again resumed his seat. Sheridan, Tierney, lords Grey and Holland, renewed their attacks, and (that which rarely happens in excited parties of an opposition) on this occasion, when contending with their political adversaries, they had right on their side. Mr. Pitt, in spite of his accustomed self-possession, had little in fact to urge in reply, when the question was asked, why he had not treated with France when the First Consul proposed peace before the battle of Marengo? Why, and that recently before Hohenlinden, why had he not consented, if not to a naval armistice which might have given the French a chance of maintaining themselves in Egypt, at least to the separate negotiation which they had proposed? Why had he so untowardly let slip the opportunity of securing the evacuation of Egypt, by refusing to ratify the convention of El Arisch? Why had he not temporised with the neutral powers in order to gain time with them? Why had he not imitated lord North, who, in 1780, avoided answering a manifesto of maritime powers, by a declaration of war? Why had he thus drawn all Europe in array against England on account of doubtful questions of the law of nations upon which all countries entertained conflicting opinions, and which at the moment did not materially affect the interests of England? Why, with the view of preventing France from obtaining for her dock-yards, timber, iron, and hemp, which were not sufficient to recruit its navy, why had he exposed England to be wholly deprived of foreign corn? Why, in short, had an English army been uselessly transported from Mahon to Ferrol, and from Ferrol to Cadiz, without any practical result? The opposition, contrasting the management of the affairs of England with

that of the affairs of France, inquired of Mr. Pitt, with bitter irony, what he had to say of this young Bonaparte, of this rash youth, who, according to the ministerial language, was only doomed to enjoy a brief existence like his predecessors, so ephemeral that it did not entitle him to be treated with?

Mr. Pitt had great difficulty in maintaining his ground against Fox, Sheridan, and Tierney, lords Grey and Holland, when in the face of all England, he was pressed by these urgent questions, but became alarmed at the number of his enemies, and disconcerted at the clamour of a famished people, in vain demanding bread.

Mr. Pitt made but a feeble defence to all these reproaches. He constantly repeated his favourite argument, that if he had not made war, the English constitution would have perished; and he cited as examples, Venice, Naples, Piedmont, Switzerland, Holland, and the Ecclesiastical States of Germany, as if it could be believed that what had occurred to some third-rate Italian, or German powers, must necessarily have happened to powerful England, and to her liberal constitution. He replied, and on this occasion with more truth, that if France had greatly increased her territory by land, England had equally augmented her power by sea; that her navy was crowned with glory, that if her debts and her taxes had doubled, her riches had also doubled, and that all circumstances considered, England was more powerful at that moment, than before the war. All this could not be disputed. Mr. Pitt added, moreover, that as the First Consul appeared to be more permanently established in authority, they were about to treat with him. But on the question of neutral rights he remained inflexible. "If England," said he, "subscribed to the doctrines laid down by the neutral powers, a small armed sloop would suffice to convoy the trade of the whole world. England would be precluded from taking any steps against the trade of her enemies, and she could no longer prevent Spain from receiving the precious metals of the New World, nor France from obtaining the naval munitions of war supplied by the North. We must," he exclaimed, "envelop ourselves in our own flag, and proudly find our grave in the deep, rather than admit the validity of such principles in the maritime code of nations."

Two sessions of parliament succeeded each other without any interval of repose. In November, 1800, the last meeting took place of what was called the Parliament of England and Scotland; in January, 1801, the united parliament of the three kingdoms assembled for the first time in virtue of the act which united Ireland with Great Britain. During these two sessions the most vehement discussions had been carried on without intermission. Mr. Pitt was visibly weakened, not as respected his numerical majority in the parliament, but as regarded his popular influence, and moral power out of doors. Every one

felt that in persisting in making war against France, he had overshot the mark, and had missed, on the eve of Marengo as on that of Hohenlinden, the favourable opportunity of treating advantageously. To miss an opportunity is for a statesman, as well as for a military man, an irreparable misfortune. The moment for making peace once past, fortune turned against Mr. Pitt. He felt himself, and the people perceived that he was vanquished by the talents of young general Bonaparte.

We must, however, do him, and also England, the justice to acknowledge, that the measures adopted during this frightful scarcity, were marked by great moderation. The proposal of a *maximum* was rejected. They went no further than to grant considerable bounties upon the importation of corn, to prohibit the use of grain in the distilleries, and to discontinue all parochial relief in money, lest it might raise the price of bread, affording, however, that relief in food such as salted provisions, vegetables, &c. A royal proclamation was addressed to all classes in easy circumstances, and who had it in their power to vary their diet, urging them to use the utmost economy in the consumption of bread in their respective families. In addition to this they despatched numerous fleets to obtain rice in the East Indies, corn in America, and in the Mediterranean. They even endeavoured to procure it from France, by a contraband trade on the coast of Brittany and La Vendée.

Nevertheless, in the midst of this distress, which was borne with great fortitude, Mr. Pitt did not neglect the prosecution of the war, and he had made every arrangement for a bold expedition into the Baltic as soon as the season would permit. He was desirous to aim a blow first at Denmark and then at Sweden, and proceed even to the extremity of the gulf of Finland, with a view of menacing Russia. But it is not known even in his own country, whether he seriously wished to continue at the head of affairs in England. Two questions were constantly agitated by him in the cabinet, one of which, most inopportune at such a moment, led to his retirement. It has been seen, that after strenuous exertions made in the preceding year, he had obtained what is called the act of union with Ireland, that is to say the union of the parliaments of England, Scotland, and Ireland into one imperial legislature. This measure had appeared like a sort of party victory, especially in the face of the reiterated attempts of the French Republic to stir up an insurrection in Ireland. But they had only succeeded in stripping Ireland of her independence, by giving the Catholics a formal pledge that emancipation should be granted to them. The Catholics were told, that they never would obtain their enfranchisement, from the prejudices of the Irish parliament, which was undoubtedly true; but it appears that promises were actually made, amounting to a positive pledge, which must be considered as a serious political error, if it be true that Mr. Pitt was bound, by the tenor of these engagements, to

grant emancipation, or to retire. It was a pledge at that time impossible of performance. Be this as it may, in the month of February, 1801, at the opening of the first united parliament, Mr. Pitt asked the consent of George III. to an emancipation bill. The king, a staunch Protestant, conceived this to be an infringement of his coronation oath, and obstinately refused it. Mr. Pitt made another request, which was a most reasonable one; namely, not to consider the occupation of Hanover, by Prussia, as an act of hostility, but to keep on terms with that power, in order to preserve at least one friendly relation on the continent. The sacrifice was too great for a prince of the house of Hanover. The dispute between the king and the minister grew warm, and on the 8th of February, 1801, Mr. Pitt, together with the majority of his colleagues, Messrs. Dundas and Windham, lord Grenville, and others, tendered their resignation. This resignation, after an administration of seventeen years, under circumstances so extraordinary, caused the greatest sensation. The people could not view it as arising out of natural circumstances, but ascribed secret motives to Mr. Pitt; and an opinion at that time took possession of the public mind, which historians have zealously perpetuated ever since, that Mr. Pitt, perceiving the necessity of a temporary peace, consented to stand aloof during a few months, in order to allow this peace to be brought about by others, rather than by himself, and then afterwards to return to the helm of affairs, when the political exigency of the moment should have been provided for. Such are the motives which the multitude generally ascribe to public men, and which ill-informed writers repeat as they have heard them. Mr. Pitt neither foresaw the peace of Amiens, nor its short duration,* nor did he conceive, moreover, that peace was incompatible with his continuance in the ministry, as he had consented to the famed negotiations at Lille in 1797, and even recently he had selected Mr. Thomas Grenville to represent England at Lunéville. But Mr. Pitt had gone to great lengths with the Catholics; he had committed a blunder, of which public men are often guilty, that of sacrificing the interest of the future, to secure the advantages of the moment. Having promised too much, he felt all the embarrassment of not fulfilling those promises, and that in a critical state of parties, when a small accession of strength to his adversaries would suffice to overwhelm him. It is true that subsequently, he denied positively, that he had ever given any distinct pledge respecting Catholic emancipation, and this denial was indeed wanting to defend him from such a charge of imprudence. Whatever opinion may be entertained on this point, there never

* I am indebted for the above details to several cotemporaries of Mr. Pitt, who were on the most intimate terms with him; who were engaged in the ministerial negotiations of that period, and who fill, even at the present day, some of the highest offices in England.

was a period when the dangers of any country justified to the same degree, or even required, the postponement of solemn engagements, for in 1801, England was a prey to a famine within, while abroad, she was at war with the whole of Europe. Nevertheless, Mr. Pitt withdrew from office, and his retirement can only be regarded as the weakness of a superior mind. It is evident that, everywhere surrounded by fearful embarrassments, Mr. Pitt was not sorry to be relieved from his situation, under the honourable pretext of an inviolable fidelity to his own engagements. He sent in his resignation to the great grief of the king, to the great dissatisfaction of the ministerial party, and to the great apprehension of all England, which viewed with alarming anxiety, a set of new and inexperienced men seize the helm of affairs at this critical juncture. Mr. Pitt caused himself to be succeeded by Mr. Addington, who was his creature, and had for many years past held the speakership of the House of Commons. Lord Hawkesbury, afterwards lord Liverpool, succeeded Mr. Grenville at the Foreign office. They were moderate, prudent men, but of second-rate ability, both friends of Mr. Pitt and for some time followed his advice. This it was which contributed, more than any other cause, to give currency to the report that the retirement of Mr. Pitt was ostensible rather than real.

The feeble intellect of George III. was unequal to bear the violence of the political crisis. He was seized with a fresh attack of insanity, and during a month was incapable of fulfilling the functions of royalty. Mr. Pitt had sent in his resignation. Mr. Addington and lord Hawkesbury were the ministers appointed to succeed him, but had not yet received the seals of office. Mr. Pitt, although he had ceased to be minister, was still, in fact, king of England, during this crisis of nearly a month's duration, and was so by the consent of the whole nation. Explanations took place upon the subject in the House of Commons. They were of a very delicate nature; they were demanded by Mr. Sheridan, and given in noble, statesmanlike language by Mr. Pitt. The various motions, usually made in the English parliament, upon the state of the country, were postponed, and it perhaps occurred to some distrustful minds that Mr. Pitt prolonged, without reluctance, the sort of royal authority which he enjoyed. He trusted it would be believed, to use his own language at the time, that in the event of ministers being no longer able to receive the commands of his Majesty from his own mouth, they would propose measures to which it was unnecessary to allude more distinctly, but which they should not delay for one single day. They found themselves placed by their duty in an unprecedented situation, which they should not wish, on any account, to prolong one instant more than strict necessity required. Mr. Sheridan replied to this, by expressing the utmost confidence, that neither Mr. Pitt, nor any other minister

would ever presume to take advantage of the unhappy condition of the king's health, to prolong, for one moment, a power equal to that of the sovereign himself.

The most delicate reserve was observed. The word which characterised the real condition of the king, that of madness, did not escape the lips of any one; and the nation waited with anxiety, but with perfect composure, the issue of this extraordinary crisis. During this period, Mr. Pitt induced subsidies to be voted, which no one opposed; the English fleets were got ready for sea, and admirals Parker and Nelson left Yarmouth with forty-seven sail, and proceeded towards the Baltic.

In the middle of March, the king's health was restored. Mr. Pitt transferred the reins of government to Mr. Addington, and lord Hawkesbury. The new ministers, when giving explanations, as usual, on assuming office, did not omit to state, from their seats in parliament, that they entertained the highest sentiments of esteem for their predecessors; that they considered the course of policy they had adopted as highly salutary, and that it had, in fact, saved England; they consequently declared, that they should be guided by the same principles, and follow in the same steps. "Why, then, have you come into power?" asked Messrs. Sheridan, Grey, and Fox. "If you mean to pursue the same line of policy as your predecessors, the ministers who have retired were much more capable than yourselves, of carrying on the affairs of the kingdom."

Impartial men, members of parliament, censured Mr. Pitt for having relinquished the government of the nation, at such a critical moment, and for retiring without valid and sufficient reasons. Even the opposition was so far in the wrong, as to reproach him with retiring at the expense of the king's popularity, by giving out, that the king refused to grant emancipation, which measure was generally acceptable to the country. This reproach was both unreasonable, and at variance with true constitutional principles. Mr. Pitt, in resigning, was under the necessity of publicly stating the reasons for his withdrawal from office; and if the king did really refuse his sanction to an emancipation bill, Mr. Pitt had a perfect right to proclaim it. He made it known, however, in language eminently suitable to the occasion. But it plainly appeared, that this refusal was rather a pretext, than a real motive, and that Mr. Pitt yielded to a state of things, with which he was unequal to contend. The lustre of his star faded before one that was now rising, and which was destined to diffuse a far brighter splendour than his own. Although he afterwards appeared at the head of affairs, and actually died in office, the expiration of his political existence may be dated at this period. Mr. Pitt, after having continued seventeen years in power, left his country loaded at once with increased riches and increased debt, with greater burdens, and with greater resources. He was an accomplished orator, if

viewed as an organ of the government; an able and powerful leader, but with little enlightened views as a statesman. He had committed grievous errors, and was ever warped by all the prejudices of his countrymen. No Englishman ever entertained a more deadly hatred towards France; but we must guard against being unjust towards him on this account, and evince our impartiality, by honouring patriotism, even when engaged in a contest with our own.

Although Mr. Addington and lord Hawkesbury were not to be compared, in talent, to Mr. Pitt, the impulse had been given, and the vessel of the state was borne onwards, for a time, by the momentum imparted to it by the fallen minister. The subsidies had been asked and voted; the English fleets were launched towards the Baltic, in order to settle the question of the rights of neutrals; and an army, transported on board the fleet of admiral Keith, was on its way to the East, in order to dispute the possession of Egypt with the French.

Admiral Parker, an old experienced officer, whose judgment could be relied upon in critical emergencies, commanded the Baltic fleet. Nelson was next in command, ready to act whenever battle was necessary; the latter, in fact, was only qualified to fight, but nature had endowed him with a happy instinct for warfare, and he reasoned ably upon subjects connected with his profession. He proposed, that without waiting for the second division of the English fleet, they should pass the Sound, proceed direct to Copenhagen, and there, by some act of vigour, detach Denmark from the coalition; then afterwards repair to the Baltic, throw themselves into the midst of the combined fleets, prevent their junction, and thus, from that time, dictate terms at discretion. This plan was well conceived, for it was now the month of March, the northern waters were still covered with ice, and this alone was sufficient to prevent the fleets of the neutrals from effecting their junction; which, indeed, Nelson had good reason to fear, as it must greatly have endangered the British squadron.

This squadron, consisting of seventeen ships of the line, and thirty frigates, or smaller vessels, appeared on the 30th of March, in the Cattegat. The Cattegat is the first gulf formed by the northern extremity of Denmark, when it approaches the opposite coast of Sweden.

The neutral powers were proceeding with extreme activity in their preparations. The emperor Paul, animated by his accustomed ardour, had urged and incited on Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia, and threatened with his enmity, those who did not manifest the same zeal as himself. Denmark and Prussia would have preferred negotiating in the first instance; but the menaces of Paul, and the stern, but no ways menacing admonitions of the First Consul, accompanied with a formal promise of assistance from France, had prevailed with these two cabinets. Denmark, be-

sides, seeing the English respond to a simple declaration of principles, by a declaration of war, did not consider herself at liberty to recede, and accordingly took energetic measures to repel the enemy. Prussia, perplexed in the extreme by the intimidation of Russia on the one side, and France on the other, having ceased any longer to play the part of mediatrix, now that Paul I. and the First Consul were upon amicable terms; instead of taking the lead as before, was now reduced to the position of an obsequious follower, and from that time could rely upon their friendly dispositions alone, for a share of the Germanic indemnities advantageous to her interests, and was therefore anxious to please those powers by her consistent firmness. She accordingly declared against England, and replied to her overtures by protestations of fidelity to the cause of the neutrals. She prohibited the English from entering any of the northern ports situated between Holland and Denmark; she closed the mouths of the Ems, the Weser, and the Elbe, and stationed troops, and raised batteries at the principal points of the entrances to these rivers. To crown all, she marched a body of troops, and took possession of Hanover. This proceeding was of all the rest, the most serious and decisive. The First Consul requited it by the warmest proofs of his satisfaction, and by the most positive pledge to her of an advantageous participation in the Germanic indemnities.

Denmark, on her part, took possession of Hamburg and Lubeck; the small port of Cuxhaven, which belonged to Hamburg, and which was the only place to which the English could have access, had been already occupied by Prussia. Thus, then, the English were left nothing but the sea and their vessels. They had not a place where they could cast an anchor. They now had the task to procure by force a readmittance for their ships into the continental ports.

It is necessary, in order to reach the Baltic from the Cattegat, to pass through the celebrated straits of the Sound. These straits are formed by the contiguity of the coasts of Denmark and Sweden. Between Elsinore and Hessingborg it is about three miles in width. The guns placed on the batteries of the two opposite banks, can just reach a vessel passing in the middle of the channel, but without being able to do much damage to a fleet of ships. Nevertheless, as the channel is deeper on the Swedish side, ships of war of a large size are obliged to approach nearer to this coast, and by fortifying it with batteries the passage could have been rendered more difficult to the English. But the Swedish coast had at that time no batteries, and, indeed, had never had any at any previous period; in fact it has no port which merchant vessels could be tempted to frequent. There is no other port in the Sound, except that of Elsinore, belonging to Denmark, and on this account batteries have been erected for the defence of the Danish coast only, with scarcely any on the Swedish side. On

the Danish side stands the fortress of Kronenberg, regularly fortified. For these reasons the usage has originated of paying to the Danes, and not to the Swedes, the dues levied in the Sound. In such a state of things, it would have been requisite to construct works on the coast of Sweden, of which they were deficient. King Gustavus Adolphus, who, next to Paul, was the most violent of the members of the league, had consulted the czar on the subject, when he was at St. Petersburg, on his recent visit, but they were aware of the impossibility of executing the least work during the present winter season, when the soil, indurated by the frost, would resist the pickaxe and the spade, to such a degree as to render any labour upon it wholly impracticable. Gustavus Adolphus had also just had an interview with the crown prince of Denmark, at that time regent of the kingdom, the same who died some years ago, in 1841, after a long and glorious reign. They conferred together upon this subject, and the Crown Prince, from private reasons by which Denmark was influenced, did not seem to attach much importance to the fortifying of the Swedish coast.* The Sound then was but feebly defended on the Swedish side. There was only an old battery of eight pieces of cannon, constructed a long time ago upon the most salient point of the shore. Although this neglect has been greatly blamed since, it is certain that the Sound, even if it had been strongly fortified on both sides, would not have presented any serious dangers to the English, as the width of the channel being about three miles, vessels passing in the midst of the straits, would be at a distance of a mile and a half from the batteries, and would therefore, being almost out of the range of their guns, escape with only perhaps some damage to their sails and rigging.

There is also another approach to the Baltic besides that of the Sound, which is formed by the two arms of the sea which separate, the one the Island of Zealand from the Island of Funen, the other the Island of Funen from the coast of Jutland, passages well known by the names of the Great and Little Belt. The English would be but little inclined to sail by this passage, in which they would be exposed to the fire of more than one Danish fort; but still more to the shoals, which rendered the navigation extremely dangerous for ships of the line; they were, therefore, most likely to decide upon going through the passage of the Sound.

The Danes concentrated all their defences, not exactly at the

* Very erroneous assertions have been made on this subject. I have had recourse to the highest and most authentic authorities. The archives of France, Sweden, and Denmark, contain the proofs of what I here advance. Those who have written to the contrary, Napoleon amongst others, have only repeated the allegations made at the time. The second passage of the Sound, which took place in 1807, at a period when Sweden was at war with Denmark, and viewed with pleasure the triumph of the English, has contributed to confirm the idea, that the Swedes had acted perfidiously. But on the first occasion, that is, in 1801, Sweden acted with perfect good faith; she was anxious for the general success, and would have done every thing in her power to secure it.

Sound, but lower down, in the channel which forms the continuation of the Sound, that is to say before Copenhagen. The two coasts of Denmark and of Sweden, after having approximated to each other at the Sound, now stretch out to an extent varying in width from three to twelve leagues, forming a strait about twenty leagues in length, abounding with reefs and shoals, through which a vessel can only navigate, by steering through the narrow channels, carefully ascertaining the depth of water by incessant soundings. The city of Copenhagen is situated on the most important of these channels, about twenty leagues from the Sound, in a direction towards the south. It was at this spot that the Danes had made immense preparations, waiting for the approach of the enemy. The post which they occupied did not exactly close the entrance to the Baltic, as we shall presently explain, but it compelled the English to risk an attack on a well-defended position, strongly fortified beforehand. The Crown Prince had taken prompt and numerous preliminary measures for defence. He had stationed before Copenhagen a number of vessels, cut down so as to form formidable floating batteries, and he had armed besides ten line-of-battle ships, which were only waiting for seamen from Norway to complete their crews. It is well known that the Danish navy is the best in the whole North.

Sweden and Russia, on their parts, had also made preparations for resistance. Sweden had placed troops on the coasts from Gottenburg to the Sound, and fortified Carlscrona, in the Baltic, as well as all the other accessible points on that coast. King Gustavus Adolphus was urging on admiral Cronstedt to complete the equipment of the Swedish fleet. This fleet already consisted of seven ships of the line, and two frigates, ready to set sail, the moment the sea was disencumbered of the winter ice. The Russians had twelve ships of the line all ready at Revel, and which, like the Swedish vessels, were only detained by the ice. The coalitionists had not accomplished, doubtless, all that would have been possible, if they had had at their head an energetic government, like France at that period, but, by assembling, in time, the seven Swedish, the twelve Russian, and ten Danish ships before Copenhagen, there would have been formed a fleet of thirty ships of the line, and of from ten to twelve frigates, stationed in a formidable position, where the English could not have come to an engagement without danger, and still less could have passed by and disregarded. To have passed it, without attacking it, in order to embark in any enterprise in the Baltic, would have been to incur the danger of leaving an imposing force in their rear, capable of closing up the sole outlet of this sea, and of preventing their egress therefrom, in case of reverses. But to collect together these naval divisions, in proper time, required a celerity of movements of which these three neutral governments were hardly capable. They used every dispatch, doubtless, but relying

too much upon the continuance of severe weather, they had not commenced their preparations sufficiently early, and the energetic promptitude of the English greatly surpassed theirs.

On the 21st of March, an English frigate touched at Elsinore, bringing Mr. Vansittart, who was commissioned to make a last application to the Danish government. Mr. Vansittart delivered to Mr Drummond, the English Chargé d'Affaires, the *ultimatum* of the British cabinet. The terms of this *ultimatum* required the Danes to withdraw from the naval confederacy of the Neutral Powers; to open their ports to the English; and adhere to the provisional arrangement of the preceding August, by virtue of which, they had engaged no longer to convoy their merchant vessels. The Crown Prince of Denmark promptly refused to entertain the idea of such a defection, and replied, that Denmark, and her allies, had not made a declaration of war, and that they had confined themselves to the publication of their principles of maritime law: that the English were the aggressors, as they had retaliated to a mere assertion of a dogma in the law of nations, by an embargo; that Denmark would not commence hostilities, but she would energetically repel force by force. The gallant people of Copenhagen nobly seconded, by their steady allegiance, the prince who represented them with so much dignity. The whole population took up arms; and, at the call of their noble leader, formed themselves into corps of militia and volunteers. Eight hundred students rushed to arms; every one who could handle a pickaxe assisted the engineers in completing the defensive works: redoubts were thrown up in every direction. Mr. Drummond and Mr. Vansittart abruptly left Copenhagen, threatening this unhappy city with all the thunders of England.

On the 24th, they rejoined the admirals of the fleet, who from that moment, began to arrange their plan for immediate hostilities.

Nelson and the commander-in-chief, Parker, held a council of war, on board the fleet. The plan of operation was discussed. Some proposed to pass by way of the Sound, and others by way of the Great Belt. Nelson maintained that it was of little consequence by which strait the fleet should pass, only that not an hour should be lost in getting into the Baltic, and bearing up to Copenhagen, in order to prevent the junction of the coalitionists. Once in the Baltic, a part of the English fleet should be directed against Copenhagen, to strike a blow against the Danes, and a part against Sweden and Russia, to destroy the northern fleets. They had twenty sail of the line, twenty-five or thirty frigates, and vessels of all descriptions. He would undertake with twelve ships, to destroy all the Swedish and Russian fleets; the remainder must attack and bombard Copenhagen. As to which of the passages they should navigate, Nelson preferred braving some of the cannon-shot to which they might be exposed in passing the Sound, to encountering the dangerous shoals of the Great and Little Belt.

Admiral Parker, less enterprising, made an attempt, by the Great Belt, on the 26th of March. Several light vessels of the flotilla having grounded, the commander-in-chief recalled the squadron, and determined to force the Sound. Early on the morning of the 30th of March, they commenced this arduous passage. At the time, it blew a topsail breeze from the north-west, favourable for navigating this strait, which runs in a direction from north-west to south-east, as far as Elsinore, after which it continues almost due north and south. The squadron, favoured by the wind, advanced boldly, at an equal distance from the two opposite shores. Nelson led the van, Parker took the command of the centre, and admiral Graves brought up the rear. The line-of-battle ships formed a single column in the middle of the channel. On each side a flotilla of gun and bomb vessels approached nearer to the coast of Denmark and Sweden, in order to engage the enemy's batteries at a shorter range. As soon as this squadron came in sight of Elsinore, the fortress of Kronenberg immediately opened a fire upon them. One hundred pieces of heavy cannon, vomitted forth a volley of shells and red-hot balls. But the English admiral, perceiving that the fire on the Swedish side did little or no execution, as the old battery of eight guns scarcely fired, immediately approached nearer to that side of the coast, and passed the straits amidst the jeers of the English sailors at the Danes, whose shells and balls fell 600 yards short of the enemy's ships. The flotilla of bomb and gun vessels, which had approached quite close to the Danish coast, poured forth, and received an immense quantity of shells, but little bloodshed ensued, as four men only were wounded on the side of the Danes, two of whom were severely wounded, and two died. In Elsinore, only one house suffered from the fire of the English, and that was, singularly enough, the house of the English consul.

The whole fleet anchored towards noon, in the middle of the gulf, off the island of Hüen.

The gulf, as we have just said, runs from north to south, for the distance of about twenty leagues, varying in width, as the shores advance or recede, from three to twelve leagues, and has only a few channels that are navigable. At about twenty leagues towards the south, stands Copenhagen, situated on the west side of the gulf, on the coast of Denmark, at a small elevation above the level of the sea, and forming a slightly inclined plane, from which a cannon-ball would just skim over the surface of the sea. The gulf is very wide at this spot, and divided by the low island of Saltholm, into two navigable channels: the one called the passage of Malmo, runs along the Swedish coast, and is scarcely accessible for large vessels: the other, called Drogden, skirts along the coast of Denmark, and is generally preferred by navigators. The latter is again divided by a sand bank, which is called the Middle Ground, into two passages; one called the King's

Channel, forms the entrance to Copenhagen: the other, called the Dutch Channel, runs on the outer side of the Middle Ground. The Danes had taken up a position in the King's Channel, leaving the other open to the English, having in view rather the defence of Copenhagen, than to prevent the enemy entering into the Baltic. But it was very certain that Parker and Nelson would not venture into the Baltic, without first destroying the defences of Copenhagen, together with the maritime forces, that the neutrals might have assembled there.

The means of defence, on the side of the Danes, consisted of land batteries, constructed on the right and left of the harbour, and of a line of razéed vessels, or floating batteries, moored in the middle of the King's Channel, the whole length of Copenhagen, with the view of keeping the enemy's fire at a distance. Commencing at the northern position, was a battery called the Three Crowns, constructed of stone work, almost completely closed at the gorge, commanding even the entrance to the port, and connecting its fire with the citadel of Copenhagen. It was fortified with seventy pieces of cannon of the largest calibre. Four ships of the line, of which two were under sail, and two at anchor, besides a frigate under way, completely blocked up the entrance to the stream which led to the port. In proceeding from this fort, that is, the Three Crowns, towards the south, twenty hulks of large ships, armed with guns, and strongly moored, filled up the passage of the King's Channel, and was thus connected with the batteries on land, placed on the island of Amak. Thus the line of defence of the Danes was supported on the left, by the Three Crowns battery, and on the right, by the island of Amak; its length occupying, and completely blocking up, the middle of the passage of the King's Channel. The works of the Three Crowns could not be forced, defended as they were by seventy yawning cannon mouths; and also by five vessels, three of which were under sail. The line of defence, consisting of the rafes and stationary hulks, on the contrary, was of too great length, not sufficiently close, and incapable of manœuvring; and, owing to the object they had in view, of obstructing the middle of the passage, was placed too much in advance of the point of support on the right, that is to say, the fixed batteries on the island of Amak. This island is but a continuation of the coast on which Copenhagen is seated. The line of floating batteries could, therefore, be attacked on the right. If it had been formed of a division of vessels, under sail, capable of shifting their position, or even if it had been more concentrated, more strongly supported on the bank, the English would not have come out of this attack altogether safe and sound. But the Danes set great value upon their naval squadron, which they had not the means of replacing, if it was destroyed; and not having, besides, received all the seamen from Norway, to man it completely, they kept it protected in the inner basin of the harbour, thinking that old

unserviceable vessels were sufficient to answer the purpose of floating batteries against the English fleet.

Their bravest seamen, commanded by intrepid officers, worked the guns, mounted on these old hulks which were strongly moored and chained together.

The English having arrived off Copenhagen, long before the junction of all the neutral maritime powers at this point, might have passed to the eastward of the Middle Ground, disregarding the Danes stationed in the King's Channel, and have proceeded by the before-mentioned Dutch Channel into the Baltic. They might have accomplished this beyond the reach of the guns of Copenhagen; but they would have left in their rear an imposing force, capable of cutting off their retreat, in case any untoward event should force them back weakened, and in want of shelter, through the passage of the Sound. It was better to take advantage of the isolated position of the Danes, and, by striking a decisive blow, detach them from the confederacy, and, after having, by this means, seized the keys of the Baltic, proceed, with all expedition, against the Swedes and the Russians. This plan was, at the same time, bold and prudent; and it received that which rarely occurred—the concurrent approbation of both Parker and Nelson.

The entire days of the 31st of March, and 1st of April were occupied, in examining the Danish line, in sounding the channel, and in concerting the plan of attack. Nelson and Parker, accompanied by the oldest officers of the fleet, with the chief officer of engineers, reconnoitred, in person, in the midst of the ice, the position of the enemy, being sometimes within reach of the enemy's shot. Nelson maintained that, with ten ships, he would undertake to attack, and break the right line of the Danes. His plan was to proceed down the whole length of the Middle Ground, by passing through the Dutch Channel, doubling round the farther extremity, and reascending by way of the King's Channel, and then take his station, ship against ship, about a cable's length from the enemy. He arranged, moreover, that a division of the fleet, under a brave officer, Captain Riou, should attack the land battery of the Three Crowns, and, after having silenced their guns, disembark 1000 men, and take it by storm. The commander-in-chief, admiral Parker, with the remainder of the fleet under him, was not to engage in this bold manœuvre; it was agreed that he should remain in the rear, to cannonade the citadel, and cover the disabled vessels as they retired from the action.

This manœuvre, as daring as that of Aboukir, could only succeed through great ability and good fortune. Admiral Parker gave his assent to it, on condition that it should not be carried too far, if the difficulties should be found insurmountable; and placed at Nelson's disposal twelve ships, instead of ten, for which he had applied. On the evening of the 1st of April, Nelson

dropped through the Dutch Channel, and came to an anchor, considerably below Copenhagen, at a place on the island of Amak, called Draco. In order to get into the King's Channel, and traverse its entire length, a totally different wind was wanting to that which had brought him down the Dutch Channel. The next morning, the wind having opportunely shifted from its direction on the night before, he ascended the King's Channel, steering his fleet between the Danish line and the shoals of the Middle Ground. The whole channel had been sounded, but, notwithstanding this precaution, three ships struck on the Middle Ground, and Nelson took up his position with the remaining nine only. He was not disheartened, but anchored broadside on, within half a cable's length of the Danish line, a distance which must render the effect of the cannonading most terrific. The want of the three vessels aground was greatly felt, more particularly for the attack of the Three Crowns battery, which thus was obliged to be attempted by frigates.

At ten o'clock in the morning, the whole English squadron had taken up its position, and received and poured forth a frightful volley of artillery. A division of bomb and gun-ships, drawing but little water, was placed upon the shoal of the Middle Ground, and discharged their shells upon Copenhagen, over the masts of the two squadrons. The fire from the Danish batteries, consisting of 800 guns, inflicted considerable damage on the English. The officers in command of the rafts displayed great intrepidity, and their gunners exhibited the most heroic courage. The commander of the Provesten, in particular, who occupied the extremity of the line towards the south, conducted himself with the most distinguished gallantry. Nelson, perceiving the importance of at once depriving the Danish line of the support which it received from the batteries of the island of Amak, directed four vessels against the Provesten alone. M. de Lassen, captain of the Provesten, defended himself until he had lost 500 out of his 600 gunners; he then threw himself into the sea, with the few remaining, and swam on shore from his vessel, which he left in flames. He thus had the glory of not striking his flag. Nelson then directed all his efforts against the other rafts and floating batteries, and succeeded in silencing several. In the mean time, at the other end of the line, Captain Riou suffered severely. Three English vessels being fast on the Middle Ground, he had only frigates to oppose to the Three Crown batteries, and he was exposed to a frightful, and destructive fire from their guns, without any hope of silencing them, or of being able to take them by storm. Parker, perceiving the resistance of the Danes, and fearing that the English ships, too much injured in their rigging, would be exposed to be run aground, gave orders to discontinue action. Nelson perceiving this signal thrown out at admiral Parker's mast-head, gave way to a noble expression of indignation. He had lost the

use of one eye, and, taking up the glass, and placing it to his blind eye, he said, sarcastically, "I really don't see Parker's signal for leaving off action," and he kept his signal for closer battle still flying. This was a noble act of imprudence, and was followed, as it often happens to audacious boldness, by a successful result.

The floating batteries of the Danes, not being able to move, or seek shelter under the land batteries, were exposed to a most destructive fire. The Danebrog blew up with a terrific explosion; several others were disabled, and drifted from their moorings, after having suffered an enormous loss of men. But the English, on the other side, did not suffer less severely, and were placed in the greatest peril. Nelson, in endeavouring to take possession of the Danish vessels which had struck, received, as he neared the batteries on the island of Amak, a deadly discharge from their guns. At this moment, three or four of his vessels were so completely shattered, as to be almost unmanageable; and, on the side of the Three Crown batteries, Captain Riou, compelled to draw off his vessels to a distance, was cut in two by a chain-shot. Nelson, almost beaten, was not disconcerted, and conceived the idea of sending a flag of truce to the prince of Denmark, who was present, on one of the batteries, at this horrible scene. He told him that, if he did not stop the firing, which prevented him taking possession of his prizes, which, by right, belonged to him, since they had struck their flags, he should be obliged to blow them up, with all their crews; that the English were the brothers of the Danes, that both had fought sufficiently to attest their valour, and ought to avoid the further effusion of blood.

The prince, moved by this appalling spectacle, fearing also for the city of Copenhagen, now deprived of the protection of the floating batteries, gave orders for the firing to cease. This was a mistake, for a few moments longer, and Nelson's fleet, almost disabled, would have been obliged to retire half destroyed. A sort of negotiation ensued, and Nelson took advantage of it to quit his place of anchorage. Whilst he was in the act of retiring, three of his vessels, considerably damaged, being no longer manageable, struck on the Middle Ground. If, at this moment, the fire had still continued, these three vessels must have been lost.

The next day, Nelson and Parker, after great efforts, got afloat the three vessels which had grounded, and opened a negotiation with the Danes for the purpose of obtaining a suspension of hostilities. They stood as much in need of this as the Danes, as they had 1200 men killed and wounded, and the havoc in six of their vessels was horrible. The loss of the Danes was not much greater, but they had relied too much upon the line of their floating batteries, and now that these batteries were destroyed, the lower part of the city, which is open to the sea, was exposed to a bombardment. They were also apprehensive for their vessels of

war, which, half equipped, immovable, and locked in the basin, might have been set fire to, and totally consumed. This apprehension was to them most alarming. They, in fact, clung to their squadron, as to their very maritime existence: and this squadron, once destroyed, they were not in a position to replace it. At this instant, under the momentary irritation of suffering and danger, they complained of their allies, without reflecting upon the difficulties which had prevented them from repairing to the walls of Copenhagen. The contrary winds, the ice; and the shortness of time, had detained the Swedes and the Russians, without any blame being fairly attributable to them. It is true, that had they arrived with their twenty ships and joined the Danish fleet in the straits, where the engagement took place, Nelson would have failed in his daring enterprise, and the cause of the maritime neutral confederacy would have triumphed on that day. But there had not been time for any of them to get ready, and the promptitude of the English changed the fortune of the war.

Admiral Parker, who was greatly alarmed at the temerity of Nelson, during the battle of the second, formed now a correct opinion of the position of the Danes, and knew how to derive every advantage from the battle which had been fought. He required the Danes to withdraw from the confederacy of the neutral powers, to open their ports to the English, and to receive, moreover, an English force, under the pretence of protecting them against the resentment of their allies. Nelson had the courage to land on the third of April to carry these proposals to the Crown Prince. He went in a boat to Copenhagen, heard the murmurs of this brave people, who were filled with indignation at seeing him, but found the Crown Prince inflexible. This Prince, more alarmed, the evening before, than the actual danger of Copenhagen justified, would not, nevertheless, consent to the ignominious defection proposed to him. He replied, that he would sooner be buried in the ashes of his city than betray the common cause. Nelson returned on board the Elephant without having obtained any concession.

During this interval, the Danes, seeing themselves exposed to the dangers of a second conflict, set to work, and added new defences to those which before existed. They rendered the battery of the Three Crowns more formidable, covered the island of Amak with guns, as well as the lower part of the city. They transported their vessels of war, the paramount objects of their solicitude, into the innermost basins of the harbour, the farthest from the sea, carefully covering them with dung and blindage, so as to protect them against fire; and were at length reassured, when they perceived the hesitation of the English, who did not evince much eagerness to renew this terrific struggle. The whole of the available population lent their aid; one part was placed under arms, and the other part employed in preparing the means for extinguishing the conflagration. At length, after waiting five

days, Nelson returned to Copenhagen, notwithstanding the threatening aspect of the preparations of the Danes. The discussion was animated, and he took upon himself to make concessions, which Admiral Parker had not authorised. He agreed upon an armistice which amounted virtually to a *statu quo*. The Danes did not withdraw from the confederacy, but all hostilities were suspended between them and the English for fourteen weeks; at the expiration of which period, they were to return to the same position as on the day on which this suspension of hostilities was signed. The terms of the armistice embraced only the Danish islands and Jutland, but not Holstein, so that hostilities might be continued in the Elbe, and that from that time the English were prohibited the navigation of that river. The English were to keep at a cannon-shot distance from all the Danish ports and vessels, with the exception of the King's Channel, which they were free to navigate, in order to reach the Baltic. They were forbidden, consequently, to establish themselves upon any points of the Danish territory, and they were only allowed to put into any port for the purpose of refreshment, or to take in a supply of provisions.

These terms were all Nelson could obtain, and they were, we must confess, all that his victory entitled him to demand. But, as he was on the point of leaving Copenhagen, a very untoward report obtained currency, and the Crown Prince, who had been influenced thereby to enter into negotiations, succeeded in keeping the knowledge of it from him. The report was in truth, at the moment, that Paul I. had just died suddenly. Nelson left the place, without being aware of this intelligence, which would doubtless have greatly increased his pretensions. The armistice was immediately ratified by Admiral Parker. The Crown Prince also intimated to the Swedes, that it was useless to expose themselves unavailingly to the attacks of the English, which they would be unequal to resist. This advice was not uncalled for, inasmuch as, after great efforts, Gustavus Adolphus had succeeded in getting his fleet ready to sail. He had in the earnestness of his zeal, dismissed one rear-admiral the service, and sent another admiral before a court-martial, in order to punish them for an alleged dilatoriness, which could not justly be laid to their charge.

All these efforts were however superfluous. Paul I., in fact, had breathed his last, at St. Petersburg, on the night between the 23rd and 24th of March. This event put an end much more effectually, than the incomplete victory of Nelson, to the maritime confederacy of the northern powers. Paul I. had been the chief promoter of that confederacy; he had applied all the impetuous energy of his character to secure its success, and assuredly he would have exerted himself to the utmost to repair the disaster, in other respects pretty equally shared, of the battle of Copenhagen. He would have sent his land forces to Denmark, despatched the whole of the neutral fleet to the Sound, and probably

have made the English rue their barbarous enterprise against the capital of the Danes. But this prince had driven the patience of his subjects to the last extremity, and he had just been put to death, a wretched victim of a tragical revolution at the palace.

Paul I. was of a lively disposition, but all his opinions were carried to the extreme, and as usual, with persons of his temperament, capable of good or evil actions, according to the temporary impulse of his weak, excitable, ill-regulated mind. If the temper of private individuals so constituted is fatal, it becomes still more so in the case of princes, especially when they are invested with absolute power. With them it often borders on madness, assuming sometimes even symptoms of a sanguinary character. Thus, at St. Petersburg, every man trembled for his own fate; even the favourites of Paul, who were treated with the greatest kindness, were not certain but that the favour they at present enjoyed might terminate in an exile to Siberia.

This prince, both sensitive and chivalrous, felt a lively sympathy for the victims of the French Revolution, and a vehement hatred against the Revolution itself. Thus, whereas the able Catherine had wisely, during her reign, confined herself to exciting all Europe against France, without setting a single soldier in motion, Paul, on his accession to the throne, had sent Suwarrow with 100,000 Russians into Italy. In the warmth of his zeal, he had interdicted, from his dominions every article which came from France, books, fashions, and dress. This more than sufficed to give umbrage to the Russian nobility, who, like the whole of the aristocracy of Europe, delighted in reviling France, but nevertheless with the reservation, of enjoying her wit, her manners, and her highly advanced civilisation. They found this anti-revolutionary zeal intolerable, when carried to such an excess.

In a short time, however, Paul was seen to change these opinions and go to the very opposite extreme, conceiving a great hatred for his allies, and receiving his enemies into favour, crowding his apartments with the portrait of general Bonaparte, drinking publicly to his health, and carrying the contrast so far as actually to declare war against Great Britain. This step rendered him not only irksome, but actually odious to the Russian nobility, for he not only interfered with their tastes, but injuriously affected their material interests.

The vast extent of his dominions, occupying almost the whole of the northern part of Europe, abounding in grain, timber, hemp, and ores, requires the aid of foreign merchants, who seek these indigenous commodities, and give in exchange, either money, or manufactured goods. The English in their trade with Russia, supply her, in return for the raw produce of her soil, with the articles manufactured by their own labour, and thus the Russian farmers are enabled to pay to their landlords the rents of their land. The English then engross the most important branches of trade with St. Petersburg, and this is the tie by

which, in some measure, the policy of Russia is fettered to English interests, and that rivalry, which sooner or later must inevitably break out between these two great co-partners in the possession of Asia, is modified.

The Russian aristocracy was accordingly highly exasperated with the newly adopted policy of Paul. If they had blamed, in this prince, an excess of hatred against France, they found still greater fault with an excess of affection towards her, especially when this surprising attachment was carried to such an extent, as to adopt steps ruinous to the interests of the landed proprietors. Besides this obnoxious interference with their tastes and their interests, Paul was still further guilty of cruelties, to which, however, he was not naturally addicted, being rather of a good, than of a mischievous disposition. He had sent a multitude of unhappy wretches to Siberia; afterwards, affected by their sufferings, he recalled them, but without re-instating them in their property. These unfortunate creatures filled all St. Petersburg with their complaints, and with their lamentable misery. Annoyed by these spectacles, he exiled them a second time. Becoming every day more and more distrustful, in proportion as the hatred of his subjects became more apparent to him, he threatened the lives of every one around him. He conceived sinister designs against his ministers, sometimes against his wife and children, and this prince, who was all but mad, assumed habitually the behaviour of a tyrant. He surrounded the palace Michael, which was his usual residence, like a fortress, with bastions and ditches. One would have said, that he seemed to anticipate a sudden attack. At night, he even barricadoed the door which separated his apartments from those of the empress, and thus unwittingly predisposed every thing for his tragical end.

Such a state of things could not long continue, and must inevitably terminate in some deed of violence, similar to that which, more than once, had been witnessed in this empire, where, it is true, rapid advances have been made towards civilisation, but where actual barbarism was the point of starting. The idea of getting rid of the unhappy Paul, by the accustomed means, that is to say, by a revolution at the palace, there where the palace is the nation, suggested itself to every mind. Let us set a proper value upon the advantages of institutions. At another extremity of Europe, upon one of the greatest thrones of the universe, sat a prince afflicted also with insanity, a headstrong, but pious and good prince, George III. This king, occasionally deprived of his reason, during whole months, had just experienced a relapse of his malady, at one of the most critical moments for England. Nevertheless, the business of the nation proceeded in the most regular and ordinary course. The constitution providing the king with ministers, who conduct the government on his behalf, this aberration of the royal mind did not, in any way, prejudice the affairs of the nation. Mr. Pitt held the government for George III., precisely as he had held it during seventeen

years; the thought of an atrocious crime never entered into the imagination of any one! At St. Petersburg, on the contrary, the spectacle of an insane prince on the throne, gave rise to the most sinister projects.

There was at that time, at the court of Russia, one of those men, dreaded by all, who never shrink from the perpetration of any audacious deed. In a regular government, such men may rise, perhaps, to the station of eminently good citizens, but in a despotic government, they become criminals, if crime is, in certain cases, one of the expedients not actually sanctioned by the government, but incidental to its administration. Crime must be condemned in every country where it prevails, but we must condemn still more the institutions by which it is engendered.

Count Pahlen had served in the Russian army with distinction. He possessed a commanding person, and concealed beneath the rough, and sometimes familiar manner of a soldier, a deep and acute mind. He was endowed, moreover, with singular audacity, and an imperturbable presence of mind. As governor of St. Petersburg, intrusted with the police of the empire, and initiated, thanks to the confidence of his master, into all the great affairs of State, he was, in point of fact, though not by office, the principal personage in the Russian government. His political opinions respecting the public policy of the country, were very decided. The crusade against the French revolution, seemed to him as unreasonable, as the new-born zeal against England was intemperate. A prudent reserve, a neutrality skilfully maintained, in the midst of the formidable contest between France and England, appeared to him the only advantageous policy which Russia could pursue. Entertaining neither English nor French views, but being wholly Russian in his opinions, he was also a Russian in his manners, and a Russian such as existed in the days of Peter the Great. Being persuaded that every thing was hastening towards ruin, unless the reign of Paul were curtailed, having even conceived some alarm for himself personally, from certain indications of dissatisfaction which had escaped the emperor, he boldly formed his resolution, and communicated it confidentially to count Panim, vice-chancellor, who was at the head of foreign affairs. They both were of opinion, that it was necessary to terminate this state of things, which had become as alarming for the empire, as for individual safety. Count Pahlen took upon himself the execution of the terrible project upon which they had resolved. * The heir to the throne

* The following details are the most authentic that can be procured concerning the death of Paul I. This is the source from which they are derived. The court of Prussia, greatly shocked at the news of the death of Paul I., was still more highly indignant at the unparalleled effrontery with which some of the accomplices in the crime dared to boast of it at Berlin. The court obtained, through various channels, and principally from a well-informed person, some curious details, which were collected in a minute, and transmitted to the First Consul. These are the particulars which M. Bignon, at that time secretary of our embassy to the court of Prussia, was enabled to

was the grand duke Alexander, of whose reign we have been contemporaries—a young prince, who gave every promise of superior qualities, and who appeared at that time, what he did not prove subsequently, easy to be led. He it was whom count Pahlen desired to raise to the throne, by some catastrophe brought about suddenly, without disturbance or confusion. It was indispensably necessary to come to some understanding with the heir, the grand duke, to have his concurrence, in order to avoid, after the deed was perpetrated, being treated like a vulgar assassin, who is sacrificed, whilst, at the same time, advantage is taken of his crime. It was embarrassing to him, to break the matter to this prince, who, governed by amiable feelings, was incapable of lending his countenance to an attempt against the life of his father. Count Pahlen, without disclosing his whole mind, without revealing any distinct project, discussed with the grand duke the affairs of state, and, at each successive extravagance of Paul, endangering the empire, communicated the fact to him, then remained silent, without deducing any consequences therefrom. Alexander, in receiving these communications, cast down his eyes, and also remained silent. These mute but expressive, scenes were of frequent occurrence. At length, it was requisite to come to some clearer explanation. Count Pahlen, at last, gave this young prince to understand that such a state of things could not be prolonged, without bringing ruin to the empire; and, taking care to avoid the mention of a crime, to which Alexander would not have listened, he insinuated to him that it was necessary to depose Paul, to provide for him a quiet retreat, but, at all hazards, to wrest from his hands the helm of power, and prevent him from driving the vessel of state to utter destruction.

Alexander shed a flood of tears, disclaimed any wish to dispute the throne with his father, but yielded, by degrees, before

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procure, and which he has introduced into his work. But the most private circumstances still remained unknown, when a singular accident placed France in possession of the only account, worthy of credit, concerning the death of Paul I., which perhaps is in existence. A French emigrant, who had passed his life in the service of Russia, and who had acquired some military renown, became the friend of count Pahlen and general Benningsen. Being at the country-seat of count Pahlen, he obtained, from their own lips, a circumstantial detail of everything which took place in St. Petersburg, on the tragical night between the 23rd and 24th of March. As the emigrant was very careful in taking notes of every thing he saw and heard, he immediately committed to paper an account of the particulars given by these principal actors, and inserted it in the valuable memoirs he has left behind him. These manuscript memoirs are now the property of France. They correct numerous inaccurate or vague statements, and, moreover, do not compromise more than they were previously, the names already involved in this dark event. They furnish, however, more precise and probable details, instead of the false and exaggerated accounts already known. After comparing this report, emanating from a quarter perfectly well informed, with the details furnished by the court of Prussia, we have drawn up the historical recital which follows, and which seems to us the only one truly worthy of credit, perhaps the only complete one which posterity will ever obtain of this tragical catastrophe.

fresh proofs of the danger to which Paul exposed the affairs of the country, and even the imperial family itself. Paul, in fact, dissatisfied with the supineness of Prussia, in the affairs of the neutral league, even talked of marching 80,000 men upon Berlin. Besides this, in the delirium of his arrogant pride, he wished the First Consul to take him as his adviser in all things, and that this powerful personage should not make peace with Germany, nor with the cabinets of Piedmont, Rome, Naples, or the Porte, excepting upon terms laid down by Russia; so that it was soon greatly to be feared that he would not remain long on amicable terms with France, whose policy he had so warmly espoused. To these suggestions count Pahlen added the expression of his uneasiness concerning the safety of the royal family, of whom Paul, it was said, began to harbour suspicions.

Alexander acquiesced at length; but, at the same time, exacted from count Pahlen the most solemn oath, that no attempt should be made against the life of his father; count Pahlen swore to every thing desired by this inexperienced youth, who imagined that a sceptre could be wrested from the grasp of an emperor, without depriving him of life.

The requisite actors in the scene yet remained to be provided, as count Pahlen, in conceiving this scheme, deemed it beneath him, to take any personal share in its execution. He fixed upon them accordingly, but decided upon only intrusting them, sooner or later, with the part they were destined to perform, according as they, by degrees, acquired his confidence. The brothers Soubow, upstarts raised by the favour of Catherine, were chosen as the chief instruments of the plot. Count Pahlen only revealed it to them at a late period. Plato Soubow, the favourite of Catherine, supple, restless, was worthy of figuring conspicuously in the revolution of a palace. His brother Nicholas, remarkable only for great personal strength, was well qualified to play a subordinate part; Valerien Soubow, a brave and honourable soldier, a friend of the grand duke Alexander, deserved, from his merit, to have been excluded from the plot. They had a sister, intimately connected with all the English faction —a friend of lord Whitworth, the English ambassador— who inflamed them with zeal for the British policy. Count Pahlen engaged many other accomplices, and brought them to St. Petersburg, under various pretences, but still without disclosing any thing to them. There was one other individual whom he had summoned to St. Petersburg, upon whose co-operation he knew he could rely, as well as upon his formidable courage; this was the famous general Benningsen, a Hanoverian, in the service of Russia, the first officer in the Russian service at that time, and who, at a later period, in 1807, had the honour to check, in Poland, the victorious march of Napoleon, and whose hands, worthy, indeed, of wielding a sword, should never have been sullied by a poniard.

Benningsen had retired into the country, dreading the effects

of Paul's anger, which he had incurred; count Pahlen withdrew him from his retreat, initiated him into the plot, but proposed nothing further to him, if general Benningsen can be credited than the project of deposing the emperor. Benningsen pledged his word, and kept it with an appalling courage.

They resolved to fix upon some day for the execution of their project, when the regiment of Semenourki, wholly devoted to the grand duke Alexander, should be on duty at the palace Michael. They were obliged to wait. But time pressed, for Paul's malady made rapid progress, became every day more alarming, and placed the interests of the empire, as well as the safety of his attendants, in greater jeopardy. One day Paul laid hold of the imperturbable Pahlen, by the arm, and addressed him in these singular terms:—"Were you at St. Petersburg in 1762?" (It was in that year that the emperor, the father of Paul, was assassinated, to transfer the throne to the Great Catherine.) "Yes," answered count Pahlen, quite coolly, "I was." "What part did you take in the event of that time?" "That of a subaltern cavalry officer in the ranks of his regiment. I was a witness of, but not an actor in, that catastrophe." "Well," continued Paul casting a look of distrust, and of accusation at his minister, "They want to re-enact to-day the revolution of 1762." "I am aware of it," replied count Pahlen, without betraying the least emotion. "I know all the plot; I am a party to it." "What!" exclaimed Paul, "are you one of the conspirators?" "Yes! but to be better apprised of it, and that I may be in a position, more effectually to watch over your safety." The calmness of this formidable conspirator quite set all Paul's conjectures at defiance, and disarmed his suspicions respecting him; but he still continued discomposed and excited.

An event of almost public interest, if such a term may be employed with reference to such a crime, concurred to hasten their proceeding. Paul ordered a despatch to be written, on the 23rd of March, to M. de Krudener, his minister at Berlin, enjoining him to declare to the court of Prussia, that if she did not promptly act against England, he would order an army of 80,000 men, to march upon the Prussian frontiers. Count Pahlen desirous, without saying too much, to induce M. de Krudener to attach no importance to this declaration, added, in his own handwriting, the following postscript:—"*His Imperial Majesty is labouring under indisposition to-day; the consequences may prove serious.*" *

The 23rd of March was fixed upon for the execution of the plot; count Pahlen, under colour of giving a dinner party, assembled at his house the Soubows, Benningsen, and several general officers, upon whom he thought he could rely. Wines of all kinds were served with profusion. Pahlen and Benningsen

* This despatch was shown to the French Ambassador, General Beurnonville, who instantly forwarded these particulars to his government.

did not drink any. When dinner was over, they unfolded to the conspirators, the project for which they were assembled. The most part were now, for the first time, made acquainted with this terrible plot. They were not told that they would be required to assassinate Paul, as almost every one would have shrunk with dismay, from the perpetration of such a crime. They were told, that they must proceed to the palace, and compel him to abdicate, that thus they would deliver the empire from an imminent danger, and that they would save a multitude of innocent lives, at present threatened by the sanguinary madness of Paul. At last, in order to succeed in persuading them, it was affirmed that the grand duke Alexander himself, convinced of the necessity of saving the empire, was acquainted with the project, and approved it. Then these men, already excited with wine, no longer demurred, and, for the most part, with only three or four exceptions, set out under the impression, that they were going to depose a mad emperor, and not to shed the blood of an unfortunate master.

The night appearing sufficiently advanced, the conspirators, to the number of about sixty, sallied forth, divided into two bands. Count Pahlen took one under his direction, general Benningsen, the command of the other; both officers, dressed in their full uniform, and wearing their sashes and orders, marched forward, sword in hand. The palace Michael was constructed and guarded like a fortress; but the bridges were lowered, and the gates thrown open to the chiefs of the conspirators. Benningsen's party marched first, and proceeded direct towards the emperor's apartments. Count Pahlen remained behind, with his reserved body of conspirators. This man, who had organised the conspiracy, disdained to assist personally in its execution. He was only there to provide for any unexpected emergencies. Benningsen penetrated into the apartment of the sleeping monarch. Two heyduks were on duty at his body-guard. These brave and faithful attendants attempted to defend their sovereign. One was struck down by a blow from a sabre, the other took flight, crying out for help—cries utterly unavailing in a palace, the guards of which are almost all accomplices in the plot! A valet, who slept in a room adjoining that of the emperor, ran to the scene; they compelled him, by force, to open the door of his master's chamber. The unhappy Paul might have found a refuge in the apartments of the empress; but, in his distrustful suspicions, he had taken the precaution, every night, to barricade the door which led to them. All escape being cut off, he flung himself to the bottom of the bed, and concealed himself behind the folds of a screen. Plato Soubow ran to the imperial bed, and, finding it empty, cried out, in alarm, "The emperor has escaped; we are lost!" But, at the same instant, Benningsen caught sight of the prince, rushed towards him, sword in hand, and presented to him the act of abdication. "You have ceased to reign!" he exclaimed to him; "the grand duke Alexander

is now emperor. I summon you, in his name, to resign the empire, and to sign this act of abdication. On this condition alone I answer for your life." Plato Soubow repeated the same summons. The emperor, confused and lost in dismay, demanded of them, what he had done to deserve such treatment. "For years past you have never ceased to persecute us," retorted the half-intoxicated assassins. They then pressed upon the unhappy Paul, who struggled hard, expostulated, and implored them in vain. At this moment a noise was heard; it was the footsteps of some of the conspirators who had remained behind; but the assassins, believing that some one was coming to the assistance of the emperor, fled in disorder. Benningsen alone, inflexibly resolute, remained in the presence of the monarch, and, advancing towards him, with his sword pointed at his breast, prevented him stirring from the spot. The conspirators having recognised each other, re-entered the chamber, the theatre of their crime. They again hemmed in the unfortunate monarch, in order to force him to subscribe his abdication. The emperor for an instant tried to defend himself. In the scuffle, the lamp which gave light to the frightful scene, was overturned and extinguished; Benningsen ran to procure another, and, on his return, discovered Paul expiring under the blows of two assassins; one had broken in his skull with the pummel of his sword, whilst the other was strangling him with his sash.

Whilst this scene was enacting, count Pahlen had remained outside, with the second band of conspirators. When he was told that all was over, he ordered the body of the emperor to be laid out on the bed, and placed a guard of thirty men at the door of the apartment, with orders not to admit any one, even the members of the imperial family. He then repaired to the grand duke, to announce to him the terrible occurrence of the night.

The grand duke, in a state of violent agitation, demanded of him when he approached what had become of his father? The silence of count Pahlen, soon dissipated the fatal illusions he had cherished, in imagining that an act of abdication was only contemplated. The grief of the young prince was profound; it continued to be, we are told, the secret remorse of his life, as he was naturally of a good and generous nature. He threw himself upon a chair, and burst into tears; would listen no longer to any thing, but loaded Pahlen with bitter reproaches, which the latter received with an imperturbable composure.

Plato Soubow went in quest of the grand duke Constantine, who was wholly ignorant of what was going on, but who has been unjustly accused of having been implicated in this bloody catastrophe. He came to the spot trembling, believing that all his family were to be sacrificed, found his brother overwhelmed with despair, and then learnt every thing which had taken place. Count Pahlen had desired a lady of the palace, who was very intimate with the empress, to acquaint her with the fact of her

tragical widowhood. This princess rushed in haste towards her husband's apartments, and attempted to reach his death-bed; but the guards kept her back. Having for an instant, recovered from her first paroxysm of grief, she felt, together with the emotions of sorrow, the rising impulses of ambition awaken in her breast. She thought of the Great Catherine, and wished to reign. She despatched several persons to Alexander, who was about to be proclaimed, telling him that the throne belonged of right to her, and that it was she, and not he, who ought to be proclaimed as successor. This was a new embarrassment; this was increased anguish for the already lacerated heart of the son, who, about to ascend the steps of the throne, had to pass between the corpse of a murdered father, and an agonised mother, in tears, frantic'ly demanding, by turns, her husband, or the sceptre. The night was consumed while these appalling and tragical events were passing; the day approached; it was necessary to leave no time for reflection; it was of importance that the death of Paul and the accession of his successor should be proclaimed at the same time. Count Pahlen approached the young prince; "You have wept sufficiently as a child," said he; "come now and reign." He tore him from this house of mourning, and, followed by Benningsen, hastened to present him to the troops.

The first regiment they met was that of Préobrajesnky. As it was entirely devoted to Paul I., their reception was very cold. But the others, who were attached to the grand duke, and who, besides, were under the influence of count Pahlen, who possessed considerable ascendancy over the army, did not hesitate to cry "Long live Alexander." The example was followed, and soon the young emperor was proclaimed, and placed in possession of the throne. He returned, and took up his residence with his wife, the empress Elizabeth, at the Winter palace.

St. Petersburg was filled with consternation at the news of this bloody catastrophe. The impression it created, proved that the manners of the empire had undergone a change, and that since 1762, Russian manners had become modified by the influence of European civilisation. It may be said to the honour of Russia, that if she had already progressed since 1762, she has equally advanced since 1800. The Russians exhibited on that occasion, feelings which did them honour. They feared Paul I. and his insanity, more than they hated him, as he was not of a sanguinary character. The horrible circumstances of his death were immediately known, and inspired the deepest commiseration. His body lay in state according to usage, but infinite precautions were used to disguise his wounds. Military gloves concealed the mutilation of his hands. A large hat completely covered his head. His face was disfigured by contusions, but it was given out, that he had died of apoplexy.

This barbarous event produced an extraordinary effect through-

out Europe. The news spread like lightning to Vienna, Berlin, London, and Paris. It caused the deepest horror and consternation. Some years previously, Paris had terrified all Europe by shedding royal blood; but at present, Paris exhibited a spectacle of order, humanity, and tranquillity; it was now the ancient monarchies, which in their turn scandalised the whole civilised world. A year before, the Neapolitan sovereign had imbrued his hands in the blood of his subjects; now a revolution in the palace, bathed the imperial throne of Russia in blood.

Thus, in this agitated age, every country in succession furnished melancholy examples, and supplied deplorable subjects of animadversion to its enemies! Truly, if nations wish to revile each other, their several histories furnish ample materials for mutual recrimination; but let us avoid recurring to these sad reminiscences for such a purpose. If we relate these horrible details, it is because truth is the first duty of the historian; it is because truth is the most useful, the most powerful of lessons, the most effectual in averting the recurrence of similar scenes; and thus, without offending any nation, let us say again, that the institutions are more to be blamed than the people; and that if, at St. Petersburg, an emperor was murdered in order to bring about a change of policy; at London, on the contrary, without any sanguinary crisis, a peace policy followed a war policy, by the mere substitution of Mr. Addington in the place of Mr. Pitt.

The particulars of this catastrophe soon became public, through the indiscretion of the assassins themselves. At Berlin especially, where the court was closely connected with that of St. Petersburg, the details of the crime spread with singular rapidity. The sister of the Soubows had taken refuge in that city, and had manifested, it was said, certain symptoms of uneasiness and anxiety, like one who awaits some great event. It so happened that her son was the very officer appointed to announce to Prussia the accession of Alexander. This young man, with all the indiscretion of his age, partially divulged the particulars of the assassination, and thus occasioned at Potsdam a scandal which gave great offence to the young and virtuous king of Prussia. The court made this young man feel the impropriety of his conduct; but hence arose a foul calumny. This sister of the Soubows was on terms of intimate friendship with the English ambassador, Lord Whitworth, who figured afterwards at Paris, and played there a very conspicuous part. The death of the emperor Paul was so highly advantageous to the English, it occurred so opportunely to complete the doubtful victory of Copenhagen, that the vulgar throughout Europe, readily ascribed the perpetration of this crime to British policy. The intimacy of the English ambassador, with a family so deeply implicated in the assassination of Paul, furnished strong plausible surmises, confirmatory of the calumny, together with fresh arguments for those who can never perceive that events may originate in general and natural causes.

Nevertheless, none of these conjectures were founded in truth. Lord Whitworth was an honourable man, incapable of participating in such a plot. The cabinet by which he was accredited, had committed numerous unpardonable acts during many previous years, and, soon after, was guilty of others still more difficult to justify, but it was as much taken by surprise as the rest of Europe by the death of the Czar. And yet, the First Consul himself, notwithstanding the unquestionable impartiality of his judgment, could not help entertaining some suspicions, and he gave rise to still more, by the terms in which the death of the emperor Paul was announced in the *Moniteur*. "It is for history," says this official journal, "to develop the mystery which surrounds this tragical death, and to declare which cabinet in the world was the most deeply interested in bringing about such a catastrophe."

This event delivered England from a relentless enemy, and deprived the First Consul of a powerful ally, but one that latterly was becoming embarrassing, and almost as dangerous as he was serviceable. It is certain that the deceased emperor, in the fulness of his arrogance, believing that the First Consul could no longer refuse him any thing in return for his alliance, had required conditions with regard to Italy, Germany, and Egypt, which France could never have conceded, and these demands must have interposed great obstacles to the re-establishment of peace, a desire for which was now becoming general throughout Europe. The First Consul selected his favourite aide-de-camp, Duroc, who had been previously sent to Berlin and to Vienna, and despatched him to Russia. He ordered him to repair to St. Petersburg, with an autograph letter, to congratulate the new emperor on his accession, and to bring to bear all the powers of flattery and persuasion of a great man, in order to instil, if possible, into his mind, sound ideas concerning the relations between France and Russia.

Duroc set out instantly with orders to proceed by way of Berlin. He was to visit Prussia for the second time, collect more correct information respecting the recent events which had occurred in the North, and thus reach St. Petersburg better acquainted with the men and the facts with which he would there have to deal.

England was delighted, as well she might be, with receiving at the same time the news of the victory of Copenhagen, and the death of the formidable adversary, who had originated the league of the neutral powers against her. The valour of the British hero, the gallant Nelson, was exalted to the skies, and that with a most natural and legitimate enthusiasm, for nations do well, in the first ecstacies of their joy, to celebrate, and even exaggerate their triumphs. Nevertheless, the first transports of enthusiasm being over, when the nation became more calm, the victory of Copenhagen was more correctly appreciated. The passage of the Sound had been, it was said, not very difficult to force; the attack on Copenhagen in a narrow strait, where the English ships could not manœuvre without great peril, was an adventurous, bold act,

worthy of the victor at Aboukir. But the English fleet had been seriously disabled, and if it had not been for the too great eagerness of the Crown Prince of Denmark to listen to Nelson's flag of truce, the day would probably have been lost. The victory had been very close upon a defeat, and moreover, the results obtained were quite unimportant, since the English had only extorted from the Danes a simple armistice, at the expiration of which the struggle must be renewed. If the emperor Paul had not died, this naval enterprise which the English must have prosecuted, in the midst of an inclosed sea, in which they could not put into any port, and the outlet, from which might be shut against them, must have had many terrible dangerous chances against its success. But the blow struck so opportunely against the power which commanded the entrance to the Baltic, that is to say, the Danes, was decisive; Paul was no longer there to take up the gauntlet, and to continue the contest. This is an additional proof, illustrating the numberless others with which history abounds, that there are in this world many propitious chances in favour of boldness, especially when its efforts are seconded by sufficiently commanding ability.

The English immediately proceeded to take advantage of this fortunate change of sovereigns, by relaxing the rigour of the principles they had laid down respecting the maritime law of nations, so as to arrive at some honourable adjustment with Russia, and, after Russia, with all the remaining powers. They were well aware of the kind and amiable character of the young prince who had ascended the throne of Russia, as at that period it was pronounced to be rather bordering on weakness; and, besides, they flattered themselves with having regained considerable influence at St. Petersburg. They sent Lord St. Helens to that capital, with the necessary powers to effect an arrangement. M. de Woronzoff, ambassador of Russia to the court of George III., wholly wedded to the cause of British policy, having even incurred the sequestration of his property on account of his not having quitted London, his accustomed place of residence, received an invitation to appear there in his official capacity, which he forthwith accepted. The vessels belonging to the neutral powers, detained in the English ports were released. Nelson, by order of his government, continued inactive in the Baltic, and was instructed to intimate to the courts of the north, that he should refrain from any act of hostility, unless they determined to put their fleets to sea, in which case he should engage with them; but if, on the contrary, these fleets should remain in their respective ports, and not attempt to make the long threatened junction with the Danish squadron, he should abstain from any hostile act against the coasts of Denmark, of Sweden, and of Russia; that he should allow free passage to all the merchant vessels, and the relations between the countries should be upon the same footing as before the rupture.

The blow struck against Copenhagen had unfortunately pro-

duced its effect. The minor neutral powers, such as the Danes and the Swedes, although deeply irritated on their own account against England, had only been forced into the league by the menacing influence of Paul I. Prussia, who regarded her maritime interests as quite secondary compared with her other national interests, and who strongly inclined towards peace, had only engaged in the dispute, when urged on by the twofold influence of Paul I. and the First Consul: she, accordingly, felt overjoyed on finding herself extricated from such an embarrassment. She was, like the rest, eagerly disposed to co-operate in the re-establishment of commercial relations.

In a short time the trading vessels of all nations, English, Swedish, Danish, and Russian, reappeared in the Baltic: and trade and navigation resumed their accustomed activity. Nelson allowed them to pass unmolested, and received in return, along the northern coasts, the refreshments of which he stood in need. This virtual armistice was, therefore, generally acceded to. The Russian cabinet, directed by count Pahlen, without yielding unbecomingly to British influence, showed a disposition to terminate the maritime dispute, by such an adjustment as would secure, up to a certain point, the rights of the neutrals. It intimated that they would receive Lord St. Helens. Already it had authorised the return of M. de Woronzoff to London, whither M. de Bernestoff also repaired, as the representative of Denmark.

The First Consul, who had ably contrived and elaborated this formidable coalition against Great Britain, a coalition founded moreover upon the interests of all the maritime nations, viewed with regret its dissolution, occasioned as it was by the weakness of the confederates. He tried to make them ashamed of the promptitude with which they receded; but each excused his conduct by the example of his neighbour. Denmark, justly proud of the bloody engagement of Copenhagen, declared that she had done her part, and that it was the duty of the others to perform theirs. Sweden expressed herself ready to fight; but, she added, that as the Danish, Prussian, and, above all, the Russian flags, were freely traversing the seas, she could not see why her subjects alone should be debarred from the benefits of trade. Prussia excused her inaction, by the change which had happened at St. Petersburg, but, at the same time, reiterated to France, the warmest assurances of steadfast constancy. She declared that a just estimate would be formed of her perseverance in the cause, when the proper time arrived for concluding an arrangement, and the articles of the maritime law of nations should be definitively settled. Russia affected not to neglect the rights of the neutrals, but avowedly confined her endeavours to the accomplishment of one thing only, which was the cessation of hostilities commenced upon insufficient grounds.

The First Consul, who was desirous of retarding an accommodation between Prussia and England as long as possible, conceived a very ingenious expedient to prolong the dispute. He had

offered Malta to Paul, and he now tendered Hanover to Prussia. We have seen that Prussia had occupied that province, so dear to the heart of George III., by way of reprisals for the violent acts which the English government had committed against the neutral flags. Prussia had lent herself with considerable hesitation to this act of aggression, but the secret longing which she has always felt for the possession of that province, the most desirable for her, that which would most conveniently enlarge and round off the frontiers of her territory, prompted her to seize upon it, notwithstanding her anxiety for peace and repose. Other motives also had influenced her. She had, besides, an indemnity to claim in Germany, as she was amongst the number of the secular princes, who were to be indemnified for their losses on the left bank of the Rhine, by the secularisation of the ecclesiastical states. These claims were very large, and in the hope that the First Consul would favour them, she was anxious to propitiate him, by taking possession of Hanover. General Bonaparte declared, at once, that if she wished to keep Hanover, and indemnify herself thereby, although this indemnity was of ten times greater value than the amount to which she was entitled, he would willingly consent, without giving way to any jealousy at this great augmentation, conceded to a power whose territory was conterminous with France. This proposal at once delighted, and disturbed the young monarch. The offer was a seductive one, but the chief stumbling block was, the resentment of England. Nevertheless, without accepting the proposal in a definitive manner, the cabinet of Berlin replied, that the king Frederick William was fully sensible of the friendly dispositions of the First Consul, that he had come to no resolution yet, that it was better to defer the consideration of this territorial question till the negotiations for a general peace throughout Europe; and he added, that grounding his conduct upon the present state of things, which was an armistice tacitly acquiesced in, rather than formally stipulated, he should continue to keep possession of Hanover.

The First Consul did not require more, being content with having thereby involved the courts of London and Berlin in a question of the most complicated solution, and placed in the hands of a power which was devoted to him, a precious pledge, which could be most advantageously used in the negotiations with England.

The period of these negotiations at length approached. England had seized with avidity, the opportunity of relaxing the rigour of her maritime principles, with a view of quelling the danger which threatened her in the north; she was now anxious to terminate this state of things, and to conclude peace, not only with the neutrals, but with a power still more formidable than they; with France, which during the last ten years had confused all Europe, and which began to threaten the British soil with serious dangers. At one period, thanks to the obstinacy of Mr. Pitt, and the talents of general Bonaparte, she found

herself alone, contending against all the world; having extricated herself from this position by a successful act of temerity, by a fortuitous stroke of good fortune, she was averse to again incur similar dangers, through a repetition of similar errors. England, moreover, could now treat with honour, and it was expedient, after having lost so many good opportunities, not to miss the one which now presented itself. Why, reasoned the people of England, why prolong the war? We have taken all the colonies worth having: France, at the same time, has vanquished all the allies, to which we have been attached; she has aggrandised herself at their expense, and has become the most formidable power in the universe. Every day added to the struggle renders it more serious, especially through her successive conquest of all the European coasts and harbours. She has reduced Holland and Naples, and at the present moment is marching against Portugal. We must not render her more powerful, by pertinaciously persisting in the prosecution of the war. If it was for the maintenance of the most salutary principles that we contended some years past; if it was for social order menaced by the French revolution; that is now no longer the case, since France affords the brightest example of order and of wisdom. Can we think to re-establish the Bourbons? There, indeed, was Mr. Pitt's grand error, his mistaken policy: and if his great influence, his great talents are lost to us, we must secure the only advantage we can from his retirement, that is to say, we must relinquish that unremitting, malignant spirit of hatred, which dictated the most imprudent and gross personalities between him and general Bonaparte.

All sensible, reflecting men in England were in favour of peace. This feeling had the powerful support of the King and the people. The pious and obstinate King of England, who refused the emancipation of the Catholics to Mr. Pitt, out of fidelity to the Protestant cause, did not the less rejoice at the restoration of Catholicism in France, a re-establishment, which was expected soon to take place. He viewed in that, the triumph of religious principles, and was content. He had a great aversion to the French revolution, and although general Bonaparte had thwarted and seriously counteracted the policy of England, he was greatly pleased with him for the reaction against that revolution, and for reinstating true social principles in public opinion. France, which possesses in such an eminent degree the power of communicating to other nations the feelings she herself experiences, being now calmed down, brought back to sound notions, King George III. regarded the blessings of social order as preserved to mankind. If with Mr. Pitt the war had been one of national ambition, as respected George III. it had been a war of principle. General Bonaparte might, therefore, consider him as a friend, but a friend of a very different stamp from Paul I. Having recovered from the attack which had obscured his reason during several months, he

now decidedly inclined to peace, and pressed his ministers to conclude it. The English people, fond of novelty, looked upon a peace with the French as the greatest of novelties; for they had slaughtered each other, during the last ten years, in every quarter of the world; ascribing also the prevailing scarcity to the sanguinary struggle which desolated both land and sea, they called loudly for a reconciliation with France. Moreover, the new prime minister, Mr. Addington, unfit to aspire to the same glory as Mr. Pitt, to whom he was greatly inferior in talents, in celebrity, and in general administrative capacity, had but one plain intelligible object in view, which was to make peace. He accordingly desired to bring it about, and Mr. Pitt, still powerful in parliament, counselled him to this step, as the most expedient. The events in the north, far from swelling the pride of England, disposed her, on the contrary, to seize a very convenient and very honourable opportunity of negotiating. The new minister had determined upon this on the day he assumed office; and he was only confirmed in his resolution, when the intelligence reached him of what had taken place at Copenhagen, and at St. Petersburg. Going still further, he decided upon making a direct overture to the First Consul, which would correspond with the initiative taken by the latter towards England upon his accession to power.

Lord Hawkesbury, who presided over the Foreign Office in Mr. Addington's administration, sent for M. Otto. This gentleman transacted in London, as we have already seen, the diplomatic business relative to the prisoners, and had been six months before intrusted with the duties connected with the naval armistice. He was, therefore, the natural medium of fresh communications, which were about to take place between the two governments. Lord Hawkesbury informed M. Otto, that the King had confided to him a most agreeable task, the knowledge of which would no doubt cause as much pleasure in France as in England, and this was, to propose peace. He said, that His Majesty was even ready to send a plenipotentiary to Paris, if it were so desired, or to any other city more agreeable to the French Consul. Lord Hawkesbury added, that the conditions which it was his intention to propose were perfectly honourable to both countries, and as a proof of the sincerity of this reconciliation, he declared, that from that day, every design directed against the present government of France, should be discountenanced by the British cabinet. He expected a full reciprocity on the part of the French Republic.

This was disavowing the antecedent policy of Mr. Pitt, who had always pretended to aim at the re-establishment of the Bourbons, and who had unremittingly fomented the attempts of the emigrants and the Vendéans by English gold. The negotiations could not have been opened in a more dignified manner. Lord Hawkesbury, however, required a prompt reply.

The First Consul, who at that time only aimed at keeping faith

fully the pledge made to France, to procure for the country peace and tranquillity, was delighted with this solution of the question, which he had, in fact, obtained by his successes, and by the wisdom of his policy. He accepted the overtures of England with as much eagerness as she had shown in proposing them. Nevertheless, a negotiation of formality appeared to him tedious, and not sufficiently efficacious. The remembrance of that of Lord Malmesbury, in 1797, which was but an empty demonstration on the part of Mr. Pitt, had left an unpleasant impression on his mind. He thought that, if they were really sincere at London, as indeed they appeared really to be, it was quite sufficient to confer directly with the Foreign Office, and there discuss, with frankness and candour, the conditions of peace. He considered these easy of arrangement, if a reconciliation were sincerely intended. "For," said he, "England has taken the Indies, and we have taken Egypt; if we mutually agree, each to preserve these rich conquests, the rest is but of little importance. Of what importance are, in fact, a few islands in the West Indies, or elsewhere, which England keeps from us, or our allies, compared with the vast conquests we have made? Can she refuse to restore them, when Hanover is in our hands, when Portugal will soon be so, and we offer to evacuate these kingdoms in return for a few islands in America? Peace is therefore easy to be brought about;" so ran his dispatch to M. Otto, "if the English desire it. I empower you to treat, but directly only with lord Hawkesbury."

Full powers were sent to M. Otto with a recommendation not to make any thing public, to write as little as possible, to negotiate verbally, and only to exchange written notes upon the most important questions. It was impossible to keep such a negotiation an absolute secret; but the First Consul enjoined M. Otto to require and, on his part, to observe the greatest discretion, relative to those questions which must necessarily on both sides be raised and discussed.

Lord Hawkesbury, in the name of the King of England, consented to this mode of proceeding, and it was agreed that the conferences should commence at once at London, between him and M. Otto. They did really open, in the early part of April, 1801 (middle of Germinal, year IX.).

From the 18th Brumaire, year VIII. (9th of November, 1799), to the month of Germinal, year IX. (April, 1801), eighteen months had elapsed, and France, at peace with the continent, engaged in a frank and sincere negotiation with England, was about to obtain, for the first time for ten years, a general peace on land, and at sea. The condition of this general peace, admitted by all the contracting parties, was the preservation of our brilliant conquests.

END OF VOL. IX.

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